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INTERNATIONAL

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OCTOBER, 1907.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY.

The term "democracy" is applied to two quite different conceptions of social relations. On the one hand it stands for the principle of individual liberty. From this point of view a democratic community is marked by a regard for individual rights, a respect for individual judgment and conscience, and an appreciation of individuality of character and point of view. But it stands also, on the other hand, for the principle of majority-rule. A democratic community is then one in which the standards of thought, taste, and conduct are those of the plain man—of the masses rather than of the classes, and in which private judgment defers to public opinion and individuality gives way to uniformity. This is the kind of democracy that Sir Henry Maine called "monarchy inverted." It is distinguished from monarchy and aristocracy only by the fact that the balance of influence and power is held by the many rather than by the one or the few.

When the two conceptions are thus placed side by side it would seem that they have no necessary connection. It is by no means self-evident that the rule of the majority is a guarantee of freedom. And yet the two are very commonly identified both in political theory and in popular thought. At the same time I think it is also clear that the ideal of democracy as developed to-day is first of all that of a society of free men, and that when we glorify the rule of the majority as democratic it is because of a belief that majority-rule is essentially favorable to freedom. I shall endeavor presently

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to show that the two conceptions are not only unrelated, but are indeed the products of quite opposite theories of human nature and social relations, and through this analysis of theory to develop the conception of individual liberty as expressing the true import of democracy. First, however, in order to give point to the discussion, I wish to call attention to the contrast of ideas as illustrated in the facts of our American life.

I.

Nowhere else is the contrast so clearly illustrated. For no other people has committed itself so distinctly to the recognition of individual liberty; yet in no other country is majority-rule so perfectly organized. The contrast is most obvious in our political institutions. Our system of government is based upon the conception of individual rights. In the limitations placed upon the several branches of government, and in the guarantees of personal rights, it may be said to represent an attempt, however unsuccessful, to secure a full consideration of various interests and various points of view. But the theory of practical politics and the practice of party-government is unequivocally that of majority-rule; and in the development of our institutions the checks and balances imposed by the constitution have been so neutralized as largely to secure this result. At the same time government by the party is regarded as properly also government for the party. No party in power regards itself as responsible for the welfare of the whole people. That the president is president of all the people is not the view of the party-voter of either party. From the point of view of practical politics an elective officer is the agent of his party; he is not the discretionary representative of their conception of public policy, but the champion of their special interests. And so firmly rooted is this point of view that an attempt to deal impersonally with questions presented to him would be widely condemned as treachery to his party. The assumption is that the administration of government is necessarily partial and discriminating and that the majority, by virtue of the greater extent of its interests, is therefore entitled to the advantage.

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The same situation is to be found, in various forms, in all our social relations. Under the head of "respect for public opinion" deference to the majority has become a national institution, which has the effect not only of rendering merely formal and ineffective the personal rights guaranteed by the constitution, but of destroying the conditions under which alone public opinion can be faithfully expressed. It should not be forgotten that constitutional provisions for personal liberties cannot do more than prevent their curtailment by law. They leave a wide field for the operation of social and economic forces. And these operate not to preserve liberty but to enforce uniformity.

Thus, while in theory we have a free press, in practice the function of the press is, through economic considerations, rather strictly limited to the task of grasping and reflecting the prevailing public sentiment. The economic condition of a free press is a public which loves free discussion. But, though we are theoretically a free people, we are better satisfied on the whole with those journals in which facts as well as arguments are carefully selected to please—and this though we suspect that a process of selection is taking place. Again, while in theory we have liberty of speech and thought, in practice we are constrained to speak well of our town, our state, or our country. This means commonly not only to support, but to support with approval the policy sanctioned by the majority, be it wise or foolish, just or unjust, honorable or dishonorable. "Don't be a kicker," is the popular maxim of patriotism. Criticism on any grounds is disloyalty; criticism on moral grounds is treason.

In a similar manner religious liberty is limited in practice to non-sectarian Christianity. Indeed it is often claimed that this is officially a Christian country just as in the South it is said to be a white man's country. That is to say, the country does not welcome those unprepared to recognize the paramount claims of Christianity. So that while the minister of religion may freely impugn the motives and question the morality and respectability of those who disbelieve, the unbeliever is expected to remain silent. And here again we

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find the majority-view enforced by economic powers and often by those belonging to the state as a whole. In the field of education, church membership, or at least a sympathetic attitude toward the church, is very commonly included among the conditions of an appointment; and this applies not only to private and denominational schools but to public schools and state universities. The condition is not always expressly stated. And in the various institutions there are different degrees of freedom. Still there is probably none, even of the state universities, in which there would be room for a man so openly critical of Christian belief as, for example, Huxley, Spencer, or John Stuart Mill.

And so, where we are led to expect individual liberty, we are confronted rather with a strong demand for uniformity, the standards for which are determined by the standpoint of the majority. It does not follow that conformity to these standards is necessarily attended with friction. Rather should we say, perhaps, that uniformity is the expression of a widespread popular ideal, at once social, moral, and esthetic. Uniformity is regarded as the condition of order and harmony. For in the popular mind all distinctions are necessarily invidious. If your hat or your philosophy of life differ from mine the fact stands as a reflection upon your taste or intelligence or upon mine, and thus becomes a ground of division and alienation. Hence, in the interest of order and good feeling, some preferences must be sacrificed, and for those who find themselves in the minority it becomes a matter of duty to conform to the majority-standard. And not of duty only but of good taste. For this conception of duty is at bottom the expression of an esthetic aversion to the individual and peculiar and a deeply-rooted sensitiveness to criticism and dissent, than which, paradoxical as it may seem, nothing is more marked in the American character. In this respect we are Latin rather than Anglo-Saxon. The unstudied directness of our English cousins is to our taste rudeness. It argues a want of acuteness, of delicacy, and fine feeling. With us the first rule of polite conversation is not to differ. Before we speak we feel the pulse of our company, and if we are out

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of harmony we keep silent. The tendency of our social life is thus to discourage individuality of taste and independence of thought. Among the ignorant it manifests itself in open intolerance and contempt; among the more cultivated it takes the form of a silent, instinctive ostracism. By both it is felt that individuality constitutes a claim to superiority and is thus repugnant to democratic standards.

II.

Now, as I have suggested, this conception of democracy has its root in a theory of human nature and a corresponding theory of social relations. It is the more or less unreflective expression of a point of view and method of conceiving realities according to which all genuine realities are mechanical realities and all relations between realities are mathematical relations. I shall call this the mechanical point of view.

When we attempt to form a definite conception of human nature the first consideration confronting us is its dual aspect; on the one hand men are physical beings, having size, weight, and movement; on the other they are spiritual beings, capable of thought and will. Inevitably we tend to emphasize one of these aspects, and to conceive it as the important or the sole reality, or at least as the pattern of reality according to which the other aspect must be interpreted. The mechanical view emphasizes the physical side and holds that the human being, whatever else he may be, is first of all a material body, like a billiard ball or a steam engine, occupying a certain portion of space in geometrical relations with other bodies, and governed, like them, by fixed mechanical laws. This conception leads to certain consequences: In the first place, each individual is exclusively himself. Like the individual billiard balls he is the exclusive occupier of his own space and his being does not overlap or penetrate that of any other. And society, like the group of balls on the table, is simply a numerical aggregate; it has no real unity. In the second place, each is interested—so far as, from this point of view, he may be said to have interests—exclusively in himself. By virtue of his independence his good is exclusively his own good.

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But now, in the third place, between his interests and those of others there is a fundamental and inevitable conflict. For as a physical being each is the consumer of material goods; and the supply of goods is limited. "At nature's mighty feast" covers are not laid for all the guests. It is conceivable, indeed, that through intelligent coöperation in the production of goods and through careful adjustment to individual needs in their distribution and consumption the ratio of supply to demand might be so increased as to render conflict unnecessary. But such a consideration is foreign to the mechanical point of view. The essence of the mechanical view is that two and two make only four. The individual is a definite quantity, which is not altered by the presence of other quantities. Society is a definite algebraic sum. The environment is a similarly definite quantity, not to be multiplied by a non-quantitative factor such as intelligence. From these assumptions it follows that where one is satisfied another hungers, that each one's gain is another's loss, and that a harmony of interests is a mathematical absurdity. The natural state of man is, as Hobbes conceived it, a state of warfare, and human activity is necessarily a competition or struggle for existence.

Such being the nature of the individuals, how are we to conceive of the social order? Evidently it cannot be a state in which all are satisfied or in which any one's satisfaction is increased by the presence of others. If the social units are non-interpenetrable, like the physical atom, if each necessarily interferes with the other, it follows that each must in a measure retard the movements of the other, and in return be retarded. There can be accordingly no real harmony of interests, but at best only a compromise. But what will be the basis of the compromise, and what is to determine how far a given individual is to yield? Evidently, on the basis of the mechanical view, this is a question of the energy put forth by the several individuals in the struggle for existence; the position of each in the completed social order will represent the survival of the fittest, that is, of the strongest. In other words, social order is a composition of forces, in which the distribution of goods, of power, and of influence is determined

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according to the relative initial energy of the several individuals.

Such is the scheme of relations presupposed in the popular social philosophy. Nor in the popular philosophy alone, for it forms also the framework of the utilitarian ethics and the classical economics. And crudely metaphorical as it may appear, it represents none the less an inevitable tendency of thought so far as thought seeks only to be simple, definite, and clear. It is the outcome of an effort to conceive the human individual as a perfectly definite quantity, as a thing of exact dimensions. This results, in social theory as in physics, in the conception of a spatially determinate, mathematical unit. And we are then committed to the view that the relations of individuals in society are necessarily those of mutual interference. The view is not necessarily restricted to the distribution of material goods. It may be extended to cover such apparently intangible goods as liberties, opportunities, tastes, and opinions. Liberty for you imposes a certain restraint upon me. Your distinction involves me in a corresponding obscurity. Respect for your tastes and opinions demands a qualified assertion of my own. Not only does your consumption of food diminish my supply, but every expansion of your personality involves a contraction of mine.

When we have defined the conditions of the social problem from this point of view it is clear how the conception of democracy resolves itself into that of a community organized in the interests of the majority. A social system which shall permit of the free play of individuality is excluded by the terms of the problem. If there is to be order rather than disorder, the variety of individual aims must be replaced by uniformity, and by the terms of the problem the basis of uniformity will be determined by the interests of the stronger party. Until comparatively recent times, we are told, political power was concentrated in king or aristocracy, but to-day society is organized in the interest of people—that is, in the interests of the majority. Accordingly, the sovereignty which formerly belonged to the king belongs now, and by the same divine right, to the majority; and to them is due

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the service and, if their interests require it, the absolute submission of thought and conscience which was formerly paid to the king. And so, by a transfer of sentiment, it has become a matter of patriotism to glorify the point of view of the average or "plain" man. One shows one's loyalty to democracy not only by wearing what others wear—which is a matter of small consequence—but by speaking as they speak, praising what they praise, and professing what they believe —in a word, by repressing every element of individuality.

Yet, while "democracy," in this sense, rests upon a numerically broader basis than monarchy or aristocracy, it is not different in principle, in motive or in result. It is simply as Sir Henry Maine described it, "monarchy inverted." It rests upon the same conception of authority as that by which Hobbes justified the absolutism of kings. Both, if we analyze them carefully, derive their authority from the crude instinct of self-assertion and the animal impatience of self-restraint. When we applaud democracy as against monarchy it means only that we transfer our admiration from the imperial conqueror whose ambition knows neither bounds nor scruples, and who successfully subdues nations to his will, to the imperial people whom nothing can subdue. And it is worthy of note that much of our enthusiasm for democracy in America refers less to our love of justice and fair play than to our impatience of constituted authority.

And where the motive is the same, the resulting attitude is not finer in quality because it is of the many rather than the few. The outcome of blind self-assertion is despotism; and the unrestrained self-assertion of the many is in no wise nobler, more liberal, more restrained or more intelligent than that of the few. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than the present labor situation. Here the issue lies, according to the point of view we are considering, between the aristocracy of capital and the democracy of labor. It has been commonly assumed that the cause of labor, as representing the many, was that of liberty, justice, and humanity as against selfishness and tyranny. But if we compare the attitude of the unions, now that they have become powerful, with that of the employers,

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we shall discover hardly a shade of difference. Each side assumes the right to control the industrial situation exclusively in its own interests. Each is bent upon securing, at any cost to the other, and through any waste of the resources of the community, "all that the traffic will bear." Neither has the slightest idea of adjusting its actions to any broadly conceived plan of social economy. And nothing could be more remote from the encouragement of personal liberty than the attitude of the union toward its individual members. The individual is compelled by fear of destitution, if not of violence and death, to enter the union, and once there he is obliged to conform to a uniform standard both of wages and of output, and to forego every advantage that might accrue to him from superior skill and industry. He becomes, indeed, no longer an individual but a simple mechanical unit.

The situation of the individual citizen in our democracy is not unlike that of the individual laborer. So long as he conforms to the standard type, meets the demands of popular sentiment and supports the dominant party, he enjoys opportunity and even privilege. But let him join the ranks of the minority—or, worse, let him become an independent critic of popular ideas—he no longer receives consideration. As an independent in politics he is ineligible to public office; as an independent in taste and opinion he is a sort of monstrosity; as an independent in religion he is the object of moral suspicion. Altogether he becomes, I will not say an "outcast" from society, but at least not a member of society in full and regular standing.

III.

So much, then, for the majority-rule conception of democracy. I have tried to show that there is no relation between majority-rule and individual liberty. Let us turn now to the other conception, according to which democracy stands for individual liberty. And just as majority-rule has been shown to rest upon a mechanical philosophy of human nature and society, so we shall see now that individual liberty is the expression of the idealistic philosophy.

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First let us note that the mere choice of liberty as a social ideal presupposes as its logical ground the idealistic view of the individual. We have seen that the mechanical view, when confronted with the diversity of the mental and physical sides of human nature, chooses as its basis of argument the physical side, and thinks of the human individual as a spatially determined mechanical unit. Now idealism sets out from the opposite side and conceives the human being to be first of all a conscious being, having thought and will. In contrast to the billiard ball he knows what he is doing; he feels desire and aversion; and he wills to attain certain ends which are always in some sense his own ends. In other words, he is a self-conscious being, or, as Kant said, a rational being.

The significance of this point of view is not apparent, however, until we attach a certain meaning to consciousness. For he who views human nature as a purely mechanical fact may nevertheless recognize the presence of consciousness. But if consciousness merely reflects and parallels bodily changes, if ideas and feelings are merely transcripts of neural conditions, and will is nothing but the awareness of bodily movements, the mode of action remains unchanged by its presence, and there is no difference in principle between the actions of a man and those of a billiard ball. The significance of the idealistic view lies in the conception that the presence of consciousness in an organism introduces a new principle of action, which may be called the principle of value as distinct from the principle of force. The billiard ball goes where it is sent and responds exactly to the stimuli applied to it—not merely because it is a mechanical object but because it is at the same time an unconscious object. The runaway locomotive goes right ahead whether the drawbridge in front of it is open or closed—again, not merely because of its mechanical construction—this is only one way of putting it—but because also its structure excludes the notion that it could be aware of its action. Once assume it to be conscious of its situation, you cannot then conceive this consciousness to be without effect upon its movements. The inevitableness of mechanical action presupposes that consciousness is absent. The two conceptions

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stand, indeed, in the relation of positive and negative; if we add the idea of consciousness to that of mechanism the mechanical character of the activity is just so far necessarily qualified. In a conscious mechanism we cannot conceive of that inevitable response to external stimuli which is characteristic of the pure machine. The mere awareness of one's situation involves, therefore, the element of self-control. Every object, so far as it becomes conscious, acquires a purpose, an ideal, a self; it becomes a person rather than a thing; it is governed by motives and foresight of consequences; and its principle of action is that of value rather than force.

It is this conception of human nature that lies at the foundation of our respect for human liberty. For suppose we ask, Why should the freedom of anything be respected? Evidently, it would seem, only because it represents an original source of value. But where are we to look for value? Not, of course, in a system of mechanical facts. For these have no ends of their own, but merely contribute to the ends of other and conscious beings. Yet just as little may we look for value in consciousness if by "consciousness" we mean a series of facts reflecting the aimless operation of animal instincts. If the human instinct for liberty is a mere impatience of restraint —if it stands for nothing more intelligent than the restiveness of a refractory horse or the pressure of water on the walls of a reservoir—it is not more representative of value nor more worthy of respect. Value presupposes (1) that consciousness is consciousness of self, *i. e.*, of one's own situation and action; (2) that consciousness of self is consciousness of ends; and (3) that consciousness of ends involves the control of action with reference to those ends. Value, in other words, is created by the fact of moral and intellectual responsibility. Accordingly, every individual who acquires a consciousness of his ends becomes, through that fact alone, a source of value, an end in himself, and thereby entitled to freedom.

But now we have to face the condition of a multitude of individuals in social relations. How is it possible that all should be free? If each is to be an end in himself what is to guard against a conflict of ends? How, indeed, is such an

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absolute democracy to be rescued from pure anarchy? In this question we have at once the central issue of the social problem and the central problem of metaphysics—nothing less, indeed, than the eternal difficulty of the one and the many, of unity and diversity: how is a genuine social unity to be made compatible with genuine individuality? Now the idealistic philosophy has always held, in some form, that, whereas the aims of individuals are necessarily conflicting when the individual is defined from a mechanical standpoint, they become, when he is conceived as a conscious personality, necessarily coördinate. Social unity is then not the antithesis of individuality but rather the correlate of a completed individuality. It is evident that this position is fundamental to the theory of democracy, for upon no other grounds could democracy be presented as a reasonable social ideal. And if the argument offered for it is not perfectly clear and final, there are some considerations which render it at least plausible and significant.

In the first place, it is a fact of daily observation, whose significance is commonly overlooked, that consciousness in its simplest form results in a certain unity of aim. Whenever two wagons pass on a narrow country road we have a situation where individual activities which from a mechanical point of view are conflicting and mutually destructive are, through the consciousness of individual aim, coördinated and individually realized. This transformation of conflict into unity is shown in every mechanical invention; for here, too, the problem is never to reach a simple result but to secure one end without failing in another. And we have an illustration on a large scale in the organization of industry, so far as it is constructive and not merely competitive. Here we have an instructive example of the contrast between mechanical and conscious processes. For through industrial organization the *per capita* output is increased and at the same time nature, whose scanty supply lay at the foundation of the conflict of interests, is compelled to set a more generous table. And thus, through the operation of intelligence, two and two make not four but more than four, the individual is no longer a fixed quantity, society no longer a fixed sum, while the resources of the en-

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vironment have no longer a fixed limit. It would seem, indeed, that the "quantity" of each factor depends only upon the extent of intelligence infused into the operation, that is, upon the extent to which the individuals concerned are clearly conscious of their aims and capacities. Now, in view of these relations, which are displayed side by side with destructive competition, it is at least not inconceivable that, with sufficient intelligence and sufficient self-consciousness on the part of the individuals composing society, any number of individual ends, however diverse, might be so coördinated as to secure the fulfilment of all. It is thus a reasonable assumption that the conflict of individual aims, like the inevitableness of mechanical action, is consistent only with the absence of consciousness; that, indeed, consciousness and conflict, like consciousness and mechanism, are inverse variables; so that, in a state of complete self-consciousness, social order would be not the antithesis of individual liberty but its realization.

But, further, it should not be forgotten that the assertion of an irrevocable opposition of individual aims presupposes a *principium individuationis* which is purely mathematical and mechanical. When we say that A must profit at the expense of B we think of A and B as spatially distinct and non-interpenetrable, like the physical atoms, which cannot move without displacing each other and cannot occupy the same space while individually distinct. From this point of view A and B are of necessity mutually exclusive and their interests, so far as they may be said to have interests, are necessarily hostile. But from the point of view of consciousness the case is different. The extent of an individual mind, whatever it may mean, is not spatial extent. My thought, in becoming yours, does not cease to be mine. Nor has the individual mind any definite limits. For who can define the boundaries of even the present thought? All that we can say is that from a focus of clear ideas it shades away gradually toward obscurity. And the same is true of the individual's interests. Each one's aims are focused about, say, his family and profession, but they do not end there. If I restrict my reading or my expenditures to certain fields, it is not because no other fields

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have any attraction but because from my personal position and point of view, these are of more immediate interest and, in view of the limitations of time and strength, demand the greater share of my attention. It is possible that these limitations themselves represent nothing but a want of self-consciousness. But no doubt they are for the time being real, and there is no denying that they involve a measure of alienation for which there is no complete practical remedy. It is none the less conceivable that a further development of self-consciousness in the several individuals would take the direction of a readjustment of attitudes in which the individual points of view were not effaced, but coördinated and completely defined in what might be called an absolute point of view.

And when we study the development of consciousness, as shown in the higher stages of reflection and culture, we find this hypothesis to a large degree confirmed. For there we find both a more pronounced individuality and a more complete and direct social sympathy. Consider, for instance, the attitude of a cultivated man toward such widely different points of view as those of Plato, Spinoza, Hobbes, Berkeley, Schopenhauer. Surely he never regards their individuality as a ground of personal offense. Nor does he commit the absurdity of estimating Thackeray, Tourgenieff, and Balzac, or, again, Mozart, Beethoven, and Tschaikowski, by their approximation to a common standard. To dispose of all of these under the head simply of the true and false, the correct and the incorrect, the acceptable and unacceptable, is a mark of stupidity quite incompatible with any intimate acquaintance with the object of criticism. To the finer critical judgment each of these represents a point of view which, though unique, is yet a point of view from which the world must be seen and felt to be apprehended in all its fulness. At the same time each by his very individuality develops an aspect of human nature which, so far as you grasp his point of view, you recognize as a new development of your own. And so of the smaller circle of personal associates. Each is a positive addition so far as he is genuinely individual, and so far as this is true he reveals to you something more of yourself. And yet, among

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those whom you most admire, whether in the larger or smaller circle, there is none whom you would set up as a model for imitation and none whose views you would accept without critical interpretation. For that very development of insight which gives value to the other points of view makes it necessary that, as an intellectually responsible being, what you believe and what you aim at must above all represent yourself.

In this democracy of culture, as it is called, we have the ideal which democracy seeks to realize in the social system as a whole. It will be observed that this ideal is all the world different from that of the sentimental "altruism" of our day. It does not say, "Sacrifice yourself. Place other selves above your own. Lose yourself by absorption in the social unity." On the contrary it says first of all, "Be yourself and stand for yourself." And yet the true democrat is not, as he is often painted, indifferent to social order nor does he question the possibility of a genuine social sympathy. What he claims is that social sympathy and social adjustment are meaningless except upon the basis of individual distinctness and individual worth. If there is no individuality in the elements to be adjusted there is no content in the adjustment. In other words, unity through uniformity is mere negation of difference; there can be no real and positive unity except on the basis of diversity.

It will be seen that under this formula there is no room for that irrevocable antithesis between individualism and socialism which figures so prominently in popular discussion. That an extension of organized government will necessarily involve a loss of individual freedom, and that the choice lies definitively between paternalism and *laissez faire,* is commonly regarded as axiomatic. Yet it is easily evident that this mode of conceiving the issue is true only from the mechanical point of view. If by freedom you mean opportunity for the unreckoning gratification of animal instinct, and by order an unintelligent collectivism which simply sacrifices the few to the many, then the antithesis is undoubtedly valid. But if by freedom you mean breadth of opportunity—the opportunity to exercise a large measure of choice in selecting your friends, your profession, your place of residence—in other words, the oppor-

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tunity to choose a manner of life according to your individual taste—then it must be said that order is not only not the antithesis of freedom but its positive condition. Measured in this way freedom is the product of civilization. The settler in the wilderness is free only in the sense that no forethought is necessary to avoid collision with his neighbor; in every other sense his life is narrowly determined. Freedom of choice presupposes the complex arrangements of the social order; it lies not in the absence of social relations but in their perfect adjustment. And every step made toward a better adjustment, that is, toward a more exact and comprehensive statement of the "social contract" and a more precise determination of individual rights, broadens the range in which the individual can move without interference and in which at the same time he can profit by his neighbor's services. It may therefore be said that if there is to be an extension of individual freedom it must come through a finer and more complete organization of the state—and thus, in this sense, through socialism.

But such socialism must be carefully distinguished from that current in popular discussion. If socialism is to stand merely for compulsory altruism; if personal and property rights representing centuries of thought and struggle are to be lightly discarded for a muddled notion of the "common good," and all private accounts are to be effaced from the social ledger; if, for example, railway rates are to be regulated, not to secure a better apportionment of rate to service, but simply to "equalize the burden" and "increase the sum of happiness"—then is socialism not only the death of democracy but the degeneration of all organic society. Socialism in the democratic sense is based upon the conception of distributive justice. It holds that while the individual may be nothing apart from society he is still a distinguishable element in society; and that social evolution while a process of unification has been at the same time a process of individuation. The present definitions of individual rights are no doubt imperfect, like every other feature of human life, but they none the less represent positive results; and the social problem—the only conceivable problem—is not how to get rid of these

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distinctions but how to make them more precise in a more coherent and comprehensive scheme of social relations.

It remains, then, only to suggest, on the basis of our analysis of social theories, how far democracy, as here defined, is a fact, and how far, on the other hand, social relations conform to the mechanical view. The suggestion is already contained in the analysis of theory. If you grant that consciousness is efficient, you will hold that democracy is a fact so far as consciousness is a fact; so far as human action is self-conscious, so far there is an adjustment of activities which secures both effective coöperation and individual freedom. But it must be remembered that consciousness is a fact of infinite gradations. The clearness which all ideas have for the plain man is mainly illusory. It requires only a superficial criticism to show that the degree of clearness is widely variable. The very problems of ethics, politics, economics, and sociology show that much of our daily behavior rests upon very indistinct conceptions of the ends to be attained and the conditions to be met. We may say, then, that in human thought in general, as in the individual mind, there is a focus of maximum, yet still relative, clearness from which ideas and motives shade away indefinitely toward obscurity, and that in human action there are all degrees of purposiveness from the highly deliberate to the blindly impulsive and mechanical. Now so far as action approaches the latter type, social relations conform in fact to the mechanical view. So far as the behavior of individuals toward each other is inadjustable, individual interests are necessarily hostile. So far, then, social order must be purchased at the price of individual freedom, and if we are to have popular institutions the majority must rule.

From this it appears that democracy is partly a fact and partly an unrealized ideal; and on this basis one can stand for the ideal of democracy without closing one's eyes to the needs of the actual situation. But if we are to work for the ideal we must rid ourselves of the delusion that democracy is a state of primitive nature, to be found at its best among "plain men," or that the safeguard of democracy lies in that

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impatience of constituted order which marks the "free-born American." Democracy is not a state of nature but of civilization. The true democrat, who respects his neighbor's freedom as he respects his own, is not the man of crude instincts but the man whose instincts are most enlightened and refined. And for a state of freedom we must turn, not to a primal condition of simplicity from which we have fallen—an Eden, now corrupted by culture—but to a condition which, in our own as in other countries, is yet to be attained, and which in its perfection presupposes a millennium when civilization shall be complete. The democratic ideal is that of a society of perfectly intelligent and cultivated men. It is, in a word, the ideal of a society of gentlemen. For not only is the problem of adjusting social relations upon a democratic basis a task for the highest intelligence, but the maintenance of such adjustment calls for nothing less than the finest sense of honor, justice, self-respect and personal responsibility, the most perfect self-control, and the broadest capacity for understanding and forming a just estimate of differing individual points of view.

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LAW AND ETHICS.*

The integrity of no profession is so often or so wrongfully attacked as is the legal. An incident illustrates the common thought. At a banquet given in honor of a leading member of the bar the toast announced was "an honest lawyer, the noblest work of God." Quick as a flash thereafter came from the lower end of the table the response, "and the scarcest."

I do not stop to answer these aspersions. And yet I can not refrain from noticing the experiences of a San Francisco publishing firm. By last year's fire its entire plant, including its letters, letter books and books of account, was destroyed.

* An address before the Society for Ethical Culture, of New York, Sunday, April 21st, 1907.

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All evidences of claims in its favor were gone, and it had only its general recollection of its business. It caused circulars to be prepared stating these facts and sent to the various lawyers named in a legal directory. Out of $175,000 believed to be the extent of outstanding claims, $150,000 has been paid. Can any profession make a better showing? How seldom you hear of a lawyer betraying his client. Indeed, the chief criticism is that he is too loyal to that client, and in discharging what he believes to be his duty, to him, forgets his obligations to the public. But I look forward and not backward. No man is so good that he cannot be better, and there is no profession whose thought and life cannot be improved, and I may add, there is no profession which makes a stronger appeal to its members to come up higher.

My friend, Dr. Lyman Abbott, in a recent address, described the advance of the race as in three stages: First, despotism; second, individualism, and lastly, the coming age of fraternalism. I do not quite like his division. I think there are really but two steps, despotism and individualism: despotism, where one man controls others; individualism, where each man controls himself. There is doubtless a difference in the quality of the despotism as well as of the individualism. One despot may be selfish, saying, as did Louis XIV, "The State! I am the State," and regard the services of all as designed and to be used for his personal aggrandizement and glory, while another may aim to improve the welfare of his subjects, striving in all things to make their lives better and happier. One is a selfish despotism, the other a benevolent; but still in each there is the ever-present thought of one man's control over others. In like manner there may be a selfish or a benevolent individualism. In the one the individual thinks only of self, and all his actions are prompted by and intended for his own pleasure, profit or power. In the other the individual realizes that he is one member of society, and that while he controls his own actions it is his moral duty to so act that the general welfare will be promoted. In that sense of the term, fraternalism may aptly describe the coming social era.

The day of selfish individualism is surely, even if slowly,

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passing away, and that of the benevolent is taking its place. We are coming to understand something of the meaning of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Brotherly love widens to the nation's borders, and neighbor has been introduced into the vocabulary of international law. Society is no longer regarded as a collection of independent and isolated particles, but as an organism, each member of which is doing not merely the work of himself as an individual, but also that of the society, the public.

Society owes to every one of its members justice. The lawyer is the appointed agent of society to secure that result. Justice is his function. Whether he prosecutes or defends, whether he is acting as lawyer or judge, in his office or in the court room, preparing documents or giving advice, he acts not for himself alone, nor only for his client, but for the community. He is doing the work of the social organism. His business is to make a living for himself and family by the practice of law, but the law is something more than business—it is a profession, and as a profession, it is that to which society entrusts the administration of justice.

But society seeking justice can never ask for wrongdoing to accomplish it. It does not rob Peter to pay Paul. It does not call upon a lawyer to be dishonest and act the scoundrel in order to secure to his client vindication and justice. Sometimes in momentary passion it may strive to inflict unjust punishment upon the individual, and then the lawyer, defending his client, apparently acts against his obligations to the public. But really he is most loyally discharging his duty to society, for he is striving to exact from it that which it rightfully owes, justice to all, even the humblest and the most detested of its members. As the ultimate thought—the final purpose—of society is righteousness, its call upon every individual acting for it must be for a like righteousness. Paul's conception that we are all members of one body is something more than a theological doctrine; it extends beyond the limits of the church and embraces the entire community. Now, every organ of the body has its separate function and must faithfully perform its own work or else the body as a whole will

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suffer. The call, therefore, of the body as a whole is upon each organ to do its own work and to do it in the best way. It may not call upon one to act wrongfully for the sake of another. The head may not say to the heart, dishonor thyself for my sake, for the result is dishonor to the whole body, including the head.

No one of a social body can rightfully do that which it would be unjust for the body as a whole to do. In that may be found the ethics of the future. The Golden Rule and the Good Samaritan are not limited to the home, but extend to the nation—yes, to humanity. The obligations of society are founded upon them. Our public charities, the laws regulating social conduct, including therein, broadly speaking, our penal laws, and the increasing volume of international law, all rest upon the thought of a social unit and the community of all individuals in it. From the duty of society we determine the duty of the individual. Our highest ideal of society is one in which absolute honesty and justice obtain.

The true community cannot be separated into two classes, one serving the community and the other serving itself. All must alike seek the common welfare, and we can have no perfect society until that is universally true. We say that in this country the people rule, that each man is a voter and has an equal voice in determining the policies of the nation. But voting is not the only way of serving the public. The whole life of the individual should be helpful to the general good. No one should ever forget that his life is part of and goes to make up the whole national life, that the one either promotes and blesses or hinders and degrades the other. No profounder truth was ever uttered than this, that "none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself."

As I have already said, there is no profession to which a stronger appeal is rightfully made. In every community the lawyer is a leader. He is a trusted counselor. If he fails, who shall stand? The idea of his professional life is loyalty to the common welfare and not pecuniary or political success. His object is the promotion of justice; for it is a most serious misconception to suppose that justice is specially and solely

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the object of the work of the judge, while the lawyer's is merely the success of his client. The old idea that a lawyer must be all that his client wishes is passing away. He has no right to barter his own integrity, to sell his honor or his conscience. The court room should always be other than a mere arena in which intellectual athletes meet, striving simply to trip and throw each the other. The judge is something more than the umpire of a debate. Judge and counsel should alike in every law suit have as the supreme thought and purpose, the establishment of justice. That will be most likely secured when counsel on each side fairly, candidly and fully, present all the facts and the law as he understands them.

A single illustration may be given. In the community in which the lawyer, Abraham Lincoln, lived, a murder was committed. No one saw the deed. A tramp was suspected, arrested and placed on trial. Lincoln was appointed to defend. The testimony was circumstantial, but tended to show the defendant's guilt. Lincoln, evading nothing, suppressing nothing, helped the prosecuting attorney to bring out all the facts. Then, addressing the jury, he called attention to those matters which pointed to the defendant's guilt, as well as those which made in his favor, and closed his argument by saying in substance, "I have looked this matter over fully, candidly, and while I concede that the testimony bears against my client, I am not sure that he is guilty. Are you?" The defendant was acquitted and the real criminal afterwards found and convicted. Confidence in Lincoln's integrity won the case. Not only that, it resulted in the triumph of justice. A lie has no place in a court room, and half a truth is, as we all know, often the worst kind of a lie. A verdict won by a falsehood is a disgrace to the counsel, and equally so a verdict won by a trick. That success is really a defeat, for it makes a profession consecrated to the pursuit of justice, an instrument of injustice.

A true lawyer may not say, "I know that my words are false, but it is not I but my client who is lying. I know that judge and jury are being deceived, imposed upon, but I am merely potter's clay in my client's hands, fashioned by him

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for the moment into a vessel of dishonor. The moment the trial is over I will refashion myself into a vessel of honor." No such moral transformation is possible. The whole body has been corrupted by this poison of the individual.

Neither should a lawyer leave his conscience behind him when he enters his office. Standing face to face with his client he is not alone with that client. The whole organism of society is with him, demanding that his advice shall be something more than how to succeed, and shall include how to do justice.

In the present day of intense commercialism the lawyer cannot escape its temptations. Indeed, in some aspects, he is more exposed than others. The rapid accumulation of money is a mania. "Money-mad" was the criticism placed upon a gentleman who personally, socially and in the ordinary affairs of life was kind, considerate in his treatment of those in his employ, generous, and, according to purely legal standards, honest, but who in the domain of business had acted apparently upon the theory that whatever was not positively prohibited by statute is morally right; and so in many ways, some of which were certainly open to criticism, had accumulated a large property. Such a man will seek the brainiest counsel, one who can advise correctly as to the precise limits of the law, but his only thought is of the brains and knowledge, and the lawyer who best answers that thought will get employment and compensation corresponding to the pecuniary returns which follow the advice. Counsel responding to his demands may in one sense of the term be honest, but it is a negative honesty. It is an honesty which regards simply the client, the statute, and the pay. It is an honesty which ignores the fact that both client and counsel are members of society, and assumes that there is no moral obligation upon either to respect the general welfare. They put themselves into antagonism to those obligations which every lover of his country should feel, and as the multitude of clients of this character increases, so is there an increasing reaching out for counsel who will respond to their demands. Pecuniary compensation follows the success of the advice which is given, of the

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services which are rendered. Is it strange that there should be so much criticism of the bar? Or that there is a common feeling which finds expression in a denunciation of the profession as though it were wholly unworthy. As against this, there is an ever-growing conviction which will assert itself positively, which cannot be ignored and which will strengthen until it compels every lawyer to advise his client not merely what is legal, but also what is honest. We all know that the wisdom of the lawmaker can never keep pace with the ingenuity of trained minds seeking to evade legal limitations. The old saying that holes may be found in every law, means simply that an ingenious lawyer can often find, either in the statute itself or in the mode prescribed for its enforcement, some way of escape from its penalties. It is this which provokes the frequent remark that the law so seldom reaches the rich. As against this I appeal for a higher standard of professional ethics. I appeal to every lawyer to put his heart alonside his head, to mix his conscience with his brains. Let him have the courage to say to his client, "It may be legal, but it is dishonest and I will have nothing to do with it."

Is this asking too much of the profession? Certainly not if it intends to be, what it is appointed to be, the instrument of society by which justice is accomplished. As we stand in this day of our nation's prosperity, facing the temptations which attend national wealth, one of the surest guarantees against the descending course which so often follows an abundance of wealth is the highest integrity on the part of that profession which has most to do with the making of the law and by far the most to do with its administration.

While not ignorant of its shortcomings, I am proud of the profession. To it as student, practitioner and judge I have given over fifty years of constant, unswerving and faithful devotion. I appeal to its members to so live and act that, purer than the vestal virgins who watched the fires on the altars in the temples of imperial Rome, they shall ever be found ministering in that temple, the grandest built by human hands, the temple of equal, universal and exact justice. So doing they will hasten the day when the prophetic vision of the seer of Patmos

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shall be realized, and the new Jerusalem will be seen "coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband."

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THE CONCEPTION OF POSSIBILITY IN ITS RELATION TO CONDUCT.

When, in deliberation, we have several alternative lines of action before us, we naturally regard all of them as "possible." We may be forced to choose and, again, the number of alternatives may be limited, but out of these we are left free to choose whichever we prefer. All lines are open; they become closed only in the moment in which we select and carry out one. It is only as the selected alternative becomes actual that the others cease to be possible, which means that as soon and so long as our will is determined one way, no other way is possible; but as long as our will is still undetermined, and "our minds not yet made up," many ways are possible. Decision consists in the realization of one possibility to the exclusion of others. And though decision always operates under conditions which we accept, and either cannot or will not alter, yet within these fixed conditions it produces a *new* result. These conditions are not merely external and circumstantial. They include our characters and our habits; they take perhaps the form of some moral principle to which in our choice we wish to be true. Yet, thus stated as conditions, these are abstract and seem to possess no determining force. It is hard to say in what sense character, habit and principle are real, except as realized in act. And thus we feel that the result of our choice—in spite of the conditions to which it is subject—cannot be fixed and determined beforehand, but only *comes to be determined* in the moment of decision. We refuse to believe that the alternative possibilities which our decision now makes impossible, were impossible from the start, and seemed open only by an illusion born of ignorance.

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Prior to decision—that is our belief apart from sophistication by theories—the result is undetermined, not because of the incompleteness of our knowledge of the conditions, ***but simply because the decision which determines it has not yet taken place.*** And by this we mean not merely that several *actions* are physically possible if we choose them, but that it is possible to *choose* one out of several. In this sense we say that it is possible for us to decide for one or other of several alternatives.

Again, it is in this sense that we say retrospectively that it was "possible" for us to act otherwise than we did. For "to act" here is used for "to decide" or "to will." We mean that we could have willed differently; that our actual volition might have been other than it was. It is this consciousness which supplies the sting to most of our regrets and to all our repentance and without which it would be mere mockery to grieve at the loss of an irreparable opportunity. We do, of course, find out *post eventum* many mistakes, and we say: if only I had known that at the time! But when, reproaching ourselves, *e. g.,* for yielding to a temptation, we say that we could have done otherwise, there is no such qualifying "if" expressed or implied. It is almost as if we wished to fly in the face of the venerable law of sufficient reason and affirm that the same man in the same circumstances could do a different act. But any such implication, I take it, is not intended. Without any theory, we simply imagine ourselves back at the moment before the fatal decision had been taken, when both the right volition and the wrong one were still "possible," because we had as yet decided for neither.

The familiar facts which I have just described are at the root of the free-will controversy. If all our volitions were of the simple ideo-motor type; if we were never thwarted by obstacles, never troubled by hesitation and doubt, never plagued by regrets; if we had always but a single line of action before us, and that one leading smoothly to immediate satisfaction, we should assuredly never raise the problem of free will, just as we should not doubt the rationality of the world or invent a devil to take the burden of evil off the

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shoulders of God, if the world in every moment of experience appeared to us perfect.

Now the reader need not fear that I shall enmesh him anew in the tangled mazes of a controversy which has become a weariness even to philosophers. Rather, I think that both Determinists and Indeterminists, in the heat of the conflict, have lost sight of the very facts which had given rise to the problem. To use a convenient German phrase, the *Möglichkeit des Anderskönnens* is what stands in the way of complete Determinism; and until we make an attempt to deal satisfactorily with that, the controversy will ever break out afresh. To dub it an illusion because it clashes with some deterministic postulate is a high-handed and unphilosophical procedure. It will be more profitable to try and find out whether we cannot connect some intelligible meaning with the "possibility of acting otherwise." For whether we are determinists or not, we use the phrase; and if it means nothing, it is sad to think of how much willful nonsense philosophers and other learned people must be guilty.

So far as I am aware, no satisfactory attempt has yet been made to examine the conception of possibility here involved. And I offer the following remarks less in the hope of solving the problem than of drawing attention to it.

That the problem has been neglected is, I think, easy to show. When hard pressed, the defender of free will is indeed apt to fall back on the facts which I began by describing, and perhaps he will even invest them with special authority as "immediate" deliverances of consciousness, and try to put them, quite illegitimately, beyond the reach of investigation. But more usually, when he tries to argue, he begins by accepting Determinism and then sets himself to manufacture a sense of freedom which shall be consistent with that. And as the result of this effort at compromise we get self-determination. Now self-determination is a word of many meanings, and I have no wish to deny that some of them are valuable. For instance, as expressing that my actions are *my own* and not the effects of some force other than my will, it is a useful corrective of theories of "external" Determinism.

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But tested by the problem which I regard as central, self-determination is *the problem itself* rather than its solution. It depends on whether we are in earnest about the *active* sense of "determination." The self determines itself to action—this is a good enough description of the process of decision and selection amongst alternatives. But do its defenders understand the phrase as implying the possibility of acting otherwise? I doubt it. Certainly the phrase is not usually regarded in that light. And I think I am right in saying that most thinkers who identify freedom with self-determination would deny that it includes a freedom to act otherwise.[1] In short, in all the so-called "reconciliations" of freedom with Determinism the latter gets the best of the bargain, in that it forces upon freedom its condition that possibilities shall be excluded. Self-determination is, from that point of view, merely a species of Determinism, working at bottom with the same conception of necessity, *viz.:* the conception that the actual alone is necessary and that *nothing beside the actual is even possible.* The self has determined itself to action and it could not have determined itself otherwise. And again, though the self may contemplate several actions as possible to it, the self is mistaken; only one action is "really" possible for it, *viz.:* the one on which it ultimately finds itself deciding.

If this position is challenged, we find it defended in the end by an appeal to the law of sufficient reason. That a different volition should be possible to the same person in the same situation seems an outrage on logic. Few have the courage of Professor James, who declares that a world *with* possibilities seems to him more rational than one *without.*[2] But, perhaps, there is no need thus to put postulate against postulate and to invoke the rationality of the universe

[1] This is perhaps the place to refer briefly to that *other* sense of freedom which identifies it with *moral* action, as with *rational* action, or with devotion to the common good, etc. It is clear that this sense of freedom (whatever its value) throws no light on the question, whether, in any case in which we preferred an immoral alternative, the moral one would have been possible.

[2] "The Will to Believe," p. 152.

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for both sides of a contradiction. Perhaps an inquiry into the nature of possibility may help us out of the deadlock. At any rate, it will enable us to avoid the term "freedom" with its misleading associations. And it will have the further advantage of limiting the problem. For whatever conclusions we may reach, they will not concern volitions in general, but only those volitions in which the making up of our minds passes through the consideration of possibilities as a distinct stage.

When we say that we could have willed and performed a different act than the one which we did will and perform, we seem to imply that our actual behavior in its time and place was not necessary. And this at once gives rise to a difficulty. For the not necessary, it may be argued, is the impossible, and hence to say that another action than our real one was possible is to say that our real one was impossible, which is an obvious contradiction. To put it positively, the appeal is to the principle that *whatever is real is necessary, and, therefore, whatever is real is also the only thing possible.* For we naturally think of reality as determinate and necessary; and necessity we think of as uniform causal determination of consequent by antecedent event. In short, we identify reality with the actual "course of events" and include in this course all ideas, volitions, actions, and other psychical happenings. And if we possessed the complete knowledge requisite for filling out this scheme, we should attain our ideal, *viz.:* to eliminate possibilities altogether out of our thinking, in that every fact would be seen in its appointed place, and everything that was "really" possible would *ipso facto* be real. This is the position which Professor Simmel of Berlin, for instance, adopts in his *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft,*[3] and from which he argues that we speak of freedom only where so far we have failed to trace causal connections.

Now, if we accept as valid this conception of a "necessary" stream of events, we are clearly contradicting ourselves, if

[3] *E. g.*, Vol. I, p. 38, *and passim*

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we arrest this stream at any one point and say: from this point onwards it *might* have been different. For to say that an event is necessary means that no other event could have been real in its place, and that means that the event is the only one possible. In fact, "real," "necessary" and "only possible" are, from this point of view, if not synonyms, at any rate merely different ways of expressing the same fact. And the principle claims to hold good not only for the past and the present, but also for the *future*. It involves not only that no past or present event could have been otherwise than it is; it implies also, that every future event, when it comes to be real, will be both necessary and the only possible event. There is, then, in the nature of things no room for alternatives; there are, and can be, no possibilities such as we were trying to assert. If human life with all its details, with its actions, thoughts, volitions, is adequately conceived as part of the "course of events," then we must say even now, that every act and every volition, whenever it does occur, will be necessary. And that means, as we have seen, that it will be the only possible one. Nor does it matter in the least whether in every case we are able to assign the cause, or formulate the law, of the psychical event. The principle, it would seem, has a right to stand against our ignorance of details.

But in thus identifying the realty, which (we say) is necessary and is alone possible, with the "actual course of events," we have so far kept out of sight a difficulty which we must now face. We have spoken as if the phrase "course of events" covered indifferently past, present, and future. But this seems to lead to startling conclusions, and to come into hopeless conflict with our habit of distinguishing the past, as "no longer real," and the future, as "not yet real," from the present, which is alone real. For we are inevitably forced to ask ourselves: *why* is the future, which we admit to be necessary, not yet real? Perhaps we attempt to reply: because the conditions for its realization are not yet complete. But why are these conditions incomplete? Because in turn the conditions of *their* realization are not yet complete. And thus we are

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threatened with an infinite regress, an unending series of "not yets," each of which is in turn responsible for the other. A is not yet, because B is not yet, and B is not yet, because C is not yet, and so on *ad infinitum*. But somewhere, surely, it may be thought, this backward procession of "not yets" must be arrested, somewhere the future must issue from the present, somewhere we must touch the "is now." But, alas, the hope is vain. *The present never can contain all the conditions of the future.* For this is the dilemma by which we are faced: either the present contains all conditions of the future, and then we fail to explain why the future is still "future"—why it is "not yet," instead of being present now; or, if the present does not contain all the conditions, where are we to look for their completion except in the future? But it is unthinkable that the future, which it itself "not yet real," should make real the conditions of its own realization. And thus we have before us the unenviable choice between saying either that the future is real now, or that it can never become real at all. Nor can we escape from the dilemma by seeking in the past the reasons for the present incompleteness of the conditions of the future. For the past, clearly, is complete and fully realized. Else how could the present, according to the principle of causality, ever have become real? The very principle which seeks to make the reality of the present intelligible forbids us to find in the past a reason for the unreality of the future.

A very similar difficulty besets all attempts to find in the present a reason why the past should be "no longer real." And we seem fairly entitled to conclude that there is hopeless contradiction between the two arguments on which the opponents of possibility commonly rely, *viz.:* (1) That what is real is necessary and, therefore, the only thing possible; and (2) that this necessity of the real manifests itself in the succession of events. For they cannot avoid calling the present real in a sense in which neither past nor future are real, and yet they are unable to explain satisfactorily on the basis of the present either the unreality of the past or that of the future.

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And the fallacy from which these difficulties spring is not far to seek. The "actual course of events" includes the past and future only, because it is itself through and through an "ideal construction" on the basis of the present. Given some present fact, we can, on the basis of experience and so far as that will carry us, infer its past causes and its future effects. Apart from such application to actual fact, causal connections are purely abstract and hypothetical. If A, then B, but whether A is or has been or will be, is another question. And in so far as past and future are reached by an inference from the present, they are themselves "ideal," and this explains why we speak of them as no longer and not yet real. Now, just in so far as the realization of the future depends on our volition, there is, so to speak, an "arrest" of the course of events. It must pass through our volition, and the direction of its continuation depends on our decision, and that decision consists in selecting one out of several possible alternatives.

So far, it is true, we have done nothing to explain positively this sense of possible. And perhaps we may not be able to do so. But at any rate we have rebutted the attempt to show the impossibility of possibilities on the ground that the real, which alone is both possible and necessary, is the actual course of events with its causal necessity.

The discussion up to this point has earned us the right to take our stand boldly on the present, and to leave aside all questions affecting the past. For the possibilities with which we have to deal in volition all refer to the future. They appear in our consciousness as ideas which will or will not be realized according as we decide about their fate. Of course, this realization depends partly on our physical powers, partly on external conditions, which may obstruct or assist us. Both these factors are variable, largely not under our control, and to a still larger extent not even accurately known by us. Of some ideas we know from experience that want of strength or unfavorable conditions make their realization impossible. Of many others we discover the impossibility in the attempt to realize them. And since our volition is thus limited, we

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may, if we choose, even call it, so far, unfree. Yet these restrictions do not alter the fact that the ideas amongst which we make our choice come before us as possibilities, as ideas that are realizable by us. And though here, again, we may be restricted in that we cannot realize them all at once, or even one after the other, yet each, in itself, is possible.

Let us take our stand, then, at this point. We will not ask how just these ideas and no others came to be there, or what is the character of the agent and how it came to be what it is. We have to inquire simply in what sense any one of the alternatives that are before the agent prior to decision is "possible."

It will be convenient to call a possibility in so far as its realization depends on our volition a *practical* possibility, and to contrast it with *theoretical* possibility.[4] And it will clear the way if we begin with a short discussion of theoretical possibility, since deliberation implies a large amount of theoretical reflection on theoretical possibilities. Thus we have to calculate our own mental and physical abilities, which are obviously facts of which in our decisions we must take account. Again, there is the external situation, with regard to which we have to ask both what changes we may expect as the result of our action, and what changes will happen irrespective of our action, and beyond the reach of our control or interference.[5] In all these matters there is obviously room for more or less complete knowledge, and for much doubt and uncertainty.

Now statements of theoretical possibility range between two extremes, according to the direction of our interest. For we may be interested either, as in pure theory, in establishing universal connections of content, *i. e.*, in getting our knowledge into the form of scientific universal judgments; or we may be interested, as in the application of theory to practice, in the analysis of a given particular situation so

[4] One might also use the terms *real* and *logical* possibility—*potentia* and *possibilitas.*

[5] I have dealt with the bearing of these points on Determinism elsewhere, see "Mind," N. S. 56 (1905) pp. 464, 5.

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as to trace in it, as fully as we can, the data which will enable us by means of our scientific knowledge to predict developments with more or less probability. In the former case we begin with "judgments of possibility." Thus when we say, "glass is brittle," or "hay is inflammable," we predicate of our subjects possible modifications. But the predicates attach to the subjects under conditions which are left unspecified. As Professor Bosanquet says:[6] "The idea of 'possibility' is our substitute for the omitted conditions." If these conditions are fully and explicitly stated, all these judgments become scientific universals, as, *e. g.*, "water can be boiled," becomes "water boils at a temperature of 100 degrees." At this point possibility is, from the purely theoretical standpoint, wholly eliminated. For we have got now a universal connection of content, the necessity of which is most clearly conveyed by the hypothetical form: if A, then B. But our theoretical interest is satisfied only at a price. By becoming universal, our knowledge has become "ideal"—it seems to have left the solid ground of reality behind. We do, indeed, imply that our universals have some relation to reality, but we do not imply that, *as such,* they exist. A universal judgment, *e. g.*, may deal with the properties of water wherever water be found, and it may imply that water exists in *rerum natura,* but it does not assert that definite quantities of water exist *actually* at definite places. Our universals are, in Mr. Bradley's picturesque phrase, "divorced" from reality, though our best knowledge of reality is enshrined in them. Now, this abstract and hypothetical nature of knowledge makes itself felt the moment we apply our universal connections to particular cases, as they come before us in feeling and sense-perception. For, then, at once the inexhaustible complexity of the given makes itself felt as a disturbing factor. We can never be sure beyond the reach of all doubt that the actual case of experience is as "pure" as the hypothetical case of our science; nor can we know what disturbing factors there may be in the total context as part of which the given case

[6] "Logic," I, p. 388.

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appears before us. And this introduces an element of uncertainty, of which we cannot say that human knowledge will ever overcome or eliminate it. The moment we leave the abstract and hypothetical ground of science, the limitation of our knowledge forces itself painfully on our notice. The distinction of what is irrelevant and what is essential, on which our science is largely built up, shows itself to be purely provisional, and a matter of degree. In dealing with the real, as given in perception, we never have the *whole* facts fully before us, and, therefore, all our judgments must be affected more or less with uncertainty; they will forecast not so much what *will,* as what *may,* happen.

Still, even such knowledge is valuable and, indeed, indispensable as a guide to action. And, hence, that second form of our interest in theoretical possibility, *viz.:* the interest in inferring from the data of a particular case the possible developments which we may expect. Here, again, possibility is a matter of degree, which with complete knowledge would pass into certainty. Thus, we can say of a given human being that it is possible for him to die within the next twenty-four hours. We may have no special grounds for expecting his death, but the general mortality of human nature makes it more or less remotely possible. But if we find him to be suffering from an acute disease, or about to enter on some perilous enterprise, we have at once definite conditions facilitating definite modes of death, and the individual's death within the time limit is so much *more* possible. But absolute certainty as to the future is unattainable, though we come near to it, *e. g.,* in some astronomical predictions.

I have spoken here exclusively of possibilities with regard to the future, because they form the *meeting-point* of the theoretical and practical senses of possibility. Theoretical possibility, as we have seen, is an expression of incomplete knowledge. But even if our knowledge were complete, the future (as we may see by comparing it with the past) would be "possible" in a further and different sense. It is *practically* possible in the sense that it is still *realizable.*

And now we are ready for an important step in the argu-

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ment. *The realization of the future implies a dynamic conception of the present.* Unless we invest the present with the power or force to realize the future, it is clear that nothing would happen at all, no movement, no process, no succession, no time, and consequently no distinction of present and future. If our knowledge were absolutely complete, so that we could foresee the future with certainty down to the last detail, yet this whole scheme would remain future and ideal, and never become present and real, unless there were in the present reality a dynamic energy for the realization of its own future stages. If we do not assume this, there is no reason why, even though the complete antecedent conditions of an event were present, the event itself should come to pass. To explain *that,* we must introduce the idea of life or movement or force into our static connections of content. And this is the reason why all attempts to find in the present, regarded simply as a given content, the *full* conditions of the future, were bound to fail. For the present, as such, leads to nothing further, unless we introduce surreptitiously a dynamic conception. I maintain that we ought to introduce it openly and explicitly. For the conception of force or power or life is nothing but the expression of "real" possibility. It means simply that the present "potentially" contains the future, *i. e.,* it has the power to realize it, to turn it from possible into actual. And now let us add that so far as *we* possess such power as conscious agents, it manifests itself in *volition.*

There is, however, one important difference between our volition and the force or power to which we ascribe the movement of a non-volitional process. In volition the power is aware, so to speak, of its own direction, for it has the future before it in the shape of an idea to realize. But what are we to say of the future stages of any natural process, to which we cannot ascribe consciousness and a knowledge of its own direction? Must we say that possibilities, being ideal, exist only for the human mind; that the development of a chemical process which we may be watching in a laboratory, or the growth of a plant, or an animal, or any future constellation of the solar system, exists only as an ideal anticipation

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for a human observer? That, I think, would give to these possibilities a false subjectivity, and introduce a distinction, for which we have no warrant, between our perception of the present "real" stage of a process and our idea of its "possible" continuation. For the perception, too, is for us, is for an observing mind; it is not the object undergoing the process which observes and perceives itself. And yet we predicate the content of perception of the object, we judge it to be true; we "refer it to reality." Just so we must refer our ideas of the future development of a given process to that process; we must judge them true of it; we must affirm that their content or meaning is part of *its* nature. We cannot restrict that nature simply to what we find within the four corners, so to speak, of any single moment of its existence. If a plant possessed consciousness and ideas, no doubt it would anticipate in idea its own development just as we to some extent anticipate ours. Now, it is true that we have no grounds for crediting it with such a conscious anticipation of its own future, but, on the other hand, though the future may not be *for* the plant, it is yet *of* it, it is part of its very nature to develop in a given direction. Perhaps the most convenient word for expressing that the power of realizing the future which we had to ascribe to the present involves in its nature a certain direction, is *tendency*. For without implying consciousness or will, "tendency" yet suggests that it is part of the present nature of a given process to complete itself in a certain direction. How natural this way of speaking is may be seen from the fact that, in explaining ideo-motor action, we commonly ascribe to all ideas that can suggest action a "tendency" to realize themselves.

However, I am content to suggest rather than to press these points. That the task of forming an adequate conception of the relation of present to future in all processes in which consciousness does not play a part, is difficult cannot be denied. But most of these difficulties vanish when we turn to our own volition and to the problem of practical possibility. In volition we have the nearest and clearest case of the

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realization of possibilities. For there we experience[7] within ourselves a contrast between present existence and various possible modifications of it, one of which is to be realized by us. Let us take a simple example: a thirsty man reflecting whether or no he shall drink from the fountain, has a concrete experience, which in its totality includes on the one hand a consciousness of his present self as thirsty, and on the other two possible ideal selves, one a self satisfied by drinking, the other a self which, for some reason or another, has passed on still athirst. This is the situation in the agent's mind, prior to decision; and if we reflect on it, we must surely be once more brought to the conclusion that the self which we here call present and real as opposed to the ideal selves, does not contain the full cause of the realization of either of these ideal selves. It is only out of the total situation that the decision issues. The ideal selves by their conflict with the present contribute to the result, for which the present alone is not enough to account. In admitting this we leave necessity in the sense of determination of succeeding by anteceding event far behind. This, with its assumption of a simple succession of elements, fails to work when applied to such a complex situation.

However, the determinist who would deny possibilities may return to the charge. He may say: "I grant you your analysis. I grant you that a decision, in a case like this, can be reached only by a consideration of possibilities, by the agent imagining that it is in his power not merely to do, but to will either of the alternatives between which his choice lies. But you must admit that of the two 'possibilities' *only one* becomes actual, only one is realized. All I say is that there must be a reason for the realization of this one in preference to the other. And whatever the reason may be, *where there is a reason, there is necessity.* And if the realization of the one possibility is thus necessary, it is plain that the other possibility can never have been really possible at all."

[7] Lest the reader be misled, I remind him that I am speaking only of those highly developed cases of volition where we have deliberation on alternatives. I use the general term for the sake of shortness.

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The argument really amounts to the paradox that the illusion of more than one alternative being possible is necessary for the realization of the alternative which alone is really possible. But to what sort of necessity are we here appealing when we say that the illusion is necessary? It looks remarkably like a necessity of "brute fact." That we think of alternatives as possible cannot be denied; that these possibilities *are* possible is against the theory. Hence, we cut the knot by declaring them to be not only illusions, but necessary illusions.

It is always a bad sign when a theory can only save itself by declaring one half of the facts for which it has to account as illusion.

But, we may be told, the character determines the decision, and a given character can consistently decide only in one way, and not in another. And we are threatened here with the law of contradiction.

Now, to say that the character determines the action is vague. How do we conceive this determination? At any rate the character is not an event anteceding the action in time. The determination, then, is not causal. Perhaps, then, the character is the ground of the action: it "expresses" or "manifests" itself in the action. But let us make sure what we mean by character. Is it more than a generalized inference from the action itself? From a given act we argue that the same man under the same circumstances will do the same act again. Hence, it is the "character" of that man to do such acts under such circumstances. But this, plainly, does not help us. It is an argument from completed volition, which throws no light on the sense in which alternatives are "possible" prior to decision.

And further, if on the one side we often say that character determines action, we no less frequently affirm that *action determines character.* If the character, as it stands, fully accounts for the action, it is hard to see how the action can help to form the character. There are, then, actions which cannot be traced to character, unless we use the word with a shiftiness which in philosophy is almost criminal.

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Besides, what we call our character is largely made up of habits. And, however difficult it may be, it is possible both to acquire and to break down habits by a volition directed to that end. Did I say "possible"? It seems impossible to speak of the will without using the word. Is that merely a bad habit, which as good determinists we should set ourselves to eradicate—because it is "possible" to do so? Why not say boldly that "possibilities" belong to the essence of the will?

Thus, to the assertion that only one alternative is compatible with a given character and that, therefore, it alone is possible, we may reply, that the character is not absolutely fixed and determined apart from the action, if the action reacts on it and modifies it.

And there is a better argument against this appeal to compatibility. When we return to our analysis of a volition and ask how the character of the agent operates, we find that it expresses itself in the *nature of the ideas which appeal to the agent as possible,* and in the reasons pro and con, which he brings forward in considering each possibility. Of course, this is a matter of degree: some ideas appeal more strongly than others. And, no doubt, the realization of one possibility would contradict certain interests or sides of our nature which incline us rather to another possibility. So far there is incompatibility, but it is not the action which is incompatible with the character, but various sides of the character which are incompatible with one another. And these aspects do not necessarily become compatible, by one of them being carried out in action. In the majority of cases action means *one-sided* realization of character, and so far as the other sides are repressed and sacrificed, the action can hardly be called compatible with the *whole* character.

I should say, then, that in so far as any idea attracts us at all, it is because in its realization a certain side of our character would express itself. Alternatives come before us in deliberation as each embodying one aspect of our nature, and, in consequence, we think of each as compatible with ourselves. And that is an important part of our meaning

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when we speak of them as "possible." No doubt, if I decide to carry out A and not B, myself as realized in A is different from myself as realized in B. But whichever I decide on, it is still "I" who decide. In other words, in deliberating and deciding I never look upon the alternatives as if the realization of one were alone compatible with the maintenance of my self-identity, whereas the realization of every other would destroy it. On this point I must ask every reader to judge from his own experience. To me at any rate, it seems, that whilst it does make a difference to the self which alternative is realized, the difference does not go deep enough to destroy the sense of self-identity. On the contrary, it is remarkable how much variety and change is compatible with a consciousness of identity.

Finally, it may be said, that one alternative only is possible, because it alone is compatible with the "true" self or the "higher" self, and that all other alternatives would contradict *that* self. But this argument shifts the discussion to another ground, and it is irrelevant unless it be meant to assert, in the teeth of facts like repentance and self-criticism, that every volition is, *ipso facto,* a realization of the "true" self. And this position will have to be seriously maintained first, before it is worth while to reply to it.

However, the mention of it suggests another consideration. I will assume that the argument so far is inconclusive; that whilst we think of alternatives as "possible," it has not been made out whether this be illusion or truth. Let us, then, turn for a moment to those characteristic cases where, in self-reproach, we express retrospective disapproval of what we have done, and contrast with it the better act which we *might* have done. It seems to me that the fact of our asserting so emphatically the possibility of the *better* act, is not without significance. If our reason—as we have been told since the days of Plato and Aristotle—in thinking and in willing moves *sub ratione boni,* may we not say that the postulate of the rationality of the universe involves, at the least, that the good should be "possible" even where it is not actually realized? Evil, like error, always appears to us in its own

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nature irrational. It may have its *causes,* but we cannot find a *ground* why it should be there. If we could find a ground, the existence of evil would justify itself to our reason. On the other hand, if we fail to find a ground for a fact, we treat that fact as irrational and not necessary. Hence, I am inclined to say that wherever *we disapprove we implicitly challenge the necessity of the fact of which we disapprove.* This is at the bottom of the familiar conflict between what "is" and what "ought to be." If we condemn what exists, we, so to speak, deny its right to be there. And this condemnation, except where it refers to the past, normally becomes a practical attitude, and issues in the effort to remove the offending fact.

I am conscious that the lines of thought which I have tried to indicate in this paper would deserve to be supported by more coercive arguments than I have been able to adduce. I have aimed at suggestion rather than at conviction. And whether or no I have succeeded in making out a positive meaning for the conception of possibility in its relation to conduct, there is one point which I regard as certain. And I will, in conclusion, briefly restate it. When we regard alternatives in conduct as possible, we do not mean to express ignorance or incomplete knowledge. We do not mean that, if our knowledge were complete, we should know before decision how we were going to decide. For this amounts to saying *that volition itself is merely a form of ignorance,* and that with complete knowledge we should cease to will: we should at best be aware of ourselves as moving (or as being moved: it would make no difference) along a line every detail of which was clearly mapped out before us. We should be conscious of our present state, conscious also of the only development of which that state was capable, and conscious finally of the realization of that development. But I do not think that we should recognize such an experience as will.[8]

In short, then, will is not a form of ignorance, nor a theoretical attitude at all. Hence, a conception of possibility

[8] I may refer to a similar argument in Sidgwick's "Methods of Ethics," ch. V, p. 66.

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formed for theoretical purposes, is not necessarily identical with the conception of possibility which arises on the basis of volition. We have no right to treat the possibilities of will as if they were theoretical assertions. In the end we cannot explain will by any categories, except those which the volitional experience itself suggests. This was clearly seen by Sigwart, and I cannot do better than conclude by a quotation:[9] "That alone is possible in the completely objective sense which is removed from the sphere of necessity as the manifestation of free subjects." And Sigwart goes on to point out that it is not a question of the metaphysical truth of this view, but of the presuppositions which lead to the thought of possibility in this sphere of experience. In other words, taking the volitional experience as it stands, it consists in the practical determination of the undetermined. And the practically undetermined is the possible in conduct.

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THE UNSATISFACTORINESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES AND VIRTUES IN MANY OF THE MODERN TREATISES ON ETHICS.[1]

In the early part of the classic "System of Logic," by John Stuart Mill, there is a striking criticism on the part of the author with regard to the list of the "Categories" in the form in which it had come down through the Middle Ages from Aristotle. He speaks of this as a "mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life," and refers to it as being "both redundant and defective." "Some objects," as he says, "are omitted and others repeated several times under different headings. It is

[9] "Logic," Eng. Transl., § 34, p. 203.

[1] The author of this article, the late Walter L. Sheldon, founder and lecturer of the Ethical Society of St. Louis, died June 5th, 1907. This is the last paper he prepared for publication.

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like a division of animals into men, quadrupeds, horses, asses, and ponies." [2]

It may be that Mill was rather severe in his animadversions. Whether students of logic at the present day would agree with him on this point, the writer of this article is not in a position to judge. But on the other hand, these comments do occur to the mind of the reader over and over when applying them in other directions. It is fair, at least, to raise the question whether similar strictures would not have a good deal of significance, for example, if they were passed upon many of the classifications of duties or virtues, that we find in treatises on ethics issued within the last generation. We cannot help thinking every now and then in this connection of that humorous suggestion of Mill as to the division of animals into "men, quadrupeds," etc.

One would not like to say this as a reflection upon the ability or insight of the ethical philosophers of the last half century. On the contrary, some of these men have done as good and as original work as anything which has been done before them, back even perhaps to the time of Plato. At any rate, we feel safe in saying, without contradiction, that beginning with the work of Immanuel Kant in the closing part of the eighteenth century, greater results have been accomplished in ethical research since that time than in all the centuries intervening from the time of the Roman Empire.

We must all admit, however, that the advances made have not been equal in all directions. The insight which has been displayed may have been great or profound along one line and somewhat weak or lame along other lines. Ethical philosophy in its various sub-departments has not moved ahead evenly. Certain problems have proved far more interesting than others and called forth a much greater degree of earnest thinking. On the subject, for instance, of the origin of conscience, the work has been acute and far reaching. The scholar in Germany has reveled in discussing the

[2] J. S. Mill, "System of Logic." Eighth edition. Book I, ch. III, par. 1.

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theme *"Das Wesen und die Entstehung des Gewissens;"* [3] and his colleagues in America and England have grappled with the same issue with a like fervor. More light has come on this phase of the whole ethical problem since the time of Darwin, than came perhaps in all the thousands of years before. The material is there, mapped out and presented for us, upon which to pass judgment. It is a delight to the mind simply to read the discussions on this point as they are presented by the various writers.

Who does not like the subject of "Origins"? In the old days there was not much satisfaction in discussing it because the material was not there in sufficient amount for men to argue about it. Anthropology and comparative psychology had not come into existence as real sciences and brought together their mass of concrete facts to be sifted over and interpreted. Both the biologist and the sociologist are able now to coöperate with the ethical philosopher in working upon this most fascinating problem.

There is, too, the metaphysical element which is naturally absorbing to the philosopher. Along with the problem of origins goes the other fascinating issue as to how ethical questions are connected with the totality, how they are linked in their final stage with the last and universal cosmic problem. We can actually see the writer putting on his armor in the glow of excitement for the fray as the issue is raised, in the language of Carneri: "Ist, und in wie ferne ist bei einem consequentdurchgeführten Determinismus eine ethische Weltanschauung möglich?" [4] Once throw this down as a gauntlet, some of the best and sharpest thinking of which the human mind is capable will be called forth at once. Perhaps men are as wide apart on this point to-day, in spite of all the acute discussion, as they were one hundred years ago. We can, however, take delight and satisfaction in the keenness with which it has been argued and the profound thinking which it has elicited.

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[3] See Theodor Elsenhans. 1894.

[4] B. Carneri, "Grundlegung der Ethik." 1881, Einleitung.

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Furthermore, we shall also be willing enough to recognize the splendid work which has been done in the application of the new or more advanced doctrines of evolution to the problems of ethics. However much men may still disagree on these matters, or whatever may be their disappointment over evolutionary ethics, they must frankly admit that the discussion itself which has been aroused, has been worthy of some of the best intellect this world has ever produced.

Some of the treatises on ethics, therefore, which have been given forth within the last generation, have been monumental in importance, while large numbers of them evince a scholarship and philosophical insight of which the human race need never feel ashamed.

On the other hand, we insist, few and rare would be the instances where the same degree of insight or thoroughness is manifest from the beginning to the end of the work. Over and over again we become aware of a certain "let-down" the instant the writer passes from the more abstract or metaphysical elements of his problem to those which are concrete. The writers seem to be on the heights where they breathe most freely, when treating of the Freedom of the Will, the Idea of the Good, the Meaning of Conscience, the Concept of Duty, or anything which brings in *"Weltanschauung."* As a sheer matter of pleasure in watching a splendid fight on the intellectual side, one might find inexhaustible satisfaction in reading the disputes between the representatives of the standpoints of "Utilitarianism" and "Self-realization." It fairly makes one think of the battle in the skies between the angels, as outlined in magnificent language in "Paradise Lost," by John Milton.

When, however, it comes to the prosaic topic of duties or virtues and how to classify them, we are down from the "heights," on a level which the ethical philosopher half unconsciously regards as commonplace. It would seem in many instances as if he dealt with it or introduced it as a topic, not because he wanted to or cared to do so; but because he had to do it in order to make his work a complete treatise on ethics. The suggestion that animals are made

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up of "men, quadrupeds," etc., is sure to come to one's mind. Instead of taking up the topic in a thorough and systematic way, going into it with acute analysis, it is oftentimes as if the author merely walked around it, looked at it here and there from various sides, touched it in spots and then let it go again.

What shall one say, for instance, of an example to be found in the treatise entitled, "The Principles of Morals," by Thomas Fowler and John Matthias Wilson—men who have held high positions and taken high rank, one may suppose, in the world of philosophy? At the latter part of chapter III, part II, under the title "Resentful Feelings," we come upon the following sentence: "Before bringing this long chapter to a close, it seems necessary to add a few remarks on the virtue or duty of veracity."[5] To come upon language of that kind in such a place is almost enough to make one gasp. He does not imply that the subject necessarily *belongs* at that precise point. He simply indicates that inasmuch as the topic must come in somewhere, this may be as good a place for it as any other. And yet the work as a whole, by its very title deals with "Principles." Now what we should like to know is how this duty or virtue of veracity fits in with the whole system of duties, and what position it has in such a system. This surely is what we have a right to ask from a treatise which deals with principles. It is not enough simply to talk it over a little in connection with "Resentful Feelings." This criticism does not imply that the work of Fowler and Wilson did not have great value, and that there was not much fine and subtle thinking to be found in it. The flaw pointed out is one that tends to pervade many other treatises as well.

In so many words, it would seem as if writers on ethical philosophy had not yet in this special phase of their problem passed beyond the conventional or the traditional stage. In discussions as to the origin of conscience or the "nature of the good," they have taken tremendous strides forward,

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[5] Fowler and Wilson, "Principles of Morals." 1894, Part II, ch. III, p. 161.

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introducing new phraseology, beginning with the problems, as it were, all over again, opening out new vistas which promise much for the future. We feel that in such directions ethics has taken a great new start.

In a work like that on "The Science of Ethics," by Leslie Stephen, there is really a big step taken in advance by the mere coinage of such a phrase as "social tissue." We may not like it or we may be convinced that it led the writer into mistaken theories. But at any rate, by the use of such a term he shook himself free from a mass of entangling language, and was able to take a new start for himself. His treatise will always surely rank as a landmark in "Evolutionary" ethics. He struck out from the old-fashioned, conventional utilitarianism into new pathways.

But, on the other hand, one is rather disappointed when he comes to the consideration of the virtues, in his chapter on "Contents of the Moral Law," that he should have gone back for his classification to a period over two thousand years ago. He is satisfied with "something which corresponds to the ancient doctrine of the cardinal virtues." "It is a method," he says, "which will be sufficient for our purposes." [6] Surely this is disappointing. With all his acuteness and far reaching insight, we might have hoped for new pathways here also. Why could he not have begun over again at this point, as he did with the doctrine of utilitarianism? After two thousand years of effort, is it possible that we cannot do better in classifications than to fall back on Plato? The quantity of the material by which to arrange a new system of virtues or duties is tenfold greater than it was in those early days. It has increased in scope quite as much as the material in the science of biology.

No matter what new suggestions Leslie Stephen may have thrown out in his discussion of this topic, it is disheartening to read the conventional titles of the four classes: I, Courage; II, Temperance; III, Truth; IV, Social Virtues.

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[6] Sir Leslie Stephen, "Science of Ethics." 1882, ch. V, *Contents of the Moral Law.*

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In a treatise that gives so much new material for thinking, we do not quite like to meet with language that speaks of "a method which will be sufficient for our purposes." We ask for the best method, one sufficient for *all* purposes, a new system, in keeping with his advanced standpoint as an "evolutionary utilitarian."

The fact of it is, we feel that he simply was not especially interested in this part of his subject, and that is why he found it easier to fall back on a traditional division, in order to pass over to other problems as soon as possible.

One notices that Professor Mezes has taken just about the same course in his "Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory," published only five years ago. Under the topic of "Objective Morality," we come upon the same old familiar headings which our great-grandfathers would have recognized; "Courage," "Temperance," "Benevolence," "Justice," "Wisdom," "Welfare."[1] Interesting and valuable as his comments may be on each of these virtues, one cannot help saying to one's self: It was the beginning of a new century, a time for a new start; why would it not have been worth while to launch out with a new classification, escaping by this means from the entanglement of traditional or conventional language?

In so many words, in a large number of these treatises, the department of objective ethics is disappointing. There would seem to be a falling off in originality on the part of the writers. They do not appear to enter heart and soul into the issues, nor to grapple with them with the same degree of thoroughness which they display elsewhere.

What if modern psychology were to retain the classifications of bygone times in such detail? How would it seem if, for example, the men at work in that sphere of research were still to divide their books into "Part I, The Body; Part II, The Soul"? What if they retained the conventional divisions usual with Plato or Aristotle? Surely it would make us smile. The vast amount of material which has been gathered

[1] S. E. Mezes, "Ethics." 1901, chs. X-XV.

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by their efforts has called for a new division or a new system. And with this they have developed a new nomenclature. The psychologist of two hundred years ago probably would be bewildered in the extreme in trying to make out the terminology, if he were to come back to life to-day and begin to peruse treatises on that subject published within the last generation. The only answer to him would be: We have passed beyond your divisions, because we have a quantity of material of which you knew nothing at all; we cannot divide animals into "human beings and quadrupeds," etc.; your divisions answered for your day, but not for ours; we are starting in over again.

But the writer on ethics of two hundred years ago might come back and pick up treatises on the subject to which he had devoted himself, and feel quite at home with much of the phraseology. There are the same old headings of the virtues or duties, "Justice" and "Benevolence"; "Duties to One's Self" and "Duties to Others"; "Self-regarding Virtues" and "Social Virtues"; "Temperance," "Prudence" and "Wisdom." He might well say to himself: This is not so bad after all; I am fairly well at home here.

And yet as a matter of fact if the right kind of advance had been made in this particular section of the department of ethics, he ought not to feel at home here. The atmosphere should seem strange to him. We have acquired enough new material to begin over again with our classifications. Ethics is also entitled to its own new nomenclature.

The discouraging feature in all this is the lack of system that we have a right to expect in a sphere of effort which may be looked upon as a separate department of philosophy. In taking up a consideration of the duties or virtues there should be a definite reason why one begins with "Veracity," if that is to be a starting point. And the same would apply to any other topic if it were chosen at the outset in a treatment of this subject. What is the *principle* according to which these virtues or duties should be classified, we ask? Give us a system or table; tell us the one rule according to which you propose to unfold them. Why do you begin first

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with the social virtues, or why do you start first with the self-regarding virtues? Better still, why do you have any such classification as the self and the social virtues? What is the reason that we cannot have a unity of method, a system here into which the parts fit together, just as we have in a treatise on psychology?

We ask that one topic follow another because it *ought* to do so, that one duty be treated "secondly," because according to a system it comes in the second place, and not in the third place.

Take again, for example, the series of "seven commandments" in the otherwise most valuable little "Manual of Ethics," by J. S. Mackenzie. In chapter XI, these are classified as a series of "Respects," for (1) Life, (2) Freedom, (3) Character, (4) Property, (5) Social Order, (6) Truth, (7) Progress.[8] This is all very interesting and would make attractive reading in an old-fashioned essay on "The Commandments." But what are we to say in regard to the remarks with which paragraph IX opens? "I have made no great effort to reduce these commandments to system. It might be a good exercise for the student to work them out more in detail and show their relations to one another." It is just this kind of language that disturbs us. If a writer in ethical philosophy undertakes to introduce a series of commandments at all, has he a right to do it without having a "system"? Otherwise, how can his work rank as a philosophical treatise? Have we not as much right to demand system in these details as in the broader subdivisions of his main theme? A man is entitled to write an "Essay" on one or another phase of ethics, and talk around the subject in a miscellaneous way as much as he pleases. This is precisely what was done all his life by Ralph Waldo Emerson. But under those circumstances, he ought not to call his work a "Manual," or a "Treatise on Ethics," or refer to his work as "Ethical Philosophy." Whether it be a mere "Introduction to Ethics" or a "Treatise," we have a right to

[8] J. S. Mackenzie, "Manual of Ethics." Third Edition, 1892, ch. XI.

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expect thorough system so far as it goes. Whenever there is any kind of a classification, there should also be a unity to it.

All this only means that some of our best and most acute thinkers in ethics have not gone ahead with the same degree of originality, when they come to the particular phase of the classification of duties or virtues. Many of them have not been aroused as yet to the importance of the matter, because of their greater interest in the problem of origins or final ends. They revel in an analysis of the meaning of duty; but are inclined to be bored when it comes to the necessity of outlining the "Duties." Perhaps this is owing to the fact that it would take them into a realm of study to which they are less accustomed. It is hard for the philosopher to get out of his "den."

At the same time we insist that either he should let this phase of his problem alone, or else that he should deal with it with the same thoroughness that he displays in his discussion of "Origins" or "Final Ends." Far better, we should say, leave it out altogether, than make "no great effort to reduce it to system."

On the other hand, we must admit that when the venture is actually made in the effort to give a new classification, it is not always satisfactory. Here, for example, is an attempt on the part of an LL. D., F. R. S. of England—G. Gore, in his work, "The Scientific Basis of Morality." It has a promising and pretentious title. There is a hint in it that there is something better than moral "Philosophy," namely, moral "Science." "A new moral code is wanted," says the writer. And he proceeds to give one in the form of ten "Moral Rules," running as follows: (1) To obey all the laws of nature. (2) To do the greatest good. (3) To preserve our lives and health. (4) To do unto others as we would have them do unto us. (5) To continually improve ourselves and others. (6) To prefer truth to error. (7) To consider beforehand the consequences of our acts. (8) To estimate all things according to their real value and not sacrifice the greater to the less. (9) To proportion the

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fixity of our belief to the scale of the evidence. (10) To acquire wisdom.[9]

This is all very interesting and entertaining. But if it be "science," then we should say at once by all means, in preference give us "philosophy." The analogy at once comes to the mind of the "men and quadruped" division of the animal kingdom. If there is anything in the world that is irritating it is to come upon a man who, because he is enthusiastic over the results of science, undertakes by means of these results to improve on the philosophers by *floundering in philosophy.*

If the new classification we are asking for is to be worked out, it must be done not by the biologist, nor by the physicist, but by the specialist in ethics.

In an earlier treatise published back about the middle of the nineteenth century on "The Elements of Morality," there is a distinction suggested in the preface, which is worthy of consideration. The writer is or was the well-known doctor of divinity, William Whewell, professor of moral philosophy in the University of Cambridge. In his work we have divisions and classifications and subdivisions to our heart's content. The book is devoted to this and nothing else. In the preface, however, he makes an apology for this, as if somehow he were a trifle ashamed of what he was doing, on the supposition that it was not quite in keeping with the dignity of the "chair" he occupied. He proposes, however, to draw the distinction between the elements of morality and moral philosophy. He points out a similar case in the science of geometry. The "elements" here, as he suggests, are made up of a "series of positive and definite propositions, deduced one from another in succession by rigorous reasoning, and all resting upon certain definitions and self-evident axioms." In contrast to this he calls attention to another class of problems: "Whence is the cogency of geometrical proof? What are the faculties by which we become aware of their truth?" [10] and the like. These latter ques-

[9] G. Gore, "Scientific Basis of Morality." 1899, ch. LX.

[10] William Whewell, "Elements of Morality." 1845, Vol. I, Preface.

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tions pertain, as he would imply, to the philosophy of geometry.

So it might be, acording to Whewell, with the distinctions between the elements of morality and moral philosophy. The duties and the virtues would constitute the elements, the ground-work of material, like the propositions in mathematical science. The philosophy of the subject would have to do with the nature and the origin of conscience, the idea of the good, and so forth.

But after examining the efforts of Whewell, one cannot help feeling glad that the distinction did not win its way and prevail. We sigh for a little more "philosophy." We are carried too much into the commonplace with the feeling that we are reading the moralizing comments of an old-fashioned doctor of divinity, rather than the thorough work of a professor of Cambridge University.

It would be a deplorable misfortune if the classification of duties or virtues became an altogether separate department. We should miss the very *philosophical method* that we crave. Happily, later writers have not accepted Whewell's distinction. Most of them continue to bring the "elements" of morality and moral "philosophy" between the same covers as sections of one subject, which they call "Ethics." Whewell's work is on the shelf where it belongs.

When we come to consider the real source of the difficulty, we may find it perhaps in the fact that ethics has not yet shaken itself free from the utility aspect. It has been expected to serve as a handmaid in the cultivation or upbuilding of character. The old phraseology arose or was elaborated chiefly for the purpose of moral training. If the distinctions did not always have their start in this way, the selection was made in the process of time with this purpose in view. The preacher and the teacher have been the great factors in molding the language or fixing distinctions in moral philosophy.

Ethics is perhaps the last stronghold to give way, therefore, to the new spirit. It is only within quite recent times that the change occurred even in the great department of

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psychology. The conventional distinctions in the latter science for long centuries have constituted some of the chief material for religious training. The two main subdivisions of body and soul have been absolutely essential for the purposes of the preacher.

Yet psychology has won its independence, while not interfering with the preacher in the work he aspires to do.

The first thing, therefore, for ethical philosophy to do is likewise to shake off the old traditions and begin all over again in the classification of the virtues and duties. It must rid itself of the "utility" connections and make its divisions or system according to the latest thinking or the most recent acquisitions of facts and experience, as we now possess them.

We do not mean to imply for an instant that the old-fashioned distinctions are to be despised. On the contrary, they will survive for utility purposes forever, beyond any question outliving any new classifications we may happen to make just at this moment. Whatever is done at the present time in this direction must be provisional only.

Psychology, we assume, has passed beyond the distinction of soul and body in the traditional sense. It divides or arranges the psychic experiences in quite a different way. Yet the religious teacher will continue to use the old forms of speech and be justified in using them, we venture to say, in all ages to come. In developing what he would call spiritual culture, these exactly answer his purposes and nothing else will take their place. For him they have a true significance by the emphasis they give to the peculiar ideal he is striving for.

So, too, the old-fashioned precepts in morals, the conventional divisions of the virtues and the duties, the distinctions between self-love and self-sacrifice, duties to self and duties to others, all these answer the purpose of the teacher whose work is moral training or character-culture, far better than any new classification might do. These rules and precepts also have a true significance for his purposes. They are much the best material for him to use in working upon the feelings of the people whom he is seeking to influence. It does not

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matter with him if one rule crosses another. He does not have to be worried about the "men and quadruped" analogy.

If, for instance, moral training ever becomes a department of our public schools, we venture to assert that the old-time distinctions will be used, in spite of anything that may be done in the opposite direction by the ethical philosopher. The precepts to whch we refer are the kind which have grown up out of human experience; and they express in a general way what has been learned through that experience. It will do no harm if the young are taught the maxim of Shakespeare: "Let mercy season justice," whether or no it be correct philosophy.

If the writers on ethics, therefore, will once shake themselves free from these traditions and deal with the same freedom that has been exercised by the psychologist, a great new step will be taken; and we shall be soon rid of the crude or unsystematic classifications of the virtues and duties we meet with in may of the well-known treatises.

It is distressing when, on turning from the work of the school teacher in moral training to that of the university professor, we still find the primeval distinction based on the sentiment of sweet Portia about "mercy seasoning justice." How anyone can clearly and fully define the word "justice" from the philosophical standpoint without making it include "mercy," almost passes comprehension.

Yet if we take up some of the ablest treatises we may suddenly come upon the old division between the duties of benevolence and the duties of justice. If I see a stranger actually dying of hunger, for instance, and there is bread in my hands, "justice" permits me to pass by. But the duty of "benevolence" requires me to share my bread with the starving. If that were the case, whence all the glow of feeling or sentiment through all ages for the word justice?

Even Professor Paulsen, in his able and fascinating treatise, "System der Ethik," still retains something of the old-fashioned classification. He has not quite rid himself of the desire of being the moral teacher, or the wish to do a little preaching while he is working out his system. With him,

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too, we have the division between *"Gerechtigkeit"* and *"Nächstenliebe."* [11] It is on a par with the division of the old-time psychology between body and soul. It is sentimental, but not philosophical. The preacher will continue his injunction in beautiful language, "Do justice and love mercy." But the philosopher must see that we are dealing here with two phases of one virtue.

We have no objection if the ethical philosopher wishes to preach good morals. He may be peculiarly adapted to do this. But it should be done in a separate treatise and not form a part of a *System der Ethik.* The latter is no place to moralize against suicide or dueling. It simply rests with him to place these types of conduct in their proper classification as a part of his system of virtues and vices.

Not long ago the writer of this article undertook to bring together a large number of definitions of justice, chiefly from treatises on ethics. The work was done with considerable pains in the hope that by such a sifting process he would discover the kernel of meaning in this word, as it is commonly employed by scholars.

But the outcome was anything but encouraging. In fact it was amazing to discover the confusion of language in regard to this subject, and the differences of opinion in connection with it. And yet, on the other hand, the disposition on the part of most of these writers has been to hold on tightly to the word, as if they would be at sea in case they had to abandon it. We may, nevertheless, come to the conclusion that ethical philosophy will be obliged to drop the word justice from its nomenclature, precisely as we may have to abandon the conventional precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," when desiring to use precise terminology.

Take, for example, the observation of J. S. Mackenzie in his "Manual of Ethics." "A just arrangement of society may be briefly defined as being one in which the ideal life of all its members is promoted as efficiently as possible." [12] Place

[11] Friedrick Paulsen, "System der Ethik." 1899.

[12] J. S. Mackenzie, "Manual of Ethics." Part II, ch. X, par. 2.

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this over against the celebrated formula of justice from Herbert Spencer: "Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he interferes not with the equal freedom of any other man." [13] In these two standpoints we are as wide as the poles asunder.

The fact of it is, Spencer was trying to be preacher and agitator, while working out an ethical philosophy. It vitiates his entire treatise. He surely was in a position to make a new division and give us a new nomenclature. The best he could do was to torture us with "Egoism" and "Altruism." But it is a very superficial division. We are back to the old point about "mercy seasoning justice." The chapters on "Negative Benevolence" and "Positive Benevolence" have plenty of interesting moralizing, and may be helpful in many ways for the teacher or the preacher. But we cannot help feeling that the great evolutionist was in the old rut nevertheless. The genius for originality which was so conspicuous in his early work appears to have failed him here.

Sidgwick was surely right when he said: "The attempt to map out the region of justice reveals to us a sort of margin or dim borderland, tenanted by expectations which are not quite claims and with regard to which we do not feel quite sure whether justice does or does not bid us satisfy them.[14] One might add that Professor Sidgwick had a way of discovering a "margin or dim borderland" to a good many subjects in ethics.

In fact the whole distinction between self-regarding duties and duties to others seems anything but philosophical in the light of modern investigation, modern sociology, or modern psychology. It is on a par with the conventional division of the self into body and soul, as if there were two halves which could be treated distinctly and dealt with separately and then put together once more as a unity.

Surely every duty that one owes to one's self is also a duty to others. And the duties we owe to others have refer-

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[13] Herbert Spencer, "Principles of Morals." Part IV, 1891, ch. VI.
[14] H. Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics." Second Edition. Book III, ch. V.

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ence also to the self and what is due to the self. We cannot split up the province of duty in this way.

If the division is to be made at all, then the writer of this article is inclined to think that the proper method has been pursued by Höffding. Instead of simply separating the duties or virtues into two classes in this way, he divides his whole work, or the whole province of ethics, into two parts, *"Individuele Ethik"* and *Soziale Ethik."* [15] Whether this is legitimate may be disputed. But at any rate it is far preferable to the other method, provided any distinction of this nature is to be retained.

Professor Mackenzie has an admirable "note on rules of conduct" in which he says: "Experience teaches me that most of those who take up the study of ethics, expect to find in it some cut-and-dried formulas for the guidance of their daily lives." [16] He is right. And it has been very hard for writers in this department not to try to do something to gratify such a desire.

Yet we insist that treatises on ethics, or "systems of ethics," are not the place where one should go to find formulas for the guidance of one's daily life. Such formulas should exist, to be sure, and there ought to be books where one could find them. But they belong to a separate province. Joseph Rickaby, S. J., told the exact truth in his "Moral Philosophy," when he said: "There is no authentic copy of the moral law printed, framed, and hung up by the hand of nature in the inner sanctuary of every human heart. Man has to learn his duties as he learns the principles of health, the laws of mechanics, the construction and navigation of vessels, the theorems of geometry or any other art or science. And he is just as likely to go wrong, and has gone wrong, as grievously in his judgment on moral matters as on any other subject of human knowledge.[17] It was a great step forward in scientific method in dealing with ethics or moral philosophy,

[15] Harald Höffding, "Zweite Auflage der Deutschen Ausgabe." 1901.
[16] "Manual of Ethics," ch. XI.
[17] Joseph Rickaby, S. J., "Moral Philosophy." Third Edition, 1892, ch. VI, sec. 2.

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when this fact was frankly admitted. Men must go to work to discover the practical rules of life and shape them in simple form so that people can use them. Many of these are in proverbs; others are in wisdom gems from the religious literature of the world; still others in the world's poetry. But the classification of duties or virtues to be worked out in a treatise on ethical philosophy should not be of this nature.

It is interesting to see how Martineau struggled with this problem in his "Types of Ethical Theory." He certainly made a desperate effort to work in a new direction through his classification of "the Springs of Action." But one feels after all that what he has to say is not good psychology. The ethical philosopher, though he shall keep his department distinct, should at least be acquainted with the latest results both of psychology and the social sciences. He requires this for his purposes. The classifications of Martineau seem rather stiff and stilted, although it is interesting to see how he was moving in the right direction in the effort to find one principle out of which his classification should flow, or a basis of unity for his division in the rules he gives: "Every action is right which in presence of a lower principle follows a higher; every action is wrong, which in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower." [18]

We are quite aware that there may be a number of conspicuous exceptions to what we have been saying. Surely not all writers are equally confusing on this point. So, too, we may have been sharpest in our criticism on some of those who are the most acute in much of their reasoning on other phases of the ethical problem.

At the same time, we should certainly want to mention one instance where a great writer has taken a new start in a most encouraging way. It is the one who seems to have made every subject he has dealt with luminous with new suggestions and new methods of treatment. Of all the treatises on ethics with which the present writer is acquainted,

[18] James Martineau, "Types of Ethical Theory." Third Edition, Vol. II, Book I, ch. VI, par. 15.

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not one has done so much for a better classification of the duties or virtues as the *"Ethik,"* by Wilhelm Wundt.

First of all Wundt seems to have struck out with a new phraseology. It may be charged that much of what he says implies the old distinctions. But a great deal has been accomplished simply by presenting the subject in new language or in different nomenclature. The chapters entitled *"Die sittlichen Zwecke," "Die sittlichen Motive,"* and *"Die sittlichen Normen"*[19] have impressed the writer of this article as being the most suggestive for a new classification of virtues and duties, so far as his reading goes, of anything that we have had since the time of Immanuel Kant. It is, to be sure, a beginning and nothing else. One can only hope that the workers in ethics in our great universities will take courage from this venture on the part of Wundt and press on and bring this branch of ethics up to a like rank and dignity with the discussions on the origin of conscience and the idea of the good.

If there is any point to the main contention I have been making, then it opens up the question whether the teachers and writers who deal with ethics should not make a greater effort to get together for mutual conference. Ought they not to be definitely organized and meet in annual convention so as to take up some of these problems in a more direct way among themselves? By this method might they not come to a clearer understanding on some of these disputed points and bring all these departments of their main theme up to the level of the most advanced standpoints of modern thinking and research? Would this not be a means of doing away with the unevenness which characterizes the chapters in many of our ethical treatises?

Before men come out in the presence of the public with the results of their work, ought they not to sift the material down and go over it thoroughly in a systematic way among themselves by discussion and argument? Has not the time come for an annual ethical congress? By this is not meant

[19] Wilhelm Wundt, "Ethik." 1886, III, 2, 3, and 4.

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a meeting where men get together in order to address the outside world on subjects of this nature, with any hope or wish of attracting the attention of the public at large to their subject. On the contrary, it ought to be limited strictly to the specialists; and these men should talk to themselves and nobody else.

One cannot help feeling that if a congress of this nature were started, if the university men and writers in this important department were organized for conference, about the first subject they would be called upon to sift down and overhaul, would be just this classification of duties and virtues. Nothing takes the place of personal conference and discussion, where men talk strictly among themselves with no thought or care with regard to the ear of the public outside.

What has been said in this article concerning the confusion and unsatisfactoriness in the classification of duties and virtues may also apply to other features or modern treatises on Ethics. Writers on ethics would find this out soon enough if they came together in an organized body for annual conference. Ethics is now a subject of enough importance to authorize such an independent association. And one can but hope that it will come ere long. By all means let this great department in which so much has been accomplished within the last hundred years take the position of dignity to which it is entitled.

WALTER L. SHELDON.

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FRAGMENTS OF A STATEMENT OF IDEALISM.

This article is a sequel to one called "The Idealist and the Intuitionist," published in the January number of this JOURNAL. In that article, for particular reasons, I suggested that the chief terms of idealist ethics might sometimes be defined as follows: Any object is *good* for a being when it fulfils a need of his, or if actual would fulfil it. I *approve* of an object when I recognize that it would fulfil my need. "This *ought* to be" means "this is what is wanted." *Self-realization* means the greatest possible fulfilment of a being's needs. "Need" was used in the widest and most popular sense; idealism undeniably has much to say about the nature of our needs and of their objects, but for my purpose I suggested that this should be left for a positive element in the doctrine of idealism— a clause in its creed—and need not be taken into the definitions of its terms.

I believe the chief doctrines of ordinary idealist ethics *can* be expressed by this method, though it is certainly not in every way the most suitable. In this article I wish to illustrate it by writing in a desultory way about the doctrines, in that language and from that point of view.

For a prologue, let us examine the analogy on which idealism generally insists between the volitional and the cognitive process. Approaching the subject from our given direction, with the given emphasis on the way in which we work out the satisfaction of our needs, we shall find much help in that analogy.

According to modern psychology, I begin on the cognitive side with a single vague presentation continuum, a blur of the most elementary judgment or belief. Gradually differentiation and detail appear, and the features of the nebula outline and define themselves. I pass along the scale of vagueness from the first, "Something-or-other is," to "This is the case here" and "That is so there," and "A is north of B," and "All men are mortal." The "notion" is gradually transformed into the concept. And throughout I am governed by the idea, more or

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less implicit, of *consistency.* I criticise; I mould my beliefs till they fit in with one another. Incompatible ideas are not merely thrown aside; each is given its fair chance of claiming respect, and one or the other, or an element in both, is likely to succeed. A very obstinate and constant perception probably some day gets the sphere of science modified to suit it. But every now and then an element is simply set aside and given up. It cannot possibly fit in with the rest; our ordered system of belief will admit most of what we tend to believe, but not this. "We cannot allow this," we say; "we must sacrifice it to the rest; it must have been a mistake."

I begin on the conative side with my nature's whole vague mass of craving, as yet undeveloped and undistinguished. Before I can give a name to any object of desire there is the mere "I *want* —." Then this continuum also grows and defines itself and differentiates, and here also through the differentiation the mere psychological unity of mass is turned into the logical unity of system. I add detail; in both spheres one point suggests another. I come, for instance, to desire one thing as means to another, just as I believe one thing as a deduction from another. And just as independent evidence will attest a deduction or a necessary promise, so independent affection springs up for a result of a means. "A pet plan" is no longer merely a plan for the sake of an end.

And here also I order and criticise. I try to mould my world to fit me, to get what is most comfortable on the whole. Bit by bit I try to work out that kind of life which is most satisfactory. Just as the creed worked out by the ordinary man—what he allows himself "really" to believe—covers most of what he has tended to believe, so the practical life worked out will normally give fulfilment to most of his nature. Heredity and bringing-up and common life and common human qualities are as powerful on the one side as on the other.

And yet here also there is sacrifice. One aim must be subordinated to another; one satisfaction given up for the sake of satisfaction on the whole. In both realms we must aim at what works *best.* (On neither side, of course, do we think often of this in the abstract: of self-realization as such, or the

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abstract "fit" of beliefs. We think of the things that concern us, and work at them until they look better.) My present needs, and my present perceptions and reasonings, are partly discordant amongst themselves. Therefore, just as my present self cannot be perfectly realized, so neither can my world of belief be made without fault; "the realization of the object" cannot yet be perfect. On the other hand, mere asceticism and narrow-mindedness are one; for that is not a good system of science or philosophy which flings aside a hundred old beliefs as "false," ignoring the part of them which could still be fitted on and could improve the whole.

The process on both sides must be largely a matter of instinct and tact. We have a good accumulation of general knowledge as to methods which generally answer, but we cannot formulate rules to cover details of special cases. Even accident and empiricism constantly come in. We construct a theory to account for a few little facts, and suddenly find it accounting for the puzzles of our whole life. We get a thing almost by chance, and only then discover how much and for how many reasons we wanted it.

The analogy may be pushed further in two rather helpful ways.

In the first place, we are left in both cases with our descriptions somewhat incompletely explained. Except in the simplest cases, we cannot properly explain or explicitly justify our statement that one state or event fulfils our needs *more* than another. Our intuition is still at the level below and not above that of understanding and discursive thought. Our instinct is to speak in terms of unit of need and unit of fulfilment, to find some measure of importance and some expression for relations, to show what value comes from the different kinds of wholes in which parts are combined. But sheer ignorance prevents us from doing it. Are we not in exactly the same position with regard to "a more satisfactory system" in science or philosophy or the details of daily life? We cannot say what we mean by claiming that the other theory left "more" facts unaccounted for, or more important facts. We cannot interpret the giving "due" weight to every piece of evidence. We can only say

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obstinately, "This *is* better. . It is more convincing, for it convinces more."

And secondly, there is a further step to be taken in both realms.

Our inadmissible judgments and needs are by no means always the important things that I may have made them sound. A dozen times in a month, perhaps, we bring out a sum to the wrong answer, or we think we see a friend who is really elsewhere, or think we hear a cup break which is afterwards found whole; and when confuted we simply say "it must have been a mistake," and never think of it again. Yet in these sacrificed fragments there still lurks a certain minute danger to the system of our beliefs. We might be made uncomfortable by somebody's persistently referring to the inexplicability of the impressions described; we might be bullied thus into doubting the best established system; and there would then be a distinctly pleasurable sense of increased safety in discovering a nearly invisible mend in the cup, or in learning that the friend in question happened to have acquired the power of occupying two places at the same time.

Therefore we must notice the one way in which the danger is prevented and the obstacle entirely removed—left no longer at the critic's disposal. This one way is the process of *accounting for our mistakes.* A dozen times in a day we make mistakes and explain them, and then have no slightest inclination to believe the thing any more. We are satisfied when we see the broken plate which accounts for the noise, or get a nearer view of the stranger whom in the distance we took for our friend.

The analogy in the conative sphere is that of the *extinction* of a need. All needs are not fixed and permanent things, any more than all beliefs. Not only may I sacrifice a desired object, but I may cease to want it at all.

Complete truth would account for all conflicting notions, and I suppose a perfectly realized self would have all its desires extinguished whose satisfaction could not be allowed. In one sense there would be "self-realization" in any state which fulfilled this condition, but of course this is not the full sense of

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the self-realization at which we aim. We try primarily to get, not absence of dissatisfaction, but as much satisfaction as possible.[1]

After these preliminaries, I will go on to state and discuss in my own language what I take to be a chief part of the doctrine of idealist ethics.

To put it very shortly to begin with: Idealists conceive a certain condition or process of life in the world, to which every person is thought of as contributing. The perfect condition, they say, they cannot describe, but they know its direction; or, as we may put it equally well, they know pretty well the form that the process should take at this point, though not the exact completion of it; and they describe it in some detail. The process thus described, they say, satisfies the needs of the whole world better than any other could do. And in his special share in this one process—in the duties of his station thus conceived—lies the self-realization of every person in the world.

Popular ways of thinking conform to a great extent with a rough belief in this doctrine, and the cognitive analogy is again interesting. We assume in daily life that normal human beings all want much the same thing, just as we assume that they all believe much the same thing. The authority of others weighs greatly with regard to what is satisfying, just as it weighs greatly with regard to what is true. A person is called feeble-minded when he shares his fundamental perceptions with us, but has not the strength to hold them all together in a well-organized system of thought. He is "morally feeble" when he wants the same kind of life as we, but has not the energy to get it. On the other hand, if a man's world of thought clashes irreconcilably with our own, we set him aside and call him a lunatic. And if a man seems to have wants which are really and fundamentally different from ours, we call him a lunatic too, and send him to Broadmoor. Where lunacy is absent, needs like ours are assumed, and therefore reasonable action is

[1] It is interesting to notice that we do not always try to distinguish a desire which is not to be fulfilled. *E. g.*, when we have decided to do without the presence of a friend, our loyalty is dissatisfied if we cease to miss him.

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supposed the same for all. "Don't be *silly*" is what we say to a naughty child, and a wicked man is one who has "played the fool."

Such rough belief in the doctrine of the common good is fairly universal, but an exact belief is much harder, and it may even be questioned by some whether we really need it. Are we bound to say, for instance, that in all possible circumstances, and in every stage of his education or of his degradation, a man would find the greatest fulfilment of his needs in the action which contributed to that state which we conveniently call "the good of the whole?" would find it there even though the action involved his annihilation the moment after? (For individual immortality is not usually assumed.)

Well, T. H. Green said that there would be no discrepancy between the individual's good and the good of the whole, and he also said that the characteristic of good was to satisfy desire. But he never actually defined good as satisfaction, or said that our greatest good satisfied us most. So that, although he would have to say that the individual would always find his greatest good in promoting the good of the whole, he is not committed to saying that he would always find in that way the greatest fulfilment of his needs. Is it fair for me to get this second statement by inserting my own definition of "good," and to propose that the result be still called idealism?

At any rate, I will go on to examine what the adoption of the doctrine actually involves. To what do we commit ourselves if we assert that the paths of private and public good, in any sense of good, are invariably the same?

Something can be done by appealing to "sanctions," to motives of purely "selfish" interest; it is broadly true that things will be made uncomfortable for us if we misbehave badly. But these motives are certainly not sufficient to secure exact coincidence, and idealism has laid very little stress on them even so far as they go. If the proposed doctrine were only one of coincidence by means of these, it would have no right at all to a place.

Much more can be done by pointing out how large a proportion of men's desires is for objects which are public as well as

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private goods. We do actually wish for knowledge and beauty for their own sakes, and we wish for the welfare of our family and friends, and for peace and order and kindness apart from the benefit they bring to our "private selves," and we desire to do what we can to promote all this. We desire these concrete objects, which, according to the idealist, are parts of that best life of the world which he describes. Our "selfish" goods no doubt are also part, but an indefinitely smaller part.[2]

Yet even so we cannot be certain that discrepancy will *never* occur. We need more than we have yet got.

And more can be found. It is evident that in many men at any rate, there is a desire more fundamental than all these endeavors for concrete things, in the sense that if necessary these would be sacrificed to it. That is the desire for the good of the whole *as such*. By such a desire many men will test the propriety of satisfying all the others, and any concrete object would be given up on proof that in the case in question it was not for the good of the whole.

Now if idealism were fanciful enough to claim that this was the *only* desire in the normal man, it would leave us without any special content for the good life (in any sense of good), for every particular object would be indifferent to everybody. But if we claimed that it was so present and fundamental in every man that he desired nothing *in comparison* with it, that he would always pursue his own self-realization in case of conflict by sacrificing other things for its sake, then we should have an infallible method for securing coincidence between private and public good.

We cannot claim a universal conscious desire of the sort, but we might claim a universal need, and I believe that idealism must do so. It is not the only thing that the typical idealist maintains, for he has always stood for the greater weight—the greater fundamentalness and importance in human nature—of

[2] Suppose even a commonplace man, believing himself as selfish as he believes others, to be convinced that he is to die on August 6th and the world to end on August 7th. Apart from all thoughts of his own immortality, he will be much more excited about the second date. I owe this observation to a friend.

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what we call the "higher" wants in the whole scale, in comparison with the lower. But without the final fundamentalness of this highest need we should have no *security* for the absolute coincidence we seek. The doctrine cannot be shortly or nearly stated. "When we come near to feeling our needs as they actually are, so that our conscious desires correspond to them, we desire all such things as are good, and amongst these we desire especially such as are honorable and pure and lovely and of good report, and therefore these will make up the greater part of that life which is the good of the whole. But beyond all these we desire that abstract good, and, for the man who knows what he really wants, every special object of pursuit is tested by its relation to this."

Idealism, then, is the expression of a supreme faith in human nature. What a man *really* wants, it is said, is "to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure, in the interests of some form of human society." And all this he wants only in subordination to his pursuit of the good of the universe, though not only as means to this end.

Notice that we are not claiming that every man will find his greatest pleasure in promoting the good of the whole. I had rather avoid even the word "satisfaction," if that carries a reference to conscious emotion. We mean only that if a man knew the world and himself, and *felt* himself all through, he would desire this, and its attainment would then give him the greatest possible satisfaction, and he would choose it for the only possible reason, because he wanted it. (When these explanations are gone through, my statements seem to become so like those of ordinary idealism that it is hardly worth while to make them afresh.) And since it is only this greater knowledge and realization that is required for him to make that choice, we say that his *needs* are of this nature all along. But we imperfect beings work largely, not by feeling our deepest needs but by remembering them or guessing at them or taking them on trust; it is only in hours of insight that we feel them vividly and clearly. Hence the apparently intellectualist character of much morality. I do a thing not because I want itself but because I approve of

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it, *viz.*: know that I really need it. I remember Philip sober, and do what he would wish. A modern Platonist might say that justice was the memory of love.

In connection with this self-realization of individuals through a common good, we ought to bring the subject into relation with what idealists have said about the "General Will."

"The General Will," says Dr. Bosanquet,[3] "is the will of the whole society 'as such,' or the wills of all individuals 'in so far as' they aim at the common good. It is expressed in law, 'in so far as' law is what it ought to be; and sovereignty 'as such,' *i. e.* when truly itself because rightly acting for the common interest, is the exercise of the General Will."

I think that Dr. Bosanquet's whole treatment of the subject implies that the "common good" aimed at must be primarily the common good "as such," the *abstract* good of the whole which we spoke of before. It is not enough that an object sought, *e. g.* a political measure, should just *happen* to be for the good of the whole. A man who promotes this measure only for the sake of his private interests has not the General Will acting in him. When this is present all concrete objects of desire will be sought with the qualification (of course not often explicit or fully conscious) "in so far as they do tend to the good of the whole." We need not say that the General Will is *merely* the will for the abstract common good; it can include the will for all concrete objects so far as subordinated to this. When a man acts in this spirit, we may conveniently say that the General Will is acting in him; and this even though he may err greatly in his idea of the concrete embodiments of the common good.

By far the most serious kind of error will occur in the case of the General Will of a limited group, whose members have not recognized that the group itself can only find its true good in subordinating itself to the world which includes it. A man may be willing to annihilate his private self in the service of his family or his church or his nation, but not perceive that these can truly prosper only by annihilating themselves, if necessary,

[3] "The Philosophical Theory of the State," page 107.

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in the service of the universe. For instance, I vaguely remember meeting in an old magazine with an article called "Hands off Trinity," in which the author contended that the duty of some commission or committee was simply to act for the good of Trinity College, Dublin, as opposed to acting for the good of education or of Ireland.[4]

Of course language creates a difficulty here. The annihilation spoken of, according to idealism, may be the good of every individual in the group, and be the good even for them as a group; be what they were all born for. But the title of "Trinity College," or of "England," or of "the North Western Railway Company," seems given to the group in a certain *aspect,* and the good of the world may involve that aspect ceasing to exist. It seems hard to say that this is still the good of the college or the country or the company. But we must insist that it is the good of the group of human beings which bears the name.

I take it that it is this kind of mistake to which Dr. Bosanquet refers on page 327 of "The Philosophical Theory of the State." "The nearest approach which we can imagine to public immorality would be when the organs which act for the State, as such, exhibit in their publication, on its behalf, a narrow, selfish, or brutal conception of the interest of the State as a whole, in which, so far as can be judged, public opinion at the time agrees (*e. g.,* if, with the knowledge of Parliament, and without a protest from it, a price were offered for the killing of a hostile statesman or general). In such a case the State, as such, may really be said to be acting immorally, *i. e.,* in contravention of its main duty to sustain the conditions of as much good life as possible. This case must be distinguished, if I am right, from the case in which the individuals acting as the public authority, are corrupted in their own private interests not shared with the public. For then the case would rather be that the State, the organ of the public good, had not been given a chance to speak, but had simply been defrauded by those who spoke in its name."

[4] My remembrance is exceedingly vague, and if I do anybody injustice, I apologize.

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We must, however, distinguish two further possibilities in the given case of the State's immoral action. A supporter, if questioned, might say that it was for the good of the whole world that each country should receive unqualified service from its members, including the authorized assassination of hostile statesmen. This would presumably be a mistake, but a much deeper mistake would appear if the supporter of the action maintained that a country for its own good need look to itself only, and did not necessarily find that good in the service of the world. Yet even here, if the patriot seeks his country's good as such, the General Will of that country is acting in him, though the mind which guides it errs grievously.

To return to the general idealist doctrine. We may state it now in new terms by saying that the General Will of the universe is fundamental in every man, so that his self-realization can only be found in endeavoring to carry it out. And his will for his own greatest good, and the general wills of every group of human beings that we like to pick out, will, if enlightened, seek mutually consistent and largely coincident objects; and all these wills will exercise themselves in that life of the universe which is its greatest good, since all will have in them the qualification, "Nothing is to be sought which conflicts with the good of the whole."

Good is what we want; we want mostly the things that the whole world wants in common; and what we want most of all is the service of the world. For some moralists the fulness of virtue lies in whole-hearted living according to a law, and the weakened form is resolute obedience. For idealism, from our point of view, the fulness of virtue would reside in a being who was in love with the universe, and the weakened form of it is loyalty.

Finally, how is this doctrine to be proved?

Evidently there is no empirical way; it must stand or fall along with a system of metaphysics. Of course we really have exactly the same sort of thing to establish in the cognitive sphere, for only metaphysics justifies us in assuming that all rational beings will think in terms of causation, and admit that $2+3=5$. Science does not begin by proving the necessity of

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its categories or justifying the "evidence" of the senses. It says, "You think at bottom on the same methods as we, and see the same when you look in the same direction. Here are the results of such methods and such looking." So in morals, "You really want the same sort of thing as we want; here are institutions and histories showing you how it works out." Science and morals turn into philosophy when they begin examining the categories themselves. And in both realms we may begin not only to examine but to question; the intellectual skeptic asks, "Why should I think in terms of causation?" the ethical skeptic, "Why should I want to be moral?" Historical answers on both sides have appealed to "association," but the answer of idealism has to go deeper than that.

Attempts have been made to do without metaphysics. For instance, it is sometimes said that the kind of good we seek is the only one which can possibly be desired because the only "coherent ideal;" or again, there is a very curious little logical and psychological proof, "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy" (pages 132-139), which has disappeared in Professor Royce's later works. I cannot think that any of these succeed. The universality of the needs that are in question can only be proved by reference in some form or other to "the divine principle within us." Ethical manuals, however, when they profess to give a metaphysical justification, often curtail it so much that it is of practically no use to the beginner. Take, for instance, Mr. D'Arcy's "Short Study of Ethics," page 102: "If all persons form a true community, then the end of one must be the end of each and of the whole. All persons are mutually exclusive . . . yet are they one in God. Hence the good for the whole is the good for every separate member. The *True Good* for every man is a *Common Good* and an *Absolute Good.*" This is evidently insufficient for a proof with my sense of "good," though Mr. D'Arcy could indeed hardly have been required to provide for that sense. What is needed for my purpose is, to put it with extreme crudeness and popularness, a statement of some such doctrine as the following: We are all incarnations of God in such wise that we share with one another most or all of the wants which mark out the

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life He wills, and that in particular we have fundamental in us God's aim after the *greatest* fulfilment of His needs. So our self-realization can only be involved in His, for each of us has God's qualification at the bottom of him—"seek this and that, but not further than they tend to my good," to the greatest good of the whole, which whole God is. As a man's "true" thoughts are what God thinks, so his "true" satisfaction is what satisfies God.

I need hardly say that I do not propose seriously to attribute ordinary desire and temporal conation to the Absolute. Yet such a popular statement as the above, with due emphasis on its popular nature, would, I believe, in a manual of ethics do more good than harm.

I have tried to state some fragments of idealist ethics consistently in terms reached by adopting a special point of view. It is not a very easy task; because the results sound heretical every now and then, and yet, when explanations enough are supplied, they seem to become quite indistinguishable from clumsy expressions of the ordinary versions of the doctrine. I am not sure that it is a good point of view at all for the philosopher; there are too many obscurities behind the popular terms. For instance, I have never defined "need," only described it as that which underlies desire; and then there are all the exceedingly difficult questions as to how far a man can be said to have a need when at present he is incapable of feeling the corresponding desire, and what "greatest fulfilment of needs" can mean when quantitative measurement is out of the question. So that I do not think philosophy is likely to profit much by what I have suggested. On the other hand, this seems to me a possible way for the beginner to approach idealist ethics. It is the way in which I got there myself—if what I have reached is indeed, as I think it is, idealism. It has the advantage for a novice of seeming very clear to him at the beginning, and revealing its obscurities by natural degrees as his metaphysical insight grows. But if it is not to be adopted, I think idealist teachers ought to consider very carefully some other way in which the doctrines may be explained in their manuals, or else postpone to the

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post-graduate stage all courses of moral philosophy. For at present I believe that the ethical student who has not studied metaphysics, and especially one who wishes to distinguish between idealism and modern intuitionism, simply does not know what idealist ethics means.

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THE ETHICS OF GAMBLING.

The extent of gambling at the present time, and the great and insidious evils which result from it, make the discussion of the subject of interest, not merely to the theoretical moralist, but also to everyone who desires to preserve the purity of national and social life. Of the extent of betting and gambling in England, B. Seebohm Rowntree says, "the practice has spread so widely among all classes of the community that those who know the facts name gambling and drinking as national evils of almost equal magnitude." [1] There is abundant evidence that gambling is almost if not equally as prevalent in the United States. One has only to think of the organization which is dependent on horse-race gambling: the army of bookmakers, and the space given in the newspapers to tips on the races; of the bucket shops and their attendant consequences of ruin and crime; and of the more respectable forms of gambling with raffles, lotteries and social games of cards, to realize that the subject has direct practical significance. The ethical principles underlying gambling and their application to activities of which gambling forms a part deserve careful consideration.

In this discussion, then, the attempt will be made, first, to define gambling and to discover its ethical implications; and second, to apply the principles already discovered to some

[1] B. Seebohm Rowntree, "Betting and Gambling: a National Evil." The Macmillan Company, London, 1905, p. 7.

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of the forms of activity which are related to gambling, and especially speculation.

It may be said with truth that all life is a wager. Only the self-confident philosopher who is certain of his interpretation of the world, and the unreflective man, fail to see the hazard in life. Pascal's famous wager in which he calculated the relative advantage of acting on the assumption that God did or did not exist, expresses well the fact that life consists in the acceptance of risks. The man who accomplishes anything must be a man of faith and not too much occupied in reckoning up the chances of failure. To give but a single example, the choice of a profession involves a risk which may make one pause, when one sees the misfits of life: the preachers who should be in business, the business men who should have been teachers, and the teachers who should have been farmers. It is sufficiently evident, then, that the mere element of risk is not a unique characteristic of gambling. Such universal risk, grounded in the limitations of our knowledge, and in the uncertainty of the actions of other men, evidently does not constitute a basis for moral approval or disapproval.

There is a particular kind of risk which is inherent in the organization of social life under the competitive *régime*. To some extent at least under this form of organization the gain of one man is the loss of another. But even so the loser, though he fails to get the prize, does not, as in gambling, furnish the prize to the winner. On the contrary he may receive a prize himself, though not the one he is striving for. The unsuccessful contestant for a scholarship prize, for example, disciplines his mind so that he is able to win some other reward as a result of his effort, and society in general profits greatly by the heightened standard of achievement which results from the struggle. For such competition consists in courageously pitting human powers against the natural and inevitable obstacles to human welfare. Patient effort, skill and foresight are developed, and the lot of man is vastly better than it would be were the incentive of competition wanting.

Now, although gambling is sometimes made to include the

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class of actions above specified, it is better to confine it to a narrower use.

Gambling has been defined as the "transfer of property made through the medium of chance,"[2] or again as "the determination of the ownership of property by appeal to chance."[3] Another says similarly that gambling involves first an uncertain issue, and second the backing of one's opinion as to the result. These definitions are essentially the same. They are, however, somewhat broader than the usage adopted in this discussion. In fact, these writers themselves distinguish between a broad and a narrow use of the term, and confine their ethical discussion to the word in its narrow use.

The characteristics of gambling in the narrower use of the term may be described as follows: In the first place, the prize of the winner comes directly out of the pocket of the loser; second, the connection between the prize and the wager is not a natural condition of social life, but is arbitrarily fixed; third, the element of chance is not a subordinate, but a predominant element in the transaction; fourth, the practice of gambling causes disorganization of character in the participants; and finally society as a whole receives no benefit, since there is no production of added utility, but on the contrary suffers severely through the deterioration of its members. The last two characteristics are, strictly speaking, not defining connotations, but they are unvarying consequences, and so may be discussed together with the *differentiæ* of gambling. We may now consider the ethical significance of these facts and from this consideration form an opinion as to the general practice of gambling.

The first characteristic of gambling which we have to note is that the gains of the winner come out of the pocket of the loser. Though this is one of the chief characteristics of gambling, not every action of which it is characteristic is gambling. The same thing can be said, for example, of a gift

[2] Lester B. Donahue, "The Ethics of Gambling." Catholic University Bulletin, October, 1906.

[3] John A. Hobson, "The Ethics of Gambling." International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XV, p. 135.

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given grudgingly. But many actions of which this seems at first sight to be true turn out upon closer examination to involve reciprocal exchange. In the case of a typical gift, that is, one which is given freely, there is a great difference in the attendant attitude of mind of the giver and recipient from that of the winner and loser of a bet. The giver of a gift does not feel that he is losing anything, but rather thinks that "it is more blessed to give than to receive." When we consider this more deeply then, it becomes evident that the benefit is not one-sided at all as in the case of gambling. The giver but ministers to the tie between himself and his friend, of which the gift is only the expression. The *thing* is not the object of desire to either the giver or the recipient of the gift. The whole transaction therefore makes for the knitting together of social beings.

The same principle holds of commercial transactions. It is a perfectly possible and in fact the normal condition of buying and selling that each party should receive something which is worth more to him than what he gives in exchange. Each may therefore aim at the gain of the other and of himself at the same time.

With the gambling wager the reverse is the case. What one loses the other gains. There is no mutual exchange. The desire of the one is that the other shall lose. Since the reward does not come from a third party it is impossible that the gambler should desire his own benefit and that of his opponent at the same time. Gambling, then, in the nature of the case causes a loosening of social ties. It sets each man's hand against his brother and thus is of the very essence of immoral action.

The second condition, that the connection between the prize and the wager is not a natural condition of social life, but is arbitrarily fixed, makes impossible the plea of necessity as a justification. There is no rational relation, for instance, between the election of a President of the United States or the winning of a football game, and the exchange of five dollars from A's pocket to B's pocket.

This feature is very closely connected with the feature of

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chance as a determination of ownership, though it is not identical with it. Arbitrariness might conceivably exist with very little chance, as it would if a person should bet that a stone would not fall to the ground if released. As a matter of fact, however, the bettor believes that there is good chance that he will win, though there is not always good ground for his belief. When the likelihood that one party to the wager will win becomes so great as to amount to a practical certainty, the transaction from his point of view loses the character of gambling. The owner of a roulette, for instance, or a bookmaker does not gamble, though the men who play the roulette or back the horse unquestionably do. What the action of the roulette owner or bookmaker is is beside the point, but it would seem to be not a very distant cousin from stealing.

These three features of gambling, the one-sided gain, the arbitrariness and the chance, since they constitute one manner of the determination of the ownership of property, involve a consideration of the ethical principles of the ownership of property.

Viewed from one aspect the ownership of property entails social division. As the owner of property one man's interests are antagonistic to those of his fellow men. But in the *conditions of acquiring ownership* there is a common tie. Socialism emphasizes the first of these principles, but leaves out of account the second. The natural right to property in the first instance, then, as Mr. Hobson points out,[4] lies in its relation as a reward to effort, both in that it supplies the means to consumption, and to recuperation after effort, and in that it supplies a motive to effort. Now so long as individuals lived an entirely independent life, each supplying his own needs, the industry and effectiveness of one individual did not concern the welfare of the others. But so soon as there arose a division of labor and community of effort, the condition which underlies effort, namely possession of property, became a matter of social interest. The conditions which govern the acquirement and exchange of property must consist in rela-

[4] *Loc. Cit.*

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tions of reward to effort which are natural, and not merely arbitrary, and they must result in mutual benefit to all parties concerned. Gambling violates both of these conditions and is therefore subversive of social solidarity.

This conclusion is strengthened when we consider the results of gambling upon the character of the gambler and as a consequence upon society in general. The daily papers frequently report cases which illustrate the moral deterioration of a gambler. An unofficial record, which is incomplete and therefore understated, shows that in Great Britain alone, "in five and one half years no less than 80 cases of suicide, 321 embezzlements, and 191 bankruptcies had appeared on the records of the courts owing to professional betting, and it must be pointed out that probably not nearly all of the embezzlements resulted in prosecution."[5] The writer recently heard of a respected citizen, ex-mayor of his city, a prominent church member, who was brought to penury through speculation in bucket shops, and afterwards confessed that speculation had such a fascination for him that he could not resist it.

The passion then is seen to have a force comparable to the delusions or fixed ideas of the insane and to entail a similar disorganization of the mind. The person under the control of the gambling mania loses the ability to reason correctly from the facts, the interpretation of which is tinged by his dominant desire. This intellectual breakdown is shown by the common belief in luck among gamblers, and in the tendency to form systems with which to break the machine. The decay of the moral nature is even more terrible. Made cold to all feelings of generosity, the gambler in whom the habit has taken deep root is given up to the selfish indulgence of his private desires, the gratification of which is based on the ruin of his fellow beings. Worse yet, the effect is not limited to the individual but "causes the neglect of wives and children, disregard for parents, and carelessness and indifference in their occupations." This is but a natural result of the fact that gambling is a

[5] John Hawke, *The Extent of Gambling*, in "Betting and Gambling: a National Evil." Ed. by B. Seebohm Rowntree, p. 20.

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wholly selfish process and so unfits a man for his duties as a member of society or of the state.

But there is still another count against the gambler, in that, in so far as he is a gambler and is successful, he abstracts from the resources of society without furnishing any utility in return. He is indeed a parasite, and that by deliberate choice. There is no place in the moral scheme for voluntary parasites.

This indictment may appear to be too rigorous, and it may be said that only when gambling transgresses certain proper restrictions is it to be condemned. The mere fact that the stake comes out of one man's pocket to go into that of another—that is, that there is no true exchange—that the stake is arbitrary, and that the ownership of property is determined by chance, does not make it immoral, the objection may run. It is only when the participants in a wager do not own the property which they stake, or there is fraud or violence, or the chances of winning are unequal, or the risk is inconsistent with the duties or calling of the participants, or there is a positive law against the transaction, that gambling is morally wrong. These are the rules given by John A. Ryan,[6] under which gambling may be permissible, but he hastens to add that it is practically impossible to gamble without violating some of these rules. His practical conclusion then would be the same as that reached in this discussion, though his theoretical position is at variance.

But it may be objected that these conclusions do not apply to gambling for the fun of it, merely putting up stakes to add an interest to the game. Perhaps it may be conceded that they do not, provided one's whole object is to add zest to the sport and one's desire does not center upon the stake. This question will be treated in more detail below.

The causes of gambling are not pertinent to the question at issue except to forestall a possible argument that since gambling is grounded in the fundamental structure of man's nature it must be moral to allow the gambling instinct some

[6] John A. Ryan, "The Ethics of Speculation." International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XII, p. 335.

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expression. Man cannot stand too much monotony. *Ennui* infects the laboring man confined to a dull mechanical task which calls for no ingenuity and permits of no variation, as well as the "idle rich." The mainspring of gambling is not avarice according to J. Ramsay MacDonald,[7] though that enters into it, nor merely the pleasure of possession, but the desire to "charm *ennui* away." In his words, "The intellectual appetite for risk, for projecting one's self on to the silent stream of fate, upon which the barque of life mysteriously floats, must be satisfied either legitimately or illegitimately, either in accord with sound morals or in the teeth of sound morals." This account undoubtedly does explain psychologically a great part of the cause of gambling, but there are many other ways of relieving the dull monotony of daily routine besides gambling. Any action requiring courage will do so, and a much nobler courage is developed in pitting one's powers against difficulties in actual achievement than in throwing one's possessions blindly into the hand of fate.

To sum up, then, gambling has been found to destroy the solidarity of social life and to make of men anti-social individuals, because, first, it is founded on anti-social feelings and aims, namely, the desire for gain at the expense of another; second, it involves exchange of property on a false basis, rendering the condition of coöperative life less secure; and third, it entails great disorganization of mind and character with its consequent social evils.

Having attempted to show that gambling as here defined is subversive of morality we now turn to the second part of our task, namely, the application of the principle thus laid down to some of the practices of modern life which involve or seem to involve gambling.

The operations which involve gambling may be divided into three classes: first, gambling in sport; second, gambling which is sport for one party and business for the other; and third, gambling in business. Under the first head would come bet-

[7] J. Ramsay MacDonald, *Gambling and Citizenship,* in "Betting and Gambling," etc., pp. 117-134.

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ting at cards and games, under the second betting on horse races, as it is usually practiced, lotteries, raffles, etc., and under the third, insurance and speculation.

In pure cases of gambling for sport the actual stake is of no consequence to the participants. The sole object is the excitement of the game. Theoretically, perhaps, as has already been said, it is a question whether such gambling is unethical when the zest does not involve desire for the stake. But the question is purely a theoretical one, for it is not likely that such cases ever actually exist. At any rate if they do they very easily change their character. An anti-social factor enters. The gambler plays for the stake, and this means playing so that the opponent will lose the stake. It is impossible to gamble with the aim of mutual satisfaction unless the sole object is the pleasure of the game. Both can participate in that and in that only. The selfish spirit which enters with the desire for the stake very easily leads to unfair methods and from this to general disregard of social ties and duties.

Prominent types of betting in the simplest form are found in betting on games, such as foot-ball games, betting on elections, or betting at cards. The last form is said to be spreading, especially among women of the leisure class. Ian Maclaren, in an address, told of a young woman, the wife of a professional man, who when the guest of an older woman, was urged to enter a game of bridge against her wishes. She demurred on the ground that she was not a sufficiently good player. On being urged, however, she entered the game and lost $175 during the evening. Another case was that of a young man who was a guest at an aristocratic mansion and who at first declined to play, but on being told that he might play or leave, lost in a few hours "half a year's income." These examples are sufficient to show that the question is not one of merely academic interest and substantiate the statement that the passion for gambling is apt to carry its victim beyond the observance of social good and even of common courtesy.

The next class of gambling operations includes those in which the aim of one party is business and the aim of the

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other sport. That is, one man depends largely on chance for his gains while the other does not. We may take, for example, lotteries, raffles, betting on horse races and gambling machines. The general principle underlying all these forms is that the person who is managing the game has it so arranged that he is sure to win. Whether the proprietor is a saloon keeper, a bookmaker, a nation, or a church, the principle is the same. By arousing the gambling spirit, the desire for gain at the expense of somebody else, or regardless of the loss of somebody else, the institution which is maintaining the game derives its profits. That a practice which thus takes advantage of human weakness for gain is anti-social, is evident on the face, and the fact that the element of chance is absent on the one side makes it worse instead of better than gambling. This is the confession of a professional bookmaker whose conscience is not likely to have been made over acute by his manner of life: "I am not happy—sometimes far from it. Conscience will make itself heard. Often and often am I troubled with thoughts of the past—memory will assert itself—and the questions arise, have I led a fair and upright life? Have I got my money and living in an upright, honorable manner? How many poor foolish backers whose money I have taken, taken as a business of course, have lost homes, business and all; whose wives and children have been turned into the streets through the father's passion for betting? How many of them have found their way to gaol through betting, and how many have sought self-destruction?" [8]

The last class includes those forms of business in which gambling has or may seem to have a prominent part. The two forms which will be discussed are insurance, and speculation on stock and produce exchanges.

Life and fire insurance are sometimes called gambling. It will be profitable, then, to examine briefly wherein insurance resembles gambling and wherein it differs from it. In fire and accident insurance the insured pays a certain fixed amount

[8] *The Deluded Sportsman*, by a Bookmaker, in "Betting and Gambling," etc., pp. 92-116.

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to the company upon the promise of the insuring company to pay a larger sum in return in case of fire or accident. Here we are evidently dealing with chance. The chance, however, is tempered with foresight based on experience, as is made evident by the fact that the amount of the premium is based on the conditions which surround the object insured. Again the prize seems to come out of one man's pocket and to go into the pocket of another. But here again there are important qualifications. In case of a loss the insurance company has received in the premium which has been paid part return, and when all its risks are averaged the balance comes out in its favor. So it is assured of a fair return for its service. Moreover the buyer of insurance, even if he does not receive in return the money he paid in, does receive substantial gain in the peace of mind and the financial credit which insurance gives him.

So far there has been some likeness to gambling, but in other features there is no similarity. The risk in insurance is not an arbitrary or artificial product as it is in gambling, but is a necessary condition of social life. In this respect insurance is in striking contrast to gambling. Again, there is no deteriorating effect on the character of the individual, because the anticipation of profit is not one-sided. And finally, the practice is of enormous benefit to society in general. It is largely due to the money received from insurance that a city like San Francisco, after being almost entirely destroyed, can be built up again. On every count, then, fire and accident insurance are radically different from gambling, and in some they are diametrically opposed to it.

Other types of insurance have still less likeness to gambling. In ordinary life insurance the premium is graded to the risk still more completely than in fire insurance. The expectancy of life is calculated to a nicety for every age, and the premium is so adjusted that if a man just attains the expected age he will receive the sum of the premiums he has paid plus their earnings. Thus the element of arbitrary chance is entirely eliminated and only the unavoidable risk remains. Furthermore the value of the insurance to the individual in the knowl-

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edge that if he dies his family will not be left destitute is not to be lightly set aside, and the benefit to society in the support which insurance furnishes the family of the deceased breadwinner is not inconsiderable.

Speculation is a prominent feature of modern industrial and commercial life. But the many questionable practices which have grown up around it often lead to its wholesale condemnation without an appreciation of its quieter and more legitimate operations. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the fundamental economic function of speculation before passing moral judgment upon it.

The economic function of speculation is ably set forth in Prof. H. C. Emery's "Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States." Speculation is by him defined as "buying or selling commodities or securities, or other property, in the hope of a profit from anticipated changes of value." [9] President Hadley similarly defines speculation as "the attempt to make money out of the fluctuations in the value of property as distinct from its earnings." [10]

The economic function of speculation in produce, as distinguished from securities, may be described as the assumption of the risks which are due to changes in price from the time the commodity is bought until it is sold. These risks are especially great at the present time on account of several facts. In the first place, the market of the world has been so extended through the railroad and the telegraph that changes in crop conditions or other conditions affecting either supply or demand in one part of the world affect the market in every other part. Accordingly, whereas a wholesale dealer a century ago needed to follow closely the changes in conditions within a small area only, he would now have to keep himself informed of conditions over the whole world. A second feature of the modern market is that there is a much

[9] H. C. Emery, "Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States." Columbia College Studies, Vol. VII, No. 2, New York, 1896, p. 96.

[10] A. T. Hadley, "Railroad Transportation." G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1885, p. 48.

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smaller margin between the buying and selling price than there was formerly. This is of great benefit to the consumer, but it would be ruinous to the wholesale dealer if he did not have means to protect himself against small fluctuations. The function of the speculator is therefore to know all the changes which will affect a world market and to assume the risks attendant on such changes. The dealer has eliminated both the risks and the profits which arise from fluctuations in price in the same market, and his profits are solely trader's profits which arise from differences in price in different markets. These differences in price are due to differences in supply and demand in various parts of the world.

The means by which the dealer protects himself from fluctuations in price consist in "hedging" sales. If there is an over supply of wheat in New York and a demand for it in London, he will buy wheat in New York to sell in London. But while it is being transported to London the market all over the world may fall so as to destroy his profit. He therefore protects himself by selling an equal amount of paper wheat in the New York Exchange for future delivery. This is called short selling, because the merchant has not yet bought the paper wheat with which he will fulfill this obligation. When now his cargo arrives in London he will buy in New York enough paper wheat to cover his previous short sale, that is, to fulfill his previous contract. If then the world market in wheat has fallen he will lose so much on his cargo, but he will have gained a corresponding amount on his paper sale in New York. But in any case he will have made his trader's profit on the difference between the New York and London market, which difference remained the same provided the relation of supply to demand remained the same.

So far all seems plain sailing. The speculator performs the function of index and regulator of the world's market. But the question may be asked, Where does the speculator get his profits? Granted that he performs a useful economic function, who pays him for his trouble? The wholesale dealer neither makes nor loses by his "hedging" transactions, so it cannot be he. The only answer can be that what one

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speculator gains another must lose. It is not, however, the member of the exchange who loses, but the outside man who deals on the exchange through a broker. On this point Prof. Emery says that to confine speculation to speculators of wide experience and knowledge "is highly desirable, but the big speculators are not prepared to maintain a market of this nature." [11] In other words the big speculators win in the long run and their gains come from a large class who lose in the long run. Prof. Emery continues, "The activity of the latter class (the large operators) depends on that of the former (the public). It will be seen that speculation by a wide public has its advantages, but that these advantages are secured at an enormous cost. The widening market is simultaneously the cure of some evils and the cause of others. The former are mainly economic, the latter moral."

In the stock exchange the method of procedure is slightly different, but the result is essentially the same. The economic function of the stock exchange consists mainly in two things: first, in maintaining the price of securities at a position corresponding to the true value of the property they represent; and second, in furnishing a ready market for the purchase and sale of securities, and by this means a place for investment where the money invested may be withdrawn at a moment's notice. There is no doubt that this service is a most important one. It greatly facilitates the investment of capital, and by this means the development of industries. It furnishes a convenient means for the investment of the funds of banks, trust companies, insurance companies, etc.

But the unfortunate part of the stock business is that it is founded upon the loss of the small outside speculator. This does not seem essential to the exchange as an institution, for there might be some other means devised by which the costs, which by the way are great—since the large speculators are often men of great wealth—might be paid by those who benefit by the operation. It is an admitted fact that the stock market is dull after a panic in which the public has been fleeced.

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[11] *Loc. Cit.*, p. 191.

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Business cannot go on till the lambs return for the shearing. The stock broker of course says that if people are fools enough to risk their money that is none of his business, but the moralist cannot view the transaction in the same light. He must declare that a transaction which is founded upon a loss to one part of the community to supply the gains to another part is anti-social and immoral, even though the loser loses through his own ignorant cupidity. It is true that in the case of stocks the property may increase in value so that it is not necessary for anybody to lose. But on the other hand it may and often does decrease, and when there is an increase it may be compensated for by an increase in the capitalization. Morever, the big operators with their larger backing and superior knowledge, can easily arrange it so that they pocket the gains from increase while the small speculators make good the losses from decrease in value.

Objectively it is probably incorrect to call speculation in its essence gambling, since as Professor Emery points out, there is an actual exchange of property, a security being as much property as a greenback, and one party does not *necessarily* lose what another gains. However, its existence in its present form depends on the spirit of gambling, which it engenders in its participants, namely, the desire to gain without giving in return a corresponding service. Speculation, therefore, shares with gambling the results on character of such a spirit. These evils are not confined to the small speculator, but infect many of the respectable members of the exchange. Evidence of this fact appears in the numerous fraudulent practices which cluster about speculation and which nobody undertakes to defend. A few of the practices may be mentioned by way of illustration.

Dealing in margins is admitted by all to be pure gambling. The person who wishes to deal in a margin does not actually buy a stock, but lays a bet with a broker that the price of a commodity or security will rise. He deposits a certain amount with the broker. The broker loans him at a high rate of interest enough money to buy the stock. If the stock rises in value he gets back his original deposit minus the interest

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charged by the broker, and in addition the increase in price of stock. If it falls he loses all that he put in.

Another evil practice connected with the exchange is the spreading of false reports. This is very effective, since the market is extremely sensitive to variations in the value of its properties. Closely related to this practice is the operation by directors of corporations so as to profit by information regarding the declaration of dividends which they know to be forthcoming. Again, since the market is influenced by strong selling or buying of any given security, speculators sometimes conduct what are called "wash sales." That is, they sell through one broker and buy the same stock through another. Now it is evident that since the seller is making the contract with himself, he will not have to deliver, but if this fact is not known the transaction will have the same effect on the market as though it were genuine. This practice is frequently resorted to in a modified form in order to stimulate buying of a new security by the public.

To sum up then, speculation in stock and produce performs an economic function. It does so in its present organization, however, only through the existence of unethical practices, which if not in themselves gambling, are very closely allied to it in spirit. More than this, speculation entails great temptation to fraudulent practices and is in fact surrounded by an unusual number of moral evils.

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THE PARENT AND THE SCHOOL.

In the January number of this JOURNAL, Mr. Oliphant took up one of the fundamental problems that concerns the welfare of the young in modern communities—the relation of parents to the school. While much that he offers is suggestive and helpful, I think that he has got astray by treating the matter as one concerned largely with the control of subjects of instruction, more particularly with instruction in religion. My own inquiries and experiments have led me to take a more comprehensive view, a view which relegates questions of curriculum, even those concerned with morals and dogma, to a subordinate place, to be determined only when we have settled the place which the parent, as distinct from taxpayer or worshiper, can claim in this business of school keeping. Without further reference, therefore, until the close, to Mr. Oliphant's paper, I offer a contribution based on considerations of an entirely different description.

For many years now I have come to see that any satisfactory determination of "rights" as regards school control must begin from a recognition that "school" is essentially a *society*, a permanent community, a social organism of a peculiar type, consisting, namely, of minors, managed by a few adults called teachers; that the aims of school are mainly achieved not by success in imparting knowledge of this or that "subject," but by the corporate life, the intellectual and moral activity, which manifests itself in the community regarded as a whole. All the great "reformers" in education admit this, and many of them gave expression to it in the character and tone of the school which they founded, but our own Arnold of Rugby, to my knowledge, is the only great teacher who made this idea the corner stone of his system of education. Perhaps Pestalozzi might be placed side by side with him; but Arnold left behind him a theory of education which has been realized in the distinctive organization of school communities imbued with his theory, whereas the

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ideas of Pestalozzi has influenced the schools rather in matters curriculum than of corporate life. Without, however, turning aside to trace the influence of this idea in the history of schools, let us see how far it may help us in considering the question of parental "rights."

Every community, every group of individuals united for a common purpose, can be regarded from two points of view: it has its own internal life, to be regulated, "managed" by its members for the common good; it has also a relationship to the world outside, to other social groups or individuals who do not belong to it, but who are directly affected by its proceedings. As regards schools, we are accustomed to make a distinction between these two spheres, although our pedagogical terminology is not exact. In order to be clear, let me describe the internal regulation of the school as "management," and its external control in spheres where the school comes into contact with outside authorities as "organization." And we will begin with organization.

How does a school community come into being? Acts of Parliament nowadays prescribe a machinery; in older times the institution was set up as an addition to the Church, *i. e.*, to a society of adults organized to achieve ideal ends, which children could only imperfectly apprehend. In both situations the actual members of the community—the children—are furnished by parents; and the parents, regarded as a collective body, might be supposed to constitute the proper authority to organize the school, but this view has rarely been accepted. For the Church has never regarded the parent as an independent factor in the situation: the parental duty and the parental right are subsumed under duty and right of the communicant. Whatever wishes or claims he may make as regards schooling must be made by him as a churchman; he has brought his child to the Christian font for baptism, and the same social group, *i. e.*, the Church, which baptized his child will now carry on the child's education. So as regards the State; the parent in the eyes of the law is a citizen, taxpayer or ratepayer, who owns educable material and is, therefore, required to submit this material to State processes of education.

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Whatever share the parent may claim in the transaction must be exercised by him as a member of the State, *i. e.,* as a voter. On such a basis all the various modes of controlling schools have been devised, sometimes the controlling body is called "managers," sometimes "governors," sometimes board or committee, but whatever be the name, the powers are exercised in virtue of machinery devised apart from the direct voice of those who contribute their children. I shall not pause to discuss recent debates and efforts at legislation in our English Parliament as illustrating this situation: every one sees how anxious all parties are becoming to claim that they or their friends stand sponsor for the parent and can take his place. It is more important to notice how these modes of organization tend to promote or retard the efficiency of the school community.

It may be taken as an axiom that the efficiency of any social body, a club, a House of Commons, or trade's union, depends upon the extent to which those who conduct it are in close personal touch with its daily life; if a society comes to be regulated merely by ordinances, by officers, by rules and code, or if those who vitally influence its fortunes stand at a distance and find their chief interests in other spheres, then the society will languish. And, again, under the general democratic principle which seeks to foster progress by giving a share in government to a great number of individuals, we should argue that each school community ought to be governed, in part, by persons who have some special reason for taking an interest in its government.

At the beginning of a new social task, no doubt, this democratic principle is not of great use, for a long time elapses before a large number of citizens can be found capable of sharing in the business of control. We have seen this to be the case in the development of the poor laws, and it has been still more true of schools. Without minute detailed control from headquarters, ecclesiastical or civil, without the large-minded enthusiasm and foresight of great administrators, we should have had no great national system of education in Europe. Nor, in many towns and villages of this country,

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should we have had efficient public schools apart from the devotion of the "one man manager," the parish priest.

When, however, the primitive epoch is gone by, when a social institution is thoroughly established as an important feature in a community, when the inhabitants, call them either communicants or citizens, have come to a thorough recognition of their responsibilities for civic service, our democratic principle must be enforced, and we must ask that each school be controlled in its daily fortunes by men and women who stand in close relationship to it, who make its life and fortunes their chief concern, without any reservation on behalf either of Church or State. In brief, I wish to maintain that every school should have some small body of persons directly concerned in its fortunes and exercising some control over it, and that this body of governors or managers should be largely chosen by the parents who intrust their children to the school.

These general propositions need, of course, a great deal of elaboration before their bearing can be fully founded; many, especially from the ranks of teachers, will regard them with alarm. Objection can, perhaps, be to some extent forestalled by pointing out that the duties of such a body of governors or managers should not be so extensive as to set aside the functions either of a local or a central authority. Thus, as regards the elementary school, I am sure they should not appoint the head teacher. We are very familiar in England with that principle of wise government which devises one authority to counterbalance the evils which may ensue by intrusting too much authority to another.

Thus, local authority, central authority, school managers, each have their place in a complete scheme of school control, and at the present day the third has almost fallen into desuetude, to the great injury of our schools. Now, an effective body of school managers, under democratic conditions, can only be provided by turning to the parents as the electors.

Let us now look at the school in its internal aspect, and consider what sort of *internal* regulation it requires. In

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spite of all democratic tendencies, the school, like the family, the prison, and the reformatory, must remain essentially a despotism. Apparently, in Japan, some extraordinary powers in the selection of teachers are placed in the hands of children, but so far as one can see at present, the internal management of a school must be intrusted to the small number of adults, called teachers, who attend day by day to direct the pursuits of the scholars. And although the latter are, since the days of Arnold, being more and more intrusted with responsibility in minor matters, this trust is merely a delegation by the head of the community of some of his autocratic powers which he can resume at his discretion, overriding the liberty which he has himself created.[1] In the last resort any school, even a public school with the most conservative traditions, must be ruled by the teacher, and he cannot part with his responsibility. But while it must be remembered that, both legally and practically, the scholar, whether day scholar or boarder, is also subject to his parents, the latter are and must be excluded from the internal management; they do not belong to the community, they are outsiders and must keep outside. Nevertheless, these parents are on the fringe of this peculiar society, they are deeply interested in it, they have legal power even to remove instantly their son or daughter out of it. Hence, it would appear as if this unique status of the parent demands some special attention also in the internal regulation of the community. Without regulation this status is recognized in all good schools, for teacher and parent reciprocally acknowledge the *duty of becoming acquainted with each other and of exchanging information.*

It would take me out of my tracks to describe many of the ways in which this exchange is provided for or the difficulties placed in the way of an adequate discharge of this duty, especially in elementary schools; but I desire to add that the need of the parent is not limited to information about *his own* child; if he is to keep in close touch with his own child's life, he must know somewhat—as much as an

[1] On this topic see interesting contributions in *The School Review* (Chicago University Press), during recent months.

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outsider can or should know—of the life of the school as a whole. And the child himself feels the need of this contact. He leads a double life, a member at once of a family circle and of a school society. True, he will resent it if father or mother try to pry into the secrets of school or "interfere" in its affairs, but he craves, unconsciously it may be, for acquaintanceship on both sides. Hence, I picture to myself the ideal school community (and the picture is not wholly fanciful, for I am engaged in an interesting experiment to realize the picture) as one in which the collective body of parents are welcomed occasionally to look in on the scene, gathering with the scholars and watching their pursuits. Occasions of this kind are, of course, usually planned in connection with school games or athletic sports, but I believe that they should also be planned so as to help father and mother to follow the more serious occupations of the school.

It is with aims of this kind that some German school communities conduct *Eltern-Abende,* at which various school exercises are performed, not for public show or competition, but with the simple purpose of introducing parents to the daily life of the place; and when the scholars are dismissed, teachers and parents stay a while to discuss matters of mutual interest. I have now for some years practiced a similar plan in schools which I have directed, and, I venture to say, with conspicuous advantage all round. Finally, I have been able, still more recently, to carry the problem to a further stage, combining the claim of the parent to a voice in external control, with his claim to be admitted now and then to share the inner life of the community. On one of these occasions, when fathers and mothers have responded to an invitation to a "Parents' Evening," they are asked to elect representatives on the Governing Committee. Nominations are made and seconded, and the person elected (who is usually a father or mother, but might be some other interested person) will act for a year or more in this capacity, and at some future Parents' Evening will give account of his stewardship.

In the discussion on the recent Education Bill, some elaborate plans were made for enabling parents and guardians to give

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votes on certain matters of religious teaching, but formal voting papers, such as are used in political elections are here out of place; the ancient Anglo-Saxon folk-moot, a gathering of plain folk interested in the social life of the place where they meet, is far more genuinely democratic. A few ill-educated parents will at first stay away; as a result they lose their vote, and deserve to do so.

I have given these particulars merely to illustrate the leading idea of this paper. I have no desire to attach importance to the special mode on which I have experimentally sought to put them into practice. Let me in conclusion, summarize in the following theses:

(1) Every school community needs a body of managers or governors, charged solely with the welfare of that community, and concerned with external control, not with internal management. This body is required in addition to (not as a substitute for) the powers exercised over a wider area by local or central "authorities."

(2) While the claim of the State, the churches, etc., to control the school is of a general nature and stretches over a wide area, the claim of the family is concerned solely with the individual school to which its children are sent; hence, the parents should have a distinct share in choosing this body of managers or governors.

(3) The law of the land should recognize this claim, since the citizen's interest in the school is far greater as a parent than when he is regarded as a taxpayer, a ratepayer, or a "layman."

(4) The collective body of parents should be summoned to choose their representatives in the school building, where they are brought into contact with one another and with the teachers for interchange of views about the welfare of the young who frequent their school.

It will now be seen how widely apart are the methods on which Mr. Oliphant and myself approach the problem of "parents' rights." He proposes plans which *he thinks* will meet the views of "the average parent." I, on the contrary, would prefer the parent to express his own opinions, and

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would confidently leave a body of parents to decide with the teachers of their school to what extent religion should play a part in school life. Subject to general laws made in the common interest for all schools alike, I would not hesitate to look to such a body of parents for sensible compromise and charity in matters affecting the highest as well as the more trivial interests of a school community.

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SOME POINTS OF ETHICAL CONTROVERSY.

The word "Good," as everyone is aware, is applied in ordinary life to two entirely distinct classes of things. It is sometimes used for "good absolutely and in itself," and sometimes for "useful as a means to promote something thus absolutely good." My paper has nothing to do with good in this second sense. It is concerned exclusively with certain points of controversy touching things "good in themselves."

The points selected for discussion fall under three heads. First, there is disagreement among experts as to the method by which ethical inquiry ought to be pursued. Secondly, even among those who follow the same method, there is disagreement as to the qualities and so on which make up the goodness of any conscious being. Lastly, there is disagreement as to the way in which the goodness of one being is related to that of others. Among these three classes of questions there is a certain degree of interdependence, but they can be roughly separated for purposes of discussion.

I.

First, as to method:

There are two principal methods by which ethical writers have sought an answer to the question, "What is good?" The one is the *a priori* method of deduction from the nature of things; the other, the method of direct perception.

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The *a priori* method is best explained by example. T. H. Green, in his "Prolegomena," advances a metaphysical argument to prove that the human spirit is timeless; and he proceeds to infer from this that the good which satisfies that spirit cannot be a temporal thing like happiness, but must be timeless also. In a similar vein Tennyson suggests that a thing cannot be good unless it lasts forever:

> "The good, the true, the pure, the just,
> Take the charm 'Forever' from them, and they crumble into dust."

Finally, certain persons, directly and without argument, assert that the Good must be One.

The method of inquiry of which these three examples are typical, despite the authority of some of its advocates, is not, I think, a fruitful one. As applied by Green, it seems even to contain a formal fallacy; for, even if it be true that the spirit of man is timeless, is there not a logical chasm between the premise that something *is* and the supposed inference that something else *is good.* As applied by Tennyson, the method involves a violent paradox: "If it be that the good and beautiful must perish, is it, therefore, less good and beautiful?"

> "I do but ask good things may pass,
> I quarrel not with Time."

Nor is the assertion that the good must be *one* in the least more persuasive. It might equally well be *two* or, since seven is a sacred number, perhaps we may suggest *seven.* In sum, then, the whole method of inquiry which seeks to determine *a priori* what things must be good seems to me mischievous and idle. "What is good and evil remains just as incapable of being reached by mere thought as what is blue or sweet." [1] The only way to know whether anything is good is by looking at it. We are confronted with the world of reality and of imagination. We turn the eye of the soul upon it, and we perceive some things to be good and some bad, just as we perceive that some are yellow and others red. That is the only way that can possibly yield results. The truer the

[1] Lotze, "Microcosmos," English translation, Vol. II, p. 357.

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eye of the percipient—not necessarily the intenser his mental power—the better the results will be. On the first of my three points of controversy, therefore, I conclude without reservation in favor of inquiry by the method of perception. The second point of controversy turns on the application of that method.

II.

Many ethical thinkers hold that the only good things are states of conscious life. If this view is put forward as a necessary universal proposition, those who believe that our knowledge of what is good is obtained only through particular perceptions cannot accept it. They have no ground for holding that all the good that there is has fallen within their perception, and, apart from such ground, it is impossible for them to make any exclusive statement about good. They are entitled, however, to say—and in this I am among their disciples—that states of conscious life are the only good things of which we have present knowledge. This, though it is disputed by some writers of importance (Mr. Moore, for instance), I shall take, in what follows, to be common ground.

When, however, we proceed to ask what kinds of conscious life are good, a formidable conflict of opinion at once presents itself. The only procedure open to us is to look out upon the people we know or can imagine and to try to judge directly of their goodness as concrete wholes. When we have brought to bear on this task a sufficiently wide experience, it is possible that we may be able to disentangle the various elements in their consciousness upon which their goodness seems to depend, together with the nature of this dependence. If that could be done our notions would be to some extent simplified and clarified.

The most daring attempts in this direction that have hitherto been made select from among the various elements of which any total state of consciousness is composed, some single element, and declare that to be the only element affecting the goodness of the state. All the other elements may vary in any direction and to any extent without altering this, but the least variation in the chosen element does alter it.

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The Utilitarians declare that the only element upon which the goodness of a conscious state depends is the quantity of pleasant feeling that it contains. Dr. Martineau, finding in the human consciousness a hierarchy of "springs of action," declares that the goodness of a man at any time depends solely on whether or not he wills in accordance with that one of two conflicting springs which he judges to be higher.[2] It need not, indeed, be judged overtly to be higher; for the good will is present in spontaneous love-motived, no less than in struggling duty-motived, volitions; it suffices if conscience is not deliberately stifled or disobeyed. Finally, yet another school believes that the only element upon which goodness depends is the emotion of love:

> "For what is knowledge, duly weighed?
> Knowledge is strong, but love is sweet;
> Yea, all the progress he had made
> Was but to learn that all is small
> Save love, for love is all in all."

Of course, it should be understood that none of the above theories adopts the violent paradox of condemning as worthless *in every sense* all elements of consciousness other than the one which determines for them ultimate good. They recognize freely that some of these other elements are desirable and ought to be cultivated as means to promote good. Sidgwick, for example, regards the good will as indirectly of great importance for the contribution it makes to social order and hence to happiness; while the adherents of the good will and of love doubtless recognize that some modicum of pleasant consciousness makes easier the development of the elements in which they are specially interested. The point is that each of these schools regards the goodness-in-itself (not necessarily the goodness as a means) of any total state of consciousness as dependent upon one element alone.

Now, as I have already argued, the only method of testing any proposition about things good in themselves is perception. It is stated in all these theories that, from whatever

[2] "Types of Ethical Theory," II, pp. 237, 286. *Cf.*, for a similar view, Green. "Political Theories," p. ix.

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initial position we start, no effect is produced on the goodness of a conscious state by variations in the quantity of any element save one. To persuade ourselves of this proposition it would be necessary to contemplate a large number of initial positions and of variations from them on the part of all the elements.

By the application of this process we do, I think, find that some elements in conscious states are irrelevant to their goodness. This, as it seems to me, is true of intellectual power and of knowledge about what *is,* though not of knowledge about what *is good,* nor of the love of knowledge even about what is. Good as these are as means, they do not, so far as I can see, affect in any way the goodness-in-itself of the conscious states in which they play a part. Maeterlinck, I think, is right when he says: "Thought, of itself, is possessed of no vital importance; it is the feelings awakened within us by thought that ennoble and brighten our life." [3]

But, in regard to other things, the case seems to me quite different. We cannot vary the amount either of pleasure, or of the good will or of the love present in any state of consciousness without altering the goodness of that state. Nor are these three the only variables upon which goodness depends. I would include also the character of a man's ideals, his attitude towards beautiful persons and things, and, so far as it is not already embraced in love and the good will, his enthusiasm for the purpose he sets before himself. In defence of these opinions, I cannot offer arguments, and I cannot be presented with valid arguments to refute. For I am merely recounting perceptions; and the only answer that anyone is entitled to make is to recount divergent perceptions of his own.

So far, the only conclusion reached is that the goodness of any conscious state is, to use a mathematical phrase, a function of several variables, some of which I have tried to specify. Can anything further be known as to the nature of this function? Is it true, first, that the function always grows when the value of all or any of the variables is increased? Is it true, secondly, that the sign of any of the variables governs in any

[3] "Wisdom and Destiny," p. 279.

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general way that of the function? These questions are difficult, and what I have to say about them is purely critical.

With regard to the first question, the following views, among others, may be maintained.

(*a*) It may be held that, under all circumstances, the goodness of a total state is increased by an increase in the quantity of pleasant feeling contained in it. I do not think that this is universally true. States of deliberate evildoing are conceivable, which would be made worse and not better if they became happier.

(*b*) It may be held that an addition to the enthusiasm with which a man pursues his ideal always adds to his goodness. Such an addition certainly has this effect if the ideal both is worthy and is thought by him to be worthy; it also has it, perhaps, if the ideal is thought worthy, though it is not really so. But I hesitate to accept Browning's view that it is better to follow deliberately chosen and recognized evil in an enthusiastic than in a half-hearted manner. Was Count Guido really better for the energy of his hatred, "since hate was thus the truth of him?"

(*c*) It may be held that an addition to the intensity of love always adds to the goodness of a conscious state. It certainly adds to this goodness if the object both is and is thought to be worthy. Does it necessarily otherwise?

With regard to the second question, three other general theories have had advocates.

(*a*) It may be held that pleasure is essential to a good state in the sense that any predominance, however slight, of pain over pleasure must always render the state as a whole bad. In my phrasing this would read that, whenever the sign of the variable pleasure is negative, that of the function is negative also. I do not accept this view, nor do I believe that it is in accordance with the ethical judgments of "plain men."

(*b*) It may be held that, when the good will is present, the state as a whole is always good; in my phrasing, that, whenever the sign of the variable good will is positive, that of the function is positive also. This view again I cannot accept. I should hold that, if a person were in extreme pain, or if he

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were following a peculiarly repulsive ideal, his state as a whole might be bad in spite of the good will.

(*c*) Lastly, it may be held that, when the good will is absent, *in the sense in which it is absent when a man is deliberately sinning against the light*, the state as a whole is always bad; *i. e.*, that whenever the sign of the variable good will is negative, the sign of the function is negative also. This view is much more plausible than the two preceding. It was something like it, perhaps, that Kant had in mind when he declared that the good will was the *only unconditioned*, though not the *only*, good. Still, extreme cases can be imagined in which even this general proposition becomes doubtful. Imagine, for instance, a man bound to a rigid and perhaps irrational rule of duty, at the basis of whose being, however, a spark of sympathy still lives. If, in a moment of exaltation, sympathy overcomes the mechanical and, *ex hypothesi*, perverted conscience, is the state of that man on the whole bad? I doubt if we could rightly lay down the proposition that it always must be so.

III.

I pass to the third of the controversial matters that were distinguished at the beginning. This is connected with the circumstance that different people are separate centers of consciousness and, therefore, separate seats of good. In view of this circumstance, the question arises whether the good of A can compete with that of B or C.

The answer, of course, depends partly upon that given to the previous question, wherein good consists. Some writers, notably T. H. Green, describe the good in such a way that, as it seems to them, competition is impossible. Green's view, for example, is excellently condensed by Dr. A. C. Bradley in the sentence: "The idea of the end or moral good is thus that of the self as realized, and that self is social, *i. e.*, its good includes that of others who are also conceived as ends in themselves." [4] Mr. Lofthouse makes this idea more explicit,

[4] "Prolegomena to Ethics," Analytical Table of Contents, p. xxvi, §199.

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when he suggests that love may so bind the goods of the different centers into one that the more the good of A is increased the more of necessity are those of B. and C.

This view, however, is not really defensible. Whatever may be the case in a world of "ultimate angels' law," it is evident that, in the actual world, good, even in Green's conception of it, may be competitive. The realization of A's self does sometimes involve diminished opportunities for the realization of B's; even action according to conscience on the part of A sometimes indirectly involves a temptation to B to act against conscience. When other elements such as happiness are reckoned among goods, the case becomes still clearer. There *are* cases in which, so far as experience shows, A's good cannot increase without affecting adversely that of other people.

This circumstance leads to a very important argument. Since the goods of different centers are liable to conflict upon earth, they must also be liable to conflict on the whole, unless there is a world beyond the grave arranged in such a way as to obviate that eventuality. In the opinion of some writers, however, to admit that the goods of different centers conflict on the whole involves assent to two inconsistent propositions. Sidgwick, as he declared, intuited and recognized as of equal authority two moral imperatives, both that he ought to pursue his own good regardless of others' good, and also that he ought to pursue the good of the whole regardless of his own good. The case is the same with those who hold that A is an "end in himself" in the sense that his good ought never to be sacrificed to anything outside himself; and who also maintain a like proposition with regard to B. These propositions are only consistent with one another provided that the pursuit of a man's own and of others' good dictate to him the same course of conduct. We are thus driven to ask whether, apart from other considerations, our need for reconciling these propositions constitutes a sufficient reason for accepting the hypothesis of a future life.[5]

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[5] *Cf.* "Methods of Ethics," concluding section.

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Against this argument Mr. Moore directs a vigorous polemic: "That a single man's happiness should be *the sole good,* and that also everybody's happiness should be *the sole good* is a contradiction which cannot be solved by the assumption that the same conduct will secure both; it would be equally contradictory, however certain we were that that assumption was justified." [6] I am not convinced that this reasoning fairly meets Sidgwick's point. Would that writer have admitted that "I ought to pursue A's happiness exclusively" is necessarily convertible into "A's happiness is the sole good"? Mr. Russell, if I remember rightly, has somewhere caviled at Mr. Moore's logical position in regard to the relation between "good" and "ought."

I am not, however, really concerned to defend Sidgwick here. For, from my point of view, the contradiction, for the solution of which he hints that a new world may need to be invoked, does not exist at all. I do not perceive that I ought to pursue my own good regardless of others' good, and I do not regard any man as an end in himself in the sense defined above. Possibly every man is an end in the sense that he has "claims to possess the good which cannot be altogether canceled by any amount of good possessed by other people." [7] But this, if it be true—which I do not myself believe, and which, given that states of consciousness are the only things ultimately good or bad, cannot as a matter of fact be the case—merely asserts that fairness as between people is one element among good things. It does not imply propositions about A and B, which can under any circumstances become inconsistent with one another. Consequently, in my view to admit that the goods of different people may compete does not involve self-contradiction. Hence, there is no reason for refusing that admission, and, on these lines—I say nothing about other lines—no argument can be constructed in proof of a future life.

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[6] "Principia Ethica," p. 103.

[7] MacTaggart, "Some Dogmas of Religion," p. 17.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE RELIGION OF ALL GOOD MEN, AND OTHER STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By H. W. Garrod, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. London: Archibald Constable and Company, Ltd., 1906. Pp. xi, 229.

The title of this book is distinctly attractive, and the book itself is decidedly interesting. There is learning in it, and undoubted ability behind it. Written from a frankly naturalistic standpoint, it is singularly free from bitterness and narrowness. The opening essay is a lengthy one on "Christ, the Forerunner," in which the author maintains that Christ never applied the title "Son of Man" to himself. Mr. Garrod fears that "many" will think his interpretations "strained," and in this he is certainly right. As his frequently forced and artificial interpretations touch matters theological, rather than ethical, there is no call to examine them in this place. A word may be said, however, as to his treatment and equipment. He assumes, for one thing, that the designation "Son of Man" always carried to the people of Christ's day "a Messianic significance," which is to ignore the weight of scholarship opposed to the notion of such current use of the title; and, for another thing, Mr. Garrod assumes that "Christ uses the title Son of Man as a synonym for Messias" (p. 24—by it "always meant the Messiah" (p. 25)—which, in the same fashion, ignores the increasing disfavor with which the best Biblical scholarship of the day regards such a view. A more generic term than that of Messiah, only in the end—in veiled or indirect form—did it carry Messianic claim with it. But Mr. Garrod does not discuss, much less dispose of, rival views. As to his general contention that Christ never applied the title "Son of Man" to himself, one may be pardoned for stating a question that suggests itself. Nowhere could "good sense" receive a greater apotheosis than in Mr. Garrod's book, and how then did Mr. Garrod's "good sense" not keep him from expending his abilities and time on the fatuities and futilities of this long chapter? There are four scholarly appendices to the chapter, but Mr. Garrod's theological reading needs widening, and there are too many subjective impressions, conjectures, probabilities, and mild dogmatisms. Mr. Garrod rarely glows, but once in a while he gives out something good, as *e. g.*, when he says of the personality

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of Jesus (p. 69), "He so left behind him all that was alien and hampering that he saw all things with the 'single eye,' the whole of him was 'full of light.' Onenesss of purpose and freedom of spirit were his shield and buckler."

But there are more directly ethical matters in the book. The chapter entitled, "Christian, Greek, or Goth," is one of the best in the book, even though one may have points of clear disagreement with the author. Mr. Garrod stands for more justice to "Gothic morality" and its distinctive ideals. Christian ethical ideals Mr. Garrod almost always presents in some painfully crude traditional form, which one is quite well accustomed to, but it is surely a bit hard on Greek moral ideals that Mr. Garrod says, "Aristotle may have been a coxcomb, but he was not a gentleman" —"resembles a gentleman in a novel of Disraeli, but no other kind of gentleman." Whatever may be said of its truth, the humor of this sort of writing is distinctly enjoyable. After vindicating, in his own way, the ideals of chivalry and honor, Mr. Garrod closes the chapter with one of his best and most suggestive passages on duty as an ideal. Not much moved by Kant's famous apostrophe, our author says, "To be moral is to identify the whole of ourselves with the whole of good. So long as we think of 'duty,' we make a false and base distinction between ourselves and the good." "The men who won the battle of Trafalgar were the men who did more than their duty. So long as we do only our duty, we are not only unprofitable, but ineffective, servants." Thus it is that, "escaping Christianity," Mr. Garrod would have us also flee the Greek ideal, and never "conduct in a kind of moral conservatory a flirtation with Hellenism which can come to nothing."

From this chapter we pass to a long one on "The Religion of All Good Men"—a most inviting theme. But, when we come to our author's treatment of the subject, what can be said? This only, that the religion of *all* good men becomes the religion of *one* good man, and that good man Mr. Garrod himself. "Each man must find his religion for himself, since otherwise it can never be to him a religion." "He who is worthy of some religion better than that in which he has been brought up, will, as years go on, find it for himself." And if, when he finds it, it is like Mr. Garrod's, it will be a very bare and thin residuum, quite as capable of sending "a chill to the heart" as the cold, gray conception of "duty" can be. The chapter closes with

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some uninspiring words of disbelief in immortality: "The skies are deaf: and if we would question them concerning immortality, we must go and fetch our answer in person." If this, or aught like this, were the last word of "the religion of all good men," then might we pray God send us another Socrates and another Plato. Mr. Garrod has yet to learn how truly "the religion of all good men" forms the transcendental root of all those ethical relations he seeks to justify, or at least is willing to maintain. He has given us his best, and forgiveness must be ours for thinking that not great is our positive gain.

Of the chapter on "Hymns," one can say no better than that it is poor and unillumined, from almost every point of view, for in those criticisms with which one does heartily agree, there is not a trace of anything original or new. We, therefore, pass to the closing chapter on "Some Practical Aspects of the Problem of Free Will." This problem our author regards as simply moral and practical, and neither metaphysical nor psychological. Judged by the practical standpoint, we cannot take Mr. Garrod's essay as a very serious contribution to the subject. He argues for determinism in a rough and ready sort of way, moral wrecks being his favorite subjects for illustration. But what a merciless criticism of his own theories and treatment are his two closing paragraphs! "There remains, of course, the tremendous fact that the individuals sacrificed on the altars of necessity are many and pitiable." And Mr. Garrod confesses he understands nothing of what this "tremendous" fact signifies, which is in reality an acknowledgment of dismal failure. The truth is, that in any true philosophy of free will there are facts and considerations, on the Libertarian side, that never sweep into Mr. Garrod's view and ken: he is perfectly innocent—though a man of "good sense" and "knowledge of the world"—of the unexpected moves of the human will, both upward and downward, in actual experience. "The Archbishop of Canterbury not merely will not, but cannot, stand on his head in Piccadilly and shout, 'Down with the Church.'" Mr. Garrod is wrong: this very thing has happened, though he may be ignorant of it, and determinism acknowledge it not: not, it is true, in the case—the merely accidental case—of the actual Archbishop, but of one whose academic and ecclesiastical position made it at one time quite as "unpredictable" that he should die a member of the Parliamentary party that cries, "Down with the Church." If Mr. Garrod had been a

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man of less "good sense" and knowledge, I should have quoted to him a passage from Emerson on "Experience," since he is fond of swearing by Emerson. The passage is—for we are at times rather fond of swearing by Emerson ourselves—one which has, in sentences, more insight and truth than Mr. Garrod's whole pages: "But it is impossibe that the creative power should exclude itself. Into every intelligence there is a door which is never closed, through which the Creator passes. The intellect, seeker of absolute truth, or the heart, lover of absolute good, intervenes for our succor, and at one whisper of these high powers, we awake from ineffectual struggles with this nightmare. We hurl it into its own hell, and cannot again contract ourselves to so base a state."

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GLÜCK UND SITTLICHKEIT: Untersuchungen über Gefallen und Lust, naturhaftes und sittliches Vorziehen. Von Hermann Schwarz. Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1902. Pp. 210.

The author of this very original and skillful work achieved great distinction some years ago through his able contributions to the psychology of cognition. The present work adds to the author's reputation as a patient and careful observer and expounder of the facts of consciousness. If the work suffers by comparison with the earlier works above mentioned, this is, in great part, due to the fact that the psychology of volition and moral judgment is relatively obscure and neglected. At the same time, the author seems in this book to be too keenly conscious of being a pioneer, and to be thus beguiled into declamation and jerky emphasis, where reasoned exposition would be more appropriate and helpful. It should be noticed that this book is supplementary to two previous works, entitled "Die Psychologie des Willens" and "Das Sittliche Leben." Yet, allowing for this, the author yields too often to the temptation to refer to his previous works, and does not take sufficient pains to make this work complete in itself. Occasionally, as, for example, on p. 103, and again in p. 118, note 2, he crowds into footnotes some novel and for his purpose important doctrine, referring the reader for its fuller exposition to some previous book or article of his own. He is, moreover, too negligent of

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tradition and too much concerned to emphasize slight differences from other thinkers. His works on sensible perception show how well qualified he is to trace the development of opinion from Plato and Aristotle through the Middle Ages, down to modern times. The attitude of uncompromising innovator which he adopts in this work seems to me comparatively retrograde. One consequence is that it is far more difficult than it need have been to discover what his answer would be to the questions of moral philosophy in the form in which men have been accustomed to ask them.

Dr. Schwarz is, in the first place, a psychological realist; secondly, he is a psychological nativist; and thirdly, he is a voluntarist. His voluntarism is not to be confused with that of the school which would make our cognitive activities functions of the will. On the contrary, he is interested in emphasizing the contrast between reason and will, so as to vindicate the whole sphere of moral activity for the will. This third characteristic will occupy us more fully at a later stage.

He is a psychological realist because he insists upon treating psychology as a real science of the mind, and not as the result of arranging mental "phenomena" in accordance with the positivist and determinist assumptions which constitute the current philosophy of natural science. Introspection, he declares, is still our principal course of psychological knowledge. He is a nativist in that he refuses to recognize the necessity of explaining our higher mental functions by lower, or by other causes, which these higher functions not only do not indicate, but which are incompatible with the nature of those functions as they reveal themselves to our consciousness. He repudiates in the following terms the supposed necessity of explaining our higher mental functions, especially our acts of choice as consequences of past events:

"Explanation by means of the causal nexus and explanation by means of the law of cause are distinct things. Natural science sees everywhere causal connection. On the other hand, the law of causation says only that every change has a cause, whether the subject of the change produces it in itself or receives it from another agent. Now, in the physical world it is the invariable rule that no body is the cause if its own changes, but that it suffers its changes from other bodies. Thus it is that the empirical conception of causal connection has arisen. Accord-

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ing to this conception, an event never derives itself directly from a being as its cause, but always from another event, which occurs in the same being as that in which the first event occurs, or belongs to another being. This relation is not a necessity of our thought when, for example, Strange ('Einleitung in die Ethik,' II, p. 197) writes: 'It is utterly impossible that anything should occur which should be outside the causal connection or independent of the necessity of the causal connection,' he is confusing the logically necessary conception of the law of cause with the empirical conception of causal connection employed by natural science."

In this section entitled "Wider der Psychologismus," this point of view is maintained: where the soul shows itself to consciousness as active and spontaneous, it is to be taken to be so. Our acts of moral choice, for example, are not reactions of an empirically formed character to thrusts from without but actions which originate in the soul itself: in these the will reveals its sovereign unempirical nature (so against Adickes, pp. 196 and 199). While I am glad to express my agreement with the conclusion to which this argument tends, I must express my regret that German realism has not as yet developed a characteristic logic and metaphysics. For this purpose it might learn much from the old conceptions of realist tradition: substance, power, and efficient causation. Without denying the value of Rudolf Eucken's philosophy of life and religion, to which Dr. Schwarz, toward the end of his book, expresses his adherence, I cannot but feel that Eucken's formulæ are not altogether congruous with the general tone and tendency of our author's psychology.

As a voluntarist in the psychology of the moral faculty, Dr. Schwarz has much that is new to propose, though I cannot but feel that the apparent novelty is enhanced through the unfamiliar terms employed. The first part of the work is occupied with extending the range of will, as compared with previous psychologists, at the cost of feeling on the one hand and of intellect or reason on the other. The fundamental and causal element both in desire and its satisfaction is not pleasure or pain, not a perception or a judgment, but a function of the will to which the name *Gefallen* is given: this is a reaction of our will upon motives presented to it, and, might be described as a sense or experience of value, except that both the words sense and ex-

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perience have a cognitive implication which our author is anxious to avoid. Corresponding to it on the negative side is *Missfallen*, or the sense of the opposite of value *(Unwert)*. (I will translate *Gefallen* by approval, *Missfallen* by disapproval). Approval may be satisfied or unsatisfied. Unsatisfied approval causes a striving of the will towards the object approved, and the combination of approval with striving constitutes *desire*. Satisfied approval is found when the object approved is possessed, and is normally accompanied by pleasure, but it is not itself pleasure, any more than unsatisfied approval is pain. These functions of approval and disapproval constitute a great part of what are commonly classed as emotions. In the first division of the work, the author discusses the views expressed by a number of recent philosophers, French, German, and English, tracing in them a progressive realization of this distinction between approval and pleasure. These discussions cannot be pursued into their details; I must content myself with expressing my admiration for the author's extraordinary patience and acuteness.

The will, however, exercises a higher function and it is in this higher function that it displays itself as a specifically moral faculty. The will has not only the power to react by way of approval or disapproval upon objects presented to it, but it can exercise a free and original choice between the objects approved, or more strictly between the various acts of approval. There are two kinds of preference or choice *(Vorziehen)*, to which our author, on the analogy of the division of judgments, gives the name *analytic* and *synthetic*. Analytic choice is properly exercised between values of the same kind; and the will following its own innate rule or norm chooses that value which gives the ampler satisfaction. In analytic choice, the will is free because it follows its own norm, not, as some suppose, because it possesses anything of the nature of liberty of indifference (p. 124).

But the properly moral choice is synthetic choice, namely, the choice between values which differ in kind. Here the choice is more complex and calls for the exercise of a higher function of the will. In synthetic choice, the will follows the two following rules:

(1) Personal values, such as honor, wealth, ambition, etc., are preferred in the case of conflict, to values which consist in

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mere states and conditions, such as pleasure and other transitory gratifications.

(2) Values outside ourselves are preferred to personal values. What values are presented to us, or in other words, what things we approve, depend upon our natural and acquired dispositions. The choice between them, however, is an original exercise of our will, not a mere reaction upon actions from without. Again, the will, in choosing synthetically, is free because the norm which it follows is self-imposed springing from its own nature. The author contends that his doctrine cuts at the root of all moral fanaticism, which consists in trying to force different men to like the same things. A man is good who postpones his love of momentary states to his permanent personal interests, and his personal interests and *a fortiori* his momentary states to interests which lie beyond his individual self: what personal interest appeals to him depends upon his individual disposition, and what impersonal interests excite his approval is likewise a question for himself alone. With these the moral judgments of his fellows have nothing to do.

Up to this point our author might seem to be a representative of a kind of free-will determinism, and I am not sure that he would at once repudiate the description. He does, however, address himself to the question, how a person endowed with these faculties and rules of the will, can act otherwise than in accordance with them. On page 170 he writes, "We are not infrequently wicked by our own choice. Only too often we choose the evil in perfectly cold blood and after mature deliberation, though with an evil conscience, and we resolve to act contrary to the law of synthetic choice." The answer to the riddle is found in the conflict between analytic and synthetic choice. It is possible, he says, in the case of values of different kinds to exercise the wrong kind of choice: we may choose analytically when we ought to choose synthetically. If in such a case we elect to exercise the analytic choice we act immorally. In doing so, we come into conflict with a third rule of synthetic choice, namely, that synthetic choice is preferable to any other. This rule, however, is not such as to constrain our obedience: it can, however, disturb our conscience and keep awake the sense of having acted wrongly.

This last explanation justifies us, I think, in reckoning our author as an indeterminist. The will may hesitate between

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analytic and synthetic choice, and its third norm does not determine which of the two kinds of choice it will exercise. It seems to me, however, that the indeterminist conclusion might have been drawn at a much earlier stage. How, it may be asked, are we to choose between two values of the same kind, neither of which pleases more than the other? Here, it seems to me, both analytic and synthetic choice would fail us; yet we should not be prevented from choosing.

I must notice one or two more points in which our author seems to me to fail to do justice to philosophic tradition or to the facts of moral life.

In the first place, our moral judgment cannot be indifferent to the relative merits of the unselfish ends adopted. However little qualified we may feel ouselves to pass judgment upon the dispositions of others, we certainly could not rest satisfied with a system of ethics which allowed an appeal to a man's better nature to be settled by such an answer as the following: "Your enthusiasm for the uplifting of the poor may be a very fine thing for you, but I am an artist, and your enthusiasms do not appeal to me in the least." A society of moral beings does demand at least a minimum of sensibility to its various interests from its members, and a moral ideal which is social cannot demand less than that the members of a society should sympathize with each other's aims and powers with a proper sense of their relative importance. Kant's conception of a kingdom of ends, supplies an element which is lacking in the voluntarist ethics of Dr. Schwarz.

In the second place, the sphere of reason is excessively narrowed when reason is represented as a merely calculating faculty, with no power to interfere in our judgments of what is good and right. Even if we admit that impulse is the *original* fact of consciousness, we must insist on the other hand that impulse is a fact of *consciousness*, and that the perfection of our whole nature consists in the harmony of knowledge and appetition: in the harmony between our knowledge of the good and our power of striving toward it and cherishing it when we have found it. Rules and principles, though they be in themselves good and proper objects of admiration and desire, are surely recognized as such by our reason; and how can a realist, above all philosophers, refuse to recognize that the difference between a principle and a law of nature, between a

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norm and an external constraining motive, consists precisely in that the principle is recognized intellectually as binding upon them by the agents who submit themselves to it?

W. J. ROBERTS.

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MEMOIR OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. By R. L. Nettleship, Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford; with a short preface by Mrs. T. H. Green. Longmans, 1906. Pp. 256.

The republication of this memoir as a separate volume is an invaluable boon to philosophical students who are attracted by Green's ideas and personality. It records, in Nettleship's own language, "a fact which has never been common, and which is especially rare in England, the fact of a life in which philosophy was reconciled with religion on the one side, and with politics on the other; the life of a man to whom reason was faith made articulate, and for whom both faith and reason found their highest expression in good citizenship." And it is also a memorial, as Mrs. Green's brief preface reminds us, not of one only, but of two of the finest minds that were influential in Oxford within the nineteenth century.

Green and Nettleship were two very different men; and the difference of their gifts and character is a testimony to the vitality of the ideas in which they were heartily at one, and enhances the value of the portrayal of those ideas, as presented in this volume through the mind of the younger man.

Green's work as he left it—he died in his forty-sixth year—lacked something of conciseness in presentation and completeness in application. Nettleship, by nature a scholar, and endowed with the love and appreciation of all forms of beauty and energy, as also with a philosophical genius perhaps not inferior to that of Green, was well able to concentrate in a few attractive chapters the significance and suggestiveness of the older man's theory, as also that of his life. And with a very beautiful loyalty he has so framed his statement that the joint work of the two minds—for it really is nothing less—appears to be entirely the achievement of the older thinker; and what a less loyal student might well have advanced as criticisms and amendments of his material, are embodied by the biographer as obvious interpretations and inevitable explanations of the thought he is reproducing. The

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result is, that while the collected works and the Prolegomena will always retain their value for the student of metaphysics, ethics, and politics, and considerable parts of them also for the general reader, yet the final statement of the philosophy, with its fullest interconnection and suggestiveness, will be found, I believe, in the memoir. Not that Nettleship has modified anything with the view of making it easier or more popular. On the contrary, his treatment of the more difficult points, partly no doubt from its mere brevity, shows a tendency to what looks like over-statement. I do not doubt that this is partly intentional, though in part the mere consequence of condensation. Nettleship, as we learn from A. C. Bradley's sketch of him, had no sympathy with the attempt to dilute a great man's views to the popular taste. His way of securing fundamental positions was by uncompromising plainness in stating them.

There is a good example of this in the discussion whether pleasure as a transient feeling can be an element in human happiness. Nettleship's phrase "a being which *had had* a million such pleasures would *have had*[1] no more enjoyment than if it had had only one," is just the phrase which Green hesitates to use (Memoir, p. 210; Prol., s. 227). If we compare with the passage in the memoir what A. C. Bradley says of Nettleship's own attitude toward Hedonism, we shall see that this slight exaggeration of Green's actual phrase is due to recognizing, as Green's real point, that the Hedonist's pleasure implies much more than the description of "such pleasures," which is the basis of the controversy, expresses. This is no more than a fair interpretation of Green; but it might have been stretched into a criticism. It falls in the memoir into half a dozen lines of matter-of-course statement; and this is typical of Nettleship's method. Or, take again the sentence (p. 110), "The full reality of time is a relationship in which something is both before and after itself." This expression emphasizes the paradox of self-transcendence as applied to every element in time; Green's phrases rather insist on the explanation through a common law or subject present in all (Works, II, 73). One may note, too, in passing, that Green always speaks of "relation" (*Beziehung*, connection), while Nettleship has adopted the word "relationship" (kinship, *Verwandschaft*) throughout. Was this because the latter disposes in advance of the question of "external" relations?

[1] My Italics.

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The doctrine that good in the consequences of an act is proportional to the good in the motive, and *vice versa,* is handled with the same almost naïve directness. Critics have sometimes treated it as an unverifiable assertion about external fact. In Nettleship's transparent statement (p. 226) it appears as a truism involved in the conception of a moral act, far reaching as its consequences are when pursued with reference to the connection between character and ideas—a point on which current views are, I am convinced, both false and dangerous. For they involve, as I understand, dissociating moral goodness from the quality of the ideas which have mastery over the self. They are supported by the conventional rules of toleration and politeness, which forbid us to connect opinions with character. But these are maintained, I suggest, not because the connection is false, but because it is so terribly true. They rest on the same grounds which prohibit allusion to personal defects.

By such directness of statement as I have tried to illustrate, the central thoughts of Green's philosophy are condensed and connected, partly in Green's own language, partly in Nettleship's phrases, often reproducing Green's with a higher intensity. "The external world is the means by which our own nature (or, 'the Divine nature') is progressively communicated to us." "Self-consciousness (in any being) means to be itself and not itself in one." "To characterize our consciousness as a succession of states is to characterize it rather by what it is not than by what it is; for just so far as it is merely here and there, now and then, it is not ours at all." "The true individuality of the self comes to be understood, not as the imperviousness and incommunicableness of momentary feeling, but as the energy, at once self-contained and self-communicating which 'spreads undivided' in knowledge, and 'operates unspent' in love."

A prominent instance of a remark which might have been offered as a criticism, but which Nettleship rather treats as an explanation, is his comment on the ambiguity attaching for English readers to the terms "thought" and "feeling." For Green and Nettleship alike, philosophy meant "the impulse to see and feel things more clearly and intensely than ordinary life allows" (p. 93). Their watchword might have been the saying of Novalis, "Philosophiren ist dephlegmatisiren, vivificiren." But in ordinary English usage such complete and vivid realization of a truth is expressed by the term "feeling," while "thought" is used to de-

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scribe any reproduction, however partial or faded, of a past experience (p. 119). Thus "the associations" of the leading terms insisted on by an idealist theory "are precisely the reverse of those which the theory is intended to convey" (p. 118), and "thought" should be understood, if we are to be just, in a more pregnant sense.

The same principle applies to the reference of such expressions as "thought" and "consciousness" to the discursive processess and transitions of the finite intelligence. Green's argument always runs, not from these phenomena of finite mind, but from the persistence and objectivity of "things," the unity of the world, the continuity of all experience, the individuality that is ours, but lies beyond what we are. All this side of Green's argument is easier to grasp in the positive formulation of the memoir, than where, as a critic must, he almost seems to adopt the distinctions which in fact he is confuting. Thus, the careless reader may carry away an impression, even from portions of the Prolegomena, that Green held reality to be, as it were, compiled out of pure sensations *plus* empty thought-relations, when, in face, he was arguing that distinctions of this kind arise from misinterpretation of the mental history of individuals in time, and cannot be ascribed to the consciousness which is one with reality.

The same point comes to the front in the discussion how far moral ideals or principles—and I should add, what Green was too cautious to insist on at this point, theories of moral ideals—could give help in actual life. Here, again, all depends on distinguishing between an abstract definition, "an idea or thought as the partial or faded aspect of some fuller experience," and ideas in the sense in which they move mankind, and are "the very experience of mankind in the making" (p. 243).

Much has been said in criticism of Green's philosophical position—a great deal that is interesting, and some things, no doubt, that are true. But against the main argument as simply and uncompromisingly outlined in the memoir, I do not believe that any fundamental objection can be sustained. Nettleship, no doubt, had in a sense a larger horizon than his teacher. He is aware of other attitudes toward external nature than receiving it as the revelation of God, of other modes of exaltation than that which is specifically religious, of other ways of approaching the highest life than the beaten track of citizenship. But he uses his own wide sympathies to expand and illustrate the teaching which he

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interprets, so that even in regard to the moral appreciation of art, where Green at times trod uncertainly, the memoir gives a definite analysis, and one true to Green's best spirit. I do not know where one could look for a worthier portrayal of the philosopher's life and mind, nor for a simpler statement of the central position of idealism, than in this short biography.

B. BOSANQUET.

ST. ANDREWS.

THE NEMESIS OF NATIONS. Studies in History. By W. Romaine Paterson. The Ancient World. London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1907. Pp. x, 338.

Is the course of history just? Does retribution fall on a nation in proportion to its moral guilt? Such questions are of the utmost interest both for the historian and the ethical student, and Mr. Paterson's book is a bold attempt to answer them. The gist of that answer would seem to be that no state founded on oppression and slavery can permanently endure. The social wrong brings about an internal weakness which, sooner or later, hands the nation over as a prey to invaders. This has been shown four times over in the ancient world; by Hindustan, fast-bound in her iron system of caste, falling at the first Mohammedan attack; by Babylon, drunk with the luxury and tyranny that made her a by-word among the peoples; by Greece, with her brilliant, short-lived culture for the few, based on the servile toil of the many; by Rome, with her world-dominion undermined through the corruption that came of irresponsible wealth. Doubtless there is a great deal of truth in this picture, and in any case it is refreshing to meet a book that attacks the really interesting questions in history and attempts to answer them in the only possible way, the way of bold generalization and imaginative reconstruction. This is really no more arrogant than the attempt to restate accurately and entirely the events of the vanished past, and it is certainly infinitely more suggestive.

After saying this much it may seem both ungracious and inconsistent to add that Mr. Paterson's book is on the whole too audacious. He admits the complexity of the subject, and yet practically he writes as though the fall of his four great empires could be explained by the same simple causes acting in the

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same simple way. But compare Athens and Rome: Rome was at least as grasping and far more illiberal and cruel; there is enough proof of that in the laws for debt and the long, bitter struggle between patrician and plebeian, enough in the custom of crucifixion and the passion for the gladiatorial games. Greece, even in her decline, always turned with horror from such barbarities. Yet Rome endured for centuries, and the glory of Athens was as "a flash of lightning." The same problem meets us when we compare the Greeks with the great Semitic empires of Assyria and Babylonia. Hard as it is to be sure of our ground in those dark ages, one thing at least is clear, if only from the testimony of the sculptured slabs: that for humanity and gentleness the Greek was to the Assyrian as a man to a wild beast.

Yet Assyrian and Babylonian lasted long enough. On the other hand, it is strange that Mr. Paterson should seek to minimize the evidence for a comparatively liberal treatment of the slaves that is to be found in the Babylonian records. The fact of such treatment, if it is a fact, taken in conjunction with the length of Babylonian rule, would be an argument on his side. His book is full of interesting facts, references, and theories, especially with regard to imperial Rome, where his ground is firmest. The criticism on it amounts to the question whether he has not given too little weight to those other factors which make for a nation's growth and decay, and which are not moral in the narrower sense of the word. Vigor does not always imply other goodness, nor other goodness vigor; ruthlessness and rapacity, as many pitiless wars have shown, do possess elements of success; there have been martyred nations as well as martyred individuals, and the reward they gain is not always the reward of this world.

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

The Evolution of Modern Capitalism: A Study of Machine Production. By John A. Hobson. Walter Scott Publishing Co., 1906. Pp. xv, 450. New and Revised Edition.

"The Evolution of Modern Capitalism" has won for itself a wide circle of readers, and all will welcome this new and enlarged edition, which is considerably more exhaustive than the

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original work of which it is an expansion. For the revision an enormous pile of material has been studied, and in many respects the new volume is a great improvement upon the old. It is characterized by "organic" treatment, which was noticeable also in the original essay. Wisely, in the opinion of the reviewer, Mr. Hobson concerns himself mainly with development during and after the Industrial Revolution. One chapter is devoted to origins, and this is largely based on Sombart's notable work, with the tone of which Mr. Hobson is in close sympathy. Passing from history to interpretation—from history to some extent colored, as evolutionary history almost inevitably must be, by the lessons which are thought to be found in it—the author reaches the conclusion that concentration and monopoly which are evident in certain spheres to-day, are destined to extend to all economic activities associated with the employment of much machinery. *Pari passu* the development of public control will expand, it is supposed, as a self-protective function of the community; and ultimately this public control will become merged in public industry. The argument is plausible, and it is supported with wealth of fact, ingenuity of reasoning, and force of conviction. The reviewer, nevertheless, is not carried along by the interpretation which Mr. Hobson sees in the facts, and still holds to the opinion, after re-deliberation, that the case is not proven. That the future will witness a significant evolution of public control I make no doubt, but I doubt considerably whether we are justified in concluding that any enormous transference of responsibility for industrial enterprise from the individual to the state will ever take place.

It would obviously be impossible to follow our author step by step in the labyrinth through which he winds his way, but a notice of this work would be defective were no space devoted to the doctrine with which Mr. Hobson's name is associated, namely, that of there being a general tendency to "under-consumption." Mr. Hobson sticks to his guns and brings to bear in addition an impressive array of fresh artillery. Certainly the case for under-consumption is nowhere more adequately defended than in the pages before us, and war is carried into the enemy's camp. "It is commonly said by English writers upon economics," we are informed, "that the state of over-production, the redundancy of capital and labor, though found in one or two or several trades at the same time, cannot be of general

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application" (p. 275). Against this view some effective retorts are made, but I should hardly believe that what he attacks would be commonly defended to-day. The existence of, or at any rate possibility of, temporary, recurrent tendencies toward "over-production" would, I imagine, be generally admitted, but at the same time countervailing tendencies to under-production would be pointed to. The one, it would be held by the "orthodox," is no more to be regarded as a general tendency than the other. Progress appears to take place by these curious spasms and reactions; and the evil that they occasion incidentally cannot be disguised. But I should argue that it is not established that production has outrun consumption, and that every invention is widening the gap. To prove it you must prove either that demand is already fully satisfied, or that organizing power is practically inelastic, its supply being unaffected by the promise of gain. And if all classes were satiated with the wealth which existing incomes represented, as indeed they are not, then earnings and the hours of labor being intimately connected, further progress would mean commensurate curtailment of the proportion of the day devoted to production.

That full justice has not been done here to Mr. Hobson's dialectics must be admitted, but the limitations of space must be allowed as excuse. We have indicated merely the lines upon which we should make reply. It is unfortunate too, that where there is so much with which we are in agreement, attention should have been drawn mainly to points in dispute. But it is only fair to the seriousness of Mr. Hobson's work that this should have been done. In view of the author's repute it is almost unnecessary to add that the book is a valuable, as well as challenging, contribution to economic literature.

S. J. Chapman.

University, Manchester, England.

Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life. By W. R. Boyce Gibson. Lecturer on Philosophy in the University of London. London: Adam and Charles Black.

There are numerous indications in this little book of the author's whole-hearted enthusiasm for his subject. In a sentence, possessing more than one interesting feature, Eucken's doctrine is referred to as "a scheme of truth which in a very

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genuine sense of the term will be the philosophy of the future, if the future proves worthy of it."

The doctrine thus hopefully spoken of is variously named as the "new idealism," "personal idealism," "religious idealism," or still more specifically "Christian idealism." On its negative side it is a protest against naturalism on the one hand and abstract intellectualism on the other. In its positive aspect it claims to sublate both by a view which is at once concrete and idealistic. Starting with the assumption that experience may be arranged in ascending stages or levels, the sensuous, the subjective, and the spiritual, it insists, in terms of this that only in the life of action on the highest stage do we come adequately into contact with truth and reality. The riddle of the universe is not to be solved by the man of science in his laboratory dealing with sense phenomena, nor by the merely logical thinker in his study neatly arranging a conceptual system, but by him who lives a life of heroic spiritual activity.

It is explicitly announced that the first questions of philosophy are addressed not to the speculative intellect, but to the personality as a whole. Truth is spoken of as "a personal ideal." The test is neither to be found in clearness and distinctness of ideas, nor in the correspondence of thought with an external reality, nor in systematic coherence; we shall only find it in "spiritual fruitfulness as inwardly realized by the personal experient, inwardly realized as springing freshly and freely from the inexhaustible resources which our freedom gains from its dependence upon God."

Eucken lays stress on the fact that only within a given realm of experience can we find the principles of its explanation. Naturalism, for instance, breaks down when it passes beyond the sphere of sense and attempts to apply its categories to ethical and religious experiences which are in the domain of spirit. We must start from that experience itself, from a spiritual immediacy which is at best as valid as sense immediacy. But in the one case, as in the other, we must make out the explanation, lay bare the rational structure of the process which, though implicit in it, is not immediately "given." This seems peculiarly the philosopher's business.

Now when we come to look for Eucken's theory of spiritual experience, for the "speculative basis" which he asserts he has furnished, we meet with but small satisfaction. The spiritual

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life gets its supreme worth and validity through this coming here into immediate touch with the Divine. We are immediately aware of this contact, and at the same time are aware of our own freedom and of the inviolate nature of our own personality. How are we to relate and connect these convictions? How explain the possibility of a truly free personality which is at the same time utterly dependent upon the all-supporting spirit which gives to it the significance and value it possesses? These questions seem vital to Eucken in a philosophical regard. He meets them by renouncing the possibility of theory, and refers the questioner to the very experience which he is seeking to explain. These are simply fundamental convictions which defy explanation, but which the truly spiritual life will verify and attest. This is distinctly discouraging to that form of "heroic spiritual activity" in which men strive after the clear understanding of experience. Those upon whom this burden is laid are not likely to gain much from Eucken's "Philosophy of Life." For such the *solvitur in ambulando* formula, worthy and even, as here, inspiring in its own sphere, has hitherto proved but an empty spell, and we do not share Mr. Boyce Gibson's expectation that it may be otherwise in time to come.

Mr. Gibson's exposition was originally given as a series of lectures, and in point of form the book suffers manifestly from the circumstances of its origin. In spirit and tone, however, it is attractive, and the reader can hardly fail to be favorably impressed by the competence of the author for his task, both in the matter of zeal and of knowledge.

ALEXANDER MAIR.

LIVERPOOL.

POETRY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. By Hartley B. Alexander. New York: Putnams, 1906. Pp. vii, 233.

Mr. Alexander seeks, in this delightful essay, to analyze the imaginative life in the department of human thought in which the idealizing motive is most manifest, namely, in the poetic instinct, the chief of the "arts," the most perfect expression of beauty. He believes that we need a sort of rebaptism of the Platonic spirit in a *humanization* of our philosophical interests, and writes this essay as a corroboration of the claims of beauty to measure the worth of life.

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That there is testimony to the worth of life even in the despairing words of the pessimist is proven by the very despair itself, for pessimism does not appear so long as it is a question merely of the maintenance of life and not of its valuation. The savage tribes produce no Schopenhauers. Pessimism appears "when the struggle for *mere* existence has become transformed into a struggle for *ideal* existence." It is regarded by the author as a sort of impatience of spirit which the large cosmism of Plato's thought would cure.

But the final worth of life is not static. It must be found in life's work. The *summum bonum* must be an indefectible good, never declining into satiety. It must exist for its own sake, and be of eternal, unwearied potency in its appeal to the imagination of men. Only beauty (Plato's καθόν fulfils these conditions. Material goods, intellect, emotions, morality, religion, all exist as means only to the final good. In beauty only do we "come to rest."

With great skill of reason and wealth of illustration the author analyzes the springs of poetry in the human consciousness and the forms of poetry in human society. He finds lyric poetry "the most perfect of all expressions of spiritual life," because fitted by its very "ideality of abstraction and its crystal purity" for the "reflection of what is final in human nature." The dramatist bears the same relation to the sculptor as the reflective poet bears to the painter: the former works "in three dimensions"; there is objectivity in his creation, a "fuller freeing of the product from the self." But the painter *suggests* on his level canvas the depths which the sculptor measures by dividers and rule. The dramatic or epic composition is man's estimate of man; the lyric cry is "man's measure of God."

Mr. Alexander is a firm champion of individualism in the higher life of the spirit. He dissents from Francis Gummere in the opinion that the poetic impulse is a product of social consciousness. Rather has the latter been educated to such degree of freedom from the hoarse and inarticulate cry of the mob as it now possesses through the ideal personality (the Platonic universal), which sheds upon it an influence transcendental, magnetic, saving. So Mr. Alexander arrives, by his doctrine of the individual and personal as the measure of the worth of life, at the paradoxical truth that "in exalting the ephemeral the permanent is won." If the content of life is social as well as individual

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it is because "sociability is a feature of (a function of) individuality."

The book is charmingly written, though it is very close reading. Precision of language and suggestiveness of figure save many a page from a style that would be both obscure and tedious in the discussion of its postulates by a less gifted literary craftsman. The moral tone of the book is lofty, and some of the passages of appeal to a life of freedom under the inspiration of beauty rise to the sublimity of prophetic fervor.

D. S. MUZZEY.

NEW YORK.

THE CHILDREN OF THE NATION. By Sir John Gorst. London: Methuen & Co.

Dedicated to the Labor Members of the House of Commons, this volume deals in a comprehensive way with the pressing problems of child life which are crying for solution at the present day.

Infant mortality, the phenomena of overworked and underfed, diseased and derelict children are dealt with in turn, and preventive and remedial measures suggested and discovered.

The author brings home to us in a simple, forcible way, the terrible waste of human life which goes on in our midst. Children are born to our country, we speak of them as valuable national assets, perhaps even recognize, though dimly, that they *are* the nation that is to be, and yet we neglect them. How many are born only to die through lack of common care in infancy, how many more grow up to be a burden to themselves and to society—a continual source of weakness to the nation—by reason of preventible disease and lack of physical, mental and moral nurture!

Sir John Gorst reminds us that by the laws of our country, children have a right to be maintained by others until they are able to maintain themselves. This responsibility rests, in the first place, on the parents, but in case of their inability or neglect to discharge it, children have a legal claim on the State.

That children belong not to the family, but to the nation, probably few would now deny. It is when we leave this broad platform of general statement and descend to particulars that controversy begins. What are the respective duties and limits

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of responsibility of the parents and the State? Are the parents to be regarded as entirely responsible, and action by the State as being only required in case of their death or absolute incapacity? At one time this was the view most commonly held, at least in theory. In practice, however, it has always been found that the mere assertion of parental responsibility does not ensure its discharge. Even well-disposed parents may be too poor or too ignorant to care for their children in the right way. Charity therefore stepped in and numbers of children have been fed, clothed and educated by voluntary effort. As the author points out, however, charity has serious drawbacks. It cannot cover the whole ground, it works unequally, and it tends to undermine the sense of independence and responsibility. Moreover, the most deserving are rarely those who profit thereby. According to another view, parents may be regarded as responsible for some duties, such as those relating to bodily welfare (feeding, clothing, etc.), while the State assumes certain others, such as education. It is difficult, however, to know what principle of division to adopt; body and mind cannot be arbitrarily separated, and the ill-nourished, bodily-neglected child cannot profit by the most carefully planned system of intellectual instruction. On the whole, Sir John Gorst's view appears to be that the function of the State is to supplement the work of the family without drawing any rigid line of demarcation. He holds that the State should even be on the watch to guide and help the parents to fulfil their duties to the children, and rather than let these be in any way neglected, should assume any and every responsibility. He sees that there is grave danger in fixing our attention too exclusively on the education of parents, it is wiser to concentrate our efforts upon the children, and so to prevent a recurrence of the hopeless conditions.

The book is written with a glow of enthusiasm and conviction which makes it very delightful reading and even those who would not agree with many of his conclusions and recommendations, could hardly fail to peruse it with interest and appreciation.

MILLICENT MACKENZIE.

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STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By George Galloway, B. D. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. Pp. 328.

This book consists of six essays dealing with the more general and fundamental questions which a "thinking consideration" of religion suggests. As is clear from the title, no attempt is made in them to give a systematic and detailed treatment of the subject. It is with the wider issues which the fact of religion raises that the author is concerned throughout. Essay I, which bears the title "Hegel and the Later Tendency of Religious Philosophy," is a useful survey of the main trend of religious philosophy from Hegel to the present day. The more important writers on the subject are referred to, and the characteristic features of their teaching indicated. In his brief review of the thinkers whom he notices, the author makes a point of calling attention to what appears to him suggestive and valuable in their contributions. Essay II has for its subject "The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion." Its object is to bring out clearly the characteristic features of religion, and to define its relations to other aspects of human culture. The most important and interesting portions of the essay are the discussion of the problem of freedom and the account which is given of the transition from the ethical to the religious point of view. The treatment of the former subject, though ingenious and suggestive, can scarcely be said to carry conviction. Dissatisfied with the spiritual determinism of thinkers like Green because of its failure to account satisfactorily for the facts of remorse and repentance, the author feels constrained to allow "the possibility of a real alternative in conduct." He thinks he can find support for this view in an analysis of the self and in the conditions of its development. We are unable to follow his reasoning on this point. It is doubtless true that "the self as will which determines to action can take up into the content of its will different conceptions of the self as object," but we fail to see how this provides for "the possibility of a real alternative." The possibility of a real alternative must mean that in any given case of moral behavior an alternative mode of action was possible, though the conditions remained unchanged. Now, it is doubtless true that the self which prevails and is reflected in the actions which supervene differs from time to time, but this is true only on the assumption of a

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difference in the accompanying circumstances. It is this difference that determines which conception of the self will assert itself. It seems to us that one can admit all that is urged by the writer in regard to the self and its relation to character, and yet refuse to admit the possibility of a real alternative for which he pleads. In Essay III the subject dealt with is "Religious Development: Its History and Interpretation." For a brief treatment of so vast a subject it is very satisfactory. Its main contention is that we must look to psychology for the chief explanation of the process of religious development. Other principles are not excluded, but those which it is the business of psychology to expound are regarded as having played the chief rôle in determining the course and character of the development. Apropos of the importance attached to psychology in this connection, it may be said that it is apparent throughout the book that the author fully realises the value of the contribution of this science to the study upon which he is engaged. In Essay IV, which had already appeared in Mind, the author states his philosophic position, and in Essay V this is further developed and applied to religion. Essay VI, which completes the volume, deals with the relation of philosophy and theology, and is in the main a criticism and a refutation of the standpoint of the Ritschlian School.

The philosophical theory expounded in Essays IV and V interprets reality as consisting not merely of a Supreme Self or the One Real Being, but also of a plurality of less exalted existences. No other explanation, it is argued, is adequate to account for the facts of conscious experience. The very conception of outer experience implies objects lying outside consciousness, and existing independently of the conscious subject. What we call "outer experience" is simply representations to self-conscious subjects of the action of these transsubjective reals. Moreover, since these reals which we find it necessary to postulate are conceived as existing each for itself as well as for others, we are compelled to regard them after the analogy of the self, and to attribute to them a degree of inner life. We consequently arrive at the conception of a plurality of individual reals or selves belonging to different grades or levels of existence, and constituting a sort of hierarchy of beings. Having established the existence of individual reals or substances, the argument proceeds in the next place to determine the ultimate ground which

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such a system presupposes. Of the difficulty of this task—of determining the nature of the world-ground and defining its relation to the individual selves, the writer is fully conscious, and his argument, which we do not propose to exhibit in detail, shows great caution and characteristic absence of dogmatism. The first step involves the use of analogy. May not the principle which obtains in the microcosm, the human organism, have its counterpart in the macrocosm? May not the world-ground be to the individual centers of experience what the soul is to the different elements of the human body, an ever-present, connecting agency, enabling each self not only to develop its own life, but also to enter into systematic connection with the other selves so as to have a function in the whole? The conception of an ever-present, eternally operative will as world-ground having been reached, there remains the further task of giving more definite content to it, and of determining more precisely the relation of the world-ground or absolute self to the finite selves. At this stage of the argument two methods of reasoning are employed. The first consists in examining the inner or subjective development of self-conscious beings and arguing by a regressive movement from the results reached to the character of the ultimate ground which has made them possible. Can it be supposed that the activity of self-conscious subjects was created by a universal and unconscious will? The second type of argument meeting us frequently in this part of the work rests on the assumption that a true theory of reality must not do violence to or misconstrue any phase of experience. Consequently in seeking to give full and definite content to the idea of God the writer, who adopts this position, feels justified in accepting the guidance furnished by the demands of the moral and religious consciousness. "Not reason, then, but faith gives ethical content to the idea of God." It is, we think, a matter of regret and a defect in the work that the author does not deal more fully and explicitly with the subject of faith and its relation to reason.

The author's treatment of the subjects on which he writes is throughout able, thoughtful, and well balanced. And since it is confined to the more general aspects of the subjects it should prove attractive even to those whose interest in religion is too slight to carry them through elaborate expositions of particular dogmas or specific beliefs. The appearance of this volume at such a time as the present, when the philosophy of religion is

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receiving increasing attention, and degrees in divinity which include this subject within their syllabuses are being instituted for the first time in several universities, is, we think, especially gratifying. We know of no better book to place in the hands of students as a general Introduction or prolegomena previous to their entering upon a more detailed and specific study of the subject. The qualities of the book which in our opinion fit it to play this rôle are the intellectual honesty and the absence of bias and dogmatism which characterise the author's handling of his themes. While giving the impression that as a believer and divine, he is anxious to find support in reason for the phenomenon of religion and the dogmas of theology, he is nevertheless careful not to allow his desire to buttress the faith to cause him to assign to his arguments more probative force than they can justly lay claim to. The discussions show evidence of wide and varied reading, and readiness to recognise merit in and adopt suggestions from systems with which, in some cases, the writer is at variance on fundamental points. Each essay, while forming a separate and more or less independent treatment, serves at the same time to illumine and strengthen the argument pursued in the remaining essays.

W. Jenkyn Jones.

University College, Aberystwyth.

Sur La Transmissibilité des Caractères Acquis. Par Eugenio Rignano. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1906.

This interesting volume is another contribution to the literature of the Biological School of Sociology, which is profoundly engaged in researches that shall demonstrate the transmission of acquired characteristics. The author tells us that he was at first inclined to the views of Weissman, because the opposing theories gave no satisfactory explanation of the mechanism of "Transmission." Realizing, however, that the theories of non-transmission scarcely corresponded with the primary biological laws, he was at last led to a new biogenetic hypothesis, which he christens "Centro-Epigenesis," and which resolves the human mind into a kind of nerve accumulator, similar to the accumulators of electrical science "substance capable de s'ajouter aux autres déjà existantes sans les alterer et apte à restituer, lorsquelle viendrait à se trouver dans les conditions de milieu pareilles, où

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presque, à celles du moment, où elle était deposée le même courant spécifique par lequel elle a été produite." The author also advances the hypothesis, that vital phenomena consists essentially "en un décharge nerveuse oscillante intra-nucléaire." The argument is presented in a clear and fascinating manner, and we recommend it to the attention of scientific students.

H. OSMAN NEWLAND.

LONDON.

OLD AGE PENSIONS AND THE AGED POOR. By Rt. Hon. Charles Booth. London: Macmillan & Co., 1906.

This is a reissue of Mr. Charles Booth's old age pensions scheme, which attracted so much attention when it was first brought forward, and which to-day, in spite of the numerous other schemes which have since paraded themselves before the public, remains the simplest, wisest, and most practicable solution. Some system of old age pensions has become during recent years more necessary than when first suggested. Men are thrown out of employment earlier and while they are yet capable of doing useful service, because the stress of modern life clamors for young men only. To find employment for such unemployed will be an industrial problem for the future; how to maintain the aged poor has been a problem for many a day. Mr. Booth's scheme grapples with both, and half solves them. To every person reaching the age of seventy, he would grant a pension of seven shillings a week; to those most in need, he would grant from sixty years of age, upward, a similar pension reduced in amount proportionately to the age at which payment began. His object is to prevent pauperism by catching the poor before they have dissipated everything. The present cost is to be defrayed by taxation; but he does not suggest the sources of revenue. We cordially recommend the volume to every social reformer.

H. OSMAN NEWLAND.

LONDON.

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LECTURES ON HUMANISM, with Special Reference to its Bearings on Sociology. By Professor J. S. Mackenzie, Litt. D. Ethical Library. Contains Nine Lectures. I—The Meaning of Humanism; II—The Growth of Humanism; III—Humanism in Philosophy; IV—Humanism in Politics; V—Humanism in Economics; VI—Humanism in Education; VII—Humanism in Religion; VIII—Limitations of Humanism; IX—Implications of Humanism. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS AND OTHER ESSAYS; with Chapters Reprinted on the Philosophy of Religion in Kant and Hegel. By Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, LL. D. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons.

THE CREED OF A LAYMAN. *Apologia pro Fide Mea.* By Frederic Harrison. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co.

THE STOIC CREED. By Professor W. L. Davidson, M. A., LL. D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

SCHOOLS OF HELLAS: An Essay on the Practice and Theory of Ancient Greek Education from 600 to 300 B. C. By Kenneth J. Freeman. Edited by M. J. Rendall. With a Preface by A. W. Verrall, Litt. D. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co.

THE PRINCIPLES OF INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION. By F. H. Matthews, M. A. Cambridge: at the University Press.

SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS. Vol. III. Published for the Sociological Society. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmilllan Co.

COLLECTIVISM AND INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION. By Emile Vandervelde. Translated by R. P. Farley. The Socialist Library. V. Edited by J. Ramsay MacDonald, M. P. London: Independent Labor Party.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUL. By Harold Monro. Two Short Essays: I—The Evolution of the Soul; II—The Soul of Christ. Norwich: The Samurai Press.

A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By Arch. B. D. Alexander, M. A. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons.

UN MOUVEMENT MYSTIQUE CONTEMPORAIN. Le Réveil religieux du Pays de Galles (1904-1905). Par J. Rogues de Fursac. Paris: Felix Alcan.

DER INTELLEKTUALISMUS IN DER GRIECHISCHER ETHIK. Von Max Wundt. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann.

DER RICHTUNGSBEGRIFF UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG FÜR DIE PHILOSOPHIE. Von Rudolf Goldscheid. Abgedruckt aus Ostwald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie. Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Co. [A very instructive

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discussion of the place of the idea of Direction in Philosophy. The author intends to develop the ethical bearings of this conception in a subsequent work.]

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THE KINGDOM OF LOVE. By Henry Frank, author of "The Doom of Dogma and the Dawn of Truth;" "A Vision of the Invisible;" "The Shrine of Silence;" etc. New York: R. F. Fenno & Co., 18 E. 17th Street, 1907. Pp. 245.

Articles by writers in Great Britain, and books to be reviewed, except those published in the United States, should be sent to Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, University College, Cardiff, Wales.

All other articles, and books to be reviewed, published in the United States, should be sent to INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1415 Locust Street, Philadelphia.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1908.

THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIVE RACES IN SOUTH AFRICA.

I.

"The strength and vitality of a race, and its power of holding its own in the world," says Mr. Bryce in his "Impressions of South Africa," "depend less on the quickness of its intelligence than on the solidity of its character. . . . Its character depends upon the moral ideas which govern its life, and on the habits in which those ideas take shape; and these, in their turn, depend very largely upon the conceptions which the race has formed of religion, and on the influence that religion has over it. This is especially true of peoples in the earlier stages of civilization. Their social virtues, the beliefs and principles which hold them together and influence their conduct, rest upon and are shaped by their beliefs regarding the invisible world and its forces. Races in which religious ideas are vague and feeble seldom attain to a vigorous national life, because they want one of the most effective bonds of cohesion and some of the strongest motives that rule conduct." Whether these remarks of Mr. Bryce need qualifying by ethnological and anthropological considerations I must leave to others to determine. The ethnologists and the anthropologists would probably say that when a race becomes deficient in vitality no beliefs or principles will save it from extinction. But to this Mr. Bryce would retort that its beliefs and principles, its solidity or its want of solidity of character would be a part of, or the outcome of, its vitality as a

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race. In all questions of race, as in our individual life, there is an unknown something which defies analysis, and our necessary ignorance of which readily lends itself to vague generalities and vicious reasoning.

On the other hand, an enthusiastic Christian missionary, on reading Mr. Bryce's words, would naturally exclaim: "Yes, let us give to the lower races our Christian beliefs and principles, and they will soon attain to a vigorous national life." But the problem is not so simple. Mr. Bryce himself would admit that the "beliefs regarding the invisible world and its forces," the beliefs which influence conduct, are the great world-beliefs in God, the destiny of the soul, and the daily requirements which will enable the soul to fulfil its destiny. But these beliefs are not by any means confined to Christianity. It is doubtful whether—for all men—they find their highest expression in Christianity. For us Christians, yes. But for Hindus, Japanese, Chinese, it is doubtful. God fulfils himself in many ways. It would be interesting to know what the moral effect upon the South African native races would have been had Buddhism or Confucianism established itself in South Africa instead of Christianity. Would the moral effect have been better or worse than under Christianity? This question would, of course, be answered in different ways by different people, but it is well to bear in mind that there is as great a difference, *in essentials,* between the beliefs of some of the missionary agencies in South Africa—say between Roman Catholicism and Wesleyanism—as there is between Wesleyanism and a high type of Buddhism or Zoroastrianism.

Another factor to be borne in mind in estimating the effect of beliefs on morality, and especially on the morality of a primitive race, is this: that the primitive man cannot possibly hold a belief in the same sense in which we hold it. The great words, God, Christ, soul, sin, heaven, come to his mind with a totally different meaning from that which they bear to us, a meaning wrought out of very rich and full, or out of very poor and meagre, experiences. The primitive man simply translates these and other great words into his

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own moral and spiritual vocabulary, with sometimes astonishing results. To give only one instance out of many, Mr. Dudley Kidd, in his book, "The Essential Kaffir," tells a story of a lady, a missionary teacher, who was trying to teach an old Kaffir the elements of New Testament Christianity. She ultimately came to the subject of angels and "spent a good half-hour trying to knock into the head of the old fellow, who was, however, very dull, some idea as to the nature of angels. At length, after endlessly dinning the same facts into his head, she said, 'And what are angels?' The old man looked very serious, and said very slowly, with a pause between his words, 'Angels—are—birds.' And on another occasion, after listening to a long dissertation on sin, which was likened to the weeds in the garden, he was asked what sins were, and he said, in the same deliberate way, 'Sins—are—weeds—in—the—garden.'" He was not far wrong in the material counterpart of the conceptions, but how dim must have been his comprehension of the moral and spiritual significance of the words! Many tribes have a dim and vague conception of an after-life, but few, if any, have any idea of eternal duration, hence, discourses on the immortality of the soul would convey little meaning to their minds. Their beliefs about God are essentially, and sometimes grotesquely, anthropomorphic.

I am not urging these considerations with the object of disparaging missionary endeavor or of throwing cold water on the Christianizing of the native races. I believe the native races ought to be Christianized. But I wish to caution the reader against expecting too much from a mere surface change in theological beliefs, and against interpreting the word "belief" in too narrow a sense, *i. e.*, the sense in which he may happen to hold it. A proper attitude of mind on this matter will have far-reaching effects on both missionary enterprise and national policy. It will tend to confine missionary enterprise to, or concentrate it upon, those peoples over whom we have assumed certain governmental responsibilities, as in South Africa. And it will tend to moderate, or make more cautious, missionary enterprise amongst those people over

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whom we have no governmental responsibilities. It may, indeed, lead European governments to disavow all responsibility for such enterprise. For there is no doubt that much harm has been done by intemperate and ill-advised missionary agencies. In 1901 the leading Buddhists of Japan issued an address to all the churches of the Western world, an address in which they condemned, in strong but dignified terms, the unwisdom of Christian missionaries and missionary societies as having been the main cause of the Boxer outbreak, and some of the missionaries themselves admit that it has been a contributory cause. "Our object is simply to make it clear," says Dr. A. H. Smith, a distinguished American missionary, in his "Convulsions in China," "that we recognize the present attitude of the Christian Church, Protestant and Catholic alike, as a great bar to the spread of the gospel in China, and perhaps the most potent single cause of Chinese hostility;" though he qualifies this by saying later on, that "for the precipitation of the tremendous crisis which has occurred the proportion of responsibility of Protestant missions is undoubtedly real, but it is a small and relatively insignificant factor." Perhaps I might make the suggestion here that with regard to missionary work amongst peoples over whom we have no governmental control, it would be wise to organize periodical international conferences between the religious leaders of the various races, from San Francisco to Pekin, with a view to the formulation of an amicable policy based on mutual toleration, purely voluntary endeavor, and respect for the law and religious customs of each country. There are two pernicious and widely prevalent notions against which it is necessary to be on our guard: first, the notion that the color of a man's skin determines his superiority or inferiority in the scale of civilization, a notion which may lead to a modified form of slavery, as with alien indentured labor, and which I may call the superstition of the color line; second, the notion that because a man's religion, or rather theology, may be good for him and his race, it is therefore good for all men and all races, a notion which may lead to the fanaticism of racial and religious wars, and which I may

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term the superstition of the tribal god—two superstitions to which we English people, or perhaps I should say European peoples, are peculiarly prone.

II.

In order to bring this question of the elevation of native races through moral and religious endeavor more vividly before the mind of the reader, I append a table, which I have compiled from the latest census returns for Cape Colony, showing the number of adherents of the various religious denominations, both of European and native descent. The figures refer to Cape Colony only, not to the whole of South Africa:

	European.	Native.	Mixed or Colored.
Dutch Reformed Church	296,792	31,254	71,266
Church of England	126,552	80,598	74,127
Wesleyan	35,860	211,017	30,329
Roman Catholic	28,480	4,204	4,364
Presbyterian	26,357	58,375	3,872
Lutheran	13,089	13,364	10,577
Baptist	9,940	3,374	761
Congregationalist (including Independents and London Missionary Society)	4,986	70,452	36,408
Unsectarians, Unspecified Protestants and Unassigned Missions	3,282	7,687	4,368
Church of Christ	1,074	5,084	1,426
Salvation Army	910	571	302
Unitarian and Liberal	475	20	39
Rhenish Mission	343	3,288	17,148
Moravian	278	12,176	10,260
Native African Methodist-Episcopal	36	10,337	1,681
Native Church		2,178	176
Agnostics, 242; Freethinkers, 131; and Atheists, 62	412	3	20
Minor sects	9,387	3,709	677
Unspecified and unknown	1,147	1,286	845
Object to state	213	8	14
No religion (so stated in census forms)	532	996,698	18,518

Various non-Christian races:	
Mohammedans (chiefly Malays)	22,623
Jews	19,537
Hindus and other non-Christians	3,295

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This table requires a little explanation, and care must be taken not to read into it more than the figures will bear. The "mixed or colored" population is composed of people of mixed European and native blood, and the offspring of these mixed European and native races are more readily adaptable to civilized customs and beliefs than are the offspring of purely native races. Again, the large proportion of natives and colored to whites in the Rhenish and Moravian bodies is explained by the fact that these are purely missionary agencies almost wholly supported from Europe. The other religious bodies, also, are very largely supported from Europe in their missionary work. It is but fair to the Dutch Reformed Church to say that the whole, or nearly the whole, of its missionary funds are raised in South Africa, a fact which probably accounts for its smaller field of missionary activity in comparison with the number of its members of European descent. I believe it raises more money, *in South Africa,* for missionary work than any other church.

But the most striking facts about this table are the almost total failure, in this field, of the Salvation Army, whose methods, one would have thought, would have appealed to the natives' love of sensation; and the comparative weakness of the Roman Catholic Church amongst the natives. On the other hand, may be noticed the great strength of Wesleyanism. Obviously, the natives take to Wesleyanism, while Episcopalianism, notwithstanding its wealth and imperial prestige, compares unfavorably, in proportion to the number of European adherents, with the leading Protestant sects.

But the most noteworthy fact is one which does not appear in the table, namely, that probably not three per cent. of the native or colored converts know anything of the doctrinal or ecclesiastical differences which separate Episcopalianism from Wesleyanism, or Wesleyanism from Congregationalism. The success and spread of any particular form of Christianity depends largely on the amount of money any particular missionary agency can devote to the work and the number of workers it can put in the field. Had as much money been available for Unitarian missionary work as for

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Episcopalian or Wesleyan, there is no doubt that a large number of natives would have become so-called Unitarians. The point I wish to enforce is this, that in the moral and religious development of native races, sectarian and ecclesiastical doctrines count for little or nothing, at least, in the early stages. It is the cardinal and fundamental beliefs that tell—God, Christ, the soul, immortality. What would be the ultimate effect on native character of an Episcopalian, as distinct from an evangelical, or a rationalistic type of religion, it is, of course, impossible at present to say.

We are thrown back, then, on fundamental beliefs. Nay, we are thrown back on something deeper than fundamental beliefs—on the modes of life in which beliefs find their efficacy and their justification. Here we are brought to the great question of education, and what education means. Every well-wisher of the native races in South Africa must surely be gratified at the emphatic way in which the recent Commission on Native Affairs has dispelled the widespread delusion that education and Christianity have a demoralizing effect on the native. In the coast towns of South Africa this notion is passed from mouth to mouth with a parrot-like repetition which becomes wearisome. The very words in which it is expressed—"Oh! the educated 'nigger' is no good"—shows the bias of those who hold it. Its prevalence may be accounted for in this way: the employer of labor requires natives in his business, that is, for the purpose of making profit, nearly all the unskilled labor in South Africa being done by natives or colored people. For unskilled work the uneducated native is sometimes more useful to the employer than the educated native, because, being uneducated, he is a more subservient "tool" with no nonsense about his "rights." This is the point of view from which the average employer judges. The educated native is not so subservient a tool, he has more self-respect, he considers himself to be a human being, perhaps even a citizen, and in this process of moral and civic development he is apt to show a certain amount of "cheekiness." Hence, from the purely profit-making point of view he is "no good"! But he gets employment for all that, which shows that he

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is some good after all, and, indeed, one wonders what South Africa would do without him. At any rate the commission has reported very emphatically and unanimously on this point, as may be seen from the following extract:

"The consensus of opinion expressed before the commission is to the effect that education, while in a certain number of cases it has had the effect of creating in the natives an aggressive spirit, arising no doubt from an exaggerated sense of individual self-importance, which renders them less docile and less disposed to be contented with the position for which nature or circumstances have fitted them, has had generally a beneficial influence on the natives themselves, and by raising the level of their intelligence, and by increasing their capacity as workers and their earning power, has been an advantage to the community.

"Testimony has been given as to the value of education as a concomitant of religious and moral instruction, and as to its economic effect in raising the standard of material comfort and thus creating wants. Apart from the consideration that there is a moral obligation upon the State to provide for the intellectual development of all classes of its subjects, there appear to be very sound reasons of policy for the adoption of a liberal and sympathetic attitude toward the subject of native education. The native, in common with the rest of mankind, does not live by bread alone, and possesses certain mental impulses and aspirations which demand satisfaction. . . . No policy can be complete or sound which is limited to political or economical considerations only, and which takes no account of the irrepressible forces within each individual. And it is evident that there is among the people themselves a growing desire for education, which cannot and need not be suppressed."

In qualification of this, and as some justification of the popular view, I may say that the education hitherto given to the native has been, on the whole, of too bookish or intellectual a character. It has been the modern board or common school system drilled into the mind of a race which has been taken away from the structure of its own tribal life and morality, and brought into contact with the artificiality, sensationalism, and vice of town life and civilization. It has neglected native aptitudes, and the formation of character in the deepest sense of that word; or rather, it has sought to reform it by a thin smattering of theological or denominational instruction. What we want in South Africa is an independent inquiry, apart from either missionary or capitalist ideals, as to the meaning and content of "education," in so far as it should strive to fit the native to be both an end in himself as a responsible human

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being, and an efficient means to the welfare of the community to which he belongs.

The commission also commends the enlightened policy of Cape Colony in the matter of native education, as compared with the other South African States, the expenditure per native scholar being as follows: Cape Colony, 15s. 9d.;[1] Natal, 14s. 4d.; Transvaal, 8s. 7d.; Orange River Colony, 5s. 6d.; Rhodesia, 9s. 3d.; Basutoland, 13s. 5d. The number of native and colored children in the schools in Cape Colony is 95,306, while the number of native school children in the other colonies is, Natal, 10,154; Transvaal, 11,683; Orange River Colony, 6,500; Rhodesia, 334; Basutoland, 10,484. The percentage of native scholars to native population is as follows: Cape Colony (native and colored), 5.20; Natal, 1.12; Transvaal, 1.13; Orange River Colony, 2.76; Rhodesia, .05; Basutoland, 3.01.[2]

But let us go back for a moment to the question of the relation of education to belief, and of belief to modes of life. On this question a great change in missionary opinion has undoubtedly taken place during the last twenty-five or thirty years. It is now more generally admitted that habits, work, industry, settled modes of life, and moral training, are quite as necessary as the inculcation of theological beliefs and elementary intellectual instruction, in order to influence character permanently and for good. The reason is obvious. Habits of industry help to develop the moral side of personality by training in method, accuracy, patience, perseverance, the adaptation of means to ends, and above all, by strengthening and disciplining the will, that is, in self-control and all that

[1] This is but approximate, however, as detailed and separate figures respecting government grants to native and colored schools, as distinct from European, are not available.

[2] For the purpose of comparison, I may say that the percentage of European scholars to the total European population in Cape Colony at the present time is about 12 per cent. The proportion of school children to total population in England and Wales is, I believe, about 17½ per cent., but education is not yet compulsory in Cape Colony, and it is the custom here for parents to send their children to school somewhat later than in England, on account of the warmer climate of South Africa.

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makes a man. We are all—and this is especially true of undeveloped natives—we are all too ready to follow our momentary feelings, impulses, and desires. The man of weak will is often submerged by these; he easily gives way to temptation, and is led, by sheer want of self-control, into the devious ways of vice. Now industry, and especially handwork, does undoubtedly strengthen the will by the sustained effort that it requires, and also, by training the mind to think connectedly, helps it to bring together and to follow a complex train of means in pursuance of a definite end. That is self-control. A child who makes a box not only learns how to make a box, it also gets lessons in accuracy, patience, perseverance, industry, and the adaptation of means to ends. These are the qualities that form character. These are the lessons that help to make citizens.

Not only this. The inculcation of beliefs requires the use of abstract terms which the immature mind cannot fully understand. Even moral terms, right and wrong, good and bad, accuracy and inaccuracy, false and true, are abstractions which to many minds have not a very definite meaning save when applied to actual concrete instances. Now industry, the work in hand, furnishes the concrete instance. By passing through those nerve-centers which affect both thoughts and habits it so stamps its influence on the mind and life that that influence becomes ineffaceable. It becomes part of the life and character, and the individual is false or true, good or bad, in proportion as his work is false or true, good or bad. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Now to dump down into the immature mind of the native the intellectual results of our thousand years of civilization, without training him in those moral habits which work and experience alone can grave upon his character, would be to commit a very serious mistake. The native must be scientifically trained in those habits of industry (not, I need hardly say, by the serf method of "forced labor") which produce self-respect, and which will make him a better, a more intelligent, and a more efficient member of society.

In this direction nothing has yet been done in South Africa

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on the scale of Mr. Booker T. Washington's splendid training institute at Tuskegee. But something has been done. There are now thirteen small training institutes in various parts of the colony and native territories at which over eleven hundred native youths and girls are trained either as pupil teachers or for the various industries. These institutes are managed mainly by the churches or the missionary societies, and assisted by government grants. One, however, is managed by the natives themselves, with the assistance of American negroes, on Tuskegee lines. The boy apprentices serve for four or five years at carpentry, shoemaking, printing, masonry, etc., in the industrial departments, studying for the standard examinations at the same time. The girls are taught house and laundry work, sewing and cookery. The fees are very low, in some cases amounting only to 5s. per week, including board. Day scholars in the standards are in some cases admitted free, in others on payment of 1s. a quarter.[8] There are about eighty Europeans engaged in the institute, among them being graduates of English and Scotch universities, and trained teachers from the training colleges of Great Britain. The examination lists are scanned as eagerly by educated natives as by Europeans.

What, then, should be done? It is obvious that with some 133,000 native and colored children receiving elementary education in the schools, but with little provision for industrial training, the great question is, not, Shall the native be educated? but, How shall he be so educated as to enable him to use his energies both for his own well-being and moral progress, and for the welfare of the State? The missionary societies and churches are obviously unable to cope with the problem. So great is the demand for higher education amongst the natives themselves, and so inadequate are the means for supplying it, that many are going to America and Europe for their education. The churches and missionary societies are inadequate to the work. They are often too conservative.

[8] For some of these facts I am indebted to an interesting paper read at a recent Teachers' Conference by the Rev. D. D. Stormont (Blythswood).

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They cannot meet the necessary financial outlay. Nor is it right that they should be asked to meet it. It is a matter for the State.

This, then, should be done. The State should impose a special educational tax on natives, the proceeds of which should be devoted exclusively to native elementary, industrial, and higher education, and particularly to the establishment of industrial institutes. The organization and management of the schools and institutes should be placed in the hands of representative boards, to which the mission schools and institutes might be transferred. It is said by those who are supposed to know that many of the churches would willingly transfer this work to the State in order that they might devote their funds and energies to other necessary work.[4] But the Commission on Native Affairs expresses itself more cautiously. On this question of State education, its report is somewhat disappointing. It declares itself against any system "of general public undenominational education independent of existing missionary organizations," but it adds, somewhat inconsequently, that "it is advisable in the opinion of the majority of the commission to extend to some form of industrial training the same general support that is accorded to elementary education;" and it goes on to say that "the resources of these mission churches are limited as to men and means, and there are parts which their organizations have not reached, and in which there may be, and in places is, a local desire among the natives for means of education. With reference to such neighborhoods and elsewhere, it is necessary to consider and decide upon the question whether native schools established, or to be established, in full compliance with the regulation of government and under its supervision, but without European missionary control, should be recognized and aided or not. The commission, while admitting that there is much opposition to the view, holds that recognition and aid should be given." It is therefore "of opinion

[4] This is the opinion of the Rev. D. D. Stormont (Blythswood) given in the paper already alluded to.

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that any local demand for native education not otherwise provided for should be met by the creation of a fund, to be administered or not, as circumstances permit, by a local board or committee and to be raised by means of a rate levied upon the natives in the area concerned."

This would obviously mean a dual system of mission and State schools, which is hardly necessary, as the native, as I have shown, is influenced by the cardinal and fundamental beliefs of Christianity rather than by its denominational or doctrinal varieties. The principle of an education rate or tax is conceded, but it might be made general instead of being confined to particular areas;[5] the work of education should be pushed into districts where, at present, the native is entirely outside the pale of education; and industrial or training institutes should be established to which all native students who would pay the moderate fees imposed should be admitted. The cry is often raised amongst Europeans in South Africa: "Tax the natives." So say I, but let this special native education tax be used exclusively for the benefit of the natives and administered by native representatives, in coöperation, of course, with advisers of European descent. I lay stress upon the advisability of inducing the native to pay more largely toward his own education, that is, through the State, or partially through the State. He is well able to do so. It is unfair to tax a comparatively small white minority for this, except to the extent of a fair proportion of the general revenue and such government grants as may be deemed advisable. Above all, the native would value his education all the more. He would feel that he himself, through his own industry, must work out his own moral and intellectual salvation. The process may be slow, but it will be more effective than any undue forcing system for which the energy has to be "stoked up" from outside. Neither must we expect too much under the best conditions. If it is true that nature never makes a leap it will take many generations for the native races to attain a fair level of civilization, just as it

[5] Such a tax is already imposed in some parts of the native territories.

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has taken Europeans many generations, nay centuries. But the task must be attempted. It is the only way.

I have not the space to deal at length with the economic objections to the industrial and higher education of the native races. It is said that the skilled native will come into competition with the skilled white workers. But surely it is too late in the day to attempt to keep one race in ignorance for the convenience of another. The more skilled workers there are in a country the richer that country will become. It is too often forgotten that for a long time to come the chief industry in South Africa must be agriculture. But Europeans will not go on to the land in large numbers, they prefer the towns. In the native training institutes, then, training in agriculture and allied industries should occupy a leading place. It would be far better to have an intelligent population on the soil than an ignorant and a practically serf population. On the necessity for teaching hygiene in native and colored schools, to a race which is gradually adopting the customs of civilization with sometimes deplorable results I need not dwell. I need only say that while, in thirty-five of the chief towns of the colony, the death rate amongst Europeans is only sixteen per thousand, the death rate amongst the native and colored races is forty-six per thousand; and while, out of 1,000 children born of European parents, 159 die before they are a year old, out of 1,000 children born of native and colored parents, 328 die before they are a year old. In some places indeed the rate for colored children reaches 450, and in one place it acually stands at 800. These figures speak for themselves.

There are other questions of grave importance affecting the welfare of the native and mixed races. There is the question of the liquor traffic amongst the natives; there are grave questions affecting the future of the colored people, that is, the people of mixed European and native descent, about whose vitality, stability, intellectual capacity, and moral and material condition we have so little available data; and there is the important question of native franchise and representation. But I have already exceeded my space. The reader

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will see that in the matter of education and genuine concern for the welfare of the native, the record of Cape Colony stands in sharp contrast to the brutality of some Australian and American States, and is far higher than that of other South African States. South Africa will never be wholly a white man's country; it will never be wholly a black man's country. It is therefore essential that all races should work harmoniously with each other, and our most fervent prayer may well be that they may never be brought into disastrous conflict. The rise of an intelligent native population will make for the desired end, and furnish, perhaps, a much-needed object lesson to the world.

RAMSDEN BALMFORTH.

CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA.

IS STOCK WATERING IMMORAL?

Stock watering, or overcapitalization, has of late become a subject of quite general interest. It is discussed in the press, on the platform, and in legislative halls. Its prevalence in railway finance is alleged to be one of the chief reasons why the Interstate Commerce Commission desires to have a valuation of the railroads of the United States. Some of the states have recently taken steps to have the same thing done for the railways within their borders, as well as to supervise more closely the capitalization of public service corporations generally. Underlying all the discussions of the matter, and all the legal proposals and enactments, is the conviction that stock watering and its results are improper and injurious to the public welfare. What are the grounds of this belief and to what extent is it well founded?

As the composition of the phrase implies, "watered stock" embodies the general idea of *excess*. It means stock in excess of the proper capitalization of a business. What is proper capitalization? Most corporation directors and some economists maintain that it is capitalization which corresponds

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with earning power. For them watered stock means stock upon which the earnings of a concern will not pay normal dividends. To put it in another way, a company is over-capitalized when the face value of its securities is more than their market value. The generality of people describe proper capitalization in terms of *cost,* and define watered stock accordingly. But all do not agree in the interpretation of cost. In the "Final Report" of the United States Industrial Commission, we read: "Stock watering may be defined as the issuing of securities that do not represent money invested in the property" (page 405). "Water," therefore, comprises that portion of a company's securities that exceeds the amount expended for the creation, purchase, or permanent improvement of a business. This is the popular understanding of the term. Political economists favor as the basis of capitalization not original cost but cost of reproduction. In the present paper stock watering is understood with reference to one or the other of these two standards, never with reference to earning power.

The morality of stock watering is determined by its methods, its purposes, and its effects. "Formerly," to quote the Industrial Commission, "sheer fraud was often practiced in issuing stock for speculative purposes." The classical example is Daniel Drew's action of increasing the capitalization of the Erie Railroad from $17,000,000 to $78,000,000, in order to manipulate the stock market. Giving excessive sums to dummy construction companies, composed of members of the railway corporation; purchasing property as a subsidiary corporation and then selling it at an exorbitant price to the main corporation, the men in control being the same in both; presenting stocks as a bonus to purchasers of bonds, are other "fraudulent devices" mentioned by the Commission. It is asserted that "these flagrant methods have been largely discontinued during recent years" ("Final Report," p. 406). "Largely," but not entirely discontinued; for each of the last three devices is still employed, particularly the second and third. Within the last four years a conspicuous instance of the second method occurred in the State in which

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this paper is written. The directors of a large railway system formed a company and bought two branch lines for something less than $1,500,000. They then formed another company and bought these lines from the first company at a much higher figure. Finally they sold the two small roads to their large system for $6,600,000, thus increasing the water in the latter by more than $5,000,000!

At present the methods of watering most frequently employed are: the distribution of "stock dividends" to stockholders, which consist either of surplus earnings in the form of new shares or of sales of stock at less than par value—"melon cutting," in Wall Street parlance; the substitution of a comparatively large amount of stock for a comparatively small amount of bonds; and the issuing of stock to defray current expenses of operation, such as wages, salaries, materials, etc. (*cf.* "Final Report of U. S. Industrial Commission," pp. 406, 407). For the most part, these are methods employed by concerns already established. In the organization of new companies most of the watering has been effected through commissions and bonuses to promoters and underwriters, bonuses to investors, and stock sold below par. These have been the favorite methods employed in forming the great trusts. A flagrant instance is furnished by the Standard Distilling and Distributing Company. For each $100,000 of property that this company bought it issued securities whose par value aggregated $600,000, namely, $150,000 common stock to the promoter; $100,000 preferred stock and $100,000 common stock to the seller of property, who became a shareholder in the trust; and $150,000 common stock to the underwriters (J. W. Jenks, "The Trust Problem," p. 87).

The proportion of water in some of the great corporations seems to be very large. In 1900 thirty-nine of the trusts testified to the United States Industrial Commission that the earning power of these concerns was equivalent to only 64.42 per cent. of their capitalization (*cf.* W. Z. Ripley, "Trusts, Pools, and Corporations," p. 123). Writing in the *North American Review* of October 19th, 1906, Mr. Wharton Barker

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submits estimates to show that of the $13,800,000,000 of railroad capitalization in the United States only $6,000,000,000 represents money invested. Senator La Follette in his Rate bill speech last year put the amount of water at about the same figures. Six years ago Professor Frank Parsons told the Industrial Commission that "the figures of construction and equipment cost given in Poor's "Manual" from time to time indicate that the railroads of the United States are capitalized at about double what they could be built for and equipped at the present time" ("Report," Vol. IX, p. 155). He added, however, that the railroads had not inflated their securities to such an extent proportionately as the street railways and the gas companies. Against the estimates of the three authorities just quoted may be placed the statement of Mr. Slason Thompson in his "Railway Statistics" for the year ending June 30th, 1906. He maintains that the roads have actually cost more than $97,000,000 in excess of their capitalization (p. 25). Mr. Thompson prepared his report for the General Managers' Association of Chicago.

So much for the methods and the extent of stock watering. What are the arguments urged in its favor?

Some of those who defend earning power as the proper basis of capitalization, declare that securities must be sold at a discount in order to attract capital for hazardous enterprises. This contention is not valid generally, because, as pointed out by Professor Ripley, in the case of many public service enterprises risk is entirely absent (*op cit.*, p. 124). Even where the risk is great the stock could be sold at par if it provided for a relatively high rate of dividend. If investors will pay only $80 for $100 par value, six per cent. shares in a new concern, they in reality demand seven and one half per cent. on their actual investment. Hence it would seem that the stock could be sold at par if it carried the promise of the latter rate of dividend. The charge upon the company and upon consumers would be precisely the same, there would be no concealment of the relation between cost and profits, and no deception either of investors or consumers. However, the amount of water that is put into

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securities through *bona fide* discounts representing merely risk, is relatively so small as to be of very little practical importance.

A second argument rests on the fact that every corporation requires a greater or less amount of ready cash for actual operation. This has to come from the sale of securities which do not represent physical cost. Many concerns, however, especially those possessing an element of monopoly, can borrow the necessary money on the security of the plant. Where this is impracticable the working capital may reasonably be obtained by the sale of additional securities, for it is part of the cost, or assets, of the enterprise. Or, it could be provided through the promise of a higher dividend on stocks representing merely physical cost. The recent German Company law prohibits stock issues for the purpose of paying organizers' commissions. These must be obtained through the sales of securities at a premium (Ripley, *op cit.*, p. 401). There is no doubt that risk, working capital, organizers' commissions, and every other item of legitimate cost not strictly included in the cost of the tangible property, could be met through this device of a higher dividend on a smaller capitalization.

Stock watering is also defended on the ground that it effects a wider distribution of securities, that it more readily attracts buyers, especially among those inclined to speculate, and that it enables the shares of a concern to sell for a higher price relatively to their earnings than they would bring if they contained no water. None of these considerations seems to be of great importance. The advantages referred to would accrue to speculators rather than to dividend-seeking investors.

The evil effects of stock watering are various. There is, in the first place, the injury to investors. When the securities of a company have been watered beyond its earning capacity, a portion of the stock will necessarily fail to yield dividends. Owing to the favorable but vague prospectuses and reports of promoters and directors, this stock is not infrequently purchased by persons who are ignorant of its true value. "There

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seems to be no doubt," says the Industrial Commission, "that in many instances the promoters of combinations have been able to unload large blocks of stock at prices far above their values, as shown by later experience" ("Final Report," p. 619). Indeed, the promoters themselves sometimes overestimate future earnings, and issue stock that becomes a source of loss to themselves as well as to the outside purchaser. Large doses of water make possible such peculiar operations as that through which the United States Shipbuilding Company was bankrupted, to the serious detriment of all but one of its stockholders (*cf.* Ripley, *op cit.*, pp. 207-210). Moreover, the existence of large quantities of fictitious securities is the direct and constant occasion of much harmful stock-exchange speculation. Paying no dividends, they attract only the man who, under the guise of investing, wishes to gamble; being cheap, they are within the reach of everybody; fluctuating constantly in price, they are ideal from the speculator's viewpoint. Professor E. S. Meade, who defends earning power as the basis of capitalization, admits that "the enforcement of a law which would limit the issue of capital to the amount actually invested in an enterprise, would have the effect of banishing from the stock exchanges the low-priced speculative securities whose number is a standing reproach to our financial methods" ("Trust Finance," p. 301).

Unnecessary and wasteful competition is another evil result. The spectacle of an overcapitalized company paying dividends upon large quantities of water, provokes the organization of an unnecessary competing concern. Owing to the ensuing cut-throat competition, the new enterprise is sooner or later combined with the old, and the charges to the public are higher than ever. It is true that a monopolistic concern whose capitalization was low could impose high charges and obtain a high rate of profits, and thereby attract competition; but it is also true that such a concern could more readily lower prices to the consumer and thus prevent the new enterprise from obtaining a foothold.

But the greater part of the mischief resulting from stock watering lies in the exorbitant prices often imposed upon the

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consumer. The aim is to provide a moderate rate of interest and dividend upon an excessive capitalization. It is sometimes asserted that, since a concern always strives to gain as much as it can, the amount of its securities will have no effect upon its charges. This is one of those half truths that are frequently more misleading than a whole falsehood. In competitive businesses overcapitalization does not affect prices, for competition keeps them down to the level of a fair return on the actual investment. But concerns possessing some monopoly advantage will strive harder to maintain excessive prices than if there were no holders of water clamoring for dividends. The presence of these stockholders constitutes a positive force of considerable magnitude making for higher charges. Were there no water in the stock, high prices would mean either a high dividend rate or the accumulation of a surplus. Either condition would easily provoke a demand that charges be reduced by public authority. True, the cost value of an overcapitalized business can be ascertained by valuation, but this is a difficult and highly technical process. It is invariably opposed and rendered still more difficult by the overcapitalized companies (*cf.* Ripley, *op cit.*, p. 125). Even when the official valuation has been made, the corporations can contest it in the courts, and delay for a long time the enforcement of charges, for example, railway rates, based upon it. Moreover, the rate-making authority sometimes permits a higher charge on account of overcapitalization. Thus, Commissioner Knapp, who testified before the Industrial Commission that railway rates did not seem to be much influenced by capitalization, admitted that in determining whether a particular rate were reasonable, the Interstate Commerce Commission would make some allowance for the financial condition and higher fixed charges of a road ("Final Report," p. 413). The conclusion to which all the facts point is that, while stock watering may not *directly* affect charges, that is, charges are not always high where the stock is watered and low where it is not watered, it indirectly does much to keep them higher than they would be if it did not exist. This is the verdict of the Industrial Commission, at

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least with regard to the railroads ("Final Report," pp. 414, 415).

Finally, we may mention the injury to society from increased inequality of wealth distribution. This happens in so far as promoters and large investors are enabled to make exceptional profits from the sale of fictitious securities or from dividends upon them. With stock watering non-existent, the small investor would save his money, and the whole population would obtain some benefit from lower prices.

Before passing to the specific consideration of the moral aspects of stock watering, it may be helpful to examine the relative merits of the two conceptions of cost as a basis of capitalization.

Original cost is defended on the ground that investors are entitled to fair returns on their actual investment, but not to anything more. This contention seems reasonable, but it leaves out of account certain factors which would make capitalization on this basis sometimes too high and sometimes too low. It would be too high in those cases in which, owing to exceptionally high cost of labor and material, antiquated mechanical processes, or incompetent and dishonest management, the actual cost of construction had been much greater than would be the present cost. To capitalize these conditions and impose charges accordingly, would be to place an unreasonable burden upon the public. On the other hand, original cost would give too low a basis in the case of concerns whose original cost had been exceptionally small, or whose physical property, particularly real estate, had greatly appreciated in value. The members of a corporation have as much right to profit by the "unearned increment" of land as have individual owners. However, original cost is the standard adopted and enforced by the conservative, and on the whole, excellent company law of Germany.

Cost of reproduction, or replacement, means the present cost of providing physical property of the same efficiency, including the cost of obtaining land equally suited to the purpose of the business. For example, the cost of duplicating a railroad comprises the cost of rails, ties, cars, locomotives,

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buildings, and all the other items of manufactured equipment, together with the right of way and terminal facilities; all these to be in the same condition of efficiency as the present property. Depreciation, as distinguished from maintenance, should also be taken into account (*cf.* Ripley, *op cit.*, pp. 136, 137). Evidently this standard differs from original cost, not only because of changes in cost of construction and of real estate, but also on account of improvements in mechanical and industrial processes. In 1900 electric motors of a greatly superior kind could be bought for one third of what they cost six years earlier. Cost of reproduction has been adopted in the anti-stock watering laws of Massachusetts, in the corporation laws framed by Congress for Porto Rico, and in the decisions of some of our State courts. The Supreme Court of Minnesota decided in 1896 that the rates fixed by the State Railroad and Warehouse Commission were reasonable, not because they afforded a fair return on the original cost of the road, which was exceptionally low, but because they provided fair interest on the cost of reproduction (*cf.* "Final Report" of the Industrial Commission, pp. 410, 411). In the case of Smythe *vs.* Ames the Supreme Court of the United States seems, but not unmistakably, to have indicated its preference for the same standard.

The chief and sufficient justification of this basis is that it is the recognized foundation of all competitive businesses. The individual, or firm, or corporation that operates a farm, or a mercantile establishment, or a factory, gets returns which are determined not by the original investment last year or several years ago, but by the amount that it costs a competitor to enter the same business now. The amount for which these concerns will sell, is likewise measured by the present cost of duplicating them. Consequently there is no good reason why monopolistic corporations should be capitalized upon, or obtain profits upon, any other basis. Cost of reproduction is likewise fair to the public, enabling it to get the benefit of industrial improvements, and compelling it to pay higher prices whenever the cost of establishing a business increases.

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The morality of stock watering may be considered in relation to the investor and to the consumer. When stocks are watered for the purpose of selling them to the unwary purchaser for more than their earning power will justify, there exists an intention that is dishonest; in so far as this intention is realized, the dishonesty is actual and the sellers of the stock are morally bound to make restitution. In so far as those in control expect to use the fictitious stocks to manipulate the market by any of the dishonest methods in vogue, there is another act of intended injustice.

When the organizers or the directors of a company present some of the watered stock to themselves, as a bonus, or through the medium of dummy construction companies, or by any other device, their action is of the same moral character as when they present the stock to others. In both cases, the consumers, the patrons of the business are the ones who will be injured. It is intended to make, as far as possible, the charges sufficiently high to yield interest on the water. To issue stock with this end in view is immoral, for the simple reason that it is an attempt to get *an exorbitant rate of interest on the actual investment, the cost value of the property.* Generally speaking, this aim is always present either actually or virtually. It is actual when those who issue fictitious stock expect themselves to direct the business so that interest will be paid on the water; it is virtual when they know that the existence of the water will exert a similar pressure on their successors. When the dividends are actually paid the injustice to the consumer becomes an accomplished fact. For example, a return of six per cent. on a capitalization that is one half water, is equivalent to twelve per cent. on the cost capital. If the maximum fair rate in the business is six per cent., one half of the net returns represents unjust charges to the consumer. To that extent he is defrauded.

This estimate of the situation assumes that there is such a thing as a fair or just price for every commodity, service, or advantage, that men may lawfully buy, sell, loan, or invest. Throughout the Middle Ages and for a considerable time afterward this doctrine was universally adopted and

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quite generally applied in all Christian countries. In theory at least, it held sway down to the Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. Its practical test was the *communis æstimatio,* or social estimate. That is to say, the fair price of a thing was to be ascertained, not by merely looking to the terms of a so-called free contract between buyer and seller, but by finding out what the community regarded as just, fair, equitable. Owing partly to new industrial conditions, but chiefly to the influence of economic *doctrinaires,* all attempts to apply this rule ceased at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But the *principle* of just price was never deliberately rejected by the community; hence Mr. W. S. Lilly overstates the matter when he declares that "the very notion of a *justum pretium* has well-nigh died out of the popular mind." Not until the idea of justice itself shall have disappeared from popular consciousness will this condition be realized. What actually happened one hundred years ago was that a new interpretation of fair price, a new working rule, obtained quite general acceptance. It was very simple, and very easily applied: "a free contract is also a fair contract." But it is no longer accepted unreservedly by any considerable or weighty section of the community. It has been dislodged by the pitiless logic of events, the events that have attended the operations of trusts, monopolies, the sweating system, and the "stronger bargainer" generally. Men are coming to see that superior economic force, though exerted under the guise of a free contract, can be as inconsistent with fair dealing as the superior physical force of the highwayman's bludgeon. During practically all of the nineteenth century, "the teaching of the political economists," to quote Professor Sidgwick, "generally pointed to the conclusion that a free exchange, without fraud or coercion, is also a fair exchange." Eight years ago Professor Ashley said to the members of the British Economic Association: "I cannot help thinking that the economist may soon find himself confronted in modern life with some of the ideas underlying the old demand for 'just prices' and 'reasonable wages' which he has been accustomed to regard as quite out of place in

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political economy." Less than three years later, the economist who prepared the report on Transportation for the Industrial Commission witnessed to the correctness of Professor Ashley's prophecy: "The principle is generally accepted at the present time that capital is not entitled to more than a certain fair rate of profits." Belief in this principle is the moral force behind the present widespread demand for legal regulation of the charges of public service corporations.

Now this "generally accepted" principle of industrial justice is violated whenever dividends are obtained or sought on the water in a corporation's securities. To continue the passage just cited from the "Final Report" of the Industrial Commission: "The issuance of additional securities on the basis of increasing earning power makes it possible for a company covertly to secure exorbitant returns on the actual investment" (pp. 409, 410). If this end were never sought and never realized, if the excess securities were kept merely as ornamental adjuncts of the property, no injustice would be done the consumer.

It is sometimes asserted that the profit obtained on the water when combined with that from the genuine stock, constitutes only a fair interest on the investment. This may sometimes be true, but only very rarely. As a rule the dividend rate that the corporation proposes to pay on its stock, or better, on its preferred stock, will be a sufficiently high rate on the actual or cost capital. Monopolistic companies, such as public service corporations, are entitled to derive from their actual capital the rate of interest that is obtained in competitive enterprises subject to similar risks. To put it in another way, they have a right to the rate of return that prevails among investments of first-class security, plus a percentage equivalent to the particular risk. The corporation that attempts to get more than this rate, whether by stock watering or by any other device, is endeavoring to get more than what satisfies the mass of investors, and what is approved as just by all fair-minded authorities.

This claim that the consumers are treated unjustly when they are charged more than the equivalent of fair interest on

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the actual investment of a corporation, does indeed run counter both to the working maxims of business ethics and to the business privileges conceded by civil legislation. But we must remember that modern business, in so far as it takes any conscious account of ethics, reposes, as above suggested, upon a mistaken belief in the ethical efficacy of free contract and competition; and the toleration of exorbitant profits by the law is a result of the same belief. The only practical alternative to the principle we are defending is the absurd assumption that a *monopoly* may rightfully charge what it pleases. For the questions of stock watering, and excessive charges, and excessive interest in general, have practical importance only in the case of corporations possessing some kind of monopoly. Concerns that are subject to real and active competition have no incentive to water their stock, since they have no hope of obtaining more than ordinary returns. Even if their stock is watered and does pay dividends on the water, these will be due to exceptional business management, and therefore will be justifiable. Now the claim that a monopolistic business may charge what prices it pleases, has never been sanctioned either in popular ethics or in law. Concerning men's ethical notions of the matter, sufficient has been said above; as to the attitude of legislation, the common law of England and America has for centuries regarded monopolies as harmful to public welfare (*cf.* Ripley, *op cit.*, pp. 231-263). Now that unlimited competition has proved unequal to the task of preventing the *existence* of monopoly, this principle of the common law is everywhere being applied, and supplemented by special statutes. The latter are aimed at the dissolution or restriction of artificial monopolies, and a fair regulation of the charges of natural monopolies.

The man who rejects all these authorities, and still contends that he can find ethical justification for the practice of exacting an exorbitant or exceptional rate of interest upon the actual investment of a corporation, has set himself an impossible task. In the first place, he will find himself confronted by the fact that the moral right to *any* interest (that is, pure interest, as distinct from insurance against risk, and

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reward for directive activity) from an investment is not among the self-evident propositions. At least one economist (C. S. Devas, "Political Economy," p. 507) holds that the investor is sufficiently remunerated through the preservation of his capital by those who utilize it and renew it; others maintain that sufficient capital would be forthcoming without the receipt of interest (*cf.* J. A. Hobson, "The Economics of Distribution," pp. 257-265). Both of these views seem extreme; but it is very probable that as much if not more capital than is now available would be forthcoming if the rate of interest were much lower than at present. Upon what grounds, then, can a higher rate than the prevailing one be justified? Again, the Catholic Church, which has discussed and developed very fully the doctrine of the morality of interest, teaches that it is not lawful to charge more than a *moderate* rate on loans. By this is meant the rate which in any given conditions the social estimate judges to be adequate and reasonable. With allowance made for the difference in risk, the same principle ought to apply to invested capital.

Those public service corporations whose charges have been fixed by a perfectly free and honest contract between themselves and the public authority, would seem to be justified in taking all the profits that result from this arrangement. Typical examples are street railways and gas companies. In the conditions just specified it may be assumed that the charges were generally regarded as fair at the time they were fixed. Even in these cases, however, there is no sufficient reason for watering the stock.

The fixing of charges by public authority will not always justify the taking of exceptional profits. For example, when the State makes a reduction in existing rates, its action is usually opposed by the corporation, with the result that the new charges are merely a practical choice of evils, and do not represent what the public authorities or the competent social estimate regards as completely equitable.

Stock watering is sometimes defended as a means of adequately compensating exceptional directive ability. Other ways exist, however, ways that are more open and straight-

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forward, by which this end can be attained. Salaries can be raised, and the surplus can be distributed to the stockholders in the form of an increased dividend. The latter method is much preferable to the stock dividend, which is a capitalization of earning power that may be only temporary. In general it may be said that any legitimate distribution of unusual profits among the stockholders can be accomplished by increasing the cash dividends. And this will always be feasible. Neither the public nor its official representatives will oppose such a course when it is fully explained and openly carried out.

Limitation of dividends to the actual investment is sometimes denounced as unfair to the "innocent investor." The objection is not as formidable as it appears at first sight. In the first place, the consumers, who have to provide for dividends on the fictitious capital, are much more numerous, and stand to lose much more than those persons who have purchased the water under the impression that it represented real property. A large proportion of the possessors of the fictitious securities are not "innocent"; they deserve to be classed as speculators. In the second place, while the State has been negligent in failing to prevent stock watering, it is under no obligation to protect even the *bona fide* investors in these securities. President Stickney's contention that, inasmuch as the railways are "*quasi* agents" of the State, their stock watering operations ought to be ratified and protected by their principal, the State, is inconclusive and farfetched ("The Railway Problem," pp. 199, 200). For he admits that the State is not obliged to protect the innocent investor when the watering process has been attended by fraud. Now with the exception of stock that is sold at a strictly necessary discount, practically all watering is fraudulent, inasmuch as it is virtually an attempt to impose unreasonable burdens upon the public. Besides, the railroad is not formally and fully an agent of the State, but only a "*quasi* agent." No such strict relation of principal and agent is admitted by the United States Supreme Court, which decided in Smythe *vs.* Ames that a railroad corporation "may not impose upon the public

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the burden of such increased rates as may be required for the purpose of realizing profits upon such excessive valuation or fictitious capitalization." Finally, the maxim *caveat emptor* ought to apply as fully to the "innocent investors" in watered stocks as to the buyer of anything else. The State does not undertake to protect against loss the man who lends his money on insufficient security, nor the man who is induced by glowing general descriptions to invest in a worthless copper mine, nor the man who buys stolen goods from a pawn shop, nor even the man who is robbed through the lack of efficient police protection. In so far as it makes any attempt in this direction, the State penalizes the perpetrators of the fraud or crime, but not the general public. Similarly in the case before us, whatever action it takes in favor of the investor ought to be directed, not against the general public, but against the issuers of fictitious securities.

In all that has been said in this paper concerning the immorality of stock watering and of exacting the means of paying dividends on water, *duplication cost* has been kept in mind as the measure of actual capital and the true basis of equitable earnings. It is admitted, however, that *original cost,* or actual investment, is not, or at least cannot be proved to be, an unfair standard. If the "dummy construction company" and the outright stock bonus be excluded, President Stickney's rather liberal conception of original cost can be accepted as substantially fair: "The amount which, under the circumstances existing at the time the road was built, it actually cost the company which constructed it, including all the discounts it was obliged to make on the sales of its securities, and the commission it had to pay on the sales; also the loss of interest during construction and after the line was completed, while it was developing its business up to the point of earning its interest, together with all the additions which have been made from time to time, not paid for out of earnings" (*op cit.,* p. 197).

Stock watering is typical of almost all the improper practices of corporations. It is typical because it is essentially an attempt to get excessive and unjust profits on capital. It

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has its origin in the greed that is not satisfied with reasonable returns. To this greed, to this desire for excessive profits, is due all that is formidable or worth considering in the current opposition to corporations. The undiscriminating and professional corporation-hater is so rare that he may safely be left out of account; but the men who believe that it is improper, intolerable, and wrong for monopolistic concerns to obtain more than a reasonable rate of interest, easily constitute a large majority of the American people. And the patriot, the true conservative, the true exponent of justice, the true friend both of the corporations and of the general public, is the man who strives openly, earnestly, and incessantly to remove the conditions that make such extortion possible. The Socialist conceives the industrial problem as that of the abolition of private capital and profits. In the interest of true civilization and genuine progress, let us hope that this conception will never be shared by any considerable section of our population. To-day the majority regard as the most urgent phase of the industrial problem, not the abolition of *private capital,* but the abolition of *unfair and unreasonable profits.*

JOHN A. RYAN.

ST. PAUL'S SEMINARY.

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ORIENTAL ETHICS COMPARED WITH WESTERN SYSTEMS.

It hardly need be asserted that the fundamental principles of ethics are common to all systems, eastern or western. Man is and has been one in all parts of the world and all periods of time. With substantially common instincts and characteristics, the same desires and passions, with differences not at the root but in the development, not in kind but in degree, it must follow that the laws which guide his growth, which teach him how rightly to deal with himself, and with a like self in others —that is to say, with his fellow men—must be essentially the same everywhere and at all times.

There are numberless proofs and illustrations of this fact. Not to mention others, and dismissing all question of inspiration as unimportant in this connection, six of the ten commandments so familiar to us all as found in the Bible of Christians, are purely ethical rather than religious, and are substantially identical with commandments found in various other systems of religion, notably the Buddhist, as well as in every formulation of ethical principles. Referring only at the moment to the Mosaic and Buddhist systems, this fact has far too often given occasion for the assertion that Moses either borrowed from Buddha, or Buddha stole from Moses. Doubtless neither assertion is or can have been true. Nothing is more common than this illogical and absurd confusion of coincidence with cause and effect. Neither of these had occasion to or could adopt the work of the other, but each formulated into words those principles of right found then, as now, in the conscience of all humanity. Each did his own work, ignorant of the other, yet the two wrought together of necessity, because they were led by the demands of a common sense of right inherent in a common humanity. That Socrates, Plato, Laotz, Confucius, and other moral philosophers held and taught these same commandments, though they may not have condensed

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them into the same form of words, only adds strength to the proof and illustration. While this is ample evidence of the truth of the assertion made, yet to it may be added one more in that golden rule of Christ, known and quoted wherever his name is known, and which forms at once the fundamental principle and perfected fruit of all western ethics. Yet it was also announced by the Chinese sage, Confucius, fully five centuries before Christ was born, and, with other of his ethical teachings, was declared by him to have been reproduced from the writings of sages who were reckoned as being among the ancients, many centuries before he, Confucius, first saw the light.

The fundamental principles of ethics are the common property of man, wherever he is found, and have been instinct in him since he first came into existence. No band or body of illuminati, no one race or nation can claim to have originated them and given them as a benison upon an unmoral world. Though often and everywhere hidden, forgotten, and violated, they have always been the common birthright, the most valuable possession, of the human being.

No sharp divergencies or contradictions need then be expected between the ethical systems of the West and the Far East. We are not to engage in an examination of rival and antagonistic principles in order to bring into sharp contrast the merits or demerits of each or either. Upon the contrary, the farther down or back we go in our investigation the more plainly and perfectly will appear the generic identity of the two. It is safe to assert in advance that every quotation made from the teachings of the ancient ethical leaders of the Far East, every principle laid down by them and cited here, will find an echo of hearty acceptance in the minds and consciences of western men and women. What was written and taught there many centuries ago, and still exists as at least the theoretical law of all social and political relations and duties, might well and wisely be written here and now—is accepted here and more or less faithfully lived. The western world has made no new discoveries in the realm of ethics.

In the immense mass of Chinese literature, greater by far

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than that of any other nation of the past or present, ethical writings form a larger proportion of the whole than is to be found in any other tongue. The cause of this fact need not here be gone into. The Chinese mind appears to be peculiarly determined toward philosophical study and speculation. In no period of its history has it appeared to be seriously or advantageously interested in any other form of scientific research than that which concerns the mind and the relations of man to his fellow. Any fantastic theory of the phenomena of nature has been good enough for it. Schemes of creation, the most absurd and impossible of belief, have been readily and carelessly accepted. Eclipses, for example, have for centuries to the Chinese had their cause in the attempts of a dog in the heavens to devour the sun or the moon as the case might be. And, though possessing a grade of intellectuality far above the average, the Chinese race to-day, after forty centuries of study, and with an immense literature, is substantially devoid of any scientific knowledge. Upon the other hand, all questions of human conduct, of civic and social duties and relations, have been studied deeply and with the utmost minuteness by them. Not to know, but to behave, has apparently always been the object of their effort. This is evident, whether one examines the writings of the leaders of Chinese thought, or looks into their system of education. The latter dates back beyond the earliest dawn of human history and has undergone no substantial change in all the centuries since. Of it one recognized authority has said: "The great end of education, therefore, among the ancient Chinese, was not so much to fill the head with knowledge, as to discipline the heart and purify the affections. Upon this point one of their writers has said, 'Those who respect the virtuous and put away unlawful pleasures, who serve their parents and prince to the utmost ability, and are faithful to their word; these, though they may be considered unlearned, we must pronounce to be educated men.'" In that single sentence is embodied the entire policy and purpose of Chinese schools as they have existed through all of the many centuries of the life of that race.

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As a simple catalogue of the Imperial Library at Peking extends to one hundred and twelve octavo volumes, it will be seen at once how impossible it would be even to name the works in Chinese which deal with the ethics and ethical principles of the Far East, and fortunately this is quite unnecessary. All Chinese writings upon this subject group themselves about the utterances of two ancient ethical leaders, and are substantially comments and elaborations of fundamental laws enunciated by them. One of these, by his own repeated declaration, drew all of his knowledge from the uttered wisdom of those who were reckoned as ancient teachers even in his day. The other, it is generally conceded, drew his ethical knowledge from the earlier wise men of India and Persia. In the writings of these two is to be found the authoritative moral code and practice of the entire Far East from the earliest ages down to the present time.

Of these two men, the elder, Laotz, was born in the year 604 B. C. He was fifty-three years older than the second of the two, Confucius, who was born in the year 551 B. C., and who died in 478 B. C. Laotz lived to an extreme old age, though the exact date of his death is not known. By some of his enthusiastic followers it was maintained that he never saw death, but, like Elijah, was caught up into heaven. It is a fact worthy of notice that the same general period of the world's history which produced these two great ethical philosophers and leaders in the Far East also produced Socrates, Plato and the two Zenos in the West, though the Sages of China preceded the Wise Men of Greece.

Confucius and Laotz met once in their lives, but only to quarrel, as seems apt to be the case whenever two men, each wise far beyond their fellows, but with different theories, come into contact. The elder philosopher rebuked the younger in most scathing terms. Not to quote the entire recorded conversation, Laotz said to Confucius: "Put away your proud airs and many desires, your insinuating habit and wild will. They are no advantage to you." Then in response to a complaint of the younger philosopher that he had sought for twenty years to gain the final truth but had sought in vain,

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Laotz retorted: "Why then can you not obtain it? This is the reason. You are incapable of giving it an asylum in your heart." The trouble lay in the fact that the two men were seeking the same end, but by different paths. And they were essentially unlike in temperament. As is plain from his writings, Laotz was both a mystic and inclined to asceticism, and he found quite a different basis for his ethics from that adopted by Confucius. The latter was far more the man of the world. He belonged evidently to a higher class in life than that with which Laotz was familiar, and appealed to educated men, the literati, rather than to the common herd of his race. Both, during their lives, were failures, but, while Confucius was merely neglected and refused a hearing, Laotz was beaten and cast out. As they appear before the mental vision to-day, Confucius is the earnest, wise, and sincere, yet sleek and comfortable, philosopher, while Laotz, no less wise, earnest or sincere, stands before one as the unshorn, tattered and famished hermit, the occupant of some hollow in the rock, or cave in the wilderness. Yet there is no essential difference in the ethical truths which they taught. Where any differences appear it may be said that both were needed, and the moral code of the Far East in modern times is practically a fusion of the teachings of the two. Each did a grand work for his race. While each died neglected and practically unknown, nearly one half of the entire population of the globe during fully twenty centuries has been benefited and controlled by their combined labors.

In his long life Laotz is known to have written but one book, and that containing only five thousand three hundred and twenty words—about the size of a modern magazine article. But probably no other volume so condensed was ever written before or since his day. And the number of volumes written upon and concerning it—perhaps upon a single word found in the text—is beyond computation. The title of the book referred to is "Tao Te Ching, or The Classic of Reason and Virtue." But the translation of the first word of the title is inadequate and unsatisfactory, and must remain so, either in English or any other tongue, as the Chinese word itself fails

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to comprehend within itself more than a fraction of the idea which it is desired to express. By the word "Tao" is intended, not human reason or knowledge, not anything human indeed, but that infinite, eternal, changeless, all-pervading principle, or idea, or scheme, or plan, upon and in conformity with which the universe, with every item of its contents, infinitely great or infinitesimally small, was created. In the opinion of the writer, the word can best be understood—can only be understood—whether that was in the mind of the ancient author or not, by interpreting it to mean the infinite power and wisdom of God, the nature of his infinitely perfect character in action. To illustrate this, and at the same time to show the final impossibility of any adequate interpretation, "tao" is used in translating, from Greek into Chinese, in the first verse of the Gospel of St. John, where "tao" is translated as "word"—"In the beginning was the word." Now that English sentence means nothing, unless the reader has some special knowledge or belief which will give to it, in that place and connection, a special significance; precisely so it is with the same word used in this single volume of Laotz. A large part of the contents of the "Tao Te Ching" are inexplicable, unless this one word is understood as indicated above. Then it is full of meaning and deep significance.

The moral philosophy of Laotz places this "tao" as prior to God, since God could not have existed without it. In this he differs from Christians, who hold it to be uncreated indeed, but the essential part of the being of God. And his entire ethical system consists in the abandonment of the human *tao,* or knowledge in man, and full conformity to the divine. Out of this, virtue is the growth, the fruit. This act, coupled with its necessary consequences, emptiness of self, quietude of spirit, will produce the upright man, the type of perfected humanity. Thus Laotz wrote:—

> "Heaven is enduring, and the earth continues on
> Because it is not for themselves they live.
> So the wise who keep behind, the foremost place will find.
> Who puts himself aside for himself will best provide.
> And unselfishly is able to achieve.

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In another form he put the same idea when he wrote:—

"When one, for love, himself will share,
And all self-sacrifice will bear,
The rule of all beneath the sky
Can be entrusted to his care."

But perhaps the best way in which to compare the Taoist element in the ethics of the Far East with the Western systems will be to quote some of the more direct and important aphorisms and rules uttered by Laotz, and allow my readers to find their own recognitions of likeness or identity. Many of these will be striking if not complete, and points of difference will be rare and unimportant. Here they are given without note or comment.

"The highest goodness which we know has water as its type,
It benefits all things, yet ever flows
To the spot which men disdain, the gutter and the plain."

"To uplift all, and yet rule not, is virtue—the deepest and best."

"They who preserve the method of the Tao
Wish not to fill themselves with their own self
And, empty of themselves, when growing old,
Are never laid, old-fashioned, on the shelf."

"Bring to its full effectiveness the state of vacancy,
Guard with unwearied watchfulness the stillness of the breast."

Here is one having a more familiar ring:—

"He who knows others is clever,
But he who knows himself is wise,
He who conquers others is strong,
But he who conquers himself is mighty,
He who is satisfied is rich.
He who acts with energy has a purpose.
He who loses not his own, endures,
But the dead who are not forgotten are immortal."

And here is another:—

"The upright man has not a changeless heart. The heart of humanity he makes his own. The good I meet with goodness. The bad I also meet with goodness, for virtue is always

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good. The faithful I meet with faith, for virtue is always faithful. The upright man dwells in the world, and is most sympathetic in his dealings with all. He opens his heart and all turn their eyes and ears to him. He regards them all as his children."

"Not to strive is Heaven's way,
And yet it conquers; not to say,
It answers; will uncalled obey.
Its perfect plans in patience hide.
The net of Heaven has meshes wide,
But through its meshes none can glide."

"The upright keeps the obligations of his own contract but exacts not that of the other party. The virtuous attend to their own obligations, but those who are not virtuous speak only of their claims. The 'tao' of heaven has no preferences, but always assists the upright man."

And lastly:—"Sincere words are not smooth, smooth words are insincere. The upright are not contentious, the contentious are not upright. Those who possess knowledge do not boast. Boasters are the ignorant. The upright man hoards not. The more he labors for others, the more he profits himself; the more he gives to others the more he lays up for himself. The way of Heaven is sharp, but it never wounds. The way of the upright man is to do, never to strive."

These quotations will furnish a sufficient idea of the root and nature of Taoist ethics, one department of the early ethical school from which the entire system of the Far East has been formed. Much of what has been given sounds as familiar as the words of an old song, and, were it not known to have been impossible, one would suspect that the Chinese author had conferred with the writers of the Old Testament or listened to the teachings of Christ. But, in view of well-established historical facts, they furnish an overwhelming proof of the solidarity of the human race, of the identity and unvarying character of truth, wherever and whenever found.

As has already been mentioned, there was a very broad difference between the spirit of the teachings of Laotz and that of Confucius. There was an individuality, so to speak, in the

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efforts of the former which is lacking in the latter. Then his purpose, or his method of work, led him deeper. The Taoist sought to correct each individual at the very roots of his being, to rectify each man's heart and secure purity and simplicity of purpose. Having secured this result, he cared little or nothing for externals, probably assuming that the man having been made right within, all matters of his relations to his fellows, the state, and the world, could not fail to arrange themselves with due propriety. In this idea he cannot have been far wrong. But Confucius, in his theory of ethical training, began at the other end. He proposed and sought to teach propriety of conduct. If the people would only observe the rules and forms of good manners and morals, he believed that all human relations would correct themselves, and the heart would be reformed by a reform in the habits of life. Laotz sought simplicity and unselfishness of heart, and cared little or nothing for propriety of conduct, while Confucius believed that by the practice of the proper decorum the heart would be affected. To further condense the theories of effort and instruction followed by each, Laotz would determine the life by the heart, while Confucius would control the heart by the life.

It is not to be expected that with such antagonistic theories there could be any sympathy between the two great leaders. Yet both were needed, and each played a most important part. The ethical principles maintained by them were to a large extent identical, and they mainly differed in their methods of work. In point of fact, the ethics of the Far East are a combination, a fusion, of the teachings of the two. And it may perhaps be said that Laotz laid the foundation upon which Confucius erected a broad and noble superstructure, and thus may be explained the fact that the latter is so well known and widely honored, while of him who wrought beneath the surface the world is so largely ignorant.

While the Taoist method of statement comes much nearer to the western, not to say the Christian, ideal, it must not be assumed that the Confucian system is wholly or mainly superficial. It is far from that. Take one of the most noted sayings of the sage as proof of this. It was to the effect that when each

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individual was, in all the relations of life, what he appeared to be, then the correctness of humanity would be complete. Confucius insisted, to quote his own words, that "filial duty is the root of all virtue, and is the stem from which instruction in the moral principle springs." He declared that the rule of life for all men in their relations, existed within themselves. As has been stated elsewhere, but may well be repeated here, he based the fabric and erected the framework of his entire ethical system upon three Chinese words. The first embodies the primary and final law of correct action, and implies doing the right thing at the right time in the right way. The second covers the principles of the brotherhood of man put into practice. It includes and requires consideration, charity, forbearance, thoughtfulness for others, a recognition of the mutuality of rights and interest, and was by the Master himself, interpreted by the Chinese golden rule: "What you do not wish that others should do unto you, do not unto them." The third, in his system, is the result, the perfect fruit of obedience to the other two, and represents the ideal man, the perfected type of humanity. It may best be translated by our word "gentlemen" in the highest, truest, broadest meaning of the term. Dignity, moderation, self-restraint, fortitude, and sincerity were to be his characteristic, and the golden rule the law of his intercourse with his fellows. No higher type may be developed by any code or system of pure ethical training.

It will readily be seen that these two formulations of the moral code of the Far East are in no sense antagonistic; that they reach the same end by different paths or processes, and that each in effect supplements and adds force to the other. Their combined influence upon the thousands of millions of human beings during more than twenty centuries is far beyond all estimate, and wholly without a parallel in all human history. There are several causes for this. The Chinese mind, while it may or may not lack that breadth of grasp which would enable it to deal with great questions, is peculiarly given to and fond of minuteness of details. It may or may not see far, but it sees finely. And while none of this quality is found in the wonderfully condensed writings of Laotz, it is exercised

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to an extreme degree in the books of Confucius, and in the commentaries upon the teachings of both these masters. Hence, the ethical system of the Far East has been elaborated and refined by successive writers and expositors, not perhaps to the point of attenuation, but to that of puerility. No point of human conduct has been left untouched, and guiding rules have been given with such detail that even an imbecile can hardly go astray. Yet it may be said that nothing can be considered as trivial which helps to the growth and permanence of good conduct among vast races of human beings. At the same time, something might safely and wisely have been left to individual judgment with the result of greater freedom and vigor of the individual conscience. In this regard Laotz left far too much to his pupils, and Confucius far too little. What has been most needed in all centuries of time has been not initiative but thinking obedience to ethical laws.

It is fortunate, however, that the larger portion of this excess of detail is prepared for and addressed to the young. An example or two will be given, not of the class to which objection has been raised. Here is the advice of one writer:—

"Let children always be taught to speak the simple truth; to stand erect and in their proper places; and to listen with respectful attention. If students, they must, with gentleness and self-abasement, receive implicitly every word the master utters. The pupil, when he sees virtuous people, must follow them, when he hears good maxims, conform to them. He must cherish no wicked designs but always act uprightly; whether at home or abroad, he must have a fixed place, and associate with the benevolent, carefully regulating his personal deportment, and controlling the feelings of his heart. He must keep his clothes in order. Every morning he must learn something new and rehearse the same every evening."

These words were written many centuries ago and are pertinent to-day! Another writer of about the same period says, "Better little and fine, than much and coarse." And he advises the student to form a fixed resolution to press forward in his studies, setting his mark as high as possible, and thoroughly understanding everything as he goes along. He also urges students to have two or three good volumes lying always upon their tables, which they can take up at odd moments, and to

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keep commonplace books in which they can jot down such things as occur to them. And Confucius himself, after having given the most tediously minute details of the propriety of conduct of children toward parents, adds this most admirable bit of advice: "Although your father and mother are dead, if you propose to yourself any good work, only reflect how it will make their names illustrious, and your purpose to do this good work will be fixed. So, if you propose to do what is not good, only consider how it will disgrace the names of your father and mother, and you will desist from your purpose."

Turning now to another phase of the ethical writings of Confucius, consider the following translation from one of his books, not indeed as illustrating minuteness of detail, but the opposite—breadth of view.

"It is only the wise man who is possessed of that clear discrimination and profound intelligence which fit him for filling a high station; who possesses that enlarged liberality and mild benignity which enable him to bear with others; who manifests that firmness and magnanimity that enable him to hold fast to good principles; who is actuated by that benevolence, justice, propriety, and knowledge which command reverence; and who is so deeply versed in polite learning and good principles as to qualify him to discriminate rightly. Vast and extensive are the effects of his virtue; it is like the deep and living stream which flows unceasingly. It is substantial and broad as the heavens, and profound as the great depths. Wherever ships sail or chariots run; wherever the heavens overshadow and the earth sustains; wherever the sun and moon shine or frosts and dews fall; among all who have blood and breath, there is not one who fails to honor and love him."

Where can be found a more exhaustive and eloquent description of the wise and upright leader of men—of Confucius himself? History has proven the truth and the personal application of this mixed picture and pancgyric throughout all the vast population of the Far East for twenty centuries.

If we turn now to a search for the secret of the profound influence which this so-called heathen code of ethics has had with undiminished vigor for so long a period, it will be found in two peculiarities: the methods of its inculcation, and the character and mode of life of the race among whom it was taught and where its power was felt. It might, however, be

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said, by way of preliminary, that the Confucian method of reaching the heart by way of the body, of teaching ethics by means of decorum, probably made the path to success far easier than it otherwise could have been. The average man is not fond or in the habit of thinking deeply. Doubtless the Taoist method of attacking the ancient people with enormously condensed ethical principles, totally devoid of explanation, and often confused and made to appear self-contradictory by fondness for play upon words, if left to stand or fall by itself, would have had small effect. Combined, the two codes furnished at once the foundation and superstructure of as pure, high, and at the same time practical system of ethics as the world has ever seen. It need fear comparison with none. Even that laid down in the Bible, if carefully separated from the religious element here and there intermingled with it, can do no more for man than this ancient system of the Far East can do. And why should it be otherwise, since the two are similar almost to identity, and are, as has been claimed, the necessary outgrowth of the same human spirit?

But the chief secret of the marvelous success, a success which has made the Chinese in some respects the most moral people in the world, is to be found mainly in the methods adopted to inculcate it. It has formed the body of the instruction in the schools of the race without exception for more than two thousand years. The government early adopted it as a basis for the official examinations which were the sole gateway to official life and service. Candidates for every degree in the literary class must know by heart, as we say, every word of every book—nine in all—which constitute what one knows as the Confucian classics. The entire educational course was shaped, not to develop scientists, or learned men of any class, but to instruct in the principles and practice of good morals and proper conduct. Not so much to know a great deal as to behave well has been the basic idea of the entire educational system. As one high authority has said: "The variety and minuteness of the Confucian instructions for the care and education of children, the stress laid upon the duty of children to their parents, the details of propriety and conduct given for the

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intercourse of all ranks and classes of society, mark these teachings as being different from and higher and of more practical value than works on moral philosophy, which, as a rule, give little or no attention to the education of the young." The same authority adds that it would be well if the young in Christian lands had the same thorough knowledge of the ethical portions of the Bible that the young of the nations of the Far East had and have of the ethics of Laotz and Confucius.

People in the Far East act less rapidly than here, but they think more, take more time to consider the wisdom or unwisdom, morality or immorality of any particular purpose or act; and while greatly inferior to us in knowledge and range of views, they live far more closely up to what they know than we do.

After all, it is not impossible that the simpler, quieter lives led in the lands of the Far East, and the shape which their education has taken and followed for so many hundred years, have, in spite of many defects and much gross ignorance led them to closer study of and more strict obedience to a sound moral code than is the rule in western lands.

If I may again quote Laotz in conclusion:

> "There is no greater sin than to sanction fierce desire;
> Than a discontented life, no calamity more dire,
> None greater than the grasping to possess;
> And he who knows contentment has the all-sufficient cure,
> He is satisfied, will ever more endure."

Herein is stated, in less than twenty words of the original tongue by that master of the art of condensation, the kernel and substance of the ethical system of the Far East. It fairly well represents the simple lives and beliefs of the hundreds of millions of the races there. How does it compare with the codes of the West either in theory or in the practical influence which it has upon the lives of its adherents?

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MYSTICISM.*

To study this subject in all its aspects would be a matter of extreme complexity; it would lead us into theology, into literature, into history, into the physical and moral sciences. We should be obliged, in particular, to examine it from the point of view of physiology and pathology, as well as from that of psychological introspection. But division of labor has its place, even in knowledge, and it is no doubt possible, without considering the organic manifestations of mysticism, to select some features of it which will be interesting and profitable.

Some of the mystics themselves were great psychologists. The observation of the inner life has always been their chief concern. So we must pay great attention to the discoveries which they held themselves to have made in the region of the human soul, unless they are all to be dismissed as pathological.

The mystics indeed are sometimes represented simply as pathological. In that case, we could certainly not treat of mysticism apart from its physiological and pathological side; but, taking the word in its broad and historical sense, it does not seem that one is justified in classifying the mystics directly among the diseased.

The attempt has been made to prove that Socrates was a degenerate because of a certain leaning towards mysticism. Nothing could be more contrary to the fact. His was a healthy and strong spirit, tireless in argument, inculcating and practicing self-control above all things. And what shall we say of Francis of Assisi, St. Bernard, Spinoza, Schleiermacher, in all of whom the mystical side was great or even preponderating: were they also pathological? Some will instance Pascal, and the abyss which he always saw at his side, and the accident at Neuilly Bridge which had affected his brain; but these little stories are without foundation, and the critical investigation of the present day has ruled them out of his biography. As for his trance of November 23d, 1664, recorded by him in a

[1] Translated from the French original by Miss Crum.

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literary fragment, which may be called his memoir, this phenomenon, partly a physiological one, was not a cause but an effect of mysticism. His thought, having been concentrated for months upon one object, naturally produced in his organism corresponding sensations. Something, not similar but analogous, happened to Descartes, the sanest of men.

I.

Mysticism consists, according to a fine definition which I find in Plotinus, in seeing with the eyes shut (*μύσαντα ὄψιν*), in seeing with the eyes of the soul, while the bodily eyes are closed. It manifests itself most essentially in what is called ecstacy, a state in which, all communication with the outer world being broken, the soul feels herself in communication with an internal object which is the infinite being, God.

But we should form an incomplete idea of mysticism if we regarded it as consisting entirely in this phenomenon, which is only its culminating point. Mysticism is a life, a movement, a development with a definite character and direction. The different phases of this development do not, indeed, manifest themselves with equal clearness in all the mystics: nevertheless it is possible, by comparing the narratives of the greatest of them, to form a sufficiently clear and consistent idea of the general features of mystical development in its normal and complete form. I shall try, as far as it is possible to reduce life to formulas, to mark the different stages of this development.

The starting point, the first moment, is a state of the soul which it is difficult to define, but which is characterized well enough by the German word *Sehnsucht*. It is a state of desire, vague and disturbed, very real, and liable to be very intense as a passion of the soul; very indeterminate, or rather very inexplicable, as regards both its object and its cause. It is an aspiration towards an unknown object, towards a good which the heart imperatively demands, and which the mind cannot conceive. Such a state may indeed be found in men of very different characters, and may have very different degrees of

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signification. In the mystic it is profound and lasting; it works in the soul, which gradually forms for itself an idea of the object of its aspiration. This revelation is not direct. But, more or less suddenly, according to the individual experience, the things amongst which we live, things about which we thought we had formed stable judgments, appear to us in another light. The things that charmed us lose their color; the things we had admired seem debased; our dearest affections cease to fill our heart. The things of the world no longer hold us; each of them now awakens in us the idea of its opposite. In all the objects presented to our sight we see only the distortion, the empty image, wan and dead, of the living idea, perfect and definite, which sensible realties are powerless to express. We conceive, as the supreme object of our desires, the infinite, the eternal, the perfect—God. And, reflecting upon the feeling which was the starting point of this conception, we can understand why the desire was tinged with disquiet, why we could neither escape from this feeling nor satisfy it. It was the still unconscious idea of an infinite object, which was creating an indefinable dissatisfaction in our consciousness with regard to the possession of all finite objects.

It is in the passing of this idea from the region of the unconscious to that of distinct consciousness that the first phase of mystical development consists.

The second phase is an effort to transform oneself from within in conformity with this idea. This effort necessarily takes the form of a contest. For, indeed, to all those objects which surround us, and which we now consider unworthy of us, we are attached by countless ties; we are used to them, they are our life, our heart is in them. And now we know that we ought not to love them, that God alone is the worthy object of the human soul. But an idea is not a feeling; and the problem which presents itself is just that of converting the idea into feeling. Now begins an internal conflict between that which we wish to be and that which we are, between an idea which is still an abstraction, and feelings which, although henceforth condemned by the intelligence, have as yet lost nothing of their reality and force.

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The means which the mystic employs for working upon his feelings and transforming them are purification and asceticism: κάθαρσις and ἄσκησις. Bodily mortification must, in his opinion, free the soul and render her obedient to the dictates of the intelligence.

The struggle thus begun becomes more and more painful as the strength of our attachment to the world reveals itself through the very efforts we make to break it. At first we had thought we were masters of ourselves; that it sufficed to resolve. Soon we understand that inertia itself is a resisting power, a force in which our past actions are stored up, and remain; and the more we struggle, the more distant and difficult does victory appear.

Thus in the first stage of its progress the soul suffers more and more, and endures all the temptations of discouragement. But soon, where a firm faith has persevered, the desired change begins to take place and the pain of the struggle is mingled with satisfaction and with hope. The soul suffers gladly, feeling that her sufferings are fruitful, and lead to a state of peace and joy. And gradually the joy penetrates and transfigures the suffering, and frees itself from it, triumphant. That is the second moment.

The third is what is called ecstacy; it is the abrupt instantaneous change from a life which is temporal, changing, composite, imperfect, to a life which does not change, which is one, simple, eternal, perfect and divine. Ecstacy is the reunion of the soul with her object. Nothing any longer acts as an intermediary between them; she sees, touches, possesses; she is merged in her object; they are one. This is no longer faith, which believes without seeing; it is more even than knowledge, which holds the object only through its idea; it is a perfect union, in which the soul is conscious of a full existence, through the very act of self-surrender and self-renunciation; for that to which she has now surrendered is being and life itself.

The feeling of this union is love. Love alone has this virtue of uniting persons without absorbing one in the other, but, on the contrary, increasing their reality and their consciousness of themselves as persons. Further, to the love which ex-

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presses the union of the soul with its object, there is added the intuition of the intelligence: light, pure and complete; certainly, in the full sense of the word. And love and light engender beatitude in the soul—perfect joy in the harmony and in the presentiment of eternity. Such is the third stage.

But in a finite and temporal creature, ecstacy can be but an accident. Ordinary life soon begins again, with its movement and its imperfection, and with its struggles and its deceptive victories. Yet the remembrance of things seen in the moment of ecstacy will henceforth be, for the mystic, the ruling principle of thought and life.

In the light of this vision of truth he now looks into himself and examines his former life, which seems to him quite other than it appeared during the struggle which preceded his conversion. Then, he had thought to raise himself to God, of himself and by himself. And the order in which the states of his soul seemed to arise was: first, the idea; second, feeling; third, action. But that was an illusion of the immediate consciousness; in reality, all progress comes from above, and it is the perfect which itself creates in us the very disposition to desire and seek it. Goethe said: "Das Volkommene muss uns erst stimmen und uns nach und nach zu sich hinauf heben." ("That which is perfect must first attune us, and then gradually draw us up to itself.") These words admirably express the mystic's point of view. The idea does not engender the feeling, but is rather its translation into clear consciousness. And the feeling itself, the desire, the aspiration, is not the principle of the possession or of its culminating act. It is because the soul is already, in the depth of its being, in some measure united to its object, that it aspires to a fuller union, a union which can be known and seen and enjoyed. "Be comforted," says Jesus Christ to Pascal, "thou wouldst not seek me if thou hadst not already found me."

Thus the true order of events, the order in which they arise, is the inverse of the order in which they appear to the immediate consciousness. First there is action, the union of the soul with God; then comes feeling, that is to say, the desire of the soul to persevere in that union, or to restore it to its integrity,

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if it has been diminished; lastly, the abstract idea, the representation, or objective projection, in the mirror of the intelligence, of this feeling which is the inner spring of the soul. The end, the object of our effort, is its consummation only because it is its principle.

Looking back from this point of view upon the state of bewilderment in which he was at first, the mystic takes quite another view of suffering than that of the natural man. The natural man, judging of the disease by the sufferings, tries to rid himself of the latter, and if in any way whatsoever he succeeds in doing so, he thinks himself cured. But in reality he was ill before he had perceived it. It was indeed the latent character of the illness which made it so serious; and that which, in our aversion to suffering, we call disorder or disease, is, on the contrary, the effort of the healthy part of ourselves, the effort of the essential in us, to which we hold, to throw off and eliminate the germs of destruction which were accumulating within. What we call illness is, in reality, a salutary crisis, a first step towards recovery. And far from its being the consciousness of our illness which causes us to seek the remedy, it is in recovering from a disease that we gradually find out its existence, its nature and its extent. The evil is recognized as evil only through its resistance to the good which fights against it.

Such is the fourth phase; a return upon the former life, and a new orientation as regards both judgment and conduct.

There remains the fifth and last phase. This supernatural life, the presentiment of which has been awakened within the mystic, must be developed by him and realized in all its fulness.

In this respect the mystics are divided, it would seem, into two classes. A certain number devote themselves exclusively to the contemplation of perfect being, and from henceforth consider the earthly life and the things of time only as obstacles which separate them from the object of their desire; henceforth they are strangers and pilgrims on the earth. Their constant care is to die to the world from that very hour. They represent what may be called ascetic mysticism. But there is

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another mysticism which may be called joyous, and which consists in transfiguring the natural life and infusing into it the supernatural principle. For a Francis of Assisi, for a Jacob Boehme, the world is only evil when seen through the eye of the flesh. But it is given to the spirit to see it as God Himself sees it; and how could that which God looks upon be altogether evil and corrupt? So far from being obliged to condemn himself to flee from the world, to feel for it only contempt and horror, the mystic may see in the union of the soul with God the very principle which rehabilitates the world, and makes its use innocent and salutary. *Omnia sana sanis.*

Thus, by divers ways, the mystics move towards their goal, the infinite enlargement of that consciousness wherein the natural man fancied himself shut in, and as it were imprisoned. Man is born a separate individual; he wants to become a person in the true sense. He will succeed by returning to the source of all personality, the spirit, and by drawing his own life from this universal principle. And in loving God he will love the whole creation, for it is through our love for one another that we come to know our love for God. This power which self-conscious spirits possess, of breaking through the material envelope and becoming mutually interpenetrable; this faculty by which beings which seemed strangers to one another, understand one another, truly love one another, and live a common life, without doing away with their own distinctive individuality; this, together with union with God as principle of this universal communion, constitutes the idea which governs the mystic life.

"Dann geht die Seelenkraft dir auf,
Wie spricht ein Geist zum andern Geist."

"Then rises the power of the soul within thee, as spirit answering to spirit."

It is this direct communication of spirits through the veil of the flesh, under the action of God, which is the mystic's dream. Pascal has well expressed the idea in these words, which, if I am not mistaken, are at once very beautiful and

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very rich in meaning: "All is one; the one is the other, as in the Three Persons." The Christian Trinity is just the expression of this essentially personal union, where there is distinction of conscious selves within a close and perfect oneness.

II.

Such are, according to the principal representatives of mysticism, the general characteristics of mystical life and doctrine. In trying to determine its signification and value, it is interesting to put oneself first at the mystic's own point of view. An investigation conducted upon this principle would constitute what may be called the subjective psychology of mysticism.

One of the first features which such a study would reveal is the remarkable way in which the mystics conceive of internal observation, or introspection. By this form of conscious activity is often understood an observation analogous to external observation, whose aim is to grasp, in the form in which they are immediately given, the facts of consciousness, as well as the relations manifested in them. Mystical observation is not of this kind; it is not content with viewing the surface of the soul, but would go much deeper. The mystic thinks that by the effort of reflection he can penetrate ever farther into his inmost being. He would fain reach its lowest depths. For him, action is only the manifestation of real being, and real being eludes the superficial consciousness which suffices for our practical, and even our scientific activity. There are more things in our soul than our philosophy dreams of. There are hidden faults which, unbeknown to ourselves, incline us to evil; there are indestructible and divine forces, which enable us to rise after every fall. In a word, beneath the conscious there is the unconscious, the true ground of our being, more and more accessible to a consciousness which methodically and with increasing intensity, searches out the ultimate causes of our thoughts and the most secret springs of our actions.

A second process of psychological method is likewise brought to notice by the practice of the mystics; this is, experimenta-

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tion from within. The possibility of this operation has been questioned. The whole of the mystical life is nothing but a series of experiments. The general problem is, given the abstract idea of certain feelings, of certain states of the soul, to make these feelings, these states, a reality in the soul. "You wait for faith to come," cries Pascal, "before you will forsake pleasures. But I tell you, you would soon have faith if you forsook pleasures. It is for you to begin. You can quite well forsake pleasures, and see whether what I say is true." According to the ordinary way of thinking, we are masters of our actions to a certain extent, but scarcely of our feelings, and cannot, for example, compel our love; but the mystic, who values actions only in as far as they give expression to feelings, sets himself, with the aid of such moral and physical conditions as we can control, to stir up within himself those feelings which nourish the true life of the soul.

If we pass on from the examination of methods to that of results, we are at once struck by the relation which the mystic establishes between knowledge and feeling, or action. It is the latter which is primitive; knowledge is dependent and comes afterwards. *Tantum intelligitur Deus quantum diligitur.* Action reveals power; love is vision. It is the form of our activity which determines the point of view and the range of our intelligence, for the principles of the latter are but the results of our practical experiments. We see only what we know; we know only what we do.

This conception of the origin of knowledge leads the mystic to transform, in a general way, the apparent relations of outwardness and transcendence into relations of inwardness and immanence. The notion of God, as Creator and Lord, to whom the world cries out from the depths of its nothingness, resolves itself into the conception of grace, or divine action present within ourselves; and grace becomes, by degrees, not only the foundation, the law of our liberty, but that liberty itself, perceived, or divined, as an original spontaneity, superior to all the temporal conditions, which seem to determine it. In all things, the determined, the finite, the given reality is but the imperfect and fugitive symbol of the infinite and the ideal.

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Moreover the liberty which the mystic thus comes to look upon as the true origin of action and of knowledge, could not be, in his eyes, the mere abstract form of a principle itself indeterminate. His inmost experience feels in it the infinite generosity of love, for real love has no need of motives, of conditions, in order to give and devote itself. It does not render like for like, nor wait for our deserving before it spends itself. It gives out of the abundance of the heart—through pure goodness, not weighing nor counting. This love, not of oneself in others, but of others in oneself, love full and fruitful in which the self realizes itself in giving itself, is, in the opinion of the mystic, the real motive power of the universe. "The eternal virgin," says Goethe (in beautiful lines often made ridiculous in translation), "the love of devotion and sacrifice, which is the divine essence of the feminine, draws us to itself—towards the heights."

"Das Ewig-Weibliche
Zieht uns hinan."

This ideal love is the foundation of being and the substance of ourselves. Hence, in spite of appearances, we are not strangers to one another. "Foolish one," said Victor Hugo, "who thinkest that I am not thou." In vain do the bodies, which are in space, oppose the impenetrability and discreteness of matter to our desire to think and feel in common. Even in this life, souls seek and find one another. Is it not a true saying of Uhland's, which Longfellow has thus translated:

"Yet, what binds us friend to friend,
But that soul with soul can blend?"

This doctrine of a fundamental oneness of souls—of a principle of life, one, infinite, and perfect, in which we can unite, find one another, and attain each to his own most complete development, not at the expense of others, but in virtue of their very development—the principle which humanity calls God—this doctrine appears to us to be the end to which all the experiences and all the reflections of the mystics converge.

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III.

Such would be the general outlines of the subjective psychology of mysticism. The remarkable consistency of these ideas, the power they exercise over the minds and wills of men, unquestionably prove their interest and value. But we cannot refrain from asking how much would remain if they were to be considered, no longer from within, from the mystic's own point of view, but from without, from the point of view of the man of science, the impartial and indifferent observer of human nature. Do these miraculous objects to which the mystic devotes himself really exist, or are they but the products of his imagination, subjective projections of his states of soul? And is there, in these very states of the soul, anything special or superior, as the mystic thinks, or are they not simply varieties of ordinary and even morbid phenomena? To study these questions would be to embark upon the objective psychology of mysticism.

If the mystic himself were to be consulted on this point, I think it is a foregone conclusion that he would be on the side of the most uncompromising objectivity. For he on his own part professes that, seen from without, mystical phenomena do not exist as such—that they become significant only for the consciousness of the mystic, as expressions of that very life which is being developed in the depths of his soul. The mystic holds that faculties become active only for those who exercise them, and that there is a kind of knowledge which is a property of love. For him, therefore, who observes without loving, this knowledge is impossible.

To anyone who, taking a purely objective point of view, denied the reality of spiritual objects, the mystic would reply, as Faust to Mephistopheles: "In deinem Nichts hoff' ich das All zu finden": "It is in that which in thine eyes is nothing that I hope to find All."

Now it does indeed appear as if, from an external point of view, one would be forced to refer the phenomena of mysticism to two affections of the mind which seem scarcely compatible

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with the reality of the objects of mysticism; namely, to auto-suggestion and mono-ideism.

The mystic's whole life is auto-suggestion. He himself knows it, and from this psychological process he adopts his method. He first of all presents to himself a certain idea, and then he employs all the means at his disposal to convert that idea into force, into feeling, into desire, into reality, inward and substantial. He suggests to himself that the earthly joys he once delighted in shall now become to him contemptible, and the spiritual joys infinite, which once had appeared empty. He is not satisfied until the idea, which at first was external, has incorporated itself in his soul and in his members.

And likewise this idea must, through its excellence, obliterate all other ideas in the mind of the mystic. He himself struggles to free his soul from all extraneous thoughts; and he feels himself at the end of his labors when at last, in ecstacy, one single idea stands without a rival, and occupies the whole field of his consciousness.

Considered objectively there is nothing more in the manifestations of mysticism than auto-suggestion and mono-ideism. Does this mean that these manifestations are to be considered as mere illusions of the individual, without reality or universal value? Such a conclusion would be too summary.

No doubt auto-suggestion and mono-ideism are often met with as special states, abnormal or pathological—but not always. The man of genius, too, is possessed by one idea, suggests to himself to find it great and beautiful, and ends by acting as it were automatically according to that idea. Nor is it only the man of genius, himself somewhat akin to the mystic, who offers examples of auto-suggestion and mono-ideism. These two phenomena are to be met with in every man of action, in all who devote themselves to some one cause, mission or task. I believe, indeed, that both of them are definite conditions of existence for every man who reflects. What is the good of living, of struggling, of taking pains, making efforts, if life has no value? And how be assured that our life has value, that the universe is interested in the ephemeral assemblage of atoms which constitutes our individu-

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ality, unless auto-suggestion comes in to fill up the gaps of knowledge? I approve myself for holding to life, because I imagine that I am of some use. And is not the concentration of our faculties upon one idea, itself, in a general way, the condition, the very principle of action? It is in the degree in which they become exclusive that our ideas cease to be mere ideas, and, drawing to themselves the living forces of the soul, are transfigured into will and action.

Nothing, therefore, has been determined as to the absolute value of mysticism, by referring it to auto-suggestion and mono-ideism. All depends upon the value of the idea which the mystic presents to consciousness as its supreme and exclusive object. Is this idea the more or less symbolical expression of a reality, perhaps inaccessible, but recognizable in its powerful and beneficent results, like the idea of the divine, present and active, to which a Beethoven attributed his sublime creations; or must it be likened to the vain mirages in which sickly imaginations indulge?

The mystic idea, taken in its essential significance, certainly seems to belong to those which cannot be treated as simple states of the soul, altogether relative and subjective. The very fact that it exists, and has the characteristics we have noted; the fact that many men, some of them eminent, have been attached to it, and lived in it, lays upon psychology and philosophy the two following problems, among others:

In the first place, is there for us, as conscious beings, besides the individual life, a universal life, potential and already in some measure real? Is our reflective and individual consciousness, according to which we are external to one another, an absolute reality, or a simple phenomenon under which is concealed the universal interpenetration of souls within a unifying principle?

In the second place, if there are thus for us two existences, one developed and immediately visible, the individual existence; the other still almost unconscious, but greater, the universal existence; what is the relation between these two existences, and what method should we adopt in order to attain to the full realization of the second?

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Many mystics hold to the way of asceticism; that is to say, they consider the two existences as mutually contradictory, and make the abolition of the one the condition of the development of the other. On such a theory no common life can come but through the destruction of individuals; no divine city except through the annihilation of the human and natural city.

Yet mysticism suggests the idea of another method. If even now the individual and selfish life is not the only one which exists in us; if already we are secretly united, one with the other, by our common participation in the life of the universal spirit, it is not possible to establish any incompatibility of the individual and the universal life. They are reconcilable, since, at bottom, in a certain measure, they are already reconciled. It would then be possible to transcend nature without going out of nature. Individual consciousnesses might, without breaking, enlarge their bounds, and mutually interpenetrate. And it would be given to humanity to become one without the necessary disappearance of individuals, of families, of nations, of any of those groups which already have a unity, and whose existence is beautiful and good. Pascal's idea would be realizable: "Unity and multiplicity; it is a mistake to exclude either."

If these reflections have any justifiable basis, it would seem that a broad and complete study of mysticism should not only be of interest from the point of view of curiosity, even the curiosity of science, but should also interest very directly the life and destiny of individuals and of humanity.

E. Boutroux.

Paris

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MOTIVE IN CONDUCT.

"Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum."
Göthe's "Faust."

Most writers upon ethics have endeavored to prove that men do certain things and leave others undone from a single motive. This motive may be either the quest for pleasure, the love of power, the desire to accomplish what may be publicly useful, the sense of duty, or so on. Or we may simplify the problem by dividing motives into two classes, the selfish and the altruistic. The altruist feels instinctively that he is the parent of the future, whether he realizes that he is the child of the past or not. It is doubtful, however, whether the problem should be posited in such a simple form. Few men are always impelled by the same internal force. It is safe to assume that the deeds of no single day in the life of the noblest man are invariably the result of a sense of duty. There is the constant interchange of obligation, of pleasure, of habits unconsciously formed, of egoistic and altruistic feelings, and of those that may be called unmoral because they are without any ethical quality. The moral motive, that is the sense of duty, predominates only in those persons in whom the moral faculty, assuming that there is such a faculty, is highly developed. Although men always obey the strongest motive, we have no right to take for granted that man is not a free moral agent, at least within certain limits, because the motive-force is external. The incentive is usually external; but the potency of the attraction or repulsion is wholly dependent upon the mentality of him upon whom it acts. In other words, man makes the motive, or may make it, not the object. Motive may therefore be said to be subjective, not objective.

Ever since the existence of a United States Congress some of its members have taken the position that, as salaried servants or employés of their constituents, they are under obligations to hold aloof from all other business, and that they had no

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right to compromise their freedom of action by forming entangling alliances with individuals or corporations in a way that might influence, or seem to influence, their votes in matters of legislation. Others, and the majority, have contended that they were at perfect liberty to serve outside interests if, in their judgment, those interests in no way interfered with the larger concerns upon which they might be called upon to legislate. The external object before the two classes was precisely the same; that they reached diametrically opposite conclusions must therefore be due solely to the subjective attitude of each class. In this matter a just decision must be based, not on metaphysical or philosophical, but on psychological grounds. The motive depends for its strength upon the mental constitution of the parties in interest. How far each person is individually responsible is a purely transcendental question. Since the external objects that determine the actions of men are still, as they have always been, substantially the same, it is evident that conduct must be regulated by bringing to bear on the psyche the right sort of influences. It is impossible to change environment to an important extent, except in isolated instances; it is generally possible to train the psyche so that environment will not produce a deleterious effect upon its decisions in matters affecting conduct. The value of a proper syetem of practical pedagogy thus becomes apparent.

I have for some time been trying to follow the strictly scientific method in the study of motives in conduct. I have endeavored to examine critically certain concrete cases in order to see what light could be obtained in this way on the general problem. For this purpose I have selected several persons whom I have known for a number of years and have tried to fathom their mentality, with the following results:—

Number One is a man who some twenty years ago was in the employ of a railroad company, but having been found short in his accounts about a thousand dollars, was dismissed. He spread the report that he had been robbed of this sum. One of his neighbors, feeling sorry for him, as he was not well-to-do, raised a subscription and refunded the ostensible loss. The man was next employed in two public positions successively;

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but in each, year after year, the receipts fell below the expenditures. The authorities became suspicious and discharged him without taking any legal steps. The records began at once to show a different face, and people drew their own inferences. He then obtained a minor position in the office of the county treasurer. After holding the place for several years, the accounts of the office were carefully gone over by an expert and revealed a deficiency of about seventy thousand dollars. Suspicion now fastened upon the man whose reputation had become somewhat tarnished. He was arraigned, found guilty of embezzlement, and sentenced to the penitentiary, where he now is. To this day no one has been able to suggest any conscious motive for this man's singular conduct. He belongs to a reputable family. He had no bad habits, nor any domestic drain upon his income. During most of his mature years he was popular in the community, and received many marks of public favor. He was a trusted official in the church and judicious in the education of his large family. There is no explanation of his long career of crime, except that he was a natural thief and could not resist the temptation, when money passed through his hands, to appropriate some of it illegally to his own use. Much of it was still in his possession when he was convicted. The fact that he several times fell under suspicion did not serve as a warning; and detection came at last. The question of motive does not seem to enter deeply into this man's case. It was, so far as any one is able to judge, the following of a blind appetence. That he and his family persistently refuse to restore the ill-gotten gains would seem to indicate that the culprit had accomplices under his own roof. Among his bondsmen is one man who has been deprived of the savings of a lifetime and is now reduced to poverty. Yet his sad fate makes no impression upon those who are in position to restore to him the money of which he has been most unjustly stripped.

Number Two is a man somewhat prominent in business in a small town, as was his father before him. He is regarded as a good citizen and a wise counselor in financial matters. He takes no risks in his investments; and if municipal affairs

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were chiefly in his hands they would be economically administered, perhaps too much so for the good of all concerned. He would not misrepresent anything he had to sell; but if it should happen to be marred by a defect which the prospective purchaser failed to notice, he would not admit that he had dealt unfairly. He is relatively liberal toward benevolent enterprises; nor is his benevolence due to motives of policy, since to give or to withhold would in no wise affect the business in which he is engaged. He prides himself on doing business in a strictly business way by asking no favors and by doing as few favors, as such, as possible. He treats his friends and relatives in matters of this sort exactly as he treats strangers. In short, he seems never to permit himself to be swayed by sentimental considerations of any kind whatsoever.

Number Three is a man of more than average intelligence, somewhat prominent in educational circles, and a leading member of an orthodox Protestant denomination. He is strictly a man of his word and punctual in the discharge of his financial obligations. He is a model of temperate living and of promptness in the discharge of his routine duties. But he lacks moral courage. While he would not be guilty of a mean act, he does not hesitate to profit by the perfidy of others. He holds that a person cannot afford to jeopardize his own interests for scruples. He is not afraid to denounce villainy in abstract terms; he is careful as to what he says about any particular villain. He would not on any account tell a falsehood, but if another person were to tell one to his profit he would not put himself to much trouble to correct it. He is one of those negatively good men in whose keeping the cause of morality makes no progress. If it were intrusted to such men mainly, it would lose ground from day to day, and the world would become worse continually. I doubt whether his motives have ever been clear to his own mind. He evidently regards righteousness as consisting in avoiding evil as much as possible, but not in resisting it, except when he meets it in a comparatively mild form.

Number Four differs considerably from the other cases here cited. He is a man who was for a number of years identified

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with an important enterprise to the building up of which into comparatively large proportions he is admitted to have materially contributed. A few years ago the conditions began to have an ominous look from the moral point of view, and he voluntarily withdrew from a prominent to a subordinate position. The worst that he had feared came to pass. After waiting in vain for some time in the hope that conditions would improve, he severed his connection with the concern at a great financial sacrifice to himself. He might have held his position indefinitely, and would at worst have seemed merely to have connived at a condition of affairs over which he had no power; but he preferred to avoid even the appearance of evil, since he had all his life preached the doctrine that righteousness and morality should be aggressive. By his course he has put himself in position to denounce the wrong he could not prevent. His motive seems to have been clearly discerned, formulated and put in practice: an honest man should not condone wrong even by silence. Although he has shown no desire to pose as a hero or martyr, he felt that the principles he had all along professed demanded the sacrifice as an example to those who had been accustomed to look to him for guidance.

In the spring of 1907 the Hocking Valley was visited by the most disastrous flood in its history. The rise of the waters was so rapid that several persons were drowned and others were for many hours in deadly peril. At one point a number of houses were surrounded by the raging torrent, which threatened every moment to engulf them and their inmates. It seemed madness for any boat to attempt the rescue of the unfortunates. At length a man who had the reputation of being a skillful waterman, unable longer to resist their frantic cries, resolved to venture. Owing to an accident, his skiff was overturned and he drowned. The outlook was now more hopeless than ever. Nevertheless another man, whom I will call Number Five, undismayed by the fate of his predecessor, also resolved to attempt the difficult feat, and safely brought all those in peril to the shore, making several trips for the purpose. It was an act of genuine heroism, albeit the doer refused all public recognition, and has ever since gone on in the even tenor

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of his way, attending to the management of his modest business. There was not a tinge of bravado in the act. Here seems to be a clear instance in which the performer of a highly praiseworthy deed expected to get no reward but that of self-approbation. Doubtless the prospective applause of thousands of spectators who would witness the daring deed had some influence; but it was to all appearance very slight. The hero had not even the incentive of responsibility that rests upon a man who is in a position where many lives are intrusted to his care, as is the case with a locomotive engineer or the pilot of a ship. The sight of distress may have had a strong influence. Perhaps, if asked why, he would have answered with Herbert Spencer, that he could not help it. If the moral motive is not intuitive in the race it certainly is in this man. He must be called an accident in a community, just as one member of a family may possess excellent abilities while all the rest are mediocres or less.

Number Six is a comparatively young man who during most of his life has shown a marked predilection for political power, which he preferred to get by intrigue rather than by fair and honorable methods. He does not hesitate in the least to resort to falsehood when it is likely to serve his immediate purpose. He would not shrink from a false oath so far as mental scruples are concerned, although he has been careful not to lay himself liable to the charge of perjury. Xenophon draws a portrait of this man in the following language, which I quote with some abridgment: "Menon, the Thessalian, was conspicuous for his desire to gain riches and influence, to the end that he might acquire the greater possessions, as well as for his love of power in order that he might turn it to pecuniary profit. He desired to be on good terms with those in authority in order that he might commit crime with impunity. He believed the shortest way to what he coveted to be through falsehood and perjury and deception. Straightforward and open dealing he held to be evidence of stupidity. It was plain that he had no affection for anybody; if he showed a disposition to be anyone's friend he was forthwith found to be engaged in some plot against him. If he came into contact with an individual who had no

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regard for an oath, and who was by nature prone to injustice, he stood in fear of him as being a person who was well on his guard. But those who reverenced the gods, and who habitually told the truth, he held to be lacking in courage. Just as some persons pride themselves on their piety, their truthfulness, and their justice, so he gloried in his ability to deceive, to fabricate lies, and to hold his friends up to ridicule. The man who would hesitate to commit any act, however unjust and base, he regarded as lacking in a knowledge of human nature. He thought the best way to make sure of the fidelity of his friends was to take them into copartnership in crime. He considered it an act of beneficence, when anyone deserted him, that he did not compass his destruction when he had him in his power." It is plain that a man with such a character is not influenced by any ethical considerations whatever. Nor does there seem to be any doubt that the successful accomplishment of the basest projects gives him the feeling of self-approval. In other words, success, as subjectively judged, is the only motive that governs his conduct. Number Six is simply concerned to make his mark as a politician. His motives, like those of Menon, are money and power. While no one of his fellow-citizens places any confidence in him, some are not averse to accepting his aid to serve their own ends, or where they think it essential to the accomplishment of their own purposes. It is the oft-repeated story of comparatively honest men in negative collusion with rogues.

The most pronounced example of conventional morality is Number Seven. He has admitted to me in private conversation that he regards all religions as equally true and equally false and that he is an out-and-out materialist. He does not think it prudent to enter a saloon, but he keeps wine and beer in his house to be dealt out to select friends. He is an honest man in business, although he likes to drive sharp bargains, and sometimes boasts of his shrewdness. He came to this country from Germany at the age of fourteen, and by the time he was sixty had become a moderately rich man. While he is entirely without education, he does some independent thinking, and reads a few of the more substantial periodicals.. He does not

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admit that men are actuated by any other motives than those of self-interest. He is a good deal of an epicure and will shorten his earthly days by high living.

It would be interesting to ascertain just how far these seven typical men are influenced by public opinion. This is possible only by approximation, as they could not answer the question with entire truthfulness even at the confessional. There seems no doubt that Number Six cares nothing for it whatever. He boasts of his astuteness and of his indifference to what his neighbors think of him. It is probable that Number One desired to stand well with his fellowmen and hoped that his criminal course would never be discovered. Number Four is undoubtedly concerned about his reputation; he wishes to be what he seems. Deliberate public opinion, as distinguished from the frenzy of a mob, is a powerful factor, and has, ever since the time of Homer, exercised more or less influence on the promotion of morality. It is a matter of common observation that persons often conduct themselves properly where they are well known, but become immoral among strangers. It is difficult for the average man to lead an upright life in a community whose standard of morals is low. The "carpetbag *régime*" in the South was a practical example. But here we meet with the apparent paradox that the exceptionally strong and the abnormally weak are indifferent to what may be called reputation. There was no crime too great and no moral turpitude too base for the first Napoleon, if they promised to promote his selfish schemes. Yet in his last years, when he had leisure to reflect upon what his contemporaries thought of him, he tried to persuade himself and others that he had the good of mankind at heart; in the full swing of his active career and the high tide of his success he thought of himself alone. Socrates, whose moral nature, judged by the standard of his time, was abnormally developed, heeded public opinion so far as to conform to the popular ritual in the worship of the gods. Assuming that Xenophon has correctly portrayed him—and he can hardly have been mistaken in a matter of common knowledge—he held relatively the same views with the modern minister of the gospel who tacitly holds a creed which, in part at least, he

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no longer believes, under the conviction that by so doing his power for good will be greater than if he takes an openly radical stand. In the latter case he would have to defend his own position instead of attacking the enemy. The Greek poets, in the main, held that the morals of their countrymen could be improved only by using the popular creed as a foundation. Saint Paul, like Socrates, was one of those strong characters who take their stand upon what they believe to be true and right without regard to what others may think of them. On the other hand, those who are at the bottom of the social ladder usually lead reckless lives. Every stratum of society has to some extent its own code, which those who belong to it obey within certain limits. Those who expect to ask nothing of the public, either by reason of wealth or penury, are very likely to care little about what it thinks of them. Men like Socrates and Paul are examples of what Benjamin Kidd calls "projected efficiency." They place themselves upon a moral elevation toward which their successors ascend slowly and painfully and with many back-slidings. Such an advanced stand can be taken and held only by men who have a preternaturally keen insight and a will of uncommon strength. They do not need the support and encouragement of public opinion. To the generality of mankind such a support is indispensable. It is therefore important to raise the moral level of the community. This it is impossible to do except by means of some agency that will operate beneficially on the large majority of those who constitute it, both by means of agencies of enlightenment and by providing the proper stimulus.

"Greift nur hinein ins volle Menschen leben!
Ein jeder lebts, nicht vielen ists bekannt,
Und wo ihrs packt, da ists interessant."
Faust.

CHAS. W. SUPER.

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THE SOCIAL IDEAL.

"When we in our study of human history, endeavor to gauge the moral force and greatness of a people or race," says Maeterlinck, "we have but one standard of measurement—the dignity and permanence of their ideal, and the abnegation wherewith they pursue it." [1] If this is true, and the ideal of a people is in any degree subject to conscious formulation and acceptance, the social philosopher should labor to construct, the ethical teacher to inculcate, and the legislator to realize a social ideal of the highest dignity and permanence. The ideal determines the life. If, then, by taking thought, we could project a social ideal upon which the people could agree, one which, because drawn from facts and existing conditions, and the possibilities of human nature, would force its acceptance on every reflective mind, we should have the most effective means of increasing the rapidity of human advancement. Such an ideal would stimulate enthusiasm, promote progressive efforts and unify them by a community of purpose. It would clear away numerous logical barriers in social thought, and straighten the zigzag path of progress.

So far are we, however, from any agreement as to what society ought to be that we have not seriously turned our attention to the subject. Indeed, many insist that it is not a legitimate matter for scientific investigation. Science, they say, has nothing to do with ideals; it must confine its attention to what has been and is. The inference suggested is that all thought concerning what ought to be in human affairs, being unscientific, is consequently useless, mere idle speculation. But if science is thus limited, the same is not true of philosophy, and the philosophy of to-day aspires to become scientific. Its methods are no less rigid than those of science; its results need be no less exact. Science, even though pur-

[1] "The Life of the Bee," Eng. trans., N. Y., p. 66.

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sued for its own sake, provides the data for philosophy. Science lays the foundation, philosophy builds the superstructure. "Useless each without the other." Neither exists for itself alone; both are the servants of art; and the highest service they can offer, the highest that thought can render action, is to determine the ultimate end toward which human efforts should be directed. It is legitimate, then, and profitable to fashion ideals, correcting them as science provides better and better material, and social philosophy is properly engaged in attempting to construct a social ideal.

The construction or projection of a social ideal is not, as some seem to suppose, a matter of foreseeing the course of the unconscious evolution of society. Social phenomena are so complex that social prophecies are likely to be abortive.[1] Still we are not so helpless even in this respect as a writer in the London *Saturday Review* represents us. " 'The Moving Finger writes, and having writ moves on,' " he says. "We can no more stop or guide its writing than could the wild man whose relics we look for in the drift of another geological period than ours. What is still more humiliating, practically we can no more tell what it is going to write even to-morrow than could that cave-dweller." This could not be true unless we were wholly ignorant of the social past. All knowledge is in a sense fore-knowledge. Vision implies prevision. The geologist Hutton, writing of his own science, said, "In examining things present we have data from which to reason with regard to what has been; and from what actually has been we have data for concluding with regard to that which is to happen hereafter."[2] This is no less true of sociology than of geology. But a social ideal differs from a social forecast. It is a conception of what society ought to be, not of what it is to become. It is ethical. It implies the categorical imperative. It must, therefore, be a work of synthesis, or, if you please, a product of the constructive imagination.

The ideals of society hitherto constructed, and with which men have been most familiar, have been, of course, too largely

[1] See Williams's "History of Science," Vol. III, p. 124.

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works of the imagination—the Utopias of Plato, More, Bellamy and the like. They lacked foundation in fact. They were not in harmony with human aspirations, desires and frailties. Still, even these were not wholly at fault as predictions, or valueless as ideals. Plato's "Republic" anticipated some modern ideas, and inspired many more. More's "Utopia" is still worth the attention of the social philosopher. "Ourselves are full of social wrong, and maybe wildest dreams are but the needful preludes of the truth." What we need now, however, and what with our wider knowledge we ought to be able approximately to construct, is an ideal scientifically conceived, in harmony with existing facts and forces, and hence possible of attainment. For, as Mr. John Hobson has asserted, "If we are to take a scientific view of human efforts and satisfactions, such as shall furnish a basis of social reform, we must have a social ideal constructed to accord with human facts and human possibilities, but transcending existing facts and furnishing a test for conduct." [8] Such an ideal would not be separable and distinct from society as we now find it, but its highest manifestation—society purified and transformed by the best elements it now contains.

At the present stage of knowledge, perhaps at any stage, it is, of course, impossible to construct an ideal accurately containing all the details of social life in its complete perfection. This, like such attempts of the past, might be an interesting intellectual exercise, but it belongs to the novelist. All that social philosophy should now undertake is to determine the main features of an ultimate social ideal. It cannot describe the daily life of the citizen of an ideal world, but it can answer the questions: Is the coming society to be based on the class spirit or on the spirit of brotherhood? Is it to be competitive or coöperative? Individualistic or socialistic? John Stuart Mill wrote, "With those who, like all the best and wisest of mankind, are dissatisfied with human life as it is, and whose feelings are wholly identified with its radical amendment, there are two main regions of thought. One is

[8] "The Social Problem," p. 66.

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the region of ultimate aims; the constituent elements of the highest realizable ideal of human life. The other is that of the immediately useful and practically attainable." [4] Neither of these regions should claim our whole attention. One is as important as the other. It is significant, however, that ultimate aims are mentioned first. Without them we cannot rightly determine the immediately useful.

Confining ourselves, then, to "the constituent elements of the highest realizable ideal of human life," we may affirm that they are three in number: (1) social intelligence; (2) social economy, and (3) voluntary coöperation.

Social intelligence has been well defined by Henry George, who calls it "that consensus of individual intelligence which forms a public opinion, a public consciousness, and a public will, and is manifested in law, institutions, and administration." [5] According to this definition, social intelligence is to be distinguished from the mere sum of individual intelligences. Intelligent men do not necessarily guarantee an intelligent society. Social imbecility is not infrequent manifested by an intelligent community. This happens because community interests are intrusted to men of low intelligence, or to men with lack of public spirit. We Americans are a "free and intelligent people," and yet we sometimes allow ourselves to be represented in the municipal council, in the legislature or in the Congress by men who do not represent even the average intelligence of the community. We allow the management of public utilities to rest in the hands of those who control them for their own individual profit. We allow cesspools to form in the slums of our cities, where poverty, disease and crime are generated, where human beings are huddled together like so many animals, and who in their brutish environment naturally tend to become "dumb, driven cattle." [6] We are more or less indifferent to the premature exhaustion of our natural resources by greedy corporations, and can witness without manifest alarm the sacrifice of future

[4] "Autobiography," p. 189.

[5] Henry George, "Social Problems," p. 9.

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to present prosperity by the over-employment of women and children. It is only as individuals that we may plume ourselves on our intelligence. Individual enterprise has opened up the resources of our country and piled up individual fortunes beyond the dreams of Crœsus, and yet as a society we stand practically helpless before the problem of poverty; inventive genius has revolutionized our methods of industry, but we have not greatly improved our methods of government; individual enterprise has organized the great industries of our country and is carrying them on with a marvelous degree of skill and economy, while the community sometimes fails in the management of the simplest form of industry.[6] Socially we are far from brilliant. In intelligence there is an element of knowledge—no knowledge, no intelligence. Until the people are socially well informed—until they have knowledge of social conditions, know the lessons of social experience, give earnest thought to methods of social improvement, begin to study the requirements of the general good as they study their own, select public representatives with the same care as private agents, no matter how intelligent they are with respect to individual affairs, there will be no high manifestation of social intelligence. This social knowledge and solicitude are at present rare or wanting. Hence, society as a whole, and with respect to its own interests, is not to be compared in intelligence to any of the higher animals. If regarded as an organism, it must be likened, so far as intelligence is concerned, to the organisms of low type. "It resembles," says Lester F. Ward, "only some of the very lowest Metazoa, such as the hydra, which possesses no proper presiding and coördinating nerve ganglia, or still more closely some of those lower colonies of cells, each of which, like the individual members of society, is practically independent of the general mass, except that by the simple fact of coherence a certain degree of protection is secured to both the individual cells and the aggregated mass." [7]

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[6] *Ibid*, p. 1.

[7] Ward, "Psychic Factors of Civilization," p. 274.

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Notwithstanding the present rudimentary condition of social intelligence, it is the primary element in a rational social ideal. It is impossible to conceive a society without collective interests and some necessity for collective action. These interests cannot be ideally conserved, and this action cannot be ideally effective without the highest degree of collective, *i. e.*, social, intelligence. The ultimate social aim must therefore involve the conception of society as a unitary body thoroughly conscious of its own rights and interests, and the means of securing them, and insistently seeking its interests as the ideally intelligent individual would seek his, and caring for the welfare and comfort of all its members as such an individual would care for the health and soundness of all the organs of his body.[8] "The best ordered state," said Plato, "is that which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual: as in the body, when but a finger is hurt, the whole frame draws toward the soul, and forming one realm under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt, and sympathizes altogether with the part affected, and we say that a man has a pain in his finger.[9] This is but to say that "the best ordered state," the ideal society, must be ideally intelligent.

This ideal intelligence of society involves no new creation, no importation of an imaginary element. Some social intelligence now exists. It is formed by the operation of natural causes, and without any special attention on the part of society. It comes as an unintended result of social evolution. As individual intelligence had its inception and a part of its development merely as a result of individual experience, so social intelligence began to manifest itself without the conscious employment of means and methods of developing it. We may expect the forces operating in the past to continue and raise this intelligence to higher and higher planes.[10]

But the formation of social intelligence is artificial as

[8] *Ibid*, p. 288.

[9] Plato, "Republic," p. 462, quoted by Ritchie, "Principles of State Interference," p. 16.

[10] De Greef, "Introduction à la sociologie," Chap. XIII, *La formation naturelle de l'intelligence sociale.*

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well as natural. Having arrived at a stage of development at which we realize the importance of a corporate consciousness, we have already begun to devise methods of promoting it. We are beginning to consider the "social aspect" of our various institutions, the "social function" of the school, the home, the church. This must result in an increase of social knowledge, and an enlarged interest in social affairs. When it is generally recognized and accepted that social intelligence is the fundamental element in the social ideal for which all should strive, a conscious use of all available means for promoting it will follow. There will be a new evaluation of knowledge. School curricula will be changed. More attention will be devoted to political economy, social history, politics and sociology. Press and pulpit will become centers for diffusing the most useful knowledge about society. All educational agencies will be newly orientated. It is therefore not chimerical to assume perfected social intelligence as characteristic of the highest form of society, or unreasonable to anticipate its final realization.

Now suppose this element of ideal corporate intelligence realized in society, what would follow with respect to social activities? Necessarily they would exemplify the law of parsimony or the economy of force, for this is the law of all intelligent action. Intelligence is inconsistent with the employment of greater effort than is necessary to attain a given satisfaction. It adapts means to ends. It avoids wastes. Ideal social intelligence therefore implies ideal social economy, and this is the second element of our ideal.

If social intelligence and social economy are concomitant, the one a manifestation of the other, we should naturally expect the latter to have developed *pari passu* with the former, and this we find is true. "The history of progress," says Ritchie, "is the record of a gradual diminution of *waste*. The lower the stage the greater is the waste involved in the attainment of any end. In the lower organism nature is reckless in her expenditure of life. The higher animals, more able to defend themselves, have the fewest young. When we come to human beings in society, the state is the chief instrument

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by which waste is prevented. The mere struggle for existence between individuals means waste unchecked. The state, by its action, can in many cases consciously and deliberately diminish this fearful loss; in many cases by freeing the individual from the necessity of a perpetual struggle for the mere conditions of life, it can set free individuality and so make culture possible. An ideal state would be one in which there was no waste at all of the lives, and intellects, and souls of individual men and women." [11] Social economy, then, as well as social intelligence, is initiated by nature and promoted by art. Increase of one implies increase of the other. Social economy, however, must manifest itself in social action, and for social action organization is necessary. The social ideal, then, implies thorough social organization for the performance of social tasks.

This raises the question as to what is properly a social task. It is the old question of the proper sphere of governmental activity, and this is a question of practical expediency. No *a priori* conclusions should be drawn. Still, from the ideal standpoint, we can see more or less clearly the kind of tasks which society should undertake. If we conceive society as a unit, we must recognize that as such it has certain needs—protection, sustenance, knowledge and the like. Supply of these needs, up to a certain point, is necessary to its life and its normal activity. This point is the degree in which these needs are universal. A social need is a general need. The matter of supplying the general needs of society, needs which are constantly recurring, may be reduced to a frictionless routine only by thorough social organization. It is properly a social task.

There is, then, a limit beyond which social organization may not go without defeating its purpose. There are products and achievements which in one sense are strictly individual. Such are the highest products of art and invention. Social organization could not produce an Apollo Belvidere, a Sistine

[11] Ritchie, "Principles of State Interference," p. 50.

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Madonna, a Wagnerian opera, a Shakespearean play, or Lincoln's Gettysburg speech. It can only release, by systemizing its routine activities, intellectual energy which may be individually employed. An attempt to organize the higher intellectual activities would render them impossible. Hence, there must always be a limit to social organization. "The line," says an anonymous writer, "is very undefined, not by any means easily discernible, but nevertheless absolutely impassable. On this side the line are all sorts of manufactures, producing and distributing agencies; the more such work can be systematized the better. On the other side the line are all the artistic, musical, literary, higher scientific, and intellectual activities. You attempt to organize and systematize in this department of the world's activities, and you simply annihilate. Personal individuality is one of the very elements of all genuine art and literature and intellectuality. The moment you begin to apply to these mere manufacturing methods of labor and production, the individuality vanishes, and the one principle which gave your productions their worth and interest has irretrievably gone." [12]

Having roughly defined the sphere of social organization, we have now to determine its ideal form or method. Turning our attention in this direction, we may observe that there are four ways in which it may be accomplished. They are as follows: (1) By an autocrat; (2) by the State (in the restricted sense, which means the governing class); (3) by private individuals acting in their own interests; (4) by society itself. Let us glance briefly at each of these methods.

First, then, the autocratic method. It is conceivable that the organization of the routine activities of society might be brought about by one man holding the reins of power and organizing and directing the activities of the people as he thought best. Suppose him to be ideally intelligent and animated by a desire for the public good. So far as the immediate aspect of the situation is concerned, we should then

[12] Social Horizon," p. 26.

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have ideal economy. Misled by this aspect some would argue that such an omnipotent being would be an ideal social functionary. But at best we should have only a benevolent despot, with no assurance that his successor would be equally wise and benevolent. But still more important, the people would be deprived of one of the best opportunities for self-development, namely, the opportunity afforded by the organization and management of their own affairs. To say nothing, then, of the difficulty of catching our benevolent despot, and of the further difficulty of keeping him benevolent after he is installed, the loss of educational opportunity for the people which self-activity affords, brands this form of organization as uneconomical in the long run, and hence not ideal. "Unlimited power," says Mark Twain, "is the ideal thing when it is in safe hands. The despotism of heaven is the one absolutely perfect government. An earthly despotism would be the absolutely perfect earthly government if the conditions were the same; namely, the despot the perfectest individual of the human race, and his lease of life perpetual. But as a perishable, perfect man must die, and leave his despotism in the hands of an imperfect successor, an earthly despotism is not merely a bad form of government, it is the worst form that is possible." [18] This is perhaps the verdict of political science. We must, therefore, dismiss this form of organization from our conception of the ideal.

The second method of organization is organization by the State or government. This is practiced more or less in every nation. If extended to industrial activities it is called State socialism, though why the antithesis between individualism and socialism should be confined to the industrial field is not clear. The same objections obtain here as to the previous method. If benevolent, it is impermanent, and always it deprives the people of the education derived from doing things for themselves. It is immaterial whether the organizing authority is a Louis XIV identifying himself and the State or a hereditary and privileged class. The results

[18] *Century Magazine*, Vol. XXXIX, p. 77.

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are the same—irresponsible power, organization for selfish purposes, paternalism, and undeveloped popular initiative. Whatever may be said for this method it is certainly not ideal.

The third method is that under which the organization of our industrial activities is now proceeding. A comparatively few men, whom we call captains of industry, own or control the instruments of production and direct our business enterprises for private profit. This is called capitalism. That by this method economy has been promoted and is in high degree attainable, no one will deny. Still it is not the ideal method, for if the number in control should be reduced to one, we should have the exact situation described under the first method. As long as there are more than one, we have conflicting individual economies which must result in waste. Like both the other methods, it localizes power and leads to the temptation to use this power for selfish ends. Its object is profits, and profits is not synonymous with public good. The more successful it is the more dangerous: prosperity breeds tyranny. The so-called "captains" are not elected or appointed by society, nor are they responsible, except in a limited sense, to anybody or anything save their own consciences, and these are not always reliable. They practically control the subsistence of a large number of people, and the control of a man's subsistence practically amounts to the control of his will. Hence, there is an element of despotism in capitalism. Its economy is immediate and cannot be perfected, for the reason that perfect social economy is inconsistent with the existence of individual economies looking to private ends. "Material civilization," says Ward, "cannot be wholly left to individual preferences. Aside from the unequal and inequitable distribution of the products of industry and thought there will always be immense waste. The individual will never make social progress the end of his action. He will always pursue a narrow, destructive policy, exhausting prematurely the resources of the earth, caring neither for the good of others now living nor for posterity, but sweeping into the vortex

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of his own avarice all that he can obtain, irrespective of his real needs." [14]

There remains but one method of organization, namely, that by which the people themselves take the initiative, organize themselves and act in the interest of all. This is democracy. It is government "of the people, for the people, by the people." In industry it is production for use and not profit. It may not be at present, and in every case, the most economical method of production. It is true that public management is sometimes more expensive than private management. Theoretically this ought to be generally true, for economy depends on intelligence, and, as already pointed out, social intelligence is as yet unequal to the intelligence of the individual. But society, like the individual, learns to do by doing, and the educational value of public management should be reckoned in any estimate of it. The economic test is not conclusive. As social intelligence advances, social economy increases; when the former becomes ideal, so also does the latter. Social intelligence, then, as well as social economy, demands thorough social or democratic organization for supplying social needs. Such organization must, therefore, be progressively realized as intelligence and economy approach perfection. Democracy is the ultimate form of government. It is not "an experiment which may be abandoned, but an evolution which must be fulfilled."

We have now considered two of the elements set forth as constituting the ultimate social aim. Necessarily accompanying these is a third, namely, voluntary coöperation. Social organization implies that men shall work together for the common good, consciously or unconsciously, under compulsion or voluntarily. If men coöperate, either unconsciously or because they are compelled to do so, there is a lack of knowledge and purpose, or a want of interest. In either case there cannot be the highest effectiveness. Unconscious cooperation is a marked feature of our present industrial life. The labor of many is involved in almost every completed

[14] Ward, "Psychic Factors of Civilization," p. 288.

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product. The precision with which human needs are supplied, the delicate adjustment of supply and demand, though sometimes unduly eulogized, are truly astonishing. They evidence a high degree of managerial intelligence. But ideal social intelligence demands the diffusion of intelligence and consciousness among all members of society. Coöperation must therefore be conscious. If coöperation is compulsory, it is obvious that the element of compulsion will prevent those subjected to it from manifesting their potential effectiveness. No one will labor as effectively under compulsion as he will as a free man inspired by an ideal of the highest good. Compulsion would defeat economy. The coöperation in an ideal society must therefore be voluntary.

We have now shown that the social ideal is represented by the conception of a society with a perfectly developed corporate consciousness, democratically organized on the basis of social economy, and having its members inspired by the spirit of conscious and voluntary coöperation for the public good. It is a coöperative commonwealth in which the good of each, while subordinate to, is yet realized in, the good of all. Now of what value is this ideal in respect to the current questions of the day?

In reply to this inquiry we may say without hesitation that it has a most practical bearing on the solution of all our social problems. Disputes concerning these problems arise from differences of opinion, which, while they are the reflection of conflicting interests, are due after all to a difference of ideal. In the long conflict of the two sections of our country, for instance, the people of the South held to the ideal of white supremacy. They believed slavery was right, and all their efforts were directed toward its perpetual establishment and extension. The people of the North believed it was wrong. Hence, they sought to limit it and put it in the way of final extinction. Ideals, therefore, had much to do with the practical questions of the Fugitive Slave Law, the Missouri Compromise, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and all the other measures connected with slavery. To-day the two main conflicting ideals are industrial individualism and collectivism.

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The proposed solutions of our politico-industrial problems—the land question, the labor question, the problem of poverty, the trust question, the questions of railway regulation, child-labor, and the like—are consequently individualistic or collectivistic. If the ideal we have suggested is the true one, it is plain that measures devised to correct the various evils out of which these questions arise must be pointed toward collectivism. They need not be radical. Evolution warns against trying to make haste too rapidly. But they must be to some extent socialistic, hence liable to criticism as such. The ideal is industrial coöperation. Hence, all social legislation should be framed with the thought of the gradual elimination of industrial strife. All attempts to rehabilitate the doctrines of *laissez-faire* and inaugurate a *régime* of free industrial competition are retrogressive and doomed to failure. The ideal is above and beyond, not below and behind.

So much for the bearing of the ideal on the industrial questions of to-day. On the questions more specifically political and educational it throws a light no less luminous. If the end is democratic organization of social forces for social purposes, we may, hence, infer that whatever tends to increase popular participation in government, to make it more democratic, more truly "of the people, for the people, by the people" is, so far, justified in principle. This is what commends such proposals as extension of suffrage, proportional representation, popular initiative, and the referendum. They are calculated to increase popular interest in government, and bring it more completely under the control of the people—in a word, to socialize it. They are measures preparatory and essential to complete social organization. So also, if social intelligence is an element in the ultimate social ideal, we know in what direction educational reform must travel. Knowing the end, we shall favor such changes in educational organization, curricula, and discipline as most clearly tend to promote it.

Such in brief is the practical value of our ideal in current discussions. The end suggests the means. All things must be made to work together for the attainment of the precon-

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ceived end. The ideal, if we would but admit it, is the most practical thing in the world.

There is another value of a lofty ideal which should not be overlooked, and that is the sentimental. No great thing is ever accomplished without enthusiasm. So say the sages. Nothing serves better to kindle enthusiasm than the contemplation of a worthy and attainable ideal. The social ideal we have suggested is attainable, for it demands only the completion of existing elements in society. As to its loftiness and worth, we have only to reflect upon what its approximate realization would necessarily mean. It would mean a society in which the atrocities of individual and national strife, with their inevitable brood of hatred, envy, malice, jealousy, cruelty, and bloodshed, could no longer take place, because so obviously inconsistent with social intelligence and the spirit of coöperation or brotherhood; a society in which the prophecy of the Scriptures would be fulfilled—men would learn war no more, swords be beaten into plowshares, spears into pruning-hooks, and monster ships be built to carry the life-giving products of industry and not the death-dealing implements of war; a society in which kings and emperors can no longer exist, because the absurd idea that God brings some men into the world to lord it over others will no longer be entertained, and the spirit of selfish domination will be held, as it deserves to be held, in utter detestation; a society in which the repressive function of government, as distinguished from the administrative function, will no longer be exercised because no longer necessary, as it is no longer necessary to-day with the best elements of our population; a society in which the barriers between nation and nation and race and race will be cleared away, and the true patriot will not be he who loves his country, but he who loves his kind; a society in which they will be no poor, except the poor in spirit; no rich, except those who are rich in goodness, wisdom and love; a society in which there will be no idle, because all will have opportunity for work, and all will have learned that the joy of living is in doing; a society in which there will be no broken down and overworked, because a fair distribution of the work of the world

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will lighten the labor of each; a society which in truth will mean a new heaven and a new earth where man, untrammeled by want and evil conditions, may press rapidly onward in his development and mount to the utmost possibilities of his being.

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A FUNDAMENTAL TEST FOR DETERMINISM.

Among all the methods of approach by which men have sought to deliver the solving word upon the vexed problem of free-will, I do not remember to have seen anywhere attempts to test the validity of the deterministic or necessarian arguments by applying to the process of the argumentation the conclusions of those arguments. The test would take the form of this question: What is the effect upon the validity of the reasoning process by which determinism or necessarianism arrives at its conclusions, if we acknowledge that those conclusions are true?

This test may well be called a fundamental one; for should it prove necessary to deny logical cogency to the reasoning involved in order that the conclusions should not fall to the ground, then we should have hit at last upon the most economical method of banishing the whole contention to the limbo of dead problems.

Recall for a moment the declaration of the necessarian that conduct is wholly determined by circumstances; that is to say, by external conditions. All our actions upon which moral judgment may rightly be passed are in a causal sequence, of which the governing antecedent is some physical event that in its effect upon conduct falls inevitably under the control of unbroken law. There is no peradventure about the consequent, about the effect, when the antecedent or set of such is given.

"But look!" says the determinist; "you cannot deny that in any case of cause and effect, the effect is determined as much

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by the nature of the object upon which that force is expended as upon the force itself. The falling of the raindrops upon a rock makes little or no change; while similar drops falling upon mud-flats leave impressions that come to light centuries later, indelibly stamped upon the stony flags. Conduct is not determined merely by the physical events in the environment but by these events plus the character of the man whose conduct is in question. Put a coward in the smoking towns surrounding an angry Vesuvius and he will rend the ties of blood and even friendship in mad zeal for his life. Set some devoted priest in that withering region, and the little finger of need will stay his departing feet."

Both physics and psychology will agree that the determinist has the whip hand in the argument. Yet what is the issue? James is surely right in saying that the victor is merely a "soft-shell necessarian." He has himself, in the very act of winning, passed under the ban. Free-will has found no helper here. Objective law, law uncontrollable by the so-called moral agent, still commands the field. The event lies completely anticipated in the bosom of the past, and all the wealth of friendly urgency or hostile malediction that forms a part of this same past can compel, indeed, but never persuade. Persuasion is a word ill-assorted with the claims of the determinist. It looks at you, indeed, from the midst of his vocabulary, but when you bid it speak, it can patter only of natural law and constraint. The river foams about the impeding rocks and therein behaves quite differently from the sluggish oil or still more sluggish lava; yet no one applauds or condemns river or oil or lava for its appropriate mode of behavior. In no different wise does conduct issue from character and circumstances. Quite as objective as the events in the physical world, it passes from phase to phase and the moral agent can in no whit control it. The moral agent indeed constitutes one factor in the issue, but controls neither in any other sense than do the natures of a stone and a lump of putty control the issue of a blow struck upon each. This is obviously not the sense in which the defender of free-will employs the term; and, with apologies to the determinist, it is doubtful whether the unreflective citizen finds

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his practical attitude toward the affair of self-direction comfortably at home in this conception.

Now the determinist must needs look elsewhere for his conclusive arguments than into the feelings of mankind; for while ready enough to admit that at times what they would not, this they do, just as stoutly at other times do they hold by their conviction of self-direction and that in no "stony" sense. So the determinist does look into the physical world, and finds that there the assumption of the inevitableness of events is a good working hypothesis. But the human body too he notes as a part of that physical world, and conduct as merely muscular adaptation to the environment. If he has a good working hypothesis for one part, a large part of the physical world, why should he not, why ought he not to, apply it to all parts.

Moreover, in the psychical sphere—which may or may not be in effective connection with conduct—he is not without a motive for his conclusion. People are pretty generally ready to admit that they act in accordance with the strongest motive. The conflict of motives is conceived precisely after the analogy of a conflict of forces. Conduct, like motion, is the algebraic sum of the several factors, motives in the one case, moment forces in the other.

Here, indeed, the defenders of free-will very properly take issue with the deterministic interpretation of the word "strong" as it occurs in this connection on the popular tongue. An ambiguity lurks in it. There is a squint two ways, toward the *vis a tergo* and the *vis a fronte*. A man may be "strongly" compelled indeed, but so too may he be "strongly" persuaded. There is no persuasion in motives as conceived by the determinist, except a persuasion of the "stony" sort already noted, which is so fundamental a reinterpretation of the word as used by the ordinary citizen as to amount to substitution of another term. The ordinary citizen is at no loss to understand this new meaning, but he is equally ready to say that he has a different term to describe that condition. "Compulsion" is that term; and to redefine persuasion as the psychical variety of compulsion is to purge these two terms of the mutual opposition that gives each its place in his vocabulary. All of this amounts to

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saying that men are under an illusion in describing the experience in question as persuasion. The experience interpreted is still to be found but, if the determinist is right, its old interpretation must be discarded.

The serious thing about the situation is that perhaps the determinist really is right. That the ordinary citizen had a different interpretation of this experience of persuasion may well be true; but it may be no less true that he is altogether wrong in his view. Surely it is no argument against the correctness of the determinist that he forces us to change our view of the meaning that we attached to the experience of persuasion. He can, to be sure, no longer draw cogent reasons from the popular employment of terms, for it has already appeared that this use is ambiguous; and, furthermore, were it ever so explicit, it still might be incorrect.

Here, then, let us see what can be done with the test proposed at the outset of this discussion. Let us assume for the moment that the determinist is right, and let us make a thoroughgoing application of his conclusion, not alone to those outer physical motions of the body that readily enough pass under the name of conduct in so far as they express an end, but also to the inner activities of thought. There appears to be no more objection in principle to regarding as conduct the thinking process, or the finer motions among the brain molecules that express some end, than so to regard those gross adaptations of the entire organism which are so public.

The new problem takes this form: Is the sort of conduct involved in drawing a conclusion causally determined? That I may tie to a concrete case, I will choose as the special object for this test the very process of argumentation employed by the determinist in fixing his conclusion that all conduct is causally determined.

No one can hesitate a moment to acknowledge that there are cases of psychic compulsion. Thought does not always move logically to an adequate conclusion, but it reaches a conclusion nevertheless. Evidence to the point is furnished us by the enumeration of fallacies in the text-books of formal logic, in the facts of social suggestibility, in the uncritical adoption of

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beliefs and opinions. Take the ordinary citizen again, whose thoughts should happen to proceed in this fashion: The ground is wet if rain has fallen; and since the ground is wet, rain must have fallen. A fair example of psychical compulsion. Again, I find that those low-crowned Derby hats, that used to go by the name of "dips," are altogether handsome and elegant articles of apparel until fashion decrees their banishment. My fellow traveler is beyond measure persuaded of the importance of a high tariff for the country's prosperity, for he calls himself a Republican. On my other side in the same car I knock elbows with a man that is incontinently sure of the verbal inspiration of Scripture because all his spiritual guides, decades long, have stoutly maintained that doctrine.

Yes, there is no doubt that we could bore ourselves to extinction with an interminable procession of instances where the process of thinking has been one of psychical compulsion. But what attitude does every careful thinker take to all such facts as these? They are the plague of his life, and he routs them wherever he may with all the valorous energy of a reformer. Thought on those terms is no thought worth having. Of this he is quite certain. No validity can for him attach to any conclusion reached by roads of that sort. Can anyone make him assured that his reasonings issue after that fashion, then, despite all feelings of rationality and logical consistency by which their meager reality gets itself decently clad, he will flout every once-so-valiant argument, abjure his conclusions, and begin once more his patient search.

Now suppose you tell such a man that he cannot escape; that the whole process of his thinking has suffered an incurable infection; that however logically he may feel that he is drawing out the steps of his argument, there is nevertheless a causal compulsion dogging every advance; that there is no such thing as uncaused thought. What will such a man say? First of all, that he is being deprived of all standards of right thinking; that in consequence, he cannot even allow credit to his conviction that you are correct in your argument whereby you are deposing his reason from its position of fancied preeminence; in short, that critical estimate of the course of

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thought is impossible. But he cannot stop there. The distinction between truth and error falls to the ground. For aught anyone can say, the gossip's opinion is as good as the statesman's. And finally he is of a mind not to be greatly disturbed by your argument anyway, since you were causally compelled to take the view that you adopted. From all of which it would appear that you are hoisted by your own petard.

There may be some among the less critical that will incline to contest this conclusion on the ground that the doctrine of necessarianism is not meant to cover thought as well as conduct. This distinction would be worth making were it not true that we have to make choice of conclusions just as we make choice of courses of action. In both cases we may do it blindly, that is to say, we may do it without consideration of the reasons leading one way or another. Then we certainly are in the toils of compulsion. But we may choose reasonably. If so, and if there is any cogency in the arguments that I have proposed, we may be assured that it is possible to be rescued from subjection to the force from behind.

Men with a theory that differs from the theories of others upon a given question like to give a psychological explanation for the occurrence of such false (?) theories. Let us ask, then, how necessarianism could have commended itself to the thinkers that have marshalled bold arguments in its behalf. In my judgment, this commendation was possible because the thinkers in question failed to reflect upon the meaning of this very process of reasoning which gave birth to their theory. The presuppositions really involved in that process were of such a character as to nullify its apparent issue. Experience in this section of philosophy has not been different from experience in other parts of the same field. Man neglects to consider how he does his task in his eagerness to get that task done.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING. By William James. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Pp. xiii, 309.

Pragmatism is primarily a name for an intellectual attitude, for a method of thought, and should not be interpreted as necessarily designating a specific philosophical creed. To be sure, a considerable body of common doctrine has grown up among pragmatists and this material may properly be called the pragmatic philosophy. Nevertheless, the term is at present properly applicable to a point of view and a mode of procedure, rather than to a body of metaphysical conclusions. Its enemies give it a bad name. Not since the appearance of the utilitarian ethics has a philosophical position been at once so roundly abused and so stanchly defended. Its more acrimonious assailants allege that as metaphysics whatever is new in it is but a shallow empiricism founded upon the ruins of logic, while its pretended novelties are mainly plagiarisms from time-honored philosophic systems, and its chief stock in trade is an unbridled audacity. Its defenders, on the other hand, are loud in its praises as a philosophic movement which promises that for the first time a full and discriminating justice shall be done to facts—a promise which positivism once made but only partially redeemed. Its disciples uphold it as the one philosophic method competent to take complete account of the teeming possibilities of reality. It is the only view, they assert, which truly apprehends and fearlessly sets forth the *creative* aspects of this reality. For the old-fashioned "set pieces" of rationalistic absolutism, it offers living, breathing creatures of flesh and blood, fallible and imperfect, but alive and fecund. Where the truth really lies amid these divergent estimates of the pragmatic doctrine may well puzzle the impartial onlooker.

One thing is certain, one must go back three or four decades to find any intellectual movement which has so stimulated the philosophic blood in the veins of English and American thinkers. Even its enemies are obliged to admit (in deed if not in word) the tonic effect of its presence. At all events the flood of vitriolic criticism which they have discharged upon it is itself a tribute to the virility and importance of the thing attacked. Though certain of

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its fundamental tenets be as venerable as its antagonists maintain, they have nevertheless been freshly formulated and in a thousand ways essentially revitalized. It is not merely a case of twice-told tales, otherwise there would be fewer listeners and far fewer critics. National lines have been for the nonce largely obliterated. Germany, to be sure, has persistently preserved her insulation, but Italy has been much affected by the agitation, and France only in lesser degree.

It is surely obvious that in our own country no undertaking of the professional philosophers has in recent years appealed so strongly to the imagination of metaphysical amateurs, to that large body of persons of general intelligence who cultivate a sporadic interest in speculative affairs. To the man in the street (the back alley of philosophy) the attractiveness of pragmatism comes at least in part from its genial disrespect for the abstractions of philosophic thought and its hail-fellow-well-met attitude toward the lowliest yellow dog of a fact. It is evidently no respecter of persons or traditions. It goes on all fours with the crowd and is both pugnacious and game. It makes its more serious appeal to the unprofessional public by reason of its avowed effort to adopt the temper and the methods of modern science. The more highly developed of the sciences aim fundamentally at descriptive insight into the *behavior* of things, and if this behavior can be made intelligible, and particularly if it can be subjected to control, no great interest is felt in the search for a possible higher order of realities lying back of the empirical facts. Now the ambition of pragmatism is all of a piece with this disposition of modern science. It seeks first and foremost an account of behavior, and having gained something which answers in this direction to the requirements of practice, it is disposed to regard as idle any further speculation about the possible ultimates residing behind the scenes.

This mood inevitably gives to pragmatic writing a certain buoyant vitality and spontaneity which is extremely alluring. It conveys a sense of intellectual resiliency which invites confidence and fortifies courage. The fresh breezes of vital fact blow so freely through Professor James' pages that, despite the exhilarating stimulation which one experiences, one is at times left sadly out of breath. The close and stuffy atmosphere of the traditional philosophy has been exchanged for the large air of life itself.

Professor James opens his case with an indictment of the pre-

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vailing philosophic systems, particularly those of rationalistic proclivities. Indeed, we are never long deprived of the merry sound of the belligerent shillalah ringing lustily about the shoulders of the unfortunate rationalist, whom Professor James belabors at every turn with rare gusto. Possibly we are here encountering the influences of his Hibernian ancestry. In any case, he finds that the philosophies of an empirical character, although they keep close to fact, are commonly irreligious, and so fail of satisfying an important part of the human demand laid upon a philosophy: whereas the more rationalistic and religious-minded cults preserve an aloofness from fact which renders them hollow, unreal, and repellent, both to science and to common sense. In pragmatism he finds a method which promises a philosophy that can be religious with the best of the rationalisms, and nevertheless cherish, with empiricism, the most sensitive reverence for fact.

This hopeful note reminds us that philosophy with the courage of eternal youth is always starting her career afresh, casting off the old outworn rags and decking herself forth in new garments of seeming beauty and worth. Pragmatism is the last costume in which she has attired herself. That it will endure to the end of her journey, who can say?

What then is the pragmatic procedure? Professor James says that it stands for "The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts" (p. 54). Pragmatism "agrees with nominalism, for instance, in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions, and metaphysical abstractions" (p. 53). "Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses, and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of private fact—if that should seem a likely place to find him" (p. 80). These quotations exhibit in the most graphic manner the temper and drift of the pragmatic position as Professor James advocates it.

In his early chapters the author offers some illuminating examples of pragmatic procedure in connection with the examination of such categories as substance, matter, the soul, design, and

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free-will, and in a special chapter he attacks single-handed the oldest and most protean of the problems of philosophy—the problem of the one and the many. From this conflict, be it said, he brings forth triumphant a somewhat battered pluralistic doctrine, a doctrine which holds that, although we MAY live in a real universe, there is at present no compelling reason for feeling *certain* that we have about us an order which either is, or ever will be, wholly unified.

On the question of the important categories, such as space, time, causality and the like, he takes a somewhat Spencerian position, holding that these mental devices for manipulating experience are presumably the inventions of some early human genius, which have survived because of their practical usefulness in enabling us to get about successfully in our world. That they have any such immanent and inseparable connection with the nature of mind, as Kant maintains, he utterly scouts.[1]

Pragmatism means the effort to discern philosophic truth by submitting hypotheses and beliefs to the test of practice. That one is true which survives this appeal by showing itself fit to guide us amid the exigencies of actual experience. Any two doctrines which lead to identical conduct and consequences are in essence one and the same. At first blush this sounds like a new deification of the philosophy of common sense, and so in a measure it is. But it is a common sense which would have scandalized Reid and his Scottish followers, for, as we shall see in a moment, it manifests but scant respect for a fixed order of any kind, whether this be thought of as mental or physical.

When applied to the interpretation of many of the older and more familiar philosophic problems, it is undoubtedly helpful in the emphasis which it lays upon the discovery of concrete and specific consequences to be apprehended from one or other of the possible solutions of these problems. That, in reaching these solutions, it can in any way dispense with the devices of an intellectualistic kind, which have hitherto been fashionable in both science and philosophy, by no means follows. In other words, the appeal to *results* in *practical* experience is in no sense equivalent to the

[1] Professor James is far less successful as a wrecker than he is as a builder. His criticisms of rationalism, especially of Kantianism, are couched in a slap-dash manner, which makes most diverting reading, but in the reviewer's judgment they are often quite wide of the mark.

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banishment of rationalistic considerations. Nor do the pragmatists mean that their view shall be so interpreted, for they recognize thoroughly that practice, concretely taken, involves rationalistic elements, quite as inevitably as it does motor elements. Their constant insistence is, however, wisely and rightly, that we must always and again carry back into the stream of actual human life the results of our philosophic speculation, in order that we may there subject them to what is their most crucial and significant test. It is against the anæmic and devitalized abstractions of rationalism that the pragmatist rails, and if rationalism has in reality allowed any of its abstractions to become thus disconnected with the vital facts of experience, it is quite certain that the pragmatic bogey-man will get them.

The doctrine which is most likely to give pause to the average lay reader is Professor James' account of the nature of truth. His philosophic critics find it difficult to discover respectable words in which adequately to voice their sentiments on the subject. A few quotations may best set forth what this view is. "The 'facts' themselves meanwhile are not *true*. They simply *are*. Truth is the function of beliefs that start and terminate among them" (p. 225). "Truth is *made*, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the course of experience" (p. 218). "Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought than health and wealth do" (p. 230). "*'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving*" . . . "expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course" (p. 222). "Truth in science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfaction, taste included, but consistency both with previous truth and with novel fact is always the most imperious claimant" (p. 217). "You can say of it then either that 'it is useful because it is true,' or that 'it is true because it is useful'" (p. 204). "Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events" (p. 201). "The reasons why we call things true is the reason why they are true, for 'to be true' means only to perform this marriage function" *i. e.*, marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts (p. 64). "Truth is *what we say* about them," (*i. e.*, new contents) "and when we say that they have come, truth is satisfied by the plain additive formula" (p. 62).

Obviously it would be easy to travesty these statements as a pronunciamento favoring truth as dependent upon the caprice of

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the individual mind which in its leisure moments takes the trouble to pronounce certain things true and others false. All the stark rigidity of truth, as ordinarily thought of, is gone, leaving a merely invertebrate mass devoid of any informing purpose. Not such a protoplasmic jelly is the truth of science and religion, however it may fare with the modest little truths of common sense and commonplace human nature. At least such is sure to be the first reaction of the normally hard-headed person.

The view which the author is here defending is one which appears to magnify into truth itself the *method* by which we *ascertain* truth and *test* it. Unquestionably, we get our truth from rough actual experience and equally, without question, we test it by its adequacy to experiential demands. But it is not so clear to the ordinary mind that the nature of truth is exhausted by any such account of it. There is a core of reality upon which our predications of truth and falsity must inevitably be grafted, and to which they are in part relative. In other writings, Professor James has more fully recognized this fact. There is, to use his own word, a "grain" in things against which we cannot go if we would. To this stubborn grain in things his present exposition does scant justice. The world out of which we construct our truth is not wholly fluid. There is in Mr. Schiller's phrase "a primary reality" which is in part given, whether we will or no, and although we refashion it in many ways to our own ends, we never get entire power to determine its nature. [Professor James might well urge that in fairness quotation should be made of certain passages in which he more explicitly recognizes the significance of "old truth" and "funded truth." The reviewer's point touches, however, not so much the author's attitude toward old truth, although this does not appear to be always consistent, as it does his conception of the part played in the formation of any truth whatsoever by the non-human element in it, the element over which we have no complete control.]

To illustrate: We may interpret the events of history as much as we like, and the successful interpretations we shall call true and the others false, and aside from such success and failure in the interpretation, we have no means of determining truth and error. But the occurrence of some actual historical phenomenon is a *sine qua non* of the whole interpretative process, and in his present work Professor James hardly gives the consequences of this fact their proper perspective. Had he done so, many of his

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sayings would have taken on a far less paradoxical air. In the mere occurrence as such, certain predicates are forever excluded from truth and certain others forever included, whatever our disposition about the matter. We must, in the first instance, conform ourselves to the event, not it to us. That a person called Napoleon lived for a time on an island called Elba can never be truthfully denied, however possible it may prove successfully to incorporate such a false assertion in our practical affairs. That kind of predicate *as true* is, by the event itself, rendered forever impossible. Even though it should be feasible to conduct successfully our purely personal career (a perfectly conceivable hypothesis) while asserting that nothing occurred corresponding to the supposed event, its reality would not be obliterated, except in our thought, and our assertion, though pragmatically true for us, would not correspond with the facts.

In this connection it seems to the reviewer that Professor James has somewhat slurred the social side of the truth-determining process, although he has not overlooked it. If all men agreed that no such event as the Napoleonic residence on Elba had occurred (an error which the historians of a million years hence may well make), the positive human outcome might quite well be as though the event had not in reality come to pass. Certainly, as a matter of fact, what we call truth, is, in most cases, a socialized product in which the less acute and less developed minds take advantage of the discoveries of the more talented and more widely experienced. In many cases the interpretation of facts which comes to be accepted as truthful is determined by a sort of plebiscite in which the verdict of the mass of mankind determines the issue. Whether we identify truth with Professor James' pragmatic edition of it or not, it is clear that the method of discovering and testing it is more social and less purely individualistic in character than he sometimes makes evident.

The reviewer goes with the pragmatist entirely so far as regards the determination and the verification of truth, and he feels that many truths are simply such by virtue of the part which they play in human affairs. They refer to phenomena which are interpretable in several ways, and the truth or falsehood of these interpretations is simply another name for their capacity or incapacity to serve certain ends, but surely there is a residual element in all phenomena which is not thus subject to utterly flexible interpretation. This view may seem to leave one mired in the bogs of an

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old-fashioned epistemological dualism, a doctrine which is at least not ultra-fashionable nowadays, but this is not the place to discuss either the ancestry or the posterity of this formula.

The moral and religious world into which pragmatism gives ingress is cast in a heroic mold. It is a world in which there is no assurance that righteousness and happiness will prevail. But on the other hand, it partially insures against the pessimistic belief in the final victory of either blind chance or malicious wickedness. Professor James entitles it melioristic. It is no doctrine for weaklings, nor for those in the extremes of spiritual depression. "There can be no doubt that when men are reduced to their last sick extremity absolutism is the only saving scheme. Pluralistic moralism simply makes their teeth chatter, it refrigerates the very heart within their breast" (p. 293).

On pragmatic principles this last statement apparently offers a clear warrant of superiority to absolutism, for it is in just such extremities that men most crave and need the comforts of religious faith. If pragmatic meliorism cannot provide a heart-satisfying belief for these moments, it is in so far tried by its own test and found wanting. Of course, the non-pragmatist will urge that what we want under such circumstances, has no bearing whatever on the question as to what are the true facts. But this answer sounds ill in the mouth of pragmatism.

Professor James draws a picture of an unfinished world in which growth is going on everywhere, in which righteousness and sin are ever fighting a real battle, and in which the issue is ever in doubt. There is here no promise that the Almighty will preserve the faithful or give him victory. For that we must look to religious absolutism. The brave soldier can but do his duty, and, if need be, die. The solid comfort which has always come to human souls in the great moments of human agony from the conviction that God lives and loves his children, that happiness will finally be achieved, that justice will ultimately be done, that peace will eventually be gained in a life beyond the grave, is not for the pragmatist—at least, not on the usual terms. These are convictions which he is free to cherish, but for *assurance* he can only look to his own unflagging purpose and resolution.

To one already endued with nobility of spirit, this form of pragmatism speaks a bracing Stevensonian gospel. But to the mean and miserable, to the wretched and downcast, it is but

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another curse in the cup of despair. No doubt, for one of the author's unflinching moral and intellectual courage such a program is inspiriting and elevating, but to those minted from a softer metal it offers a bleak and cheerless prospect, with little to instigate hope, and nothing to inspire confidence. This is a faith for the spiritual aristocracy, and pragmatically tested by the proletariat, its condemnation is sure.

In his volume on religious experience the author intimated, as he had previously done elsewhere, a faith of a more mystical complexion. There is still room for such a faith here, but it is badly crowded by the regnant empiricism of a scientific kind which pervades the present volume. One who had not read the earlier writings of the author, would hardly suspect its existence from this book. So swamped is this former leaning of the author, that even his overt reference to his expositions of it elsewhere serves but to emphasize its absence here.

Professor James fearlessly advocates the view that philosophic convictions are the result of temperaments, and that the great system makers can all be divided into either the "tender minded" or the "tough minded," into rationalists or empiricists, into intellectualists or sensationalists, optimists or pessimists, monists or pluralists. However adequate these divisions, there can be little doubt that the pragmatic deductions which the author makes in moral and religious directions are colored by his own temperamental prepossessions. It is not at all clear that a consistent application of the same pragmatic principle to the issues of the moral and religious life would not in other hands result in a quite different conclusion.

In the "Varieties of Religious Experience," the author himself made inferences as to the implication of the experiences of the great saints and religious leaders, to say nothing of the experiences of plainer folk, which were distinctly pragmatic in basis, and spiritually much more positive in their outcome. They looked with much greater confidence than is here disclosed toward a view of life in which spiritual affairs play a conspicuous *rôle,* and in which the life of the soul after physical death is more than a speculative possibility. At all events, such was the interpretation commonly placed upon the author's words. The reviewer can only feel that in writing this part of his book the author has had too much in mind the conventional difficulties which philosophy has always raised for religious belief, and too little the

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actual pragmatic warrant for religious faith itself as tested in actual life.

Taken as a whole, "Pragmatism" must be counted a great book. No one can read it and escape constant stimulation in his own thinking. It freshens and revivifies every topic upon which it touches, and even if each tenet in it be proven false, it must nevertheless be recognized as one of the most serviceable of contemporary works in philosophy by reason of the vivid way in which it raises vital issues. Moreover, despite its occasional coquetting with paradox, it contains an amazing amount of sheer solid good sense. It embodies a courageous and lucid defense of a doctrine notoriously unpopular in many professional circles. It reveals in a most delightful manner the inner workings of one of the foremost minds of our own time, and in sustained brilliancy of style it would be difficult to name a peer. Whether its teachings, like those of Socrates, will be adjudged dangerous for the younger generation and subversive of good citizenship can only be determined by time. Signs are not wanting that the asperity of its critics is already softening—especially those who come out from behind the screen of anonymous reviews.

The movement which the book represents suffers most from the ordinary faults of youth, *i. e.*, impatience, precipitancy, and a certain raw enthusiasm. Under the mellowing influences of age it should take its place among the real progressive factors in the history of thought. In any case it is but the focal point of influences which radiate from every branch of science and philosophy. It is no sporadic phenomenon, no stray meteor in the intellectual heavens. It belongs to a larger system, for which the term "enlightened empiricism" may serve as a title.

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THE CREED OF A LAYMAN. By Frederic Harrison. Macmillan & Co., 1907. Pp. vi, 411.

Mr. Frederic Harrison calls this book a defence of his faith—Apologia pro Fide Mea. "I have at no time in my life," he wrote in 1890, in words prefixed to the introductory section, "lost faith in a supreme Providence, in an immortal soul, and in spiritual life; but I came to find these much nearer to me on earth than I had imagined; much more real, more vivid and more practical.

Superhuman hopes and ecstasies have slowly taken the form in my mind of practical duties and indomitable convictions of a good that is to be." It is his object to explain this statement, and show how such a change of outlook not only has taken place in his own case, but—one is warranted in adding—can in his view be justified.

Accordingly he gives a brief account of his early life, at home, at school, and at the university, wherein he makes it plain that religion was from the first with him a very powerful interest; brought up in a high church family, from the influence of which he was never withdrawn by a boarding school, being sent as a day boy to King's College School in London, he went still untroubled by doubts, in 1850, at the age of eighteen, to Wadham College, Oxford. Here, during the next six years, his belief in Christian theology gradually melted away. There was no violent crisis, and no antagonism, as sometimes arises, to that which he forsook; it was as much the compromises of critics whom he admired within the Christian body as the attacks of those without that moved him. To the end he tells us he has retained a love of the forms of worship he has discarded; but this could not induce him, by any device of waiver or reinterpretation, to continue to give his assent to doctrines which had come to seem to him false.

We are told of the books of Mr. Harrison read at this time; as might be expected, they are more numerous than most of us could set down for the years corresponding. He avows himself still a disciple of the Philosophy of Experience as expounded by Mill in his Logic, and of the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge as taught by Herbert Spencer. He read Positive Philosophy, and had an interview with Comte in Paris, who told him to study the physical sciences; but he was not yet a Positivist. At the age of twenty-four he returned to London, and set himself to improve his scientific education, reading also the volumes of the Synthetic Philosophy as they appeared. He became a barrister, but quitted practice in 1870. His readers know, though they are not told, how much literary work he has done since abandoning his original profession. But the first piece which he published was an article on "Essays and Reviews," entitled "Neo-Christianity," in the *Westminster Review* for 1860. This article emphasized the sceptical tendencies of a book which had at first attracted comparatively little notice, and it was the signal for the breaking of the storm. It would seem as if the controversy into which he was then drawn helped to precipitate Mr. Harrison's own opinions.

He gives us an extract from his diary, dated January, 1861, in which he had written down his then views on questions of religion, and though it was not till 1867 that he helped to found a Positivist Union, he was pretty much a Positivist when this statement was written. "I believe," it begins, "that before all things needful, beyond all else, is true religion;" a man's worship is said to be "the submission of his whole soul to that highest law and Power which he can certainly see and know;" and the real grounds of truth have been discovered by Auguste Comte. "He has given order to the sum of all knowledge—wide enough for all minds—deep enough for all hearts—practical enough for all action. In this now long since I rest, in this I live. Through this only do I hope, and work, and trust. This is my real—my sole—my abiding religion." The whole human race is a providence to all its members, and there is no other providence. Though the notion of some other life after the grave than what Positivism promises was not yet perhaps altogether abandoned (the document is obscure), yet the Positivist view presents itself. "The fate of each man is bound up with the destinies of his fellows. As they suffer, he suffers; as they flourish, he flourishes; as they live hereafter, he lives hereafter" (pp. 39-44).

The first Positivist school, afterwards known as the Church of Humanity, was opened by Dr. Congreve in 1870. Mr. Harrison thought that the time was not ripe for such a step, but as it was to be taken, he would not refuse his support. When, however, in 1879, Dr. Congreve parted company with Pierre Lafitte and the headquarters in France, Mr. Harrison could not follow him. An English Positivist Committee under Pierre Lafitte was formed, of which he was a member and, from 1880 to 1905, president.

These are the main outward features of the story which Mr. Harrison tells. In some thirty more pages he discusses some of the main aspects of the Positivist creed; the remainder and main bulk of the book consists of reprints. The article on "Essays and Reviews" already referred to has been included, under the title of *"Septem Contra Fidem,"* and it is the only thing in this volume that is directly destructive; for the rest, there is an article called by the same name as the volume, from the *Nineteenth Century* of March, 1881; a dialogue in answer to an attack by Mark Pattison, of date 1876; another article, from the *Nineteenth Century* of August, 1881, on "Pantheism and Cosmic Emotion;" a short account of the "Aims and Ideals of Positivism," from the *North*

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American Review of March, 1901; and a number of addresses of a character somewhat between that of a sermon and of a speech at a school prize-day, given on different occasions at Newton Hall, the home of the Positivist community of which he was the head. These are interesting as indicating the character of the corporate worship which Positivism enjoins. The occasions are various. The Day of all the Dead—New Year's Eve—is one; another the Presentation of Infants, corresponding to Baptism; another, Initiation, corresponding to Confirmation; another, the Day of Humanity or New Year's Day; then there are Marriage and Burial; and under the title of Destination, a special service in behalf of a member of the society returning to work in Burma; there is also a Valedictory Address of 1902, reviewing the work of Newton Hall, and a specimen report, for the year 1885, of the Positivist Committee.

It will be seen that the contents of the book are rather miscellaneous, and in some ways it suffers accordingly. It must be admitted that the addresses are not in themselves more worth preserving than any other sermons or addresses by a man of ability at recurrent seasons would be likely to be. Their interest lies in the fact that they are specimens of ordinary Positivist religious exhortation. Neither again has Mr. Harrison undertaken a systematic exposition of the bases of the Positivist doctrine; but he has said much upon the subject up and down, and his views on religion and worship, providence and a future life, may be gathered from the book. Of these it is proper that something should be said; and if they do not command assent, none the less every reader must feel respect for the charity with which subjects so controversial are handled, and for the genuine devotion to high aims and to the service of others which has manifestly inspired the writer.

The philosophic eminence of Comte is assumed rather than argued. We are told (1887, p. 354) that "Sixty years ago Comte propounded the conception of laws in social evolution. It was an idea wholly new in human thought. This idea of Sociology is now one of the grand axioms of Philosophy. . . . And that idea of Evolution, now the watchword of all progressive philosophy, is itself due to Comte." What impressed more than anything upon men's minds the importance of studying things in their development, and the truth that they have had a continuous history, was the success with which Darwin traced the stages and

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conditions of that history in organic species; but surely the importance of studying developments was taught by others, and especially by Hegel, before Comte. As to sociology, we may doubt if it has yet entered upon the sure pathway of science; and still more, whether in the Comtean classification of the sciences, there is not a gulf separating it from the natural sciences that precede it quite different from any that separates these from one another. By such doubts Mr. Harrison appears unmoved; just as he accepts as proved Comte's law of the three stages of thought; though, as John Grote pertinently urged, even if Comte had irrefragably shown that there is a necessary transition from theological through metaphysical to Positivist views of the world, that would not establish the relative truth, but only the relative date of the three. "The philosophers say, or think, if they do not say," writes Mr. Harrison (p. 349), "'till we can show a coherent synthesis of all Natural Science, in one plane with an explanation of History, and a working scheme of Human Society, till we can show men how science supplies a true substitute for Theology—so long as there is no other complete Synthesis extant but that of Comte—so long as there is no living social community on a purely human basis but the Positivist, so long shall we have to wait before we displace Comte.'" Would the philosophers admit Mr. Harrison's reading of their thoughts? We doubt it; and would he really still believe they thought it? The philosophers do not all of them think that "relative knowledge" is knowledge at all. If what we know we know only in relation to our faculties, and this makes it only true for us, it might perhaps be really false; though it is hard to see how any being (unless he is going to know without faculties of knowledge) is to avoid the same condemnation. But those philosophers who belong to the Comtean era have usually held that, even relatively to human powers of criticism, the Comtean synthesis fails to "hold the field."

But the central interest of the book is religious, and we need not pursue the more metaphysical problems; though we are told (p. 224) that "it is playing with the question to offer us anything less than a systematic philosophy." The religion commended to us is the religion of humanity, and that we have to understand. Humanity is our providence, and it is what we are to worship; and in its life lies our immortality. What then is humanity? Alas, it is nothing better than the social organism. "The reality of the social organism never could have been doubted since such a science

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as political economy began. But the laws of its life and development have been long in coming to light. At last this is being done. Philosophy has traced the laws of society, whether of its organization or of its progress" (p. 183). We are expressly told that the social organism is not a metaphor; it is "the commonplace of all the scientific thinkers about society. See what Mill, or Lewes, or Spencer say." "If Spencer says so, I accept it," replies the interlocutor in this dialogue—"the collective energy of mankind may be that of a being." But what is this organism? The religion of humanity requires that it should be mankind as a whole. The application of the analogy under the formula of evolution requires that there should be as many social organisms as there are competing societies. How could the doctrine of evolution be applied to the species man, if there were only one man? What would it be more than a Latin word for growth? And how many of those events and processes which really constitute the *modus operandi* of growth in the individual take place, not metaphorically but literally, in society? "There always stand everywhere," says Mr. Harrison elsewhere (p. 213) "and in the last analysis—matter and mind, we cannot conceive the absence of either; [this from an adherent of the empiricism of Mill], we cannot identify them; we cannot state one in terms of the other. Hence, the eternal dualism of all real philosophy, and thereby of all true religion; the eternal Cosmos, as the field and envelope of the moral life, and that moral life itself—the Environment and the Life; Man and the Universe; or better, Humanity and the World" (p. 213). Is it really meant that the antithesis between matter and mind is exhibited in that which positive science traces between the organism and its environment? And is the social organism a fact of mind or of matter? If of matter, the consequences are staggering; but clearly that is not meant, for it is humanity which is contrasted with the world; yet it cannot be denied that the individual organism, as biology treats it, is a fact of matter. How then, if one cannot be stated in terms of the other, can a fact of mind, like the social organism, have literally and strictly the self-same organization as a fact of matter like the bodily organism? Mr. Harrison hardly seems to have thought clearly on this subject; and another statement strengthens the suspicion. "Morally, intellectually, truly, Man stands face to face with Nature—not her inferior, not her equal, but her superior, like the poet, like the last man confronting the Sun in death. The laws

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of Nature are the ideas whereby Man has arranged the phenomena offered to his senses; the beauty of Nature is the joy whereby he grasps the relations of his environment to his own being" (p. 202). Beauty is definitely held to be subjective. "What is beauty, and harmony, and majesty in Nature? Nothing but what Man sees in it and feels in it. It is beautiful to us; it has a relation to our lives and our nature. Absolutely, it may be a wilderness or a chaos. The poets indeed are the true authors of the beauty and order of Nature; for they see it with the eye of genius." It would seem to be implied, therefore, that law in nature is subjective too—a difficult position for the Positivist philosophy.

We have seen then that the justification for speaking of humanity as an unity lies in the doctrine of the social organism. Let us see what kind of an unity it is. It is the Great Being, of which the dead and the living alike form a part, and which they have helped to create (p. 342). (We may ask in passing, whether the dead portions of an individual organism, which it has thrown off, continue to form a part of it; if not, here is a grave difference between the two.) It is "an External Power dominating our lives, to whom every act and thought is equally to be referred" (p. 365). It is our Providence and the "largest living power on earth" (p. 57). And on the next page it is spoken of as if it had a personal mind—"the human Providence, with awe and resignation, accepts the mysteries which it neither seeks to minimize, nor ventures to solve." "We acknowledge in Humanity the source of the best things that we possess, our protector and comforter when evil things afflict us, the end and object of our lives and hopes" (p. 330). It is an immortal being, though it cannot live without us (pp. 282, 294). (What assurance does science give of the perpetuity of the human race?) And yet it is "an ideal assemblage of human beings, living, dead, and unborn and (presumably) without any collective personality or consciousness" (p. 392). It is "*real,* human, sympathetic" (p. 72),—"a Power: human, real, demonstrable, lovable, one that we can feel with, and work for, and learn to understand, who provides for us, and whose good we can promote" (p. 227). We confess that we cannot reconcile this last relatively sober statement with all that has been quoted before it. And when, in support of a hope that in a regenerated society humanity may nevertheless one day serve as an object of worship, Mr. Harrison goes on to say that "poetry, rhetoric, and all emotion are habitually prone to attribute feeling to moral and

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even to material organisms," we begin to wonder whether humanity, as the social organism, does not, after all, belong rather to the province of metaphor than of science.

In all seriousness, if humanity is the sum total of mankind, how can it be any more our comforter than our tormentor? Do we not owe to our fellows many of the worst evils as well as of the highest goods that befall us? Mr. Harrison is not slow to criticize theology, when facts regarded scientifically will not bear out its doctrines; but no scientific view can attribute to human influence good only and not also evil for man. Religious faith may accept what science cannot prove; perhaps it is part of religion in its highest form to believe that "God's in his heaven. All's right with the world," at least, that there does exist a security for the triumph of good, and a being in communion with whom the soul may find peace. Nor is there any doubt that for Mr. Harrison, at least, humanity has in this sense been the basis of religion. "On my gravestone—or rather on my urn—I would have inscribed—He found peace." But he would be the first to allow that beliefs may bring peace which cannot satisfy the reason.

Humanity is to be the object of our worship. What then is worship? "Simply the outward expression, the visible emotion of Veneration, and of Self-surrender to a Power or Being that we love and serve" (p. 234)—"the education of the heart in reverence, sympathy, and duty" (p. 362). The child that stoops over its mother, and kisses her, at this rate worships her. Mr. Harrison has surely taken worship, as he takes religion, if not on its lowest, still by no means on its highest level. The proper object of worship is that which we recognize to be supreme in the universe: not the largest living power on earth, even if humanity be that, but the highest in all reality. Hence the impossibility of separating the business of metaphysics from religion, as Mr. Harrison would do (*e. g.*, p. 58). Doubtless many religious people, and (what is very different) many adherents of many religions have troubled themselves little with metaphysics; it is for lack of metaphysical reflection that many forms of religion survive. What the religion of humanity may accomplish, in so far as its power rests on training and habit and is bound up with appeals to the emotions, we would not venture to define. But this is not what its advocates ask for. "Positivism, so far as it is a religion, does not seek to be accepted on impulse, or by rapture, under a gush of devotional excitement. . . . Being a religion, it is not a thing to

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be decided by the authority of the learned. Every brain must reason it out for itself" (p. 254). A reasoned religion, Comte notwithstanding, will never be able to cut itself off from metaphysics. It may be hard to define religion; but Mr. Harrison's definitions are not easy to accept. It consists, he tells us (p. 189), "in the acknowledgment of a Power without us towards which our nature submits, and to whom our energies are devoted" (p. 189). "It is a scheme of thought and life whereby the whole nature of individual men and societies of men are concentrated in common and reciprocal activity, with reference to a Superior Power which men and societies alike may serve" (p. 216). The oath of allegiance, taken with enthusiasm, would satisfy the first definition; men's life under a complete tyranny, the second; but immediately after it is the " 'consolidation of coöperation' (religion is really that and nothing else)." We may ask too in what sense humanity is a "power without us," since we are parts of it. In one place (p.174), it is said that no individual, no generation even, can struggle against the course of collective evolution or turn it back for more than a season; the course of civilization will at length sweep on as an uniform current. That we cannot struggle is perhaps but loosely said and not meant. But if enough of us struggle, why can we not modify the course of civilization? Surely if humanity includes us all, its evolution includes our struggles, which are not directed against it, and are not in vain; and to suppose that it is a power without us and has a current which sweeps us all on, and yet is an ideal assemblage, of which we are parts, seems to betray some confusion with regard to the relation of the individual to the social organism.

We saw that humanity is the power which protects and comforts us, but that we must look elsewhither for that which troubles and destroys. An equally arbitrary and unscientific distinction is drawn in the Positivist doctrine of immortality—"our real immortality on earth, as our active lives are carried on by our fellow-beings, not only in memory and in love and gratitude, but in act and in practical conduct" (p. 56). To call this immortality at all may seem to smack of metaphor; for it is neither (as some religious minds have conceived immortality) a state we can attain to here and now, nor one to which we shall consciously attain hereafter. But if it is immortality, the good and the bad should equally be reckoned immortal. Such is not Mr. Harrison's creed. The dead "are with us, around us, in us—*all* of them, but the

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worthless and the evil, whose worthlessness and evil does truly die away in the tide of progress and of good" (p. 90). "The vicious and destructive energies of man have been on the whole abortive, and are more and more absorbed. . . . The good energies alone find permanent incorporation in the course of civilization" (p.177). "With death all that is not abiding and fruitful sinks into oblivion. The good and the true survives and is continued" (p. 342). "Our Heaven . . . is a Heaven without a Purgatory and without a Hell. It is a Heaven, or, more truly, an earthly Future on a nobler plane, to which all good men, all good women, children, slaves, outcasts, contribute and share, in which even the merely useful or the moderately virtuous share, provided their evil deeds do not positively outweigh their better deeds" (p. 343). And yet we are told how "the lightest word is heard and remembered by a child's spirit, and fashions it for good or for ill," how "each fresh idea or example comes home to it, forming it, expanding it, or sapping its life, nay, it may be, corrupting and poisoning its purity" (p. 281). "The nature worshippers" are rebuked because "they are blind and deaf to the waste and the shrieks which meet the seekers after truth" (p. 201); but when the humanity-worshippers act likewise, it is all "synthesis" and "scientific truth." So at one moment we are told that "the general course of civilization is sufficiently clear for practical purposes" (p. 246), at another, it is doubtful whether socialism will or will not "strangle Society, and turn Order into Anarchy" (p. 353). On the one hand, the faith of humanity "honours the ancient societies which have not entered upon the rapid whirl of changes that we call Progress, and it honours them for hesitating to commit themselves to the course of blind confidence in the future, and blind contempt for their past" (p. 312). On the other hand, in their religion, "the End is Progress;" but whither, does not seem to have been determined.

The difficulties from which Mr. Harrison takes refuge in these quicksands are great enough. So much of what used to be held essential to the Christian faith has gone by the board, that one may well ask whether with what is left a reasoning man can retain Christian fellowship. Much is forcibly said to this effect in the article on "Essays and Reviews," and yet some things are overlooked which are crucial in the position there discussed. In particular, there is no reference to the character and personality of Christ, as giving him a claim to be, before others, a revealer of

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what is divine. In spite of his learning, his tolerance, his sympathy with the medieval church and with much in Christian forms of worship, Mr. Harrison says strange things about the religion of Christianity. "Hitherto . . . every religion has appealed directly to the emotions or the imagination, but has stood sublimely above terrestrial things or the passing cares of men" (p. 252). "The religious reformer renders unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and is absorbed in the higher interests of the Soul and its Salvation" (p. 264). "The human type of religion must radically differ from the theological type, for it can have nothing of the violent, ecstatic, sensational character which is inherent in Monotheism" (p. 266). Christian worship unnerves us "with ecstatic yearnings" (p 338). "In the days of our darkness, when we were still under the thraldom of the Old Adam, we could not feel this deep incentive to life and ground of hope [which the Positivist's sense of the true immortality of the soul furnishes]. Taught to regard the life on earth as a pilgrimage in a vale of tears, there was little to do in it which could affect an immortality in Heaven, unless it were prayers, hymns, and religious 'exercises'" (p. 56). "Theology with its ideal Heaven and unearthly rewards always draws off its devotees from active life, treats it as a stumblingblock to godliness, has really nothing to say to it, except to hope that it will be saintly" (p. 237). Those who are really Christians have surely not all so learned Christ. And if it be said that the religious belief of most Christians is superstitious, and their practice worldly, we may ask whether, if the religion of humanity were to become the creed of millions, we could count on its inspiring many with the same unselfish devotion to his fellows with which it inspires Mr. Harrison, or on its being part to them of a systematic philosophy. For indeed—and this shall be our last point—Mr. Harrison has nowhere connected the religion of humanity with positive science. He springs lightly from the revelation of what man is to the revelation of what man should do. "Positivism now simply says (1) The true relation of Man to the Universe is the relation proved by Science; (2) the source and cause of man's duty is to be found in a true and full knowledge of human nature" (p. 241). Supposing science has settled the relation of man to the universe—a large assumption—how does it follow that I have any duty to my fellow-men? If that be granted, an understanding of humanity and its conditions, that is of "History, Social Philosophy, Morals,

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the laws of Mind, the laws of Progress" (p. 233) may help me to determine my duty; but it cannot be discovered empirically that I have any. In one passage (p. 232) to those who say that they do not want social affection, Mr. Harrison replies, "Your life will be *wasted,* will finally be miserable; the society around you will share your doubts, will go on becoming more disordered till you all do feel it. If you cannot feel the charm of social affection, you will feel the horror of social discord, of utter lawlessness and self-will." But it cannot be shown that these mischiefs will mature in my time; and if it be said that such a man is preferring "vice," "self," "his lower nature," we may ask how Positivists distinguish between a man's lower and his higher nature. Both exist, and the lower sometimes is more favorable to the individual's survival. If less favorable to that of the social organism, let the social organism see to it: *deorum injuriæ dis curæ.*

To speak frankly, this book is melancholy reading. Its candor and good intention would disarm criticism. The age and literary reputation of the author command respect. It is so true that man needs a religion that shall at once satisfy his mind, give scope to his energies and fill his soul with a worthy object of devotion (p. 222), that no one can take any pleasure in discovering the futility of the claims which a new religion makes to fulfil this threefold need. Yet the religion of humanity, which this book is written to commend, fails in every way. It rests, as we have endeavored to show, on metaphor, assumption, and confusion. "The Religion of Humanity is simply, the Evolution of Man—idealized and revealed" (p. 354). This is but a slipshod statement, yet it seems to me not uncharacteristic of the volume.

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Lectures on Humanism, with Special Reference to Its Bearings on Sociology. By J. S. Mackenzie, M. A., Glasgow, Litt. D., Cambridge; Professor of Philosophy in University College, Cardiff; author of "Outlines of Metaphysics," "A Manual of Ethics," and "An Introduction to Social Philosophy." London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1907.

Professor Mackenzie uses the term humanism in a sense different from that which Professor James and his friends have

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tried to attach to it, and a nobler one. He employs it to denote not so much a school as a tendency of thought—the tendency to explain the universe in the light of and from the point of view of human nature—to employ in that explanation the humanistic concepts of purpose, end, good rather than the naturalistic concepts of matter, motion, quantity. It is thus contrasted with both of the opposite tendencies to which he gives the names naturalism and supernaturalism. It is eventually admitted that the humanistic explanation of the world is not entirely adequate by itself. A true account of the universe as a whole must take account of and include those aspects of it which are revealed by physical nature and its laws, and it must end in the recognition of some being or beings greater than the individual human animal: so far it must include the points of view characteristic both of naturalism and supernaturalism. But in the final explanation—such explanation or comprehension of the whole as is possible to the human intellect—the humanistic tendency should, in the author's view, play the largest part. Even science cannot, at least when it enters the biological region, get on without the concept of end or purpose, while supernaturalist explanations of the universe are after all based upon facts of human nature; so that in the last resort a true philosophy cannot but be humanistic, though not in a narrow or exclusive sense. At bottom this rather elaborate account may be said to come to this: a true view of the universe must be teleological and ethical.

The book represents the substance of lectures given by the author as Dunkin lecturer in sociology at Manchester College, Oxford. Its main object is to suggest the kind of light which philosophy, conceived of in this way, may be expected to throw upon the problems usually discussed by sociology and sociologists. After explaining the contribution of Humanism to philosophy itself, Professor Mackenzie goes on to develop its bearings upon politics, economics, education, religion. The lectures naturally assume very largely the form of a criticism upon various mistaken or one-sided tendencies of thought—popular, and in the narrower sense of that term "scientific," thought—which arise from the neglect of the philosophical point of view.

Under the head of politics we have a defence, within its proper limits, together with a criticism of the democratic idea. "It is of the essence of humanism to think of man as a being with an end. This end, moreover, is not something external to his nature,

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but rather something which exists for himself, and which is realized, in the main, by the unfolding of his own being. It is the growing consciousness of this, more than everything else, that has made it impossible for men to recognize any purely external rule, and that has often given to the democratic ideal a force almost amounting to that of a religion. . . . Now it is hardly possible to look at human life in this way without claiming for every one who is human that he should have some effective share in the regulation of his own life; and in practice this almost inevitably means, among other things, that he should have some real voice in the government of his country. When, however, this point of view is adopted, it becomes at the same time clear that what is really essential is not that the voice of each should tell with equal weight, but rather that each should find his place as an organic member in the progressive life of humanity" (p. 98). As regards education, we find a vindication of the importance of "humanistic studies combined with a much-needed protest against the idea that mere linguistic instruction (be the tongues ancient or modern) is really humanistic at all. Under the head of religion the most striking of Professor Mackenzie's ideas is perhaps his contention that "anthropomorphism" in its strict and literal sense is not really an outcome of humanism in religion, but on the contrary is in the main a naturalistic tendency. The Jewish religion with its stern interdiction of visible representations of the Deity was far more truly humanistic than the religion of Hellas, whose humanly envisaged deities were at bottom personifications of natural forces. For a true humanism "we single out humanity from the rest of the universe, as containing within it the highest that we know; but in humanity also we have to make a similar selection of that which is worthy of our devotion. This inner core, the ultimate divine spark, would appear to be what we understand by the supreme good, or the moral ideal; and thus the religion of humanity would seem in the end to be identified with what has recently been set before us in a simpler and more definite way, as *Ethical Religion*" (p. 183). An elaborate criticism of this position would be out of place here; I will only remark that, while I am in full sympathy with the general spirit of Professor Mackenzie's "humanism," its application to religion would seem to me to result in a more distinctly "personal" theism than he seems disposed to recognize. In what sense can the universe be interpreted in the light of the human conception

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of "end," unless this end is present to a consciousness which works towards this end?

All that Professor Mackenzie has to say upon social problems seems to be very well worth saying and united to its original purpose. It is eminently calculated for instance to correct the naïve idea of the Spencerian, or the modern disciple of M. Durkheim, who thinks that all sociological problems can be solved by mere evolutionary studies of origins, or by the manipulation of statistics, without any preliminary thought as to the nature of the human mind, its ideals, its relation to the universe which it studies. But the lectures range over so large a variety of topics, and treat of each so briefly, that a detailed account and criticism of them would be difficult, even if there were much (from the present writer's point of view) which called for criticism. To readers of this JOURNAL the principal interest of the volume will be in the light which the two concluding chapters on "The Limitations of Humanism" and the "Implications of Humanism" throw upon the author's own philosophical position.

The general outcome of the first mentioned chapter has already been indicated. In the second we have first some remarks on the importance of the idea of causality, and the tendency of naturalistic views of the universe to resolve all distinctions into quantitative distinctions. The only point which seems to be questionable in Professor Mackenzie's treatment of the matter is a certain vagueness about the relation of "quality" to "goodness." It is undeniable that "the conception of preferability seems to involve difference of quality (p. 216)," but there is a tendency to speak as if differences of quality *necessarily* involved differences of value or "preferability:" yet surely we might recognize differences of color, and even a scale of colors from red to violet, without regarding red as preferable to violet or violet as preferable to red. I desiderate here a franker recognition of the doctrine so admirably insisted on by Mr. G. E. Moore, that "the good" is a distinct concept not resolvable into any other. Then there is a much-needed protest against that mechanical view of causality which is still dominant in Oxford:

"If, however, we recognize ends as determining factors in the real world, it is clear that we must, in some degree modify the ordinary conception of causation. . . . The fact is that the ordinary conception of causation has been completely subverted by the progress of the sciences; so that it is hardly necessary to attack

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it with philosophical criticism" (p. 220). This could not be better put; but alas, ancient prejudices die harder in Oxford! There at least, people will not see that the universe as a whole cannot be regarded as purposeful or as good, if the end at no point whatever influences the succession of events. Professor Mackenzie goes to the root of the matter in a pregnant note, wherein he remarks:

"It must surely appear, on reflection, to be a very curious prejudice which leads the ordinary consciousness to suppose that a thing is sufficiently explained if it can be shown to have been pushed, but not if it can only be shown to have been drawn. Yet, even in the physical world, the conception that has thrown most light on the general structure of the system in which we live is the conception of a force of attraction operating, if not at a distance, at any rate through a distance. . . . The Platonic view, which I am here seeking in a manner to revive, is to the effect that the attractiveness of the good may in the end be at least as satisfactory a principle of explanation as either physical attraction or transference of motion" (pp. 222-3).

My only difficulty is to see how Professor Mackenzie supposes this conception of the good to act. The only mode within our experience which can and does exercise causality is through a conscious will; yet elsewhere Professor Mackenzie repudiates the inference that all causality must be that of a will. Some day Professor Mackenzie will, I hope, develop the interesting hints which he has here given us into a complete metaphysic. I must not, however, pass over without notice the most novel of the suggestions which are outlined in this book. He has attempted, with all proper apologies for lack of space to develop it, a new solution of the time problem. "The simplest way, and I think a quite true way of putting it is to say that the order of time must be accepted as real, but that its transcience must be regarded as illusory. . . . We must, that is to say, think of reality as permanent, the past and the present portion existing quite as truly as the present. But this need not lead us to deny the reality of the time-order. The real universe may be a series of events, starting from a definite beginning and leading up to a definite end (or rather, perhaps forming a closed circle in which the end and the beginning are identical), even if we deny that the process disappears when the end is reached" (pp. 225-7). A note adds "the last number of the series can hardly be thought of as followed by nothing or by an empty time. It seems necessary,

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therefore, to think of it as being immediately followed by the first number; and we are thus led inevitably to the conception of revolving cycles."

But surely an event which is at once after and before the same event involves a contradiction. Or, if that end of the first series (and beginning of the second) is regarded as not really the same event as the beginning of the first series, but only a similar event, the old difficulty comes back again: an endless series of similar cycles of events is as great a difficulty as an endless series of totally dissimilar events. Professor Mackenzie, like other explainers of the time difficulty, has, I fear, simply cut the knot by transforming the time-series into some other kind of series. A series of events in which the future is looked upon as existing—now in the present—"quite as truly as the present" has nothing in common with time as we know it. Doubtless all ways of looking at time involve contradictions; but, where we have to admit contradictions, we are still confronted with a problem, not a solution. Doubtless there must be some way of resolving or "transcending" them; but that solution is not provided by just saying "Be ye transcended."

I may perhaps be allowed to add a line or two by way of reply to a criticism of Professor Mackenzie upon myself. "When Dr. Rashdall, for instance, affirms that 'a better universe is imaginable' one would like to know whether the better universe that he imagines includes those human excellences which are only known of through their development and exercise in relation to the difficulties, dangers, and imperfections of the world in which we are. If not, how can he be sure that the universe that he imagines is really a better one" (p. 236)? I answer that I know it by means of that moral consciousness which is the only source of knowledge about good and evil, better or worse, that I or anyone else can appeal to. Not all the "imperfections" of the world have any immediate relation to the human excellences, and my point may perhaps best be seen in reference to these. If before the evolution of man there had been as much pleasure as there was without any of the pain that actually occurred, I cannot help pronouncing that such a universe would have been a better universe than the universe we know. Professor Mackenzie will reply that it is impossible that there should have been the pleasure without the pain, and impossible that the human excellences should have come without the previous animal suffering. I have no

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doubt of it; but had it been possible, I cannot doubt that it would have been better without denying the validity of the moral, and of a great many other judgments that we actually make. I have not denied that the universe is the best of all possible universes: an imaginable universe is not necessarily a possible universe.

Professor Mackenzie has written a suggestive, stimulating, and thoroughly interesting book. He has given us emphatically a *multum in parvo;* the best compliment that one can pay to such a book is to say that it makes one look forward eagerly to a fuller development of its leading ideas, chiefly, that is, a development of the leading ideas contained in the concluding chapters, such as he promises us in the preface.

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DER INTELLEKTUALISMUS IN DER GRIECHISCHEN ETHIK. By Max Wundt. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1907. Pp. 103.

According to Dr. Wundt, intellectualism in Greek ethics occurs in three forms. The first of these he traces to the Homeric praises of the advantage of cool and clever reflection over passionate and headlong action; the second to the sacred knowledge of magic formulas by which the various mysteries professed to fortify the initiate against the perils and mischances which might beset him in the house of Hades; the third to the practical efficiency and skill in the management of circumstances which always formed so striking an aspect of Greek ideas of "virtue" (or excellence). "Homeric," "mystic," and "practical" intellectualism are first fused together in the Platonic system, and the complete intellectualism thus engendered continued (with varying degrees of emphasis) to dominate Greek ethics to the end, although the later Neoplatonists revert almost completely to the standpoint of primitive magic. All this is worked out in an interesting and suggestive way, though it is clear that Dr. Wundt has no great sympathy with the intellectualist treatment of ethics, and even ventures to call its inability to admit the reality of conscious ill-doing a "curious prejudice."

Nevertheless it may be doubted whether Dr. Wundt has not conceived intellectualism somewhat too broadly to bring out its

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characteristic flavor. The full oddity of Greek ethics resides not so much in the intellectualizing tendencies which he has analyzed out, but in the peculiar twist given to them when they are combined in the intellectualism of Plato, whose *rôle* is certainly not overstated. For it is a mistake to suppose that all intellectualizing must lead to intellectualism, or that every protest against intellectualism is a depreciation of the intellect. The real issue in the dispute between intellectualism and voluntarism is as to the nature of what is called the intellect. Now all ethical reflection is bound to intellectualize in some sense. It is by nature intellectual reflection on action. Ethics is not merely an idle spectator of the tangled knots our passions weave. However much our morality, *i. e.*, moral conduct, may depend on feeling, moral theory (*i. e.*, ethics) cannot be conceived as constituted, thereby. We must distinguish, therefore, between intellectualism and an appeal to intellection. In point of fact all the three tendencies stigmatized by Dr. Wundt extend far beyond the borders of Greek ethics. They are natural and world-wide in their occurrence and do not elsewhere lead to the Greek paradoxes. Hence is it instructive to inquire why in Greece extreme intellectualism is evolved.

It is pretty clear, in the first place, that the facts on which the Homeric praise of self-control is a reflection, are quite universal. It is everywhere obviously salutary to restrain impulses and to refrain from hasty action. Indeed this fact of experience is the chief reason why intellect has been developed at all; why "the reason" has to contend with and to overcome "the desires" in the successful types of man. It only means man's recognition of the fact that his superiority depends on the development of his intelligence and that *vis consili expers mole ruit sua.*

Similarly the "mystic" and "practical" intellectualisms are at bottom hardly more than recognitions of the vital value of religion and science. In all early religions the learning of magic formulas, by which man is wishful to believe that he can control the mysterious powers around him, plays a great part. But these formulas are in no wise the creations of pure reason. They are the offspring of man's wishes, and their intellectual pretensions soon vanish when we inquire how they were discovered, how they work, and how their grotesque and contradictory behests can be combined into a rational system of thought. When thus threatened with exposure, they invariably take refuge in mystery, and so

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betray the thinness of their rational texture. Mysticism claims often to be rational, and its attitude is often rationalistic; but though it may pretend to know, its "knowledge" will never stand rational testing.

"Practical" intellectualism, on the other hand, has nothing mysterious about it. In its origin it is essentially the moral homage very rightly paid to the skill of the expert who knows how to make, and so how to achieve.

Thus in none of these cases is "intellectualism" the real aim of an intellectualizing which is thoroughly natural, practical and pragmatic in its functioning. The caste-mark of Greek intellectualism on the other hand is not constituted by the discovery (made by all men to some extent) of these uses of the intellect, nor even by their combination in a single ethical system; it is to be found in the peculiar way in which the Greeks combined them, and arrived at an idolatry of *useless* intellect.

This achievement must in all probability be ascribed to Plato. For the purpose with which, and the sense in which, the Sophists advocated knowing were certainly practical; and the historic Socrates probably agreed with them in this respect. He did not, that is, inquire what virtue or excellence was, in order to rise to a contemplation of transcendent ideals. He merely wished to improve the regulation of human conduct. And his homely illustrations from the handicrafts were merely intended to suggest that morality was a science, in order that men might no longer make it a playground of arbitrary opinions. Unfortunately the analogy was soon pressed out of all rational shape, though not perhaps by Socrates himself. It was taken to mean that virtue was *in every way* analogous to science, and in fact nothing but science. Whence it followed inevitably that "incontinence" was unthinkable.

But even these excesses of logical analogy would hardly have sufficed to generate a full-blown intellectualism, if Plato had not intervened. The exigences of his polemics constrained him to identify ethical with epistemological "sensationalism," and to rescue (as he thought) knowledge from human corruptions by relegating it to an ideal world of unchanging "forms." He managed thereby to throw the centre of gravity of ethics over into a transcendent world of dehumanized abstractions, and to set them up as the true (but unattainable) objects of human reverence. Thus with one stroke he severed the connection between the

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sensible and the intelligible, between the intellect and its functioning, between the true and the practical, between "theoretic" and vital values, between the excellence of the good man and of the wise. Platonism is as important for the history of ethics as for that of logic.

Thus the Platonic synthesis was not merely a combining of pragmatic intellectualizings; it was the setting up of a highly original intellectualism which tried to soar far above all human interests, and yet at the same time to uplift man beyond himself into a superhuman sphere. As such it could not be a success. It was too untrue to life to last, too unkind to man to be accepted by men, too incoherent to be translated from the language of myth into that of science. But it is no derogation from Plato's genius to admit that he was bound to fail. The wonder is how nearly he succeeded, and how indelibly his thought has marked all thought that followed. He still dictates most of our moral and intellectual prejudices, and in Greek philosophy even the revolts against his influence were too half-hearted to succeed. Thus Aristotle no doubt perceived that the facts of life are constantly refuting Plato's identification of the sage with the saint, and exhibiting his impotence. But having detected the incongruity, he does not reject its premisses; he prefers instead to lapse into a dualism between theory and practice, and to maintain that nevertheless the sage is somehow a higher being than the merely good man.

The failure of mankind to emancipate itself from the false values to which Plato first gave currency, is hardly less striking. The discrepancy between the human and the ideal which Plato had vainly tried to overcome, and Aristotle had fixed with characteristic precision, evoked no doubt a practical reply in the shape of a widespread refusal to cultivate the philosophies which refused to concern themselves with the "good for man." When Platonic intellectualism had made it clear that its highest knowledge had no real reference to human uses, the inference was no doubt clearly drawn that, if so, it had no interest for man. But though the exaggerated claims of pure intellect were practically rebuked by the turning away of men from the philosophies which asserted them to other schemes of thought more indulgent to the needs of conduct, no theoretic refutation of Plato's assumptions was attempted. Perhaps the Stoics and Epicureans who gained great popularity by their interest in human ethics had already lost

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their theoretic interest too completely to attempt this; at any rate they did not contest the theoretic superiority of a highest life conceived according to the regulation pattern of Platonic intellectualism. Even the sceptics never dared to doubt that the discovery of intellectual contradictions in the working values of life amounted to a *destruction* of their value. Philosophers simply refused to recognize that human institutions often continue to work in spite of, or even by reason of, the fact that they are infected by what may (abstractly) be represented as self-contradiction. It is only quite recently that men have come to perceive that the fundamental assumptions of Platonic intellectualism are (1) that the source of values must be regarded as transcending human experience; and (2) that the way to secure such ideals is to put them out of relation to that experience. That both these assumptions are utterly false is what we are slowly coming to suspect.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

AN OUTLINE OF THE IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF EXPERIENCE. By J. B. Baillie, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. xx, 344.

Professor Baillie is already known to philosophical students as the author of a book on Hegel's Logic, from which it became at once apparent that he was a writer of genuine ability who had given a great deal of attention to the works of modern idealists, more particularly to those of Hegel. Some defects were also pretty readily discernible. The exposition was not always lucid; and it was somewhat doubtful whether the views put forward were always quite coherent. The book, however, sufficed to raise the hope in the minds of many readers that Mr. Baillie would before long produce other works of a similar character in which such defects would no longer be apparent. The book now before us to some extent realizes these hopes; but it is to be feared that to a large extent it will prove a disappointment. Like the previous book, it is in the main concerned with the exposition of the Hegelian point of view; and, like the previous book, it is characterized by a deeply sympathetic appreciation of that point of view, as well as by a competent knowledge of other philosophi-

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cal positions, and a considerable degree of critical acumen in dealing with them. But the plan of the work is rather too comprehensive to permit of the thorough treatment of any particular points; and one feels, in consequence, that there is a certain vagueness and inconclusiveness throughout. Fundamental difficulties seem often to be rather evaded than solved; and occasionally it is even doubtful whether the doctrines put forward can be regarded as forming a quite coherent whole. Notwithstanding these defects, however—some of which may lie rather in the reviewer than in the author—there can be no doubt that the work is an important contribution to philosophical literature.

The general lines upon which the work proceeds may be briefly indicated. It contains ten chapters, five of which contain the substance of the Shaw Lectures in the University of Edinburgh. The first is introductory; the second discusses Dualism; the third and fourth are concerned with the general nature of experience; the fifth is on sense-experience; the sixth is on "Understanding and the World of Noumena and Phenomena;" the seventh is on "self-conscious experience;" the eighth is on scientific experience; the ninth is on moral experience; and the tenth is on religious experience. The standpoint from which these subjects are dealt with is substantially that of Hegel; and indeed Mr. Baillie seems to have steeped himself so thoroughly in the Hegelian system that considerable parts of his book read rather like a translation from Hegel than like an independent treatise. He certainly adopts the Hegelian manner and phraseology to an extent that is unusual among British idealists; and the significance of the work would in many places be made much clearer if there were some more definite indication as to how much of it is to be regarded as Hegel's and how much as Mr. Baillie's. At the same time, it is evident that a good deal of attention has been given to more recent statements and criticisms of idealistic positions. In particular, Mr. Baillie seems to have been largely influenced by the works of the late Professor Adamson and the writings of some of the Pragmatists. Among the latter he refers more particularly to the logical work of Professor Dewey, who, if he is to be regarded as a Pragmatist, is surely a Pragmatist of a very different type from that represented by Messrs. James and Schiller, just as the late Professor Adamson represented a position very different from that of Messrs. Moore and Russell. On the whole, the chief significance of the work

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of Mr. Baillie seems to lie in the attempt to point out "a more excellent way" in idealistic thought than the somewhat half-hearted idealism of Lotze, Bradley, and even Bosanquet. This more excellent way is suggested by the criticisms of such writers as Adamson on the one hand and Dewey on the other, but consists substantially in a return to the more strictly Hegelian position. If something like this is Mr. Baillie's design, the present reviewer is certainly to a very large extent in sympathy with his aim. No writers, it seems to me, are better adapted than Adamson and Dewey to lead by their criticisms to a more adequate conception of what idealism really means; and I think the chief value of such a book as that of Mr. Baillie's is as an indication of the general results to which we might in this way be led. Any student of the critical writings of Adamson and Dewey, or again, of the criticisms of Kant and Lotze given by Caird and Henry Jones, might find it useful to turn to Mr. Baillie's book for a more positive and constructive statement. But it does not seem to me that the statements here given are sufficiently clear, coherent, and cogent to be of the highest value to such a student. The treatment is too dogmatic—occasionally one might almost say oracular—and the difficulties are not sufficiently brought forward and discussed.

It will be seen, from the acount given above, that only a comparatively small part of this book falls strictly within the province of a journal of ethics. The last two chapters are those that may be expected to have the most direct interest for our readers. Chapter IX is mainly concerned with the universality of the self as the basis of the social unity. On the more critical side, the inadequacy of the Kantian conception of the moral order is well brought out. But here, as throughout the book, one is conscious of a certain vagueness in the treatment. One wishes that the difficulties involved in the relationship between the individual and society, in the antithesis between moral order and moral progress, and the like, could have been more fully considered.

The concluding chapter is concerned with the various phases in the development of the religious consciousness, in which three main stages are recognized—"The Religion of Nature," "Religion of the Moral Order of Experience," and "Religion of the Spirit." Religion, Mr. Baillie maintains, "is more than morality, and goes *beyond* moral experience altogether." "In religious life," he

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further states, "spirit is not merely all reality, but *the point of view* of the absolute reality is deliberately and consciously *adopted* as an attitude of experience. In religion man places himself at the point of view of God's spirit, and looks, thinks, feels, and acts in the 'sight' or in the 'light' of it." "We must not," however, "suppose that in religion the finite mind suddenly *becomes* God. To be one with God consciously, to take up the position of absolute spirit, is possible without man being God. Man is the religious being, not God. In religion man merely takes up the attitude in which spirit, the supreme reality, is *for* itself: he is at the *point of view* of that spirit; that is all." "Strictly speaking," again, "so far from religion being purely anthropomorphic, it is the sphere where man is really deanthropomorphised. His peculiar characteristics as man are even eliminated altogether." "We must not suppose, further, that religion is one thing and the life of absolute spirit another. The life of absolute spirit appears *just in* religious consciousness. It shows itself to consciousness *quâ* spirit, because itself is spirit, and that is all reality. The consciousness of it is religion. The expression of its content is the active life of absolute spirit. These are merely two sides of the same process, the same phase of experience. Hence, on this view, religion does not so much create the idea of absolute spirit; rather absolute spirit creates the religious life. It appears to the conscious life of spirit."

I have given these passages in Mr. Baillie's own words, because I must confess that this part of his book is one of those that I find it most difficult to make coherent or intelligible. Sometimes I can hardly even follow the grammatical structure of the sentences. For instance, I cannot feel quite sure what is the antecedent of "it" in the last sentence that has been quoted. It seems to me, moreover, that the lack of clearness in expression, both here and in some other places, is not accidental, but is the counterpart of a want of clearness in the view that Mr. Baillie is seeking to set forth. He seems never to have thoroughly considered the question as to the relation between the finite and the infinite in human experience, or in other words, as to the sense in which man is God and the sense in which man is to be distinguished from God. And so far as I can judge, it is the lack of clearness on this point that is mainly responsible for the difficulties that are to be found throughout Mr. Baillie's work.

The closing sentences of the book are, however, even "darker"

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than those that I have just quoted. "It is by philosophy that all the processes of experience (religion among them) are constructed. The development of experience as a whole attains its end in the realization of that mode of experience (philosophy) by which all experience has been evolved. The culmination of an absolute idealism is the justification of the idealistic position itself, as the ultimate form of knowledge." This surely would "want a Delian diver."

My impression is, in general, that Mr. Baillie has here been making rather too ambitious an attempt. It is no doubt natural that any writer in whom the constructive impulse is strongly developed should wish to see how the results of philosophic thought look as a whole. But, having once done this, it is to be hoped that Mr. Baillie will now turn his attention to more special problems, and will attempt to develop them with greater clearness of exposition and with a more adequate sense of the difficulties that they involve.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE UNIVERSE. By John Denham Parsons, of the Society for Psychical Research. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906. Pp. 561.

Of this portly volume it seems desirable to give some idea in respect of scope and design, before saying anything as to execution. Forty-two chapters are comprised in its seven parts. These latter include treatment of such topics as definitions of soul, substance, life, future hope, relations of body and mind, the resurrection, reincarnation theories; present day facts as to the material universe; psychical research; and general conclusions as to man's place and pilgrimage. It will thus be seen that the work represents a large amount of varied reading, besides much thinking. Many good things are to be found in it, albeit it contains things that are odd and fantastic. The worst thing, perhaps, about the work is its style, which does the treatment grave injustice. Sentences interminable and involved, requiring, as often in German translations, to be split up into three, are of continual recurrence. But this drawback must not be allowed to detract from ap-

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preciation of many excellent features of the work, taken in whole.

In this JOURNAL, reference must be mainly to ethical aspects of the work. But it may first be allowed to remark the interesting character of many of the observations on a wide range of topics in philosophy and life. Take, for example the definition of genius (p. 380) as of two kinds; (1) that which is easily and early developed,"due to abnormal ease in setting up automatisms," and, as a rule, "of value to its possessor" only from social or financial "point of view," and (2) the kind "which is neither early nor easily developed, is not due to abnormality of any description, is always the result of continuous sanity of choice and persistent self-development, contributes largely to the progress of mankind, and is of value to its possessor and exhibitor as raising him or her to a higher intellectual level." Genius, too, he tells us (p. 379), is the result of the "subliminal consciousness"—a favorite theme of the author—being in the ascendant.

In the ethical sphere, the real significance of finite personality, of freewill, and of immortality are among the author's main insistences. He insists as to personality, that "personality is unity;" that, "from the point of view of conceivable progression," finite personality "is not so much finite as infinite" (p. 336); that personality is "an ideal" (p. 338), "a mental condition"—"a slowly evolved, intricate, historical, uncopyable, inalienable condition" (p. 336). With the author's aim to preserve the integrity of finite personality, in the real world of space and time, whether against pantheistic tendency in religion or absolutist tendency in philosophy, one cannot but sympathize, but it is quite impossible to admit that much has been made of the attributes or implications of ethical personality in this work.

As to freewill, the author says (p. 111), "how morality can exist if freedom of will do not exist, it is particularly difficult to see;" "wherever mental personality exists, there, also is to be found moral responsibility" (p. 427); "though freewill is indubitably ours, to be 'master of our fate' and 'captain of our soul' something more is needed than the determination to strike a heroic attitude on the bridge when the ship seems in danger;" "we must 'live the life;'" "only what we persistently will, day by day and year by year, really determines our action under any given circumstances." These insistences may serve to show in what sense the author claims to hold freewill, which, to be of

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any worth, must doubtless be no abstract possibility, but an achieved freedom, as he insists. But, again, it cannot be pretended that he has done much towards a philosophical presentation of the ethics of freedom. It will readily be understood how, in the matter of responsibility, our author holds man responsible "for his action and inaction as regards inherited tendencies, as also for the tendencies created in himself as a cumulative result of the continual exercise of his power of choice" in respect of suggestions (p. 422).

In matters of ethical teleology, Mr. Parsons gives "the purpose of the totality of things"—"the eternal purpose underlying creation" (p. 512)—a refreshingly bracing turn, in respect of the phenomena of pain, when, in marked contrast to much modern whimpering and sentimental writing, he says:—"It (pain) is the best gift of the infinite to the finite. It is the normal guardian of the finite from the abnormal, an essential instructor of the mind, the often needed inducement to make fuller use of life, the evolver of reason, the architect of character, the foundation of all sympathy worthy of the name, and the one and only basis upon which nobility of soul can be built" (p. 513). This seems a fairly good list of merits, albeit a little hard to subscribe to in our most painful hours and pessimistic moods.

In a work of this kind, it has seemed more desirable to give some insight into the real scope and design of the work, rather than deal mainly with matters of criticism. But its manifold points of learning and interest can scarcely be set forth in a review.

JAMES LINDSAY.

KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND.

A DIRECTORY OF THE CHARITABLE AND BENEFICENT ORGANIZATIONS OF BOSTON, together with legal suggestions, laws applying to dwellings, etc., compiled by the Associated Charities of Boston. Fifth edition. Published by the Old Corner Bookstore, Boston, 1907. Pp. 504.

Dr. Emil Muensterberg, the president of the Department of Public Charities of Berlin, has been giving us his impressions of American charity. "The involuntary feeling came over me," he

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says, "that this filth, this misery, and this degradation were altogether beyond redemption. And when I heard patriotic Americans lamenting the sway which politics hold over government and legislation, when I came over and over again upon testimony to this sway . . . then it almost seemed to me as though all the good and unselfish instincts of society were being irretrievably crushed beneath the lust of money and of power. The radiance that emanates from all that is being done by those enthusiastic philanthropists seemed to me but as the feeble torch with which a naturalist enters a newly discovered cave; its dim light can do very little to disperse the gloom."

A volume like that before us is in a sense a review of the forces, paid and volunteer, enlisted in the struggle against the misery and degradation which seem so overwhelming to our German visitor. Twenty years ago the same society issued its first directory, a little book of 182 pages, or of something over one third of the size of the issue of 1907. This present edition lists 1,424 agencies, including 147 mutual benefit societies, 322 trade unions, and 15 savings banks. Fifteen years ago the list included 820 agencies. This enlargement may be partly a mere matter of greater inclusiveness in the plan of the directory, but it undoubtedly represents also a very considerable increase in the number of persons, the amount of money, and especially in the variety of methods employed in this modern crusade.

The mere growth of the population might be expected to be accompanied by some increase in the bulk of charitable endeavors. Our unprecedented immigration, with all the special claims that it implies, and above all, the ever greater congestion in cities and industrial centers, make it sometimes seem as though, like Alice through the looking glass, we had to run as hard as we could in order to stay in the same place.

Is this increase of philanthropic effort, then, merely a symptom of increasing need, or does it represent an advantage won? Is the struggle so far a defeat—or at best a drawn battle—or can we note gains?

We have no statistical measures for the things that we most want to know, but it is reassuring so far as it goes to find that in Massachusetts, the state, city and town poor, other than the insane, were in 1905, 107 in 10,000, whereas in 1885 they were 129 in 10,000. So, too, the average number of families dealt with by the Associated Charities of Boston for the five-year period ending

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with 1890 was one family to about 111 persons living in Boston in that year. The corresponding figures for the five years ending with 1905 were one family to about 130 persons.

To get at the significance of such figures our situation must be taken into account. What should we think of a primary school teacher who should lament: "See how little the illiteracy of the town decreases despite all my efforts. Twenty years ago I had a class of thirty children who could neither read nor write. To-day, after all these years of teaching, here are still thirty absolutely ignorant little pupils." To a considerable degree, social workers, of our ports of entry cities especially, are like the teachers—they are helping successive relays of newcomers on to their feet in the strange land to which they have come, and are graduating them into a higher standard of living.

More important than facts as to the numbers of persons needing help is any indication of the plane on which the life of the community goes on. The best available measure of degrees of filth and degradation is the death rate. What does this show? In the period 1885-1905 this fell in Massachusetts from 19.61 per mille to 16.8, and in Boston from 24.6 to 18.5.

Granting that figures are at best but a meager indication of the facts, what is the report of the workers themselves? Professor Muensterberg, in spite of his dismay at our situation, himself says: "No one who has seen and conversed with those who are at the head of the charity organization societies and the settlements, or who has been present at their meetings and assemblies, can fail to be aware that the prevalent spirit is one of youthful enthusiasm and unwonted idealism. They combine a just insight into the realities of life with a hopeful and indomitable conviction that things can and are bound to improve, and that the lines along which their nation is developing tend upwards."

A part, though only a part, of this optimism may be due to the more or less conscious closing of the eyes to the gravity of the situation in the interest of cheer and courage in work, and to the fact that the American public requires to be fed on encouraging reports, and that a confessed doubt might entail lessened supplies of money and helpers.

On the other hand, genuine courage and hopefulness are maintained in the face of a self-imposed task of incomparably greater difficulty than the one originally undertaken. At first the charitable said: "Let us relieve the suffering as far as we can." Then

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their aim grew to be to "help people in such a way that they may learn to help themselves, and along with self-respect develop their powers of self-support."

But neither of these purposes represents the attitude of the leaders of to-day. Already in 1890, Professor Marshall was writing, in his sober "Principles of Economics," of the "hope that poverty and ignorance may gradually be extinguished," of the "question whether it is really impossible that all should start in the world with a fair chance of leading a cultured life free from the pains of poverty and the stagnating influences of a life of excessive mechanical toil."

With these words of the greatest living English economist, consider the utterance of Dr. Devine, of New York and San Francisco, probably the most famous representative of charity organization. In his noble address as president of the Thirty-third National Conference of Charities, he said: The method of modern philanthropy "is radical, to strike hard with every weapon which is at hand against the organized forces of injustice, corruption and predatory greed. . . . Other tasks for other ages. This be the glory of ours, that the social causes of dependence shall be destroyed."

This new conception of the object to be aimed at is bringing together in fruitful coöperation, not only the so-called social workers, but political reformers, journalists, educators, doctors, lawyers, ministers, and ethical leaders, labor men, writers, and dreamers, and, indeed, the intelligent, public spirited, and humane in all ranks. The trade union attacks one side of the work, the socialist another, the directors of the Sage Fund another, the settlement another, the charity organization society another still, yet all are fellow workers.

It is characteristic that in the volume before us the growth is in the constructive and reform enterprises rather than in the relief agencies. In the edition of 1891 one settlement is announced—not under that name—as about to be opened in Boston. Sixteen years later there are sixteen, one for each year! Societies like Mr. Lee's Massachusetts Civic League, or the Consumer's League, movements like those against tuberculosis and child labor, have all grown up during the period, and this is typical.

This ought ye to have done, and not to have left the other undone. The care and intelligence with which this directory has been prepared, making it a most useful book of reference, even to

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persons outside the charitable field, is one proof of many that, in the large ambitions of social reformers, the necessary and unexciting work of attending thoroughly to details is not being overlooked.

EMILY GREENE BALCH.

Wellesley College.

SWEATED INDUSTRY AND THE MINIMUM WAGE. By Clementina Black, with an introduction by A. G. Gardiner (chairman of the executive committee of the National Anti-sweating League, 1907). London: Duckworth & Co. Pp. xxiv, 281.

That the conditions which we associate with the term "sweating" constitute a gigantic evil none could deny, but persons will be found who have the hardihood to dispute whether the lines of analysis made popular by Kingsley quite exhaust the explanations which might be offered. Generally diagnosis and prescription are so closely associated that it will not be irrelevant to dwell somewhat upon the former. Is it plausible that the sole or chief cause is a steady pressure exerted upon weak labor whereby in the first place its earnings are pressed beneath its marginal worth and in the second place its marginal worth is reduced by lack of nourishment to the level of its earnings? If so a State-imposed minimum wage might cure sweating. But if not the observance of such a rate would mean the dismissal of all who were not worth it. It is true that some of these would see that they were worth it, and that a larger proportion of the next generation might be made worth it, but for the present the reaction upon the minimum wage, if it were made moderately high, would be exceedingly serious. The real truth is that the bulk of these sweated people are not worth more to employers, or appreciably more, than they get. They compete with machinery, they are untrained, they are in part mentally or physically defective, they are immobile. They are here now and the choice is between their earning pittances or nothing. Why decree that they shall earn nothing? If it is plain that the real cure as regards the next generation is to prevent persons from being such in themselves or in such positions that they have only this low value, why try to effect it by the indirect and uncertain method of the national minimum wage?

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The problem is more complex than many who advocate this method suppose, but it is not insoluble. Miss Clementina Black has not solved it. She seems to me to believe too firmly in the 'unlimited competition' argument and to trust too much to methods of levering up wages directly. But if Miss Black is mistaken in her drift, she is not a blind advocate. She is alive to the difficulties which have been experienced in the Australian colonies, though she writes "Happily there are signs (in the United Kingdom) . . . of a growing inclination to seek the remedy along the lines of endeavor marked out by our colonial brethren." And her survey of existing facts is excellent—though I must disagree as to the adequacy of her analysis—and evidently written with unusually detailed knowledge.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

UNIVERSITY, MANCHESTER.

COLLECTIVISM AND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. By Emile Vandervelde: Labor Independent Party, London, 1907.

"We shall soon be no longer able to eat, or drink, or dress ourselves, or consume anything whatever without paying tribute to some trust." M. Vandervelde sees in this growing tendency towards concentration and socialization a gradual eviction of personal and isolated property. Recognizing, however, that under an absolute monarchy or a controlling oligarchy, the exploitation of the public services may run directly counter to the interest of the greater number, he contends that socialism is the only hope of collectivism, and must come.

The work is ably written, and is more moderate in tone than those of any other socialist leader of the same standing. In common with his party M. Vandervelde depreciates and totally misinterprets the individualist claim to the "wages of abstinence" and the "wages of the superintendence," although socialist leaders are themselves taking these wages from their followers, and, therefore, from their point of view exploiting them; but he recognizes that "a new social organization founded on justice must be accomplished without a single injustice." He would begin by exacting that "all collateral inheritance should be annulled, every inheritance without direct heir to become the property of the com-

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munity," and by "limitation of direct inheritance by testament." One serious misprint should be corrected in the next edition. On page 182, the subsection should read, Expropriation *without* Indemnity, not *with* indemnity.

H. OSMAN NEWLAND.

LONDON.

LABOR AND CAPITAL: A letter to a labor friend. By Goldwin Smith, D. C. L. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907. Pp. 38.

Professor Goldwin Smith's little essay is sensible and stirring, and though the analysis exhibited is seldom profound, the right suggestive note is frequently struck as if by intuition. That we suffer from the operative's lack of control over conditions is admitted and the value of standing trade conferences is hinted at. The parts dealing with profits will hardly prove satisfactory to working-class readers. The question is not whether the employer ought to be paid at all, but whether he ought to get so much. On page 24 Professor Goldwin Smith seems to confess that in this matter something is amiss, but he fails to hit on the solution of opportunities to rise, educational and otherwise, being more evenly spread. The cure is the emergence of more capacity in the higher walks of life, which would increase the sum total of wealth and at the same time raise the ratio of wages to earnings of management. In the criticism of socialism there is nothing new, but the most telling points are made—"Without freedom and personal choice of callings, how could there be progress? . . . Can the government pick out inventors, scientific discoverers, etc.? By what standard will it measure remuneration?" And attention is with equal insight directed to the fundamental defect of settling all wages by arbitration or wages boards.

In general the writer's attitude is sympathetic to the wage-earning classes, and rebuke and plain speaking can easily be borne from one who stood by the trade unions after the Sheffield atrocities and supported Joseph Arch. The style, needless to say, is direct and picturesque.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

UNIVERSITY, MANCHESTER, ENGLAND.

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SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS, VOL. III. Published for the Sociological Society by Macmillan & Co., London, 1907.

The mere enumeration of the contents of and contributors to this volume is sufficient to indicate the wide scope and high quality of the work which the Sociological Society is undertaking. "The Biological Foundations of Sociology," by Dr. Archdall Reid; "The Sociological Appeal to Biology," by Professor J. Arthur Thomson; "Sociology as an Academic Subject," by Professor Wenley; "The Russian Revolution," by M. G. DeWesselitsky; "A Civic Museum," by Prof. Patrick Geddes; "The So-called Science of Sociology," by H. G. Wells; "Methods of Investigation," by Mrs. Sidney Webb; "The Study of Individuology," by Dr. J. Lionel Taylor; "The Origon and Function of Religion," by A. L. Crawley; "The Problem of the Unemployed," by W. H. Beveridge; and "A Eugenic Suggestion," by W. McDougall.

Many of the papers are of a searching nature; some are merely suggestive, but, in most cases, that which the writer's thesis lacks is supplied by the discussion which follows. This, indeed, is one of the most interesting features of the volume—the reproduction of the discussion and of written communications upon each subject, enabling foreign sociologists like Comte Goblet D'Alviella, Professors Steinmetz, Tonnies, Leuba, and Sergi, to contribute, and supplementing the views of the actual essayists by the personal criticisms of distinguished sociologists like Mr. J. A. Hobson, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, Mr. Rider Haggard, Dr. A. C. Haddon, Sir John Cockburn, Dr. Saleeby, Mr. Francis Galton, and Mr. Edward Clodd.

There is a tendency perhaps in this as in previous volumes of the Sociological Society to give particular prominence to biological methods, and to exaggerate the importance of the biological factor in sociology, but Professor Thomson's paper on the sociological appeal to biology is a healthy and vigorous corrective in this respect, while Messrs. Crawley, Wesselitsky, and Beveridge emphasize in their contributions the psychological, the practical, and the historical factors. The volume before us is certainly the best which has been published by this society and its appearance marks the steady progress, high purpose, and future possibilities of social science in England.

LONDON. H. OSMAN NEWLAND.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

LAY SERMONS AND ADDRESSES, delivered in the Hall of Balliol College, Oxford. By Dr. Edward Caird, late Master. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons. [Subjects:—Freedom and Truth, The Nation as an Ethical Ideal, Spiritual Development, True Purity, Courage, Immortality, The Faith of Job, etc.]

NATIONAL IDEALISM AND A STATE CHURCH: A Constructive Essay in Religion. By Stanton Coit, Ph. D. London: Williams & Norgate. [An important work bearing upon the humanistic conception of religion.]

THE TODAS: A Study in Social Anthropology. By Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

THE NEW ETHICS. By J. Howard Moore. London: Ernest Bell.

BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Authorized translation by Helen Zimmern. Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis.

THE DUTIES OF MAN, and other Essays. By Joseph Mazzini. With an Introduction by Thomas Jones, M. A. (Everyman's Library, edited by Ernest Rhys.) London: J. M. Dent & Co. [The introduction includes two interesting letters from Mazzini to Mrs. Carlyle.]

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS. By Edward Westermarck, Ph. D. Second Volume. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF RELIGION. By Professor John Watson, LL. D. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. By Frederic Harrison. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co.

THE LIBERAL STATE: a Speculation. By Thomas Whittaker. London: Watts & Co.

THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By the late Lord Acton. Edited, with an Introduction, by J. N. Figgis, M. A., and R. V. Lawrence, M. A. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co.

GEORGE MEREDITH: NOVELIST, POET, REFORMER. By Mrs. Sturge Henderson. London: Methuen & Co. [A book containing an admirable union of literary criticism and philosophical interpretation.]

THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM. With an Introduction by Anagarika H. Dharmapala. By P. Lakshmi Narasu. Madras: Srinivase Varadachari & Co. [A clear and interesting account of the leading ideas of Buddhism in relation to modern philosophy.]

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DIE RELIGION BABYLONIENS UND ASSYRIENS. Von Morris Jastrow, Jr., Dr. Phil. (Leipzig), Professor d. semit. Sprachen a. d. Universität von Pennsylvanien. II Lieferung. Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann; London: Williams & Norgate, 1907. Pp. 225-304.

RELIGION AND HISTORIC FAITHS. By Otto Pfleiderer, D. D., Professor in the University of Berlin. Translated from the German by Daniel A. Huebsch, Ph. D. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1907. Pp. 291.

LA FILOSOFIA DELL'AZIONE. Di Giovanni Cesca. N. 38 Biblioteca "Sandron" di Scienze e Lettere. Milano, Palermo, Napoli: Remo Sandron. Pp. 330.

OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By Wilhelm Wundt. Translated with the co-operation of the author by Charles Hubbard Judd, Ph. D., etc. Third revised English edition from the seventh revised German edition. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann; London: Williams & Norgate; New York: G. E. Stechert & Co., 1907. Pp. viii, 392.

SOURCE BOOK IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. By Charles M. Bakewell, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. Pp. xii, 393.

THE SEXUAL INSTINCT: Its Uses and Dangers as Affecting Heredity and Morals. By James Foster Scott, B. A., M. D., C. M. Second edition, revised and enlarged. New York: E. B. Treat & Co., 243 W. 23d St., 1908. Pp. 473.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1908.

THE PROBLEM OF MORAL INSTRUCTION.*

The work of the Moral Instruction League, with which I am glad to be, in however humble a way, associated, has already been of such a kind as to render any statements of an explanatory or apologetic nature entirely out of place. One who advocates its claim is no longer like a voice crying in the wilderness. It has behind it a really magnificent record of strenuous labor and solid achievement; and we may, I think, without any presumption adopt a tone of confidence, and even of triumph, with regard to it. Everywhere we find it recognized (largely, no doubt, through the influence of the Herbartian conception of education) that the formation of character is one of the chief, indeed the chief and highest, of all the aims of education; and in very many places the schemes drawn up by the Moral Instruction League have been in substance adopted, and are being more or less successfully applied. I do not feel, therefore, that it is my business here to play the part of prophet—a *rôle* for which I am not, in any case, adapted—but rather to attempt to deal with certain doubts and difficulties that still seem to suggest themselves to many minds with regard to the work which the League has so ably undertaken.

There are, of course, many doubts and difficulties in connection with this subject, as there are in connection with all important educational questions; and with many of them it

* Presidential address to the Moral Instruction League in London.

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is not in my province, even if it were in my power, to deal. Many of them are concerned with the details of methods of instruction—how far, for instance, the teaching of morals should be direct and systematic, how far it should be indirect and incidental; how far it should be dogmatic and constructive, how far tentative and heuristic; how far it should be abstract and preceptive, how far concrete and illustrative; what time it should occupy in the curriculum of the various schools, and what other subjects, if any, it should displace. Such problems must, I suppose, be decided in the main by the results of experience; at any rate, they must be dealt with by those whose special business it is to discuss the organization of studies; and I should suppose that the solution of them would necessarily vary in different times and places, in different types of school, and at different ages of the pupils. On questions such as these we may expect a great deal of useful light from the elaborate inquiries that have recently been made in many countries; and we may certainly congratulate ourselves that the preliminary task of arranging these inquiries and bringing out their results has been intrusted to such competent hands as those of Professor Sadler. It is not my object to anticipate these results—it would be presumptuous to attempt it; nor do I intend to touch, except in a very incidental way, upon any of the points to which I have now referred.

The doubts and difficulties that I have in my mind are of a more fundamental character, and may be summed up in two broad and simple questions—simple, I mean, to ask; not, perhaps, very simple to answer: (1) Are the principles of morality sufficiently definite to admit of being taught to all children in a generally acceptable form? (2) Admitting that they can be so taught, can a sufficient number of suitable teachers be provided? These are very far-reaching doubts; they are, I believe, genuinely felt by a good many people not unfavorable to the general idea of moral instruction, and I think it is important that we should make some effort to meet them. The former of the two is, however, the only one to which I can give much attention in this address.

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The first doubt that I have mentioned has reference to the uncertainty of moral principles. I do not, of course, mean that those who feel this doubt are sceptical as to the existence of moral principles at all. If there are any who entertain that kind of doubt, we must wait, I fancy, till their doubt is removed before we can expect any help or sympathy from them. I certainly cannot undertake, in such an address as this, to do anything toward the clearing away of such a doubt as that. But, granting that there are genuine principles of morality, there are some who would urge that these principles are too subtle and recondite to be made accessible to the minds of young children. Did not even Plato, it may be asked, acknowledge that what we can hope to instil into the minds of the young is, at the most, good habits, good practical dispositions, fostered in an unreflective way by music and gymnastic, and only to be understood by reflection at a very much later period of life? Must we not content ourselves with the initiation of our children into what has been called the "ethos of their people," the general body of law and custom which has come to be recognized as good in our particular time and country? And, if we admit this, it may be urged further that, in a complex civilization such as ours, there are many divergent types even within this "ethos"; so that it must in the end be left to different classes of the community, or even to different individual parents, to select the special kind of moral "atmosphere" within which they wish their children to be reared. From this point of view, it seems hopeless to many, or at least to a considerable number of thoughtful people, to attempt anything of the nature of general public instruction in the principles of morals—at any rate, in a direct and systematic form. They look rather to indirect influence than to explicit instruction.

How are these difficulties to be met? Well, I think it is best to meet them, first of all, by admitting that they are difficulties. We shall gain nothing, in the long run, by minimizing the difficulties with which we have to contend. There *are* differences in men's moral ideals. Some, for example, like Tolstoi, regard war in all its forms with absolute

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horror; others think that in many circumstances it is pardonable, in a few admirable; others, with Heraclitus among the ancients, or with Nietzsche among the moderns, might go even further in its defense. Some repudiate vivisection or the use of animal food or alcoholic drink under any circumstances whatever; others, with varying degrees of emphasis, are prepared to allow them. Some think that we should on all occasions speak the truth "in the scorn of consequence," and do what seems just, "though the skies should fall"; others would be prepared to set aside the absolute claims of truth and justice for the sake of mercy, happiness, or peace. Some have before their minds the ideal of the Christian saint, some of the cultivated "gentleman," some of the citizen-soldier, some of the self-centered strength and freedom of Nietzsche's "Superman." And these differences are not merely to be found in different ages and nations, but in the same time and country, sometimes in the same street, perhaps even within the same household. How is the moral instructor, who has no claim to any private revelation, to deal with such divergences as these? And yet, if he does not deal with them, how, it may be asked, is he to make his teaching concrete? How is he to get beyond the mere commonplaces of the moral life, such as are summed up, let us say, in the famous couplet:—

> "Die Tugend ist das höchste Gut,
> Das Laster Weh dem Menschen thut."

Perhaps I might give a little more point and definiteness to the difficulties to which I am here alluding by referring to two divergent types of moral ideal that have been brought prominently before us in recent times. One is what we may call the civic ideal, the ideal of social service, of self-sacrificing devotion to the welfare of the community in which we live. This is the ideal that has inspired the Christian socialists, the founders of our Settlements, the Salvation Army; and, in a different form, it is that which has prompted the heroic efforts of the Japanese and of other citizen-soldiers in the defence of their country. To give up one's life for the

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sake of the life of a larger whole—the neighborhood, the nation, or the general life of mankind—is the central idea of this view of the highest good. *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.* It is the ideal of self-sacrifice.[1] Against this, however, we have the ideal of which in recent times Nietzsche is the most eloquent apostle—the ideal of the "Superman," the realization of a strong individuality, the ideal that urges one by all means to love his neighbor as himself, but first to make sure that he does really love himself. It bids us, in effect, strive to make individual giants rather than gradually to "elevate the race." The establishment of such an ideal would, as Nietzsche puts it, involve a "transvaluation of all values," a reconsideration of what is really to be admired and praised in human life. Instead of the "morality of slaves"—the morality of those who think of themselves as "food for powder," whose highest glory is to be used up for the sake of others—we should have to substitute the morality of lords or freemen, who aim at the complete development of their own individuality. Now I do not personally believe that there is any ultimate opposition between these two ideals; and on other occasions I have sought to urge that there is none.[2] I do not believe that we can make giants without elevating the race as a whole, or that we can really devote ourselves to the good of mankind without seeking to develop strong individualities in ourselves and others. But for our present purpose it must be allowed that the apparent opposition between these ideals puts a certain difficulty in the way of any general system of moral education. And these are

[1] As a striking illustration of the force of this in modern times, Lafcadio Hearn mentions that he once gave seventy-two boys in Japan, as a subject for composition, the question, "What would you most like in this world?" "Nine of the compositions contained in substance this answer: 'To die for our Sacred Emperor.'" Bisland's "Life and Letters of Lafcadio Hearn," Vol. II, p. 30. There is, of course, another form of the ideal of self-sacrifice, *viz.*, that of the pure ascetic; but this does not appear to have much hold in the Western world, and I have not thought it necessary to take account of it here.

[2] I may refer, for instance, to the paper on "Self-Assertion and Self-Denial" in a previous number of this JOURNAL.

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only two extreme types; there are many other ways in which moral ideals may be more or less opposed.

Now I think there are at least five different ways in which difficulties of this kind may be met; and I believe it will be worth while to give a little attention to them all. One way is to distinguish between the good man and the good citizen, and to say that moral instruction should be directed mainly, if not exclusively, to the production of the latter. A second way is to urge that there is an overlapping margin in all the divergent moral ideals, and that we should direct our attention mainly to that. A third is to maintain that there is not merely an overlapping margin, but an underlying unity, and that it should be one of our chief objects to bring this out. A fourth is to acknowledge that the difficulties remain, but to plead that they are not intrinsically different from those that have to be encountered in many other educational subjects, and to suggest that they may be dealt with by methods similar to those that are already adopted in these. The fifth way is to hail the difficulties with delight, and to urge that it is just these difficulties that give the subject its highest educational value. I believe that all these lines of defense are to a certain extent sound, and I would ask you to consider them in order.

I think it is true then, in the first place, that we can draw a certain distinction between the qualities of the good man and the good citizen; and that it might be well for the moral educator to devote his attention mainly to the latter. The distinction cannot, I believe, be sharply drawn; but it is easy to see that there is a sense in which it has a relative validity. The "good Rousseau," whose heart was all aflame with some of the noblest conceptions of life, seemed to many but an indifferent neighbor and citizen;[3] and, on the other hand, most people could probably think of many energetic and valuable citizens whom they would yet hesitate to describe, in any emphatic sense, as good men. If we understand by

[3] Recent discoveries have thrown some doubt upon this judgment; but the illustration may still serve its present purpose.

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a good man a saint, a hero, a superman, a Stoic sage, or one who realizes some other conception of the most perfect type of human excellence, we may fairly hold that a man who is not to be so described may yet be an admirable neighbor and a most useful citizen. And perhaps we may add that, while the various types of good man might be apt to regard one another with a certain degree of suspicion and possibly even repugnance, they would all have a certain esteem for the man who is simply a good citizen, and would not differ very widely in their estimate of the chief qualities that go to make him. Hence I believe the Moral Instruction League has been wise in adding the word "citizenship" to "moral instruction" in its syllabuses, and in giving considerable prominence to the ordinary duties of the citizen in the schemes that it has drawn up. To say this is not, I think, necessarily to commit ourselves to what I have called the civic ideal, as against any more individualistic conception of the moral good. I think it is true, in the end, that that civic ideal contains a larger element of value than the more self-assertive one. But, at any rate, from the very nature of the case, the more individual side must be cultivated in a more individual way; and there remains the more social side, to which our schools may devote their attention. There are few individualists so extreme as not to recognize that it is desirable to have good neighbors and citizens, though they may think it still more important that we should have saints or supermen. The churches may teach us to be saints; the newer prophets may teach us to be supermen; the schools can, at any rate, do something to help us to be citizens. This contention seems to me to be sound so far as it goes, and I call it my first line of defense. It is not entirely convincing, because you cannot make a thoroughly good citizen without making him, in some degree, a good man. If his aims and motives are not of the highest kind, the defect is sure to show itself even in his simplest actions;[4] just as, on the other hand, the "good-

[4] It is hardly necessary to remind readers of this JOURNAL of the striking way in which this point is emphasized in Green's "Prolegomena."

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ness" of the saint or hero must be considerably qualified if he is deficient in the more commonplace virtues—if he lacks, for instance, those refinements of feeling and action which we express by the word "gentleman." [5] Still, in spite of these qualifications, we may give our main attention to the duties of the citizen, and in that way evade some of the difficulties—though by no means all the difficulties—created by the conflict of ideals.

Again, I think it is true, in the second place, that, apart from any such distinction between the good man and the good citizen, even the most divergent moral ideals would be found to contain certain elements in common; and I believe it is true that the moral educator of the young should give the largest share of his attention to this common ground. There is a great difference between the Utilitarian and the Intuitionist, between Nietzsche and Tolstoi, between the Christian saint and the citizen-soldier; but I think you would find that they all attach value, though in somewhat varying degrees, to such qualities as courage (even Tolstoi does not underrate courage), self-denial (even Nietzsche inculcates a certain form of self-denial), regard for others (even the soldier does not despise this), kindness to animals, honesty, fairness of mind, self-control, perseverance, thoughtfulness, interest in human progress. Even if we confined ourselves quite strictly to what they all recognize as good, we should be laying no inconsiderable foundation for the character of our future citizens. And it is, in fact, these general and common elements, which may very easily be made the basis for more special developments in different directions, that constitute the larger part of the syllabuses that have been drawn up by the League. It is in this way preparing the soil for almost any kind of flower or tree. This is the second line of defense. It is again not entirely satisfactory, because it would be difficult for the teacher to confine himself exclusively to those points that are held in common, and a too rigorous attempt

[5] See Bosanquet's paper on "Ladies and Gentlemen" in a previous number of this JOURNAL.

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to do so might take a great deal of the life and spirit out of his teaching. Hence I am led to pass on to the third line of defense.

This third way is a good deal harder than the others. It consists in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting ideals of the moral life. I have already stated that I believe that this can be satisfactorily done; but to do it satisfactorily would involve the working out of a complete system of ethics. The complete moral ideal seems, in the end, to be best summarized by some such phrase as "self-realization through self-sacrifice" (Goethe's "Stirb und werde"); but the full significance of this can only be brought out by a thorough analysis[6] of the different meanings of "self." It might appear, therefore, that this method can have very little value for the practical moral educator, who cannot wait for the reconciliation of these apparent contradictions. To a certain extent I admit this. All that I would urge is that the practical educator should not too readily assume that these divergent ideals are irreconcilable, and that he is bound to commit himself to one as against all the others. The attitude of Aristotle may be commended to the practical moral instructor—the attitude, I mean, of one who believes that every moral ideal that has ever commended itself to any considerable body of thoughtful men, must have some essential truth at its foundation, and must be worth trying to understand and appreciate. And, in particular, those who are engaged in organizing schemes of study and preparing text-books for the use of teachers, ought, I think, to try, as far as they can, to keep before their minds the conception of a comprehensive ideal in which these apparent contradictions could be transcended. They would be well advised, I think, to select their types of excellence and their maxims of duty from many different ages and peoples and from writers of widely divergent views; so that, in Emerson's fine phrase, they may not miss any genuine "accent of the Holy Ghost." Thus, by degrees, a truly com-

[6] Such as is to be found, for instance, in Bosanquet's "Psychology of the Moral Self."

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prehensive ideal of life may be framed. This is, I believe, the best way, in the end, of meeting the difficulties to which I have referred, but, like most things that are best, it is not easy; it may even seem at first to be only another difficulty to add to the others. Hence I do not now dwell upon it further, but pass on to my fourth line of defense.

What is to be urged, in the fourth place, is that the difficulties in the way of moral instruction are similar in kind to those that are found in other subjects, and may be met by similar methods. Many of the subjects that are taught in schools are concerned with matters of opinion, on which divergent views may be entertained. I suppose the mathematical sciences are those that are freest from this defect, but even they are not entirely free from it. Some of the natural sciences would probably come next to them, if the more speculative parts of them are omitted, and next to these, perhaps, grammatical and philological studies, and the mere dry bones of history. But whenever we touch on the larger interests of human life, political and ecclesiastical history, the aims and characters of great men, works of genius in art and literature, as well as the central problems of morality and religion, we are at once plunged into the currents of passion and strife. Are we, then, in matters of education, to invert the good old saying, "I count nothing human as foreign," and to declare instead that all human interests are to be rigidly banished? Few, I fancy, would be prepared for so heroic a remedy. The skillful teacher meets the difficulty, I imagine, by a certain toleration, a certain balance of judgment, a certain acknowledgment of the limitations of human knowledge. He does not expect all his pupils to take the same view of Oliver Cromwell or the French Revolution, or to admire in equal degrees the poetry of Shelley, Chaucer, and Browning. What he desires, if he is wise, is that they should have some intelligent conception of the facts of history, and a real appreciation of some of the finest things in literature. Why should he not also be prepared to allow that his pupils may be good in different ways, and may specially admire somewhat divergent types of human excellence? I may perhaps add at

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this point that I think it is to be desired that both the writers of text-books and the teachers of the young should not be entirely lacking in the sense of humor. I do not mean that they should take Mr. Belloc's "Moral Alphabet" as their model; but I should hope that something midway between that and stories about George Washington and his abnormal incapacity for fiction might be devised. It is the making of the sensible good citizen we have to aim at, the man with an intelligent insight into the conditions of human life, its difficulties, its limitations, its duties, its pathos and humor, as well as its ideals and aspirations. We must guard against the production of that self-conscious and self-satisfied type that is popularly described by the term "prig."

This is the fourth line of defense; and, so far as I can see, the only serious objection that could be made to it would be the contention that the difficulties in the case of moral instruction, though similar in kind to those in other subjects, are so much greater in degree as to make the usual methods of solution inapplicable. It might be urged that, in this respect, the problems of morality are rather on a par with those of religion than with those of history or literature. Certainly it must be allowed, as I have already indicated, that the difficulties of this kind vary greatly with different types of subject, and that the methods of teaching must vary accordingly. The extreme types are probably to be found in arithmetic on the one hand and religion on the other. In the case of arithmetic, all are agreed that two and two are four; and it is generally allowed that no great harm can be done by teaching children, either directly or indirectly, that this is the case. Even here there is room for difference of opinion as to the best method of giving reality to this kind of knowledge, but no very serious practical difficulty is experienced. Consider how different the situation would be if some maintained that two and two are four, others that they are three, others that they are five, others that the human mind is quite incapable of ever discovering what the sum of two and two really does amount to; while, again, another group of people believed, that, even granting that two and two are four, it is very un-

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desirable that young children should be told so; and yet another group, that, even if two and two are not four, it is yet of the utmost importance that children should be led to think that they are. If we were faced with such divergences as these, I suppose we might be driven to the conclusion, either that the teaching of arithmetic must be excluded from our schools altogether, or that the method of dealing with it must be left to be determined by that many-headed monster, the British parent. This appears to be the present state of affairs with regard to the teaching of religion. I hope it will not always be so. I hope Swift's old gibe will not always retain its sting—that most people have just enough religion to make them hate one another, not enough to make them love one another. I hope it will be found possible in time to allow the teacher to convey to children some simple ideas (whether on the lines of Sir Oliver Lodge's Catechism [7] or in some other way) as to what is known or conjectured with reference to the nature of this wonderful universe—so much greater than all the creeds and than all the sciences!—and of man's place in it. But in the meantime, it must be confessed, this does not seem very hopeful.

Now, the question about the teaching of morality may be said to come to this: Is the state of opinion with regard to moral principles more nearly like that with regard to arithmetic or like that with regard to religion? Or do they stand rather in that middle region which is occupied by such subjects as literature and history? It seems to me that there cannot be much real doubt that this last suggestion is the true one. Some moral ideas are perhaps comparable to those of arithmetic. The "Golden Rule" is almost as simple and self-evident as the "Rule of Three"; and this by itself carries us no doubt a considerable way in morality. Some moralists —among whom we must place the great name of Kant—have sought to show that all moral principles may be reduced to

[7] That catechism is probably not really suitable for children; but it is valuable as an indication of the way in which religious ideas, in harmony with the results of modern science and philosophy, might be made accessible to the young.

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some such formal statement; and, in another way, the Utilitarians have endeavored to treat morality as a sort of arithmetic. But it is now pretty generally recognized that neither of these views is completely tenable. On the other hand, the conception of the ultimate basis of morality is beset by almost as great difficulties as the doctrine of the Trinity or the relation between mind and body; and there is room for almost as great diversity in men's ideals of life as in their ideals of worship. But, on the whole, the problems of the moral life belong to neither of these two extreme types. They cannot be solved by a mechanical process, like those of arithmetic; nor yet do they bear on their face (though perhaps they do hold in their heart) those metaphysical subtleties with which religion is confronted. A large part of them can be made clear and convincing to the plain man, and even to the simple child; and, where doubts begin, the judicious teacher would not unduly press his opinions, just as he would not in matters involving historical judgment or literary appreciation. On the whole, therefore, I maintain that our fourth line of defense is a sound one.

But now I go a good deal farther. I urge, in the fifth place, that the difficulties to which I have been referring are, to a large extent, the very circumstances that give to the teaching of morality its highest educational value. If all subjects were as straightforward as arithmetic, or as matter-of-fact as certain parts of history, our children would have very little chance of ever learning to think for themselves. It was one of the malicious sayings of Heine that the machinery in England is so perfect as to be almost human, and that, conversely, the human beings are almost on the level of machines. However our ideals may differ, that, I should imagine, is not what any of us would like to see realized. Now, in the physical sciences, it is possible to guard, to some extent, against this benumbing influence by the use of personal observation and experiment; and older children may secure the same end by reflections on history and literature. But even in these studies the facts must, in general, be accepted to a large extent at second hand. The problems of conduct,

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on the other hand, are directly presented in every one's experience, and presented, in some form or other, even from the earliest age. Some of them, moreover, are presented in so simple a way that only a little reflection is required to bring out their significance. Yet, on the other hand, they have an increasing complexity in their bearings, which opens up fields for the speculations of the strongest and ripest minds. On these grounds I believe that there is no other kind of study so well adapted to rouse the intelligence of the young, and to carry them on by degrees to more and more profound reflection. We in this country need this stimulus perhaps more than any others. John Bull is generally regarded as a muddler, a mechanical kind of person who stumbles along he knows not how, and is saved from disaster more by luck than guidance. Might he not be a little improved in this respect if he were taught from an early age to reflect about his actions, and to pass judgments upon them?

If this point is a sound one, however, it suggests an important consideration with regard to the best method of teaching morality. If we are to get the full benefit of this reflective discipline, it seems clear that the teaching of moral principles should be, as far as possible, undogmatic. The great object of the teaching should be to enable children to discover for themselves the distinction between the better and the worse in their modes of action. I think this is to a considerable extent recognized by most of those who are interested in moral instruction; and I need not dwell upon it at any length, especially as I am not attempting to discuss the details of method. It is enough to say that in teaching truthfulness, for example, even at the earliest age, the object should be to enable the child to see for himself that lying does not work out satisfactorily, that it destroys human confidence and the security of the social system, and carries a host of other evils in its train. The attitude to be cultivated in him is not that of being forbidden to tell lies, or of thinking that it is not "good form" to tell them, but rather of feeling that he does not want to tell them—at least as a general rule—any more than he wants to put his hand into the fire. This

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attitude is brought about by the development of reflection. The cultivation of a thoughtful view of life, rather than the inculcation of particular opinions, is what we ought to aim at. Socrates made a great discovery when he found that the best way of teaching morality is to get people to reflect on what they themselves really mean. He applied this method, however, chiefly to the teaching of young men. What we have now to recognize, I think, is that what is good for young men is good also, with the necessary modifications, for growing boys and girls. I should hope, therefore, that the method of questioning and of free discussion would be very largely adopted even in the teaching of the youngest children. This plays, in the teaching of morality, pretty nearly the same part as that played by experiment in the teaching of the physical sciences. Instead of "questioning nature," we question ourselves and one another. And it has the advantage over physical experiment that it does not need any elaborate apparatus, and that it can be carried on at all ages and at any time and place.

It may perhaps be objected that I am here going against the teaching of that great master of moral educators, Plato. Was it not his contention, it may be asked, that moral ideas are to be communicated unreflectively, by means of music and literature and various forms of physical training; and that reflection is to be cultivated much later, and only in the case of selected individuals, by means of mathematical and logical studies? I answer that on this particular point I think we must diverge from Plato—or at least from the literal interpretation of his scheme. It would be a poor compliment to him who taught us all to think on such matters, if, instead of thinking, we were to follow blindly the letter of his teaching. Plato thought, to put it broadly, that morality is to be taught by the cultivation of good habits, and that arithmetic is to be used to lead us to reflection. He even thought that people should be prevented from thinking about moral principles till they have reached a pretty advanced age, lest they should be led to doubt the value of the habits in which they have been trained. This view depends on an opposition be-

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tween habit and insight, which we moderns can no longer admit. Arithmetic is surely quite as much a matter of habit as moral action is, and is on the whole much less calculated to stimulate reflection on the meaning of what we are about. But both in arithmetic and in morals the right habit and the insight into its significance ought, I believe, to develop side by side. The kind of reflection that tends to paralyze or pervert our action is not, I think, that spontaneous reflection that grows up along with action as its natural accompaniment and inner side, but rather that which enters in, as it were, from outside, without sufficient previous preparation, as a disturbing afterthought. It was against such disturbing influences that Plato was anxious to guard his most highly educated class. But surely the right way to guard against the destructive influence of reflection upon our moral habits is not to keep our habits and our reflection as far apart as we can, but rather, as far as possible, to base our habits from the outset upon a reflective insight. We ought to say, I think, with Wordsworth,

> "The child is father of the man;
> And I could wish my days to be
> Bound each to each by natural piety."

The way to save ourselves from being dazzled by the new light of thought is not to bury ourselves in the darkness, but rather to live steadily, from the first, in the open sunshine. The new light, when it comes, will then be only the old light made a little brighter. And this completes my fifth and last line of defense.

But now there is a final difficulty to be met, on which, unfortunately, I can only very slightly touch. If we are to pursue the Socratic method, where are we to find our Socrates? It seems obvious that a subject of so great a practical importance, capable of supplying so valuable an intellectual discipline, and needing to be handled with so much care, cannot safely be intrusted to men of immature and undisciplined minds. Yet, if a scheme of moral instruction is to be carried out everywhere, and at all stages of the school curriculum, it

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would appear that nearly every teacher would have to take some part in it. The problem here suggested is, to some extent, one of organization, and, as such, is not one with which I am here concerned. But it raises too large a difficulty to be passed over in this way. And here again I cannot but think that it will be best for us to acknowledge frankly that the difficulty is a very real one. I am afraid you will think me an incorrigible optimist if I go on to add that, here again, the difficulty is, to some extent, a point in our favor.

Let me explain what I mean. The teaching of all subjects is beset with difficulties, and I am afraid they are often very imperfectly overcome. In this country, in particular, the general education of the people is certainly not a matter on which we have, even now, any reason to feel either proud or content. Why have we borne with it so long? Well, we have not borne with it altogether. We are no doubt improving things by degrees. But I am afraid we are doing it very slowly. Why do not the people of this country insist that it shall be pushed forward with more rapidity and energy? Partly, I cannot but think, because they do not fully realize what it means. There is still, I believe, too much tendency to suppose that our schools exist only to supply children with certain instruments which may be of use for their advancement in life. It is not yet sufficiently realized that the schools are there for the making of our citizens; and that it depends largely on the way in which they are conducted whether our citizens are made or marred. It is in general recognized, in our modern democracies, that every one has to take upon himself, in some form or other, the duties of a citizen; but it is not yet generally understood that every one has to be prepared for them. Yet surely it is for this that our schools exist. Whether we are teaching morality and citizenship formally or not, we are bound to be teaching them somehow, formally or informally, reflectively or unreflectively, well or ill. However it may be done, it is a great work and a difficult work that we impose upon our teachers. They are teaching morality, whether they know it or not, if they are in any true sense educating at all. Now, what I would urge

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is that it is a good thing that they should be made to realize in some degree what it is that they are about, even if the first effect of that realization should be to make them conscious of the difficulty of their task. The difficulty is not created by the introduction of moral instruction, but is only brought to light by it. And to see a difficulty is already, I believe, a considerable step toward its removal.

The next step, however, is one that no doubt the Moral Instruction League will have to take. It will have to consider how the teachers are to be trained for the great work that lies before them, how they are to be provided with suitable books for their guidance, how the work is to be apportioned among different classes of teachers, and other problems of a similar kind. These are questions of detail, with which it is not my business here to deal. Some of them have already been taken in hand by many competent people. Others, we may trust, will be undertaken in the near future. What has already been accomplished entitles us to believe that the rest will not be lacking. I can only state, in a quite general way, that I believe the solution of this problem is to be found in the more thorough training of our teachers, the more careful differentiation of their work, and the more systematic organization of our schools.

I think you will admit that I have not sought in any way to belittle the difficulties that stand in the way of a satisfactory system of moral instruction. It is well that we should understand what it is that we have to contend with. But I have tried also to make it apparent that I do not regard any such difficulties as insuperable. I think we may apply to the Moral Instruction League the old saying of Virgil: *Possunt quia posse videntur*—They can because they think they can. We hear a good deal in these days about the power of the will, "faith-healing," "the will to believe," "pragmatism," and the like. I am a little doubtful of the value of ideas of this kind in metaphysics; and I am afraid that "Christian Science" is mixed up with a certain amount of quackery. But in the sphere of moral endeavor, at any rate, we can hardly make too much of the power of faith. In the face of all the diffi-

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culties to which I have referred, I think the members of the League may still say, "It is our business to produce good citizens; it is right and necessary; it must be done; it shall be done; and it is we who have to make sure that it is done thoroughly." We cannot summon any bygone Milton to our aid to "give us manners, virtue, freedom, power." We must rather, if we are to gain any of these excellent things, work out our own salvation by continuous and indefatigable effort.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE IN RELATION TO MORALS AND RELIGION.

"The gods change, beloved. Ay, all save One, who makes love in the hearts of men."—*Kipling.*

I.

Attempts have been made by some modern biologists to prove that too great importance has been attached to the principle of natural selection and that other causes have had greater influence in bringing to pass what is commonly called evolution, *i. e.*, the descent, with modification, of all plants and animals from one primitive form of life.

Recent workers have shown that natural selection cannot itself be the *cause* of the variations which occur in plants and animals, nor indeed, although his language is sometimes obscure, does Darwin appear to have believed that natural selection did cause the variations. What he held was that the main instrument by which modifications were fixed and made permanent is the fact that among all living beings there is a constant struggle for existence (more being born than could survive), and that any organism that chances to come into the world endowed with an advantageous variation will survive and will bequeath this advantage to its descendants, the latter in course of time forming a new species. The problem of the ultimate origin of variations Darwin never

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considered. Around it discussions center to-day, but they need not detain us. For most thinkers would accept the principle of selection in the form in which we have stated it, and it was in this form that it exerted an influence over the progress of the ethical thought of the later nineteenth century. Yet we must not be taken as insisting that all the philosophers whose views we are to notice in this paper were immediately under the influence of Darwin. Some no doubt write with Darwin's system constantly in mind; others, *e. g.*, Schopenhauer[1] (who died only one year later than the publication of the "Origin of Species") and Nietzsche[2] (who scoffs at Darwin as at most other English thinkers), have their philosophic tendencies determined merely by the general trend of thought, the interest in biology, its problems and methods, which characterized the nineteenth century. All alike, however, have constantly in mind the struggle for existence, the fierceness it breeds, the disappointments that result from it, and its apparent conflict with the deepest laws of morality and religion. For it turned out that that animal was most likely to survive which was strong and which used its strength to its own advantage, in selfish and unscrupulous craftiness. All the varied and beautiful forms of life which fill the world to-day were not formed, as the saints and prophets had imagined, by the direct fiat of an infinite and all-loving God, but had evolved by means of ruthless practice of all the vices that men most abhor. It is little wonder that the people in whom the intuitions of religion were strong were revolted by the theory, and declared that it overthrew the very foundations of human virtue. And even Huxley, the great defender of Darwin, found himself, when he considered the relation of human morality to

[1] Compare Höffding, "History of Modern Philosophy," Vol. II, p. 233: "Nevertheless in virtue of his will to live and of the great significance which he attributes to the strife and struggle of nature, he [Schopenhauer] must be regarded as a herald of the evolutionary theory in the form in which it was afterwards promulgated by Darwin."

[2] Compare Külpe, "Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland," p. 61: "Der biologische Gesichtspunkt, wonach alles unter die Herrschaft vitaler Zweckmässigkeit tritt, ist überhaupt für Nietzches Lehren in ihrer letzten Fassung von dominierenden Bedeutung geworden."

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the natural process of evolution, faced by a conclusion that obviously leaves him with a certain sense of uneasiness. In his famous Romanes lecture he says, "Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process." [3] "The practice of that which is ethically best involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence." [4] He perpetually applies to the ethical code the terms artificial, non-natural. "We come to think," he says, "in the dialect of morals. An artificial personality, . . . conscience, is built up beside the natural personality." [5] It is true that in notes and parentheses he declares that the life of man is after all a part of nature; yet he draws over and over again a distinction between the ordered garden of human society and the wild, untended forest of animal nature. He admits fully, and yet with an obvious misgiving, that the laws that rule or should rule human life are in many respects the very opposite of those that have caused the evolution of the animal world. And he does nothing whatever to solve this contradiction. He leaves us face to face with the two processes, "the cosmic struggle" that demands "ruthless self-assertion" [6] and the moral life that "demands self-restraint;" "the cosmic process," he states, "has no sort of relation to moral ends." [7]

Precisely the same view is taken by another thinker of a very different stamp—Tolstoy. He is indeed more interested in the complete statement of what he takes to be the highest moral laws than in the working out of any scientific or philosophic explanation of them. He is a prophet, a seer of the unseen, and has the prophet's scorn of mere wordly knowledge. Science is to him the doctrine of the scribes, the false materialism that misleads man into the belief that the private, personal interest of his carnal individuality is the end of

[3] "Evolution and Ethics," p. 81.
[4] Ibid, p. 81.
[5] Ibid, p. 30.
[6] "Evolution and Ethics," p. 82.
[7] Ibid, p. 83.

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life. If however, Tolstoy does make any reference to natural selection, he insists, as Huxley did, that in human society it is negated, overridden. "The life of man, as an individuality, aiming only at its own particular welfare among the infinite number of similar individualities, who destroy each other and annihilate themselves; that life is an evil and nonsense, and the true life cannot be of this nature." [8] But he goes further; instead of regarding, as Huxley tends to do, the altruistic life of man in society as precarious and artificial, he insists with the emphasis of a mystic that only in self-abnegation and service of others can true happiness be found. "In spite of all his efforts man can never obtain welfare so long as he will not live in conformity to the law of his life. And the law of his life is not strife, but on the contrary a mutual exchange of services between all beings." [9]

The true human life, as compared to the life of the animal that still persists within man, is just the renunciation of the claims of self for the claims of others. Here, and here only, is human well-being to be found, not as a plant living a precarious life in a secluded garden, but as a mighty tree destined to spread more and more widely and finally to supersede altogether the lower form of life that depends on self-assertion.

But Tolstoy, like Huxley, simply sets these two modes of life over against one another; he does not explain how the one is related to or develops out of the other. Human life is in his view simply the negation of animal life.

Nietzsche solves the problem by adopting the position that obviously had suggested itself to Huxley only to be cast aside. He boldly declares that the life of self-renunciation is a sickly invention of the downtrodden masses, and represents an unwholesome revolt of the weak against the strong. He stoutly asserts that in human life, as among the animals, the law of self-assertion produces the finest results,[10] and that man's one duty is to be strong, able, self-sufficing, and to avoid as fatal

[8] "On Life" (Free Age Press), p. 32.

[9] "On Life" (Free Age Press), p. 93.

[10] "Wherever I found living matter I found will unto power." "Also sprach Zarathustra," trans. by A. Tille, p. 163.

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to the highest life the weakening and degrading emotions of pity and sympathy. He contrasts the life of the free warrior, who loves and exults in danger and hardship, in all strenuous and healthy activities, with the pining, sickly existence of the slaves, whose mutual self-compassion and envy of their stronger masters gave birth, under the guidance of the ascetic priest, to Christianity, that religion of hate masquerading as love. "Your love for your neighbor is your bad love for yourselves." [11] "Wherever there are sacrifices and services and loving glances there is will to be master." [12] He urges men to put aside this craven pity and unselfishness, this underhand attempt to fight against the fundamental law of life, the search after power and more life, and in healthy strenuousness to express in and through their own personalities the relentlessness of the life-force.

"This new table, O my brethren, I put over you: 'Become hard.'" [13]

"And then it came also to pass that his word praised blessed selfishness, whole, healthy selfishness that springeth from a mighty soul." [14]

"Spare not thy neighbour. Man is a something that must be surpassed." [15]

As the last quotation indicates, this hearty approval of animal ruthlessness in the assertion of a man's own personality is given weight and significance by the thought of the superman.

"And Zarathustra thus spake unto the folk: *'I teach you beyond man.* Man is something that shall be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him?

"'All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: And are ye going to be the ebb of this great tide and rather revert to the animal than surpass man? . . . .

"'Beyond-man is the significance of earth, your will shall say: beyond-man shall be the significance of earth.

"'I conjure you, my brethren, *remain faithful to earth* and do not believe those who speak unto you of super-terrestrial hopes. Poisoners they are, whether they know it or not.'" [16]

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[11] Ibid, p. 81.
[12] Ibid, p. 163.
[13] Ibid, p. 319.
[14] Ibid. p. 282.
[15] Ibid, p. 296.
[16] "Also sprach Zarathustra," trans. by A. Tille, pp. 5 and 6.

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To Huxley, too, had come the same thought of the possibility of breeding a finer human being, but in an external, artificial fashion, and only to be rejected. Men might be bred better, as in a pigeon-fancier's polity,[17] but he decides that the task of selecting and coercing the finest specimens is too great. His lukewarm conception is very different from Nietzsche's burning thought of a possible evolution of a stronger, nobler being—an evolution which we should strive to bring about by any means in our power, breaking, if it be necessary, all the old tablets of the law that enjoined on us gentleness, pity, forgiveness, all that asceticism of mere renunciation which stank in the philosopher's nostrils. If an attempt be made to grasp Nietzsche's central thought the reader comes to feel that a new breath has blown through his old theories, tearing down many that are moth-eaten and mildewed, vivifying and purifying others. There is a truth, a deep, mystic truth, in his wild, disconnected sayings. He clears our minds of hypocrisy and of cant. But has he grasped all the truth? Are the old ideals, the human ideals of unselfishness and sympathy, *merely* the foul miasma of the paltry envy of weaklings? May it not be that the miasma indeed is there and needs the wind's rough breath to drive it away, but that the old ideals, only veiled by the mist and not the mist's very self, will shine more clearly when the blustering breeze has swept it away? In the end of this essay an attempt will be made to suggest that this is the truth. In the meantime we must turn to some other thinkers.

Schopenhauer wrote before Darwin, and always rejected the conception of the evolution of higher forms of life from lower; but his thoughts are obviously inspired by biological science, and certain modern writers who owe much to Darwinism also work with categories first used by Schopenhauer. According to him all organisms are impelled by the will to live; during their whole existence they are urged on by the passionate search after life and more life. But true, self-sufficing life is never reached; all we feel, all the other animals

[17] "Evolution and Ethics," p. 23.

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feel, is the never-ceasing pressure of one desire after another. If the desire be unsatisfied, we are miserable; if satisfaction is attained, then satiety and melancholy follow. The will to live involves us in perpetual unhappiness. Nature cheats us for her ends, which are not ours, and which can never yield us bliss. In his analysis of sex-love, Schopenhauer drives home this view most thoroughly, and few who have read his cynical account of the lover's progress can avoid the thought that in only too many cases it is fundamentally and miserably true. The world then is full of wretchedness, and each step of advancement in life or in civilization brings more wretchedness. The only means of escape is to negate in ourselves this perpetual will to live, to resolve not to live, to strip ourselves of desires and wishes, and to enter on the path of self-renunciation. According to Schopenhauer this has been realized by all the great religions of the world, and they all advocate the path of quietism, the self-abnegation that leads to Nirvâna, the blessed rest of destruction and nothingness, where at last the ever-striving will is stilled. We need not pause at this stage to criticize Schopenhauer's pessimism, but may note his central thought (not dissimilar from Nietzsche's) of the everlasting *will to live,* that operates perpetually throughout the world of organized creatures. Students of contemporary writers on social and religious subjects will perceive that the latter commonly use the same conception, though with a different bias. Bernard Shaw, for example, speaks of the "life-force," and implies that it strives to get expression through the brains of living men for the purpose of raising and elevating human society. Ibsen, he declares, was the tool of the life-force when he wrote "The Doll's House," and the end aimed at by the impulse that moved him was the breaking down of the barriers which prevent women from attaining the independence of life and thought that is essential for future progress of the race. Mr. Shaw himself, with a genuine and living religion that is far more instrumental in getting things done than the apparently more reverential creed of those who think him a mere jester, feels himself an instrument in the hands of this "life-force," and is content

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to be worn out and cast on the scrap heap if only he may advance its mightier ends. Mr. Wells speaks of the Good Will that is alive in men, and yet greater than any individual man; those impelled by it he names by the words that occur so often in his writings, "Men of Good Intent."

The same thought (which is really in its emotional bearings, in its half-comprehended relations, more like an emerging instinct than a purely intellectual conception, and which perhaps might be best named by Fouillée's phrase, *idée-force*), this same thought-force is seen in the recent interest excited by the discussion on the "Immanent God." From this discussion there emerges at all events the fact that many men find helpful the idea of a life greater than their own, which yet finds expression through them; of a will that links them to the animal kingdom on the one hand (from which all now admit we have emerged) and on the other to that great and mystic reality of which we are conscious in religion and which most men name God.

Here we seem to see dimly a possibility of that reconciliation between religion and science which this age needs so greatly, which is indeed the first requisite for making possible, without unwholesome violence, the solving of the problem of the present disastrous poverty of many sections of society. For thinking men are coming to believe that self-interest and the cold light of science are equally insufficient to bring us safely through the tangled web of perplexities and injustices that confront us. Some force of personal devotion is needed to inspire us with the glow of determination, the warm emotion of helpfulness, which are necessary agents in the building up of a new social system. Religion, personal, keenly felt religion, must come back to life; yet it must not be longer at conflict with science. For one thing, at least, the nineteenth century has taught man;—that the truth, discovered from careful study of the physical universe, is sacred, is a genuine reality that cannot and must not be set aside. The modern religious consciousness itself demands that an altar to science be enshrined within the temple, and that no rites remain which cannot honestly be celebrated in the presence of that

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sanctuary. The restatement of religion for which the modern world is waiting must satisfy three demands at once; it must supply a motive for the amelioration of human society, it must be absolutely consistent with science, and it must provide an outlet for the personal and intimate practice of devotion.

Thus may a yawning wound in the modern soul be cured, and that soul, healed for a time of its doubt, hesitation and insufficiency, set forth once more with joy on its pathway toward fuller life.

II.

Such a religion is dimly appearing. The conception due to biological science, of the struggle for existence, appears, when translated into philosophy, as the will to live, and that will is thought of as animating in different degrees and in different ways plants, animals and men. But from our sketch of the philosophers who have used this conception it will be clear that one great difficulty exists. The will to live is in animals and plants (speaking broadly) a purely selfish and individual one. Each organism seeks perpetually its own pleasure and its own life, and in this search must strive with two opposing forces, the lifeless environment and the existence of other animals. The first it cannot to any considerable extent alter, and therefore the will to live expresses itself through the animal by adaptation to the environment.[18] Thus giraffes grow long necks, herons long legs, the eyes of moles degenerate, etc. But there is more than this modification of the body of the animal. There is also modification of its desires and instincts. For most animals the supply of food is uncertain; hence desire for it must be keen in order to impel the animal to unremitting search. On occasions food is found in large

[18] For our purpose there is no need to discuss the various difficult questions connected with the inheritance of acquired characteristics, or continuous or discontinuous congenital variations. It is sufficient for us that variations, whether acquired or congenital, continuous or discontinuous, do, when winnowed by natural selection, give rise normally to the gradual evolution of finer and stronger forms of life, ever better adapted to their environment.

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quantities; then the animal must learn to gorge in order to tide it over the only too probable season of scarcity. Hence nature, to secure life and more life, coarsens and makes gross the desires that support the bodily existence. Could an animal be conscious of itself, it might know that in order to preserve that precarious spark of life within it and to hand it on to its descendants, it was its duty to be gluttonous and lustful.

At this stage the "life-force" must work through the individual bodily existence. But that existence is threatened not alone by an indifferent or unfavorable environment, but also by other animals, against whom it must defend itself. All life strives to live, all at this stage fights, ought to fight, to scheme, to kill, in order to preserve alive its portion of the "will to live." Thus by incessant conflict, by what to us are the vices of gluttony and lustfulness, of selfishness that reaches even to murder, of unscrupulousness that attains to treachery, was life trained and led to a higher level. The advance to this level is begun when the embodied spark of life learns that other sparks of life with like feelings and desires to itself animate other portions of matter. How this recognition of other personalities akin to oneself occurs is a problem that psychology has never yet faced. Obviously the lower animals know only their own organic sensations, and respond very vaguely to external stimuli. But in the scale of advancing life somewhere this step is made. First the self, identified with the body, is distinguished in a fashion from the external world, and then it is discovered that certain portions of that external world are also living beings, selves similar to our own self. This recognition almost certainly must arise, in racial development, in connection with sex and parentage, and especially the latter. In the relation of the mother to her child the struggle for existence is for a time superseded; she lives for it, not for herself, and is prepared to die even in its defense. Gradually this relation extends itself and comes to include the male as well as the mother and child, and there is established a little social group within which the old animal virtues of self-assertion are superseded by the new social virtues of self-

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renunciation. These groups are more and more frequent and more and more permanent as we rise in the animal scale. Among the social insects (perhaps—who knows?—an early attempt of the life-force to attain those unknown ends which men are *now* blindly laboring to achieve), community of life with all its attendant virtues is very highly developed. But among mammals, man alone has evolved an organized social life on any considerable scale. And this has been attained piecemeal. Beginning with the loose organization of the horde, hardly distinguishable from the undefined groups of some of the higher mammals, mankind has passed slowly to the various forms of family life, to the tribe, the city-state, the village community, the nation, the federated commonwealth. Always *within* these communities the struggle for existence is to some extent suspended. We allow no man to die whose life may be saved, though we are still willing to allow the lives of many men to be rendered stunted and miserable by unhappy conditions. For a time, the natural state of perpetual war (Hobbes was in a sense right, after all) persisted between communities, and was indeed often a means of progress. But now our advance in social feeling is so great that vast numbers of people are declaring war absurd and wrong, and in practice our humanitarian modification of its conditions is rapidly depriving it of its *raison d'être* from the biological standpoint. We kill, indeed, in war, sending to slaughter the finest specimens of our own nation, but we always save as many of the wounded enemies as possible and we rarely deprive them of their territory. War is to-day no more than a foolish and barbarian survival of earlier times. Soon, it seems to many, wars will rage no more on earth, and the brutal animal method of natural selection will pass away.

Speaking generally, indeed, it is this capacity for social life, this power to stand aside from the struggle for existence, at least in its crass physical form, that distinguishes man from the mass of the animal kingdom. And by some religions and systems of morality it is commanded that men should not participate in even the finer forms of rivalry, competition for wealth and for power.

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At all events man has preëminently this power to feel the good of his own life in the lives of others, and to lose his narrow personal good in the good of his family, or tribe, or city, or nation, or in the good of humanity itself. His personality is no longer bounded by his animal individuality; in love and service he transcends his own selfish aims and conceives a wider good in which his own is involved, or to which, it may be, he is even willing that his own should be sacrificed. But he differs from the animals in another point of great importance. They are bound by their environment, and to stimulate them to get the utmost possible out of that environment, the will to live expresses itself in them in fierce bodily desires. But man may modify, does increasingly modify, his environment. The fulfilment of his bodily desires in large sections of society becomes always easier, and in some cases has now no limit save the man's own will. Therefore the keen animal desires, formerly necessary for life, are now a hindrance; to eat, for instance, to satiety, impairs efficiency, does not increase it. Man, as he grows in civilization, feels more and more the weight of the physical desires; like atrophied organs they are the source of much disease. Our vices are indeed but the outgrown virtues of our animal ancestry. To raise and increase the amount and quality of human life they must be increasingly controlled. Man then becomes conscious that his finest and fullest life is only possible in obedience to two principles, both of which reverse the duty of the animal: (a) to care not for his own personal life but for the lives of others; (b) to war constantly against the atavistic animal instincts which we call sins. Putting it into the language of morality, love and purity comprise the duty of man.

But man did not wait for the teachings of biological science to impose on himself these duties. Long ago they were announced to him by another agency—that of religion.

Religion is always that set of emotions, directed toward some group of superhuman beings, or one single deity, that holds together any given form of human society. The tribes have their own idols, the city-states their gods, the

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nations their national churches. Each inferior form of human organization has its inferior deity. But we have learned in recent years to distinguish these pagan and incomplete creeds from the world-wide religions where is proclaimed the duty of love, not merely of one's own family or community, but of humanity at large; indeed men in whom the religious and moral consciousness is most fully developed go further and include, as did Buddha and St. Francis, within the sphere of love the animal and even the vegetable kingdom.[19]

These same religions (religions of envious weaklings, according to Nietzsche) also lay stress on the need of purity, of self-discipline; they call on us to emerge from the animal existence which seeks satisfaction from bodily desires, and aims at its own good in opposition to the good of others, and to enter on the spiritual life where purity and love rule. This is so well known that quotations are hardly necessary. The following may suffice:

"Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you; that ye may be sons of your Father who is in heaven."[20]

"Let no man seek his own, but each his neighbor's good."[21]

"Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey the lusts thereof."[22]

"Beloved, I beseech you as sojourners and pilgrims, to abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul."[23]

Compare the following precepts of Buddhism:

"Abstain from destroying life."

"Abstain from fornication and all uncleanness."

"Abstain from fermented liquor, spirits and strong drink, which are a hindrance to merit."

"Abstain from eating at forbidden times."[24]

All religions stand for the energizing of a special form of social feeling. But the greatest religions make clear the abso-

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[19] Compare Warren, "Buddhism in Translation," p. 431.

[20] Matthew 5:44.

[21] I Cor. 10:24.

[22] Rom. 6:12.

[23] I Peter 2:11.

[24] "Buddhism in Translation," Warren, p. 397.

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lute unity of all life and our duty to sink our personal existence and sacrifice it to that greater life. Now it is these greater religions that lay (as James has shown) special stress on the necessity of conversion.

Keeping in mind the previous remarks on the opposition between the animal duties of self-assertion and the human and social duties of self-renunciation, let us recall the main facts in conversion as given by Starbuck. "Conversion is primarily an unselfing. . . . It is part of [the individual's] oldest and deepest seated instinct to preserve his own integrity. But it is part of Nature's way to crush that which is out of harmony with herself. The social will is stronger, and the individual must at last surrender himself to it. . . . . The individual learns to transfer himself from a center of self-activity into an organ of revelation of universal being, and to live a life of affection for and oneness with the larger life outside.[25]

This point comes out even more clearly in quotations from the various documents describing the feelings subsequent to conversion:

"I had more tender feeling toward my family and friends." F. 17.
"I felt for everyone and loved my friends better." F. 16.
"I felt everybody to be my friend." M. 19.
"I felt in harmony with everybody, and all creation and its Creator." M. 15.[26]
"I experienced a complete change of conduct; I left off the old habits of drink and profanity without an effort." M. 23.[27]

In fact, conversion, whether as a sudden experience or as the slow turning of the soul toward religion, is the final triumph of the true human spirit over its animal heritage. It produces normally a feeling of escape from a narrow personality into union with a mightier Will, and it fills the spirit with a resolve to conquer the lusts of the flesh, and to live in love with all men. "Those who are truly converted are kind-hearted, indulgent, praising the works of their neigh-

[25] Starbuck, "Psychology of Religion," p. 145-7 passim.
[26] Ibid, pp. 127, 128, passim.
[27] Starbuck, "Psychology of Religion," p. 133.

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bor as far as they can, and they rejoice in his well-being and have sympathy with him in his troubles. They are decorous in the satisfaction of their natural wants, shunning all excess, and if they by accident transgress, avoiding it for the future." [28]

Now in most of the writers studied so far it is suggested that there is an opposition between this moral and spiritual life of man, and the process of biological evolution as revealed by science. But if we assume the constant energizing, constant pressing forward of the "Will to Live," it becomes possible to reconcile them.

The "will to live," in its struggle for expression, rises first to fierce intensity in individual animals, this individuality being modified only occasionally in the higher animals by certain facts of sex and parentage. The "Will to Live" appears here in its *intensive* form, willing to sacrifice to its one narrow but glowing spark all other life that comes its way. But life is not to be measured by intension alone, but also by extension, and a life that wills the death of all that it needs as food, or of all that excites its hostility, may often be not an agency of life, but of death (as are tigers and serpents, as were many great conquerors). The "Will to Live" in such a case is intense indeed, but is circumscribed and narrow. There is need of greater breadth, wider inclusion. This is gained when gradually there arises the will not merely that oneself should live, but that others also should live, and finally the resolve that others shall live even at the sacrifice of oneself.

Does not after all the Will for Life, to change the phrase, bring to pass a greater mass of happy living in altruistic mankind than in the selfish tiger, and if there be really an animating will behind all organized existence—and to the reality of this will many of the facts alike of biology and of religion point—will it not urge us further on the path of service of others, and of the control of those animal appetites that hinder so

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[28] Dr. John Tauler. Sermon VII, as quoted in the "Message of Man," p. 37.

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greatly our efficiency in civilized life? The "Will for Life" must, after it has established itself in this world in the animal's fierce desire for fullness of personal existence, expand in later organisms into the will that others too should increase in life.

The one phase, the ethical process, is indeed opposed to the cosmic movement as unselfishness to selfishness, as self-control to self-gratification, yet from another point of view it carries out more adequately and attains more fully the aim that always underlies its opposite, *i. e.*, the maximization of life. Mystics of all ages have declared that it is always possible for man, through self-discipline and self-submission, to attain union with the ultimate source of all existence, to reach the ecstasy of oneness with God. And it is declared to be the common experience that on emergence from that ecstasy, the devotee knows at one and the same time a great exaltation of his own life, a strong yearning for purity, and a keener desire to serve others. Wise men of all ages have asserted that only in this way, in submission of the personal will to a larger purpose, in self-control and in loving service of all that exists, come true peace and happiness for men. We who find it hard to reach these mystical heights may know, at all events, by experience the truth of the Hedonistic paradox, "happiness is not to be won by looking for it, but by losing oneself in another object external to oneself"—generally the good, as T. H. Green said, of some group of persons.

III.

From this standpoint, then, how shall we estimate the worth of those opinions which we glanced at in the earlier part of the paper?

We may claim that this conception of the underlying similarity of the progress of life through natural selection, and through conscious community of existence, explains and enlarges Huxley's views. It turns out that man is not a fragile reed, a delicate plant in an artificial garden, but that he embodies in himself, in a better and higher form, the same

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forces that urge on the cosmic process of life. We acknowledge the fundamental truth in Tolstoy's view; his doctrine sets forth, as did Christ's and Buddha's before him, the aim for which human existence must strive. Yet we may believe this without Tolstoy's rather irritating scorn for science, and since we realize that this life of man is a process of slow evolution, we may see without bitterness the ideal which blazes in his words attain now only an imperfect fulfilment, content with the belief that its perfect fulfilment will come. What of Schopenhauer? The fundamental fallacy of his thought is that he identifies the animal will to live with the human will. But humanity can only find happiness in the satisfaction of the will of others, *i. e.*, in *love*. The very fact that the human mind can "look before and after" shows it the transitoriness, the unsatisfactoriness of the animal and purely personal desires. In conscious search for the good of others, on the other hand, there arises a strong, mysterious sense of happiness, a sense that the human spirit has at last found an atmosphere natural to it. But if forced to stay in the lower atmosphere of personal selfishness, it gasps and faints with a misery which it does not understand and attributes in its ignorance to the universe as a whole. Schopenhauer's pessimism, in short, rests on his egotism. But it is a needed and valuable protest against the shallow optimism of the healthy animal.

And what of Nietzsche? He too identifies life with this personal demand for existence, but differs fundamentally from Schopenhauer in that he contemplates the incessant emergence of vitality with joy and not with depression. Neurotic and invalid though he was, Nietzsche yet voices better than any other writer the keen pleasure in mere physical life, that is veritably a very fine and good thing in its way. Laughing and singing and a fierce contempt of danger must accompany all noble life in his view, and he expresses fiercely the contempt of the natural man for the way of the ascetic and the twice-born saint. Now there is no doubt that the protest of Nietzsche has its justification. True saintliness perhaps comes nearer to the real meaning of Nietzsche's conception of

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the superman than anything else on earth, as we shall see shortly. But there is a false and cowardly piety, which exists only as a cover for weakling souls, that clings fast to the old creed that is familiar, that dare not think or experiment, that delights in hunting out heresy, that cramps growing spirits by outworn dogmas, that cares more to save its own paltry soul than to save the world, and shrinks from all keen joy in life as from an evil thing. This type is, indeed, incarnate in Mrs. Dudgeon in "The Devil's Disciple." Against this false and noisome religiousness that is content with the mean, ugly and base, Nietzsche's protest was justified. And moreover, even genuine piety tends at one stage to think that asceticism is good in and for itself, and not merely as a guide to the higher life. "Despisers of body" Nietzsche calls these people, and thus describes them. "Once soul looked contemptuously upon body, that contempt then being the highest ideal—soul wished the body meagre, hideous, starved. Thus soul thought it could escape body and death." [29]

But this asceticism may and does defeat its own ends. The human body exists, it is true, *only* as a vehicle for the soul, but yet as a vehicle for the soul. And among a certain section of Western peoples, at all events, perfect, hard healthiness of body is now being regarded as one of the ends of the moral life. Modern medical science is beginning to show us, with its theories of the open-air life and of limitation of diet, that in merely following the most healthy *régime* there is abundant scope for asceticism.

From another point Nietzsche suggests a valuable thought—in his conception of the "superman." So far morality and religion, in setting ultimate aims before the human soul, have tended to adopt one of two ends—personal salvation either for self or others, to result in bliss (conceived more or less materially) in an after world. This conception (though it again is more an *idée-force,* a thought-force, than a purely intellectual attitude) may tend either to a lofty kind of personal selfishness or to the preaching of a submission to mean and wretched cir-

[29] "Thus spake Zarathustra," trans. by A. Tille, p. 6.

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cumstances in consideration of happiness hereafter.[30] If the submission is urged by the prosperous in wordly goods upon the unprosperous, there is more than a suspicion of hyprocisy, a "stench," as Nietzsche would say.

Hence there comes often a reaction to another type of thought—to Utilitarianism. "Make people happy here and now," it says; "enjoy the many pleasures and delights of this material world; help as many others as possible to enjoy them with you." To the kind-hearted and rather unimaginative man this creed will be quite satisfactory, especially if he is faced, as were the early Utilitarians, with crying social evils demanding only, it seemed, quite simple remedies. But to the more highly strung man, who is filled with a theoretic passion for democracy—or, to use our new phraseology, in whom the life-force calls out for as large an extension as possible—who yet finds in himself a practical dislike of vulgar personalities—the life-force demanding also intensive expression—this man can only be stirred to abiding depression and disgust by our present democracy, with its hideous towns, its low level of physical and mental efficiency, its numbness to literature and art, its lack of real beauty or distinction. Such a man must place his future good not in some transcendental bliss in some unknown heaven; it must be realized on this earth. Yet it cannot be simply to provide for Englishmen of the common banal type the happiness they now appreciate. To a man of this character, when he has read Nietzsche, there comes the conception of the superman—of the future being in whom all the forces of life will be increased far beyond what we know now, who is to be at once harder and healthier, and more sensitive and comprehending—and a thought frames itself in his mind of a democracy that levels up and not down. Such a conception supplies what the educated man needs as an ideal. It suggests to him well-being on this earth, yet a well-being

[30] "Such sayings I heard pious back-worlds-men say unto their conscience: 'Let the world be the world, lift not even a finger against it. Let anybody who careth to do so, throttle and sting and flay and scrape the folk. Thereby they shall one day learn to renounce the world. Break, break, O my brethren, these old tablets of the pious.'" Ibid, p. 305.

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that is as much spiritual as material. It supplies him with a motive for striving to reach his own perfection in body, mind, and soul; it furnishes him with a motive for endeavoring politically to remedy the social conditions of to-day; for supermen cannot be bred in slums. In short, Nietzsche's thought of the superman bids fair to act as a reconciler of very different religious and moral conceptions.

But Nietzsche's view has its deficiencies. He was in reaction against the unhealthy asceticism of his time—often, as he himself says, the mere symptom of degeneration and insufficient vitality—and against the altruism that leveled down, instead of leveling up, the altruism that is content to have always with us the poor and sick, as objects for the exercise of charity and unselfishness, instead of burning with a fierce determination to see the end of poverty and sickness. In consequence, the superman of Nietzsche turns away in disgust, puts out of sight all victims of ebbing vitality; he himself and his comrades will have nothing to do with such morbidness; their one aim is to keep alight within themselves that burning flame of intensity of life. No ignoble aim! Ill health and poverty *should* be hated; health and life *should* be cherished.

But yet in true human society, not mere intensity but extensity of life ought to be desired. Our hearts echo to that noble saying, "A civilization that is squalid anywhere is squalid everywhere."

The superman, if he is to be human, and not a glorified animal, must always keep in mind that the life-force works in us in two directions. He will have, indeed, the animal virtues of fierce vitality and perfect health, will grow in a straight line upwards; he must have also the human virtues of unselfishness and helpfulness, must have sympathy so radiating through the lives of other personalities that they may form with his a continuous plane. Indeed, the problem of the future, to put it in a different way, is to unite the pagan with the Christian character, and it turns out that, after all, the true superman must have in him more than a dash of the Christian saint, alike on his benevolent and on his contemplative side. For if there be truth in our hypothesis that religion is the full-

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est and purest channel through which the life-force reaches us, then it will be the superman's duty to prepare himself to receive this life-force in religious meditation and prayer, and it will be for him too to free his life from any brutish re-emergence of the earlier selfish instincts. This threefold aim is well given in the following prayer:

"O God, enable me to feel my oneness with all things in Thee. Burn out of me my baseness and make me wholly part of Thy pure flame. Help me to prove my brotherhood by constant, joyful service." [22]

By living in this spirit alone can we make for the emergence of the superman, in whom life must not be merely intensive, but also extensive—so much so, indeed, that there can be no single superman in the fullest sense until all human society consists of supermen.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF ETHICS.

The evolutionary point of view has had more than one important result for philosophical thought. Not the least important among these has been the conception of the evolution of evolution. Not only can we trace in the history of thought the evolution of the conception of evolution, but we find ourselves with a consciousness which we conceive of as evolved; the contents and the forms of these contents can be looked upon as the products of development. Among these contents and forms are found the temporal and spatial qualities of things, of the world. The very time process as well as the space of the universe lies in experience which is itself presented as the result of an evolution that arises in and through spatial conditions, which is first and foremost a temporal process.

The peculiarity of this situation lies in the fact that the involution appears in the immediate findings of science. Our

[22] Winslow Hall, "Applied Religion," p. 122.

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geological and biological sciences unhesitatingly present epochs antedating man in terms of man's consciousness, and biology and scientific psychology as unhesitatingly present that consciousness as an evolution within which all the distinctions must be explained by the same general laws as those which are appealed to to account for animal organs and functions. It is true that occasionally a scientist such as Poincaré recognizes that even the number system, as well as Euclidean space, is but a construction which has arisen and maintained itself because of its practical advantages, though we can draw no conclusions from these practical advantages to their metaphysical reality. If this position be generalized, there results the conception of an evolution within which the environment—that which our science has presented as a fixed datum in its physical nature—has been evolved as well as the form which has adapted itself to that environment; that the space within which evolution has taken place has arisen by the same laws; that the very time which makes an evolution presentable has arisen in like manner. Now, to a certain extent the conception of an evolution of environment as well as of the form has domesticated itself within our biological science. It has become evident that an environment can exist for a form only in so far as the environment answers to the susceptibilities of the organism; that the organism determines thus its own environment; that the effect of every adaptation is a new environment which must change with that which responds to it. The full recognition, however, that form and environment must be phases that answer to each other, character for character, appears in ethical theory.

In a certain sense this is found in the statement which genetic psychology makes of the development of the consciousness of the individual. Here there can be no evolution of the intelligence except in so far as the child's world answers to increased powers of conscious control. The world and the individual must keep pace with each other in the life history of the individual. But the child comes into a world which receives him as a child. The world of the adult,

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from the point of view of descriptive psychology, is an independent environment within which the child and his world evolve. Within the field of ethics, on the other hand, the moral individual and his world cannot consistently be presented as themselves lying inside another moral field. The growth of moral consciousness must be coterminous with that of the moral situation. The moral life lies in the interaction of these two; the situation rises up in accusation of the moral personality which is unequal to it, and the personality rises to the situation only by a process which reconstructs the situation as profoundly as it reconstructs the self. No man has found moral power within himself except in so far as he has found a meaning in his world that answered to the new-found power, or discovered a deeper ethical meaning in his environment that did not reveal new capacities for activities within himself. Moral evolution takes place then as does that of the child; the moral personality and its world must arise *pari passu*, but, unlike the psychologist's statement of the development of the child, it does not lie inside a larger determining environment.

I am not ignorant of evolutionary ethics, nor that every type of ethical theory in these days has felt itself bound to interpret the development of moral consciousness in terms of custom and institutions. Thus we seem to postulate not only a community moral consciousness, a moral world which determines the growth of the moral consciousness of the individual, but also we imply that this determining moral environment goes back into a past that antedates moral consciousness itself. From this point of view, morality, *i. e.*, control by community habit, has determined the development of individual moral consciousness as tyrranically as the intellectual world has controlled the growth of intelligence in the members of society. But this paradox disappears when we recognize that this control by the community over its members provides indeed the material out of which reflective moral consciousness builds up its own situation, but cannot exist as a situation until the moral consciousness of the individual constructs it.

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It is another statement of the same thing that moral consciousness is the most concrete consciousness—the most inclusive statement which can be given of immediate experience. There is no phase of activity, intellectual or physical, no type of inner experience, no presentation of outer reality, which does not find its place within the moral judgment. There is nothing which may not be a condition or an element of conduct, and moral consciousness reaches its climax in the estimation of every possible content of the individual and his situation. There is no other type of consciousness which must not abstract from other phases to assure its own existence. One cannot carry out an acute analysis and respond to the beauty of the object of analysis, one cannot swell with emotion and dispassionately observe. But we place every phase of our experience within the sweep of conscience; there is no one of these phases of consciousness which has not its legitimate function within the activity when viewed as moral. It is but a step further to claim that the abstractions of science and the expressions of the emotion and the direction of attention in perception and inference must find their functions, and hence their reason for existence, in the act; and that morality inheres in the act alone, but in none of these functions of the act (if I may be allowed two meanings of function in the same sentence).

It is, of course, possible to make this a metaphysical doctrine. If one finds reality in immediate experience and admits that the various intellectual, æsthetic, and perceptual processes exist only as parts and functions of an act which is the ultimate form of immediate experience, then the recognition of the ethical statement of this act as its fullest statement would found metaphysics upon ethics. The presentation of such a doctrine, however, would demand first of all a discussion of the meaning of the terms "immediate experience," of "reality," and the "cognitive state" that answers to it. I have no wish to enter this debatable field, that is loosely defined by the term pragmatism.

There are, however, certain implications of modern ethical doctrine which fall within the lines which I have indicated

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above; that are of interest quite apart from their relation to metaphysical and logical speculations. The implications to which I refer are those that flow from evolutionary doctrine on the one side and from the identification of purposive activity with moral activity, and the recognition that our intelligence is through and through purposive. The first implication that flows from this position is that the fundamental necessity of moral action is simply the necessity of action at all; or stated in other terms, that the motive does not arise from the relations of antecedently given ends of activities, but rather that the motive is the recognition of the end as it arises in consciousness. The other implication is that the moral interpretation of our experience must be found within the experience itself.[1]

We are familiar with three ethical standpoints, that which finds in conscious control over action only the further development of conduct which has already unconsciously been determined by ends, that which finds conduct only where reflective thought is able to present a transcendental end, and that which recognizes conduct only where the individual and the environment — the situation — mutually determine each other. In the first case, moral necessity in conduct, for the conscious individual, is quite relative. It depends upon the degree of recognition which he reaches of the forces operating through him. Furthermore, the motive to act with reference to the end of the fullest life of the species is one which is primarily quite narrowly individualistic, and depends for a social interpretation upon the community of which the individual is a member. Moral necessity in conduct from this point of view is quite independent of the activity itself. So far from being the most fundamental reality it is a derivative by which, through what it is hard not to call a hocus pocus, the individual acts, for what is only indirectly his own—a distant end, through a social

[1] The full analysis of position assumed here has been given by Prof. John Dewey in his article, "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," in Vol. III, of the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago.

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dressur. It is, of course, natural that this point of view should mediate the process of training by which men are to be led unwittingly to socially worthy action, rather than the immediate conduct of the individual who finds himself face to face with a moral problem. It is the standpoint of the publicist and the reformer of social institutions.

But if we admit that the evolutionary process consists in a mutual determination of the individual and his environment—not the determination of the individual by his environment, moral necessity in conduct is found in the very evolutionary situation. The possibility of intelligent action waits upon the determination of the conditions under which that action is to take place. The statement of these conditions becomes the end, when it is recognized that the statement is in terms of the activities that make up the personality of the individual. The content of the end is the mutuality of statement of personality, *i. e.,* the tendencies to activity, in terms of the personalities who make up the environment, *i. e.,* the conditions of the expression of the activities. It is because the man must recognize the public good in the exercise of his powers, and state the public good in terms of his own outgoing activities that his ends are moral. But it is not the public good which comes in from outside himself and lays a moral necessity upon him, nor is it a selfish propensity that drives him on to conduct.

It is inconceivable that such an outside end should have any but an extraneous position. It could never come into a personality except by the door of its own interest. The end could not be a social end. Nor could a purely individual propensity through the agency of community training become social. The moral necessity lies not in the end acting from without, nor in the push of inclination from within, but in the relation of the conditions of action to the impulses to action. The motive is neither a purely rational, external end, nor a private inclination, but the impulse presented in terms of its consequences over against the consequences of the other impulses. The impulse so conditioned, so interpreted, becomes a motive to conduct. The moral necessity is that all

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activity which appears as impulse and environment should enter into the situation, and there is nothing which ensures this completeness of expression except the full interrelationship of the self and the situation. That one fully recognized the conflict which the impulse involves in its consequences with the consequences of all the other social processes that go to make him up, is the moral dictum. From the reconstructions that this recognition involves the immediate statement of the end appears. To enforce this dictum is simply to live as fully and consciously and as determinedly as possible.

The moral necessity for education is not an ideal of intelligence that lies before us of the clear refulgence of the intellect. It is the necessity of knowledge to do what is trying to be done, the dependence of the uninformed impulse upon means, method, and interpretation. The necessity of uprightness in public affairs does not rest upon a transcendental ideal of perfection of the self, nor upon the attainment of the possible sum of human happiness, but upon the economy and effectiveness, and consistency demanded in the industrial, commercial, social, and æsthetic activities of those that make up the community. To push reform is to give expression to all these impulses and present them in their consequences over against those of all the other social impulses out of which an organism of personalities arises.

There is abroad a feeling of lack of moral force; we look before and after—to our ancestors, our posterity—for incentive to right conduct, when in fact there is no moral necessity which is not involved in the impulses to conduct themselves. To correct one abuse we must emphasize the interests it jeopardizes. There is no reservoir of moral power, except that which lies in the impulses behind these interests. To correct the sin of the individual is to awaken through the consequences of the sin the normal activities which are inhibited by the excess. It is this healthful, aggressive, moral attitude, which it seems to me is encouraged by the recognition that moral consciousness is the most concrete, the most inclusive of all. Here we must abstract from nothing, and

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here we cannot appeal from ourselves to a power without ourselves that makes for righteousness. In the fulness of immediate experience, with the consciousness that out of the struggle to act must arise all power to mediate action, lies salvation. In like manner evolution in moral conduct can appeal to no environment without to stamp itself upon the individual; nor to him to adapt himself to a fixed order of the universe, but environment as well as individual appears in immediate experience; the one coterminous with the other, and moral endeavor appears in the mutual determination of one by the other.

Nowhere is this point of view more needed than in the struggles which fill our industrial and commercial life. The individual is treated as if he were quite separable from his environment; and still more is the environment conceived as if it were quite independent of the individual. Both laborer and the society which employs him are exhorted to recognize their obligations to each other, while each continues to operate within its own narrow radius; and because the employer regards the labor union as a fixed external environment of his activity, and would have all the relations between laborer and employer determined by the method in which he bargains and does business, he becomes a narrow individualist; and because the laborer would determine these same relations by the methods which he has used in building up this union, he becomes a socialist. What will take that and other allied problems out of the vicious circles in which they are at present found, is the recognition that it is the incompleteness with which the different social interests are present that is responsible for the inadequacy of the moral judgments. If the community educated and housed its members properly, and protected machinery, food, market, and thoroughfares adequately, the problems at present vexing the industrial world would largely disappear. We resent the introduction of the standard of life into the question of the wages; and yet if the social activities involved in the conception of the standard of life were given full expression, the wage question would be nearly answered. Every such problem is the

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inevitable indication of what has been left undone, of impulses checked, or interest overlooked. We turn back to history and talk about the evolution of man as if his environment were not the projection of himself in the conditions of conduct, as if the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets were not the realization of all that is in us. The sources of power lie in that which has been overlooked. Again and again we are surprised to find that the moral advance has not been along the straight line of the moral struggles in which a sin seemed to be faced by righteous effort, but by the appearance of a novel interest which has changed the whole nature of the problem. If we were willing to recognize that the environment which surrounds the moral self is but the statement of the conditions under which his different conflicting impulses may get their expression, we would perceive that the reorganization must come from a new point of view which comes to consciousness through the conflict. The environment must change *pari passu* with the consciousness. Moral advance consists not in adapting individual natures to the fixed realities of a moral universe, but in constantly reconstructing and recreating the world as the individuals evolve.

The second implication to which reference has been made, is that we must find the interpretation of moral consciousness within the act. The appeal to a moral order which transcends either metaphysically or temporally the moral situation; the besetting assumption of the moralist that a moral reconstruction can be made intelligible only by a perfect moral order from which we have departed, or toward which we are moving, have very grave practical consequences which it becomes us to consider. In the first place these assumptions rob our moral consciousness of the intellectual interest which belongs to them of right. If morality connotes merely conformity to a given order, our intellectual reaction is confined to the recognition of agreement and disagreement, beyond that the moral reaction can be only emotional and instinctive. There may be, indeed, intellectual processes involved in stating this moral order, but such statement is con-

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fined, in the nature of the case, to apologetic and speculative thought to thought which cannot be a part of the immediate moral consciousness.

A moral order to which we must conform can never be built up in thought in the presence of an exigency. There are only two types of reaction in a practical situation. One may respond to well-recognized cues by well-formed habits, or one may adapt and reconstruct his habits by new interpretation of the situation. In the first instance we have habitual conduct, in the second that type of reaction which has been most explicitly worked out by the natural sciences. Most of our action, of course, falls within the first category, and involves no moral struggle. The second type, on the other hand, is that in which practically all our moral issues arise. If a practical scientific problem arises, such as the engineering problems in constructing railroads or driving tunnels, we recognize that the intellectual process by which the problem is solved cannot be a mere reference to a perfect model of conduct already in existence. On the contrary, just because the engineer is face to face with a real problem he must find in the physical situation facts of which he is at present ignorant, and at the same time readjust his habits; in fact, it is the possible readjustment of the habit that directs his attention in investigating the situation, and, on the other hand, what is discovered serves to mediate the formation of the new habit. In a word, there is the typical play of attention back and forth between perception and response. In any such process the criterion which governs the whole and its two phases—three phases if we distinguish between perception of the new data and the formation of the hypothesis by which they are interpreted and mediated in the response —can never be external to the process. There exists as yet no plan of procedure which the engineer discovers or receives as a vision in the mount. The control is found in the relation of the different phases of the act which have been sketched above. It is the possibility of reaction to a stimulus that holds the reaction in the field of investigation and it is the continued investigation of the field of stimulus which

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keeps the reaction continuous and pertinent. The control is then that which was earlier referred to as the process of evolution in which individual and environment mutually determine each other. It is the criterion of action, which uses working hypotheses, but which cannot possibly be identified with an external ideal. This process, whether met in the field of mechanical invention, or the range of engineering, or that of scientific research, is recognized as the most absorbing, most interesting, most fascinating intellectually with which the mind of man can occupy itself, and this interest belongs legitimately to the solution of every moral problem, for the procedure is identical intellectually.

Yet we succeed in robbing our reflective moral consciousness of a great part of this interest. For there is and can be no interest in merely identifying certain types of conduct with those found in a given theory. For example, there is no intellectual interest involved in merely identifying the control exercised by a financier over an industry with the concept of property, and justifying him in doing what he will, within the limits of the law, with his own. There may be a very vigorous emotional reaction against the suggestion that he be interfered with in these vested rights; or, on the other hand, against an institution of property which permits such individualistic exploitation of social values, but there is no intellectual interest except that which is either apologetic or purely speculative. It does not come into the moral reaction to the situation. And yet the enormous content of interest which does attach to these moral questions is attested by the social sciences which have sprung up and expanded in every college and university.

It is interesting to compare the intellectual treatment which such problems receive at the hands of the scientific investigator and the pulpit. In the latter there is at present no apparatus for investigation. The pulpit is committed to a right and wrong which are unquestioned, and from its point of view unquestionable. Its function then is not the intellectual one of finding out what in the new situation is right, but in inspiring to a right conduct which is supposed

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to be so plain that he who runs may read. The result has been that in the great moral issues of recent industrial history, such as the child labor, woman's labor, protection of machinery, and a multitude more, the pulpit has been necessarily silent. It had not the means nor the technique for finding out what was the right thing to do. The science of hygiene threatens the universal issue of temperance, while we can look forward to the time when investigation may enable us to approach understandingly the prostitute and her trade, and change the social conditions which have made her possible instead of merely scourging an abstract sin.

The loss to the community from the elimination of the intellectual phase of moral conduct it would be difficult to overestimate and this loss is unavoidable as long as the interpretation of conduct lies outside the immediate experience, as long as we must refer to a moral order without, to intellectually present the morality of conduct.

In conclusion may I refer to another loss which moral conduct dependent upon an external ideal involves. The interpretation of sin and wrong with reference to a moral order external to the conduct fails to identify the moral defect with the situation out of which it springs and by whose reconstruction it may be eliminated. An illustration will at once indicate, I think, what I have in mind. The responsibility for death and accident upon our railroads cannot be laid at the doors of the system and those that work it, if an abstract doctrine of property and contract is used to judge the conduct of railroad managers and directors. The imperative necessity of the situation is that responsibility should be tested by the consequences of an act; that the moral judgment should find its criterion in the mutual determination of the individual and the situation. As it is, men who would risk their own lives to save a drowning man, regard themselves as justified in slaughtering others by the thousand to save money. Abstract valuations take the place of concrete valuations, and as the abstract external valuations are always the precipitations of earlier conduct, they are pretty uniformly inadequate.

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But not only does an external moral ideal rob immediate moral conduct of its most important values, but it robs human nature of the most profound solace which can come to those who suffer—the knowledge that the loss and the suffering, with its subjective poignancy, has served to evaluate conduct, to determine what is and what is not worth while.

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WARS AND LABOR WARS.

"There has been an almost constant *state of war* between the miners' union and the mine owners."—Gov. Sparks of Nevada to President Roosevelt, Dec. 26, 1907.

"I renew my previous recommendation that the Congress favorably consider the matter of creating the machinery for compulsory investigation of such industrial controversies as are of sufficient magnitude and of sufficient concern to the people of the country as a whole to warrant the Federal government in taking action. . . . The creation of a board for compulsory investigation in cases where mediation fails and arbitration is rejected is the next logical step in a progressive program."—President Roosevelt's annual message to Congress, Dec. 4, 1907.

That there is a considerable fitness in calling a strike of wage-earners a labor war is shown by the very general use of the phrase. War has been defined by military writers as the application of force to make a peace that shall be consistent with desired conditions of existence. This definition would apply to a labor war, although in a labor war the legal weapon of coercion assumes a different form. "A collision of interests leads to war," writes the eminent German strategist, General Von der Goltz, in his military treatise; and thus he suggests to us the more concise definition—A war is a collision of interests. And this is still very close to the old definition by Grotius, the founder of international law, who defined war as "the state of those contending by force, as such." Strikes are that, and nothing else in the world.

"Collisions of interests" do not take place usually without effecting serious damage to society, whatever may be the

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special advantage gained by one of the belligerents. War between nations is accompanied by human slaughter, devastation, the disarrangement of industry and commercial exchanges, injury to neutrals—it is needless to recite the familiar catalogue of evils. Labor wars,[1] even when they are not accompanied by acts of violence, boycotts, and menaces to "scabs," usually are responsible for a serious train of economic injuries both to the contestants and to the community at large. As a measure of coercion, a strike is meant to hurt the employer, but in reality it hurts everyone within the circle of its influence. The Duke of Wellington once said that "nothing except a battle lost is half so melancholy as a battle won." And we may say that nothing except a strike that is lost is half so melancholy as a strike that is won.

One of the most singular aspects of the present situation is that while war itself is so ancient as a "right" that very few venture to dispute its claims to a venerable sanctity, the labor war has become possessed of a legal standing only within the past century. War has come down to us with aristocratic respectability and romantic glamor. It luxuriates in, and overawes us with, a social standing conceded by every century since mankind invented the bow and arrow. But few adequately realize, perhaps, that the labor war represents a very recent ascent from the pit of industrial slavery. It is one of the great compromises of the capitalistic and wage system forced by the ethical spirit of the modern age.

Go back into antiquity far enough—through the serfdom of the Middle Ages to the slavery that was the industrial corner stone of the empire of Rome—and the utter helplessness of the working population under the heel of their masters is one of the commonplaces of history. There were, indeed, labor wars even in those shadowy times, for occasionally slaves arose in rebellion and sought redress for their bitter grievances with fire and sword. The masters imperiously denied their claims and, with all the power and

[1] Owing to their comparatively small number, lockouts as causes of labor wars are not considered in this article.

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authority of the state behind them, they crushed "servile insurrection."

In those European countries which had felt the civilizing influence of Rome, chattel slavery and the serfdom of feudalism were succeeded by wage slavery, and we may properly characterize it in this harsh manner because of the laws which, in the period between the Crusades and the development of the steam engine, continued to shackle labor's freedom of action. The labor laws of England, from 1350 to 1875, were an extraordinary composite of tyranny and spoliation in the interest of the ruling classes. A statute of Edward VI provided that laborers could work only at a "certain price or rate," under penalty in certain cases "of the pillory or loss of an ear." Another statute provided that if a man refused to work at wages fixed by law he was to be branded with the letter "V" (meaning vagabond) and reduced to slavery for two years. If he attempted to escape, he was branded with an "S," and made a slave for life. If he then had spirit enough to protest, he was to be hanged. It was not until 1795 that an English workman could legally seek work outside of his own parish. Down to 1779, miners in Scotland were obliged to work in the pit as long as their employers chose to keep them there, and they were literally sold as part of the plant.

Conditions like these, of course, were nothing short of a very real form of wage slavery, and back of it all was the old common law conception of conspiracy. A strike in "the good old times" was a downright criminal conspiracy. The first strike case on record in English jurisprudence, decided in 1721, was notable for the establishment of the legal principle that "a conspiracy of any kind is illegal, although the matter about which they conspired might have been lawful for them to do, if they had not conspired to do it." It was declared, in short, not illegal for laborers to quit work in order to better their condition, yet a conspiracy to do so was criminal; and laborers could not possibly plan to quit in concert without entering a conspiracy.

The same conception was held by American courts early

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in the last century. Some Philadelphia shoemakers, in 1806, were convicted of a criminal conspiracy because they combined to compel some other shoemakers to quit work in order to secure higher wages. So long as a mere agreement among workmen to stop their labor simultaneously in order to secure an increase of wages was an indictable conspiracy, labor was necessarily in a helpless condition.

The experience of the New England cotton industry illustrates the severity of the conditions that formerly prevailed. The late Stephen A. Knight, of Providence, R. I., the president of the Hebron Manufacturing Company, was connected with this textile industry from the very tender age of seven until his death at about eighty. The mere fact that he entered a cotton mill as a bobbin boy at the age of seven years, at a wage of forty-two cents a week, illustrates the attitude of the public and mill owners toward child labor in the first half of the last century. The child worked fourteen hours a day for six full days each week. As Mr. Knight has written, in an article of reminiscences: "No daylight was wasted by the manufacturer. During the summer months we went in as early as we could see, without having waited for anything to eat. After working about an hour and a half we had half an hour for breakfast. At twelve o'clock we had another half hour for dinner, and then we worked until the light began to fail. The stars were out as we walked home for supper, and bedtime came quickly after the evening meal." Mr. Knight was accustomed to tell a story of his first employer's relations with his help that illustrated the position which mill owners then assumed. It is one of the most vivid and lifelike accounts of working-class conditions in New England sixty and seventy years ago that can now be found. Mr. Knight said:

"The mill was in the town of Coventry; its owner was one of the progressive and intelligent manufacturers of the day, who had been governor of the state and whose standards were as enlightened as any. And yet his attitude toward his help is illustrated in the following incident, which, though typical of all manufacturers of that day, was such as would not be tolerated to-day.

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"It was his custom to make a contract with his help on the first of April for the coming year. On one occasion a mother of several children who were employed in the mill, when making the contract with him, complained that the pay seemed small, and suggested that a better contract might be offered them.

"'You get enough to eat, don't you?' asked the employer.

"'Just enough to keep the wolf from the door,' she replied.

"'And you have enough clothes to wear, haven't you?' he continued.

"'Barely enough to cover our nakedness.'

"'Well,' said the employer, ending the interview, 'we want the rest;' and he undoubtedly considered his point of view the just and reasonable one."

The emancipation of labor from this kind of serfdom was inevitable in England and America, and how the legal changes in labor's status came about it is not necessary to show in detail. Through court decisions and statutes in this country, and finally by legislation in England, workmen were conceded the right to strike.

For it was recognized that wage labor must at least be given the chance to fight for its own protection and advancement. The wage system was to remain; that could not be abolished. Modern industrial society was not ready for a more advanced system of production, and this fact necessitated the concession to the working class of the right to wage labor wars, which are only to be regarded by society as a necessary evil designed to rescue the wage-earners from oppression and degradation, while a more perfect relation, as we hope, between employer and employed is being developed.

There is, of course, nothing whatever in the history of the concession of the right to strike that makes it appear an end in itself, having a strong moral sanction. And certainly there is nothing in the history of strikes the past half century to make us crave the permanent fastening of the labor war upon our civilization.

Necessary as the right to strike undoubtedly is in our time for the promotion of the interests of labor, from another point of view it marked a moral reversion, inasmuch as a strike, as a measure of coercion, is often an economic waste to society, a ruthless neglect of the legitimate interests of

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others, and a manifestation of class war. Surely the idea that what one person may fairly do all may do does not morally apply to the right to quit work. Concerted action in this direction has been made legal, for the imperative reasons referred to, yet its morality can still be challenged.

It is not too much to say that a strike of many workers may be a moral monstrosity, while the action of one worker in abandoning his employment has a negligible moral aspect. For the concerted action of the many has an injurious effect upon society at large. The economic waste involved in strikes affects not only those workers who sacrifice their wages for a time; it encompasses the employer in financial devastation and, more important still, it subjects to all manner of stringency innumerable persons who are not of the belligerent classes yet whose incomes and interests cannot be separated from the conditions prevailing in their corner of the industrial world.

The waste of strikes, to those immediately concerned, is a subject of familiar comment. The millions of dollars in wages lost by the workmen, the millions of dollars lost by the employers in unexecuted orders, depreciation of plant, falling off in business and dislocation of the trained labor supply—these facts need no emphasis. But the losses of the great non-combatant class, the public in general, are less heard of. Their interests are not only ignored, they are often seriously sacrificed. The non-combatants, who are the neutrals of labor warfare, are subjected to all the inconveniences of the cessation of industry and, when the war is over, the cost of it is often made a charge upon them in the higher prices of goods and services.

Employer and employed, after a protracted struggle, come to terms; the public pays the cost in increased plumbers' bills. A trolley strike comes on; the public walks. The telegraphers "walk out"; all commercial transactions, the dissemination of news and intelligence, are paralyzed. The garbage collectors in a great city cease their rounds; a vast community is instantly threatened with epidemics of disease from the filthy conditions that everywhere arise. Some

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weavers in a mill town "go out"; the grocer, the butcher, and the baker must whistle for their bills. The great anthracite coal industry is brought to a stop by a strike of the miners; millions of people spend the winter shivering over foul oil stoves and treacherous gas heaters. The associated cab drivers present an ultimatum; and it becomes impossible for days to bury the dead. Mr. Dooley has given a shrewdly humorous touch to this situation. After a long discussion of the strike question, Mr. Hennessey wisely remarked that capital and labor "ought to get together." "How cud they get anny closer together thin their prisint clinch?" answered Mr. Dooley very convincingly. "They're so close together now that those that ar-re between thim ar-re crushed to death."

Ethically considered, the right to strike is a right to injure and perhaps destroy the entire productiveness and happiness of people whose claims to consideration should not be ignored. That such a system of adjusting industrial grievances lacks a strong moral sanction, no one should deny. No group of men has a moral right to dislocate industry, to upset the industrial equilibrium of a whole community, to massacre the innocents of production in order even to improve its own economic status.

In legalizing labor wars, the state virtually recognized industrial classes as belligerents; and enough time has now elapsed to enable one to say that the long series of these wars and their highly probable continuance for an indefinite period, under present conditions, establishes the presumption that the wage system is a failure and must some time be replaced by another, which will not produce industrial classes with hostile interests and exacerbate society by their class antagonisms and hates. For the labor war, no less than the war between nations, cultivates prejudice, bitterness, and hatred — only these feelings affect classes within a nation rather than the nations themselves in their relations with each other.

In the period of transition it becomes important to know how society at large, which is the neutral party in labor wars,

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can best protect its interests as against those of the industrial belligerents, and also, by some process, reduce to a minimum the evils of these devastating hostilities. An aid to a solution of this question may, first of all, be found in a comparison of wars and labor wars in actual operation. Wherein do they resemble and differ from each other in theory and practice? Various points of similarity have already been suggested. Both meet the definition that war is a collision of interests; both are a recognized evil, albeit perhaps a necessary evil; both are measures of coercion; both cause serious injury, not only to the combatants, but to the non-combatants and neutrals over a very wide area; both arouse and develop abiding bitterness and hates, which are seen, in the one case, in "class consciousness" and, in the other, in national animosities; both have a legal sanction, the one in municipal law and the other in international law, a state of belligerency being in both cases duly provided for; both, ethically considered, may be defined as the exercise of the "right" to injure and perhaps to destroy the entire productiveness and happiness of other people.

In practice, there is one very important difference in the legal standing of the two kinds of warfare. In war, the combatants resort to actual physical violence, with full legal sanction; but in labor wars, there can be no legal resort whatever to physical violence in any form, and strikers are even legally restricted in the use of boycotts, threats, intimidation, "persuasion," "watching and besetting."

If war were as much restricted in its actual operations as labor wars, nations could still be in a state of belligerency but could not commit acts of physical violence against each other. This appears from the following statement by Professor Lawrence in his "Principles of International Law": "We speak of states as being belligerent, and thus indicate their condition, while we reserve the word 'war' for the series of hostile acts which take place during belligerency." The extreme to which these hostile acts in our own time may be carried is indicated by Prof. W. E. Hall in his "International Law," in saying: "When violence is permitted at all, the amount

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which is permissible is that which is necessary to attain the object proposed. The measure of the violence which is permitted in war is, therefore, that which is required to reduce the enemy to terms."

The difference between wars and labor wars at this point is exceedingly suggestive, inasmuch as in legalizing the strike the state has substantially provided for a condition of industrial belligerency, while inhibiting all hostile acts in the form of violence on the part of the belligerents. While international law recognizes as permissible in war that measure of violence "which is required to reduce the enemy to terms," municipal law concedes to combatants in labor disputes no such margin of physical coercion. The explanation of this marked divergence is simple, for the use of violence in international war cannot be so far restrained as to be forbidden absolutely, so long as there exists no power superior to nations, and strong enough to compel them to respect its decrees. In labor wars, however, the state is a power superior to the belligerents, and strong enough, theoretically at least, to command their respect for the limitations to warfare which it may impose. In the absence of such a restraint, experience demonstrates that labor wars would quickly rival international wars in the use of physical coercion; indeed, they would probably surpass them in the savagery and ferocity of violent methods. For, in labor wars, feelings of hatred are more easily and deeply aroused in the individual combatant with his personal interest at stake; whereas, in international, or even civil, wars the individual soldiers of one army generally entertain no bitterness toward the individuals of the opposing forces.

Having been allowed to enter a condition of legal industrial belligerency, it is necessary to recognize that strikers are under the most tremendous incentive to resort to violent methods to attain their ends. When we contemplate the barbarous license in this respect still demanded by states themselves in dealing with each other—and states are much more abstract entities, freer from passion and the compelling motive of acute personal interest than are labor unions—we

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must appreciate as never before the peculiarly delicate and even dangerous moral position in which the state has placed the warriors of labor, in conceding to them belligerent rights against their employers minus the war privilege of committing violent acts. Is it remarkable, under these circumstances, that so much unlawful violence attends the progress of strikes in all countries, including our own? Should we not be surprised there is so little? Is it not apparent that, in its tendency to acts of violence, the labor war obeys the same impulse that drives nations at war to kill each other's citizens and devastate each other's territory? The ethics of violence present no obstacle to such a tendency, since there is easily developed a class morality that excuses violent acts, even when illegal, just as national morality excuses all the crimes that make war so thoroughly beastly, even in its most highly organized state.

The temptations to strikers may be appreciated the more easily if we consider the lynching of negroes and homicide under the sanction of the "unwritten law." The lynching of negroes, in lawless disregard of the state's judiciary system, is usually a form of race war, inasmuch as the unmentionable crime sometimes committed by the negro is assumed to be an attack upon the white race in general and is resented as such by whole communities. The lynching is an act of violence as extreme as the most wanton murder, since it consists in taking human life in defiance of law and authority. Yet its morality is often defended by "the best citizens" in the communities where such events occur; and public sentiment tolerates these outrages to such an extent that lynching has become an established custom for certain crimes by negroes in large portions of the United States.

Homicides, under the "unwritten law," exhibit, in some states, a condition of public sentiment that is entirely favorable to their commission. Several cases in Belgium and in the older commonwealths of the United States, in 1907, notably in Virginia, Maryland, and Mississippi, which had involved murders because of some species of assault upon a woman's honor, were taken before the courts only to have

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the defendants acquitted of crime. In one notable Virginia case the presiding judge congratulated the jury upon its verdict of acquittal and, in a speech from the bench at the close of the trial, publicly indorsed homicides of this nature, notwithstanding that they could not possibly be reconciled with the law of the state or even with a decent regard for fairness toward the murdered victims. Governor Vardaman, of Mississippi, in pardoning Mrs. Birdsong, in the summer of 1907, boldly asserted that the homicide she had committed was morally justified, although the victim's offense had gone no farther than some alleged remarks reflecting upon the lady's private character.

The morality of these acts of violence, whether in lynchings or in murders under the "unwritten law," was not questioned by bodies of people large and powerful enough to dominate public sentiment in nearly all the regions where they were committed, and it is our privilege to institute some comparison between them and the acts of violence that often disfigure labor wars. It is not our purpose to palliate or excuse the one or the other, but to fix definitely upon the attention the fact that violent acts by strikers are no less justifiable in ethics, while they are even the more provoked by the conditions with which the law surrounds them. For the law, as has been pointed out, places strikers in a legal belligerent status while denying to them the privilege of using violent means to attain their ends.

When one reflects upon all these varieties of violence and the unblushing ethical sanction claimed for them — the slaughter and destruction of organized war between nations, the barbarism and even savagery of lynchings, which occasionally extends to burning at the stake, and the license of murder under the "unwritten law"—when one reflects upon it all, he can begin to understand that violence in strikes may also be morally condoned by those interested in its use as a weapon of labor warfare. If "good citizens" can approve of lynchings, if judges and governors can publicly applaud murders in "defense of a woman's honor," if the average moral sentiment of great civilized nations can glory

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in the organized massacres of the battlefield, why should anyone be surprised to find whole battalions of strikers who sincerely regard violent acts in labor wars as justifiable measures?

If Harry Orchard told the truth in his confession of assassinations during the labor wars of the Western Federation of Miners—and let us assume for the moment that he testified truthfully, notwithstanding the jury's verdict in the Haywood case—were not such acts the natural result of the conditions under which they were committed? The Orchard confession may be mentioned because it is the most extreme episode in the history of violence attending American labor warfare.

There is a striking passage in Orchard's "Autobiography," as published in *McClure's Magazine*. Speaking of the strike at Cripple Creek in 1903, Orchard writes: "In this strike, as in most others, the real issue at stake was soon lost sight of. . . . As frictions arise, as they surely will, most of the strikers forget the real cause of the strike, and although a man at first might not have been in sympathy with the strike and might have known it was wrong, as he sees the non-union men being shipped in and herded by the militia like cattle, he forgets all about this, and he hates these men and hates the militia, and they become more and more bitter toward each other. . . . The breach widens as the strike proceeds, and it is more like two hostile armies—only the strikers know they cannot fight in the open. After they are prodded around with a rifle and bayonet a while, they begin to think up some way to get even, and men will do things at such times, and feel justified in, that they would not think of at ordinary times."

There have been countless killings, maimings, and beatings in the long record of strikes in this country, yet the Orchard catalogue of murder, incredible as it may seem, may be regarded as the legitimate fruit of the tree.

How easily the violence begins! Like violence in war, it is in the first instance a weapon used for no personal end but rather for a group or class engaged in an associated struggle

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against a powerful foe. The bomb for the destruction of the property of a mine being operated by "scab" workmen—how easily it comes to be thrown! Once exploded, it is morally no worse than the burning at the stake, or the murder under the "unwritten law." Then the assassination to remove a particularly hated enemy—a pugnacious superintendent, an obnoxious foreman, a "scab," a dozen "scabs"—how much it must seem to the perpetrators like war itself! Can we not imagine even an Orchard at last schooled to the conception that his shocking crimes, far from being personal acts, are merely the supreme manifestation of labor warfare, and that his terrible bombs may be planted with as much ethical sanction as the batteries of opposing armies may hurl their shrapnel into the enemy's lines?

Let us not forget that violence fattens upon itself. Long after the American Civil War, General Sherman, defending the conduct of his troops in South Carolina, said to Carl Schurz: "Before we got out of that state the men had so accustomed themselves to destroying everything along the line of march that sometimes, when I had my headquarters in a house, that house began to burn before I was fairly out of it. The truth is, human nature is human nature. You take the best lot of young men—all church members, if you please—and put them into an army, and let them invade the enemy's country and live upon it for any length of time, and they will gradually lose all principle and self-restraint to a degree beyond the control of discipline. It always has been and always will be so." If General Sherman's army of young church members would act in that way, what is one to expect from certain kinds of men who get desperately involved in labor wars? As the general said, human nature is human nature.

Nor can we ignore the fact that violence in labor wars may be susceptible of a certain philosophical defense in the "class morality" which is emphasized by some socialist writers on the "class struggle." If there is a class struggle, as Karl Marx and his followers have maintained, the labor war certainly embitters it and tends to emphasize not only the class

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interest, but the class morality that accompanies a class interest. The practical effect of two classes in industrial war, exactly as in the case of two nations at war, is that each side tends to minimize those moral precepts which especially interfere with its own operations, while it places all possible emphasis upon those precepts which the enemy finds it to his interest to violate. We observe, for example, that the ruling class of a country will view with the utmost equanimity the employment of all forms of violence in a foreign war in which it is concerned, but will sternly reprobate the slightest evidence of physical coercion in a strike of workmen. The capitalistic class considers itself persecuted if the laws against corporate abuses are enforced—the proof of which has but lately been offered in America. But the same class and its newspaper organs will appeal fervently for law enforcement whenever the issue arises whether "scab" workmen and strike breakers shall be protected from violence and intimidation. So, too, labor unions want the conspiracy laws sternly enforced against the trusts but not in the least against themselves. The entire influence of such conditions is to develop class moralities, in exactly the same way as different races, living under diverse economic, social, and religious systems, develop very distinct ethical concepts regarding the most primary relations of life. The Arctic Eskimo, referred to by Doctor Nansen in one of his books, was horrified at the sanguinary accounts of the wars between nations down in civilization, but he had certain loose ideas of his own concerning the marriage relation that would shock an average American community.

General Von der Goltz, in writing a few years ago of a possible war between Germany and England, was not thinking of strikes by wage-earners when he declared so flatly that "violence is a right for people who fear for their existence." Yet if labor union philosophy should claim that same right in practice, need we wonder at labor union pretensions? If a whole people have the moral right to resort to violence when they fear for their existence, may not bands of strikers, who fear for their bread and butter, and whose "jobs" are

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their existence in a real sense perhaps—may they not also resort to it? By what divine moral sanction could General Von der Goltz condemn labor union violence in a struggle involving, let us assume, the most vital interests of wage-earners, while approving violence in a nation's struggle for expansion or again political domination by its neighbor?

Surely, Labor has a right to ask these questions and to demand an answer. It is not enough to point out the majesty of the law, for Labor may retort: "Who makes the law?" Labor can quote from the essays of Captain Mahan, our foremost defender of war as a factor in human progress, such passages as these: "We speak of law with bated breath, as though it were some self-existent being; a reverence probably due to the superabundance of lawyers in representative governments." And again: "There is unquestionably a higher law than Law, concerning obedience to which no other than the man himself, or the state, can give account to Him that shall judge." And this is Captain Mahan, in the act of justifying war. Law makes violence by nations right; law makes violence by strikers wrong; but what does morality say concerning such a discrimination?

If the issue be referred to morality, we have already seen how easily the ideas of "class ethics" may justify labor union violence. Certain conduct may seem to *us* immoral, but Karl Kautsky, the socialist philosophical writer, declares that it is not necessarily immoral because it contradicts our own moral code. The wage-earning class may have its own code of morality, according to him, and, in that case, it might be as easy to claim violence as a moral "right" in labor wars as it is for General Von der Goltz to claim it for peoples or nations in international wars.

The ultimate danger to society and to the state that may develop from these possible divergences in the ethical ideals of different classes, that have varying social needs and economic interests, cannot be ignored now that the state has legalized that form of open belligerency known as the strike. For the strike creates conditions of active antagonism that tempt the belligerents into forms of violence, and, if class

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morality should give to that violence a moral sanction, then the way might be prepared for a catastrophe, that is, for civil war or revolution. This is the ultimate danger; and that it may be a real danger appears in the growing intensity and savagery of the labor wars in our time, culminating in the strikes conducted in the Rocky Mountain states the past few years by the western miners. The free use of the shot gun and dynamite in Idaho and Colorado will serve as a warning to people who see in social order the great security of the country's institutions.

Does the world's experience with war afford us any guidance in regulating or restraining labor wars, in the interests of society as a whole? The question whether strikes should be forbidden entirely is not now an open one, apparently. So long as the wage system endures and the state does not intervene with courts of compulsory arbitration for all conceivable disputes between employer and employed, the right to strike will have to be conceded. The wage system may have broken down, in theory, but nothing perfect in theory ever seems to work perfectly in practice; nearly everything that works is a compromise of some sort, and working systems are almost always the resultants of conflicting forces. We must take things as they are and constantly strive to adapt existing institutions and systems to our needs. When Mr. Jaures, the Socialist leader in the French Chamber of Deputies, defined a strike as a state of war, the premier, Mr. Clemenceau, answered by saying that it was not simply a war between two adversaries, but a war between two adversaries *at the expense of the public.* And then, Mr. Clemenceau declared that the right of the state to intervene "is the right that society has to live." For behind both capital and labor is society as a whole, whose interests are paramount. It is in this view of the case that one should consider the question of the proper restraint and regulation of labor wars. Does the world's experience with war in all the ages help society in formulating a policy?

Notwithstanding Field Marshal Von Moltke's declaration that "war is a link in God's management of the universe"

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and that "without war the world would smother itself in the swamp of materialism," mankind's experience has encompassed a process of restriction upon the methods of warfare really impressive to consider. The nations, in response to developing ethical and humanitarian conceptions, have for centuries been placing restrictions upon the military methods of contending forces. The "rights" of belligerents have been steadily cut down and narrowed, while the rights of neutrals and the rights of humanity have steadily risen in the scale. The right to wage war to-day does not imply the same degree of license to burn, plunder, ravish, and massacre as it did centuries ago. The women of a conquered province or city are not now made captives and turned over to the conquering soldiers to satisfy their lust. The entire garrison of a fortified town that refuses to surrender on demand is not in our time put to the sword when the town is finally carried by assault. Captured soldiers are not made into slaves.

Alexander Hamilton, in a letter to Colonel Laurens concerning the execution of Major André as a spy, said that the maxims and practices of war were "the satires of human nature." That they are less so to-day than in Hamilton's time is shown by the fact that while England employed the North American savages as allies in the American Revolution, she carefully refrained from employing the South African savages against the Boers one hundred and twenty-five years later. Even private property is now much more respected than formerly and, on land at least, it is not taken without compensation by an invading army. The changes that have been effected through the insistence of neutrals have been very important. The decrees of Napoleon and the British orders in council would be impossible to-day, and neutral commerce in war time is now protected as it never was prior to the second American war with England. Mercenaries are a thing of the past, and privateering has been finally abolished. Civilized states, indeed, pride themselves upon these numerous restrictions on the primitive savagery of war and they are regarded as the marks that distinguish civilization from barbarism.

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This restrictive process upon war is in progress in our own time, and it will always be felt while war endures. The recent Hague peace conference was a notable illustration of the new impetus that has been given to measures of military regulation. That conference disappointed many people because it failed to score great achievements for the cause of peace, yet it accomplished something for the further restriction of the license of war. It regulated the rights of belligerents in laying submarine mines and placed them under narrow limitations in bombarding towns from the sea. It dealt with the treatment of captured crews and the transformation of merchant vessels into warships. It regulated the use of wireless telegraphy, on neutral soil, for the benefit of belligerents. It created an international prize court, an absolute innovation in warfare. It mitigated to some extent the international nuisance of collecting contractual debts by armed force. All these matters attracted slight attention, yet they illustrated the fact that war is constantly being regulated, restricted, hemmed in like a conflagration, in response to the imperative demand of civilization.

If the analogy has force, the state may do for the regulation of labor wars what the international conscience and neutral interests have done for the regulation of armies and navies. The community as a whole may step in between industrial belligerents and require such restrictions upon their respective "rights" as the interests of society seem to dictate. It is not necessary at this moment to inquire to what extent this restrictive process should go, except to point out that, of course, labor's power of self-protection must be preserved, in so far as such power may be necessary under the wage system to prevent labor from sliding back into its old-time condition of semi-slavery.

There is, however, not the remotest danger of such a deplorable reaction, for, whereas, in the days when strikes were forbidden altogether, the state regulated labor wars mainly in the interest of the master or employer class, to-day the state must regulate them in the interest of society as a whole. For it is inconceivable that, under universal suffrage and re-

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publican institutions, the legislatures, Congress, and the courts could be so manipulated as to oppress the wage earning people of this country. The actual tendency is in the other direction, because of the latent political power of Labor in democratic countries. As never before, politicians and statesmen, whether in France, England, the United States, or even Russia, have come to appreciate the force of Mirabeau's remark to the privilege classes, during the French Revolution: "Take care," he cried, "not to irritate this people that produces everything and that, to make itself formidable, has only to become motionless." It was a people becoming motionless only two years ago that forced from a reluctant autocrat the grant of parliamentary institutions in Russia. And, as a last resort, there must ever remain to all peoples the right of revolution.

Protected by universal suffrage, therefore, Labor can have no reasonable ground of complaint if the state intervenes in labor wars in order to compass their restriction within limits which society can endure without damage to its most vital economic and moral interests. The process of restriction, as in the case of international wars, is already going on. How far the courts should go in applying to strikes and boycotts the arbitrary judicial power of injunction is a grave question; more promising, because more in harmony with the democratic spirit, is the tendency toward arbitration, whether voluntary or involuntary, and also the compulsory investigation of industrial disputes. In conclusion, let us remind ourselves once more how closely the parallel continues to run between wars and labor wars.

Is it not remarkable that to-day the movement for compulsory arbitration should meet at substantially the same point the reactionary forces in both wars and labor wars? At the recent Hague international conference compulsory arbitration between nations was not seriously considered; yet there was an effort made to commit the powers to a compulsory investigation of international quarrels, with all possible publicity of the results of the investigation, before the nations in controversy should be permitted to draw the sword. This

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effort failed at The Hague, but right at that point now rests the peace movement.

The parallel now reaches its fitting culmination in the fact that, in his recent annual message to Congress, President Roosevelt recommended, in view of the great increase in strikes and lockouts in recent years, that a law be enacted "creating the machinery for compulsory investigation of industrial controversies." In short, the President asks for exactly the sort of regulation of labor wars that was asked at The Hague for international wars. That this measure is practicable and will sometime be applied with very advantageous results, in this country, can scarcely be doubted. It is already embodied in Canadian law.

The ideal way to abolish war is to obliterate possible belligerents by merging all the nations into a single world state. Likewise, the ideal way to abolish labor wars is to obliterate possible belligerents by socializing industry through the elimination of the wage system and of industrial classes. In short, a form of socialism would be the outcome in the one case, as the world state dreamed of by Dante would be in the other. But these ideals are too remote. It may be, as Emerson said of the immortality of the soul, they are "too good to be believed." Meanwhile, each generation has its special work to do, and the work of ours and of the succeeding one, so far as wars and labor wars are concerned, is to minimize their destructiveness and waste, and to repair the moral damage they inflict upon us.

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THE ETHICS OF NIETZSCHE.

Between philosophy and poetry a sharp contrast is sometimes drawn.

> "Do not all charms fly
> At the bare touch of cold philosophy?
> There was an awful rainbow once in heaven;
> We know her woof, her texture; she is given
> In the dull catalogue of common things.
> Philosophy will clip an angel's wings,
> Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
> Empty the haunted air and gnomed mine."

That Keats was right in this even Paracelsus at last confesses. Nevertheless, below the contrast there lies a deeper unity. The spirit of wonder and reverence that prompts the greatest poetry is also the impulse to philosophy. Philosopher and poet confront the same problem. The difference between them is not in attitude but in method, the one following the hard road of systematization, the other flying to the same goal on wings of intuition. In some parts of the field of truth, no doubt, men who work by these divergent ways are apt as men to represent antithetical types. But over the whole field this need not be so, for in some parts of it the main work of systematization is just to cut away obstructions from intuition. This is the case in ethics. Systematic work in that department is, as I conceive it, almost wholly negative; its business is just this, to break down those false systems which our irrational thirst for unity has set up and which, so long as they hold the field, blur and obscure insight. Positive construction in ethics *is* insight and little else. Here poet and philosopher meet; and that is why Nietzsche, musician and artist to the core as he is, is nevertheless a philosopher also.

The poetical element in him, while it makes his work literature, does not and cannot be expected to permit the comprehension of it as a whole to be easy. His exposition is disjointed, sometimes almost incoherent. Some methodo-

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logical key we must bring to the task ourselves, if we are to hope to understand him. The key which I propose to employ is the familiar and time-worn distinction between means and end. It is by ignoring this distinction and assuming that Nietzsche is condemning *in themselves* things which he really condemns only as means that the popular conception of his teaching seems to me to have lapsed most signally from truth.

I.

Let me begin by stating the general problem of practical ethics. Our ultimate goal, of course, is to promote the greatest possible amount of goodness in itself. Since, however, everything that there is produces effects, we cannot always work with success toward this end by manufacturing things that are good in that way. For these things may produce other things bad in themselves, and the badness of the effects may outweigh the goodness of the original cause. It is this practical difficulty, stated here of design in very abstract form, which Nietzsche envisaged in the concrete and from which, as a center, a great part of his teaching radiates. It is his clear view that certain things admittedly bad in themselves are nevertheless desirable on the whole because of the predominating goodness of their effects and also that certain other things, admittedly good in themselves, ought to be destroyed because their effects are more than equivalently bad. I shall illustrate these two points in turn.

Of things admittedly bad in themselves, suffering or pain is one. Nietzsche, in my opinion, knew this perfectly well; and *pace* certain paraders of paradox, I can find no ground for attributing to him the opposite opinion. But, while he knew this, he knew also that suffering often produces other states of mind that are good in themselves. Therefore, shaking himself angrily free from that sentimental sympathy which looks to the moment only, he welcomes suffering and will not have it done away. "The discipline of suffering," he writes, "of *great* suffering—know ye not that it is only *this* discipline that has produced all the elevation of humanity hitherto? The

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tension of soul in misfortune which communicates to it its energy, its shuddering in view of rack and ruin, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting, and exploiting misfortune, and whatever depth, misery, disguise, spirit, artifice or greatness has been bestowed upon the soul—has it not been bestowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering?"[1] And, as things have been in the past, so in this respect, must they always be. Even when beyond-man is perfected, this discipline must continue. The beyond-man must have a beyond-dragon that is worthy of him.[2]

Nor is suffering the only thing bad in itself that is in Nietzsche's view desirable by reason of its effects. He speaks in the same tone of that bondage of the spirit, which, according to him, Christianity produced in Europe during the Middle Ages. "This tyranny, this arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has *educated* the spirit; slavery, both in the coarser and finer sense, is apparently an indispensable means even of spiritual education and discipline;"[3] and again, "Many there are who threw away everything they were worth when they threw away their servitude."[4]

In these two instances it will be noticed that the evil which Nietzsche would retain produces its good effects in the persons upon whom it itself impinges, so that each person is better on the whole than he would have been if it had not been there. This condition is, however, by no means essential to his view. If an evil will produce more than equivalent good effects he is indifferent to where these goods are located. He is prepared to sacrifice one man for the good of other men in just the same way as he is prepared to sacrifice one aspect of a man for the good of his other aspects. Hence his thesis that there are gradations of rank among persons, that "moral systems must be compelled first of all to bow before gradations of rank," and that "it is immoral to say that what is

[1] "Beyond Good and Evil" (English tr. by Helen Zimmerman), p. 171.
[2] "Thus spake Zarathustra" (English tr. by Alexander Tille), p. 211.
[3] "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 109.
[4] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 85.

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right for one is proper for another." [5] The point is that some persons, being incapable of realizing any large good in themselves, contribute best to the goodness of the whole by remaining bad in themselves, and in their badness serving merely as means. In this category apparently Nietzsche places all the women in the world. No higher education of woman for him. "Her first and last function is that of bearing robust children." [6] She must not in any way be "cultivated," lest her fitness for that office be impaired. And the same is true of all common people. They too promote goodness best when, at the sacrifice of all chance of goodness located in them, they remain evil and serve as means. "The essential thing in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should *not* regard itself as a function either of kingship or the commonwealth, but as the *significance* and highest justification thereof—that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, *for its sake*, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is *not* allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher *existence;* like those sun-seeking climbing plants in Java—they are called Sipo Matador—which encircle an oak so long and so often with their arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness." [7]

From this last instance of badness that should be retained for the sake of good effects, we pass easily to cases of goodness that should be destroyed to obviate bad effects. It is here that Nietzsche's great denunciations enter and here that through them he has been widely misunderstood. The point may be put broadly in this way. Among the qualities usually considered virtues sympathy and love for other men occupy

[5] "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 165.
[6] Ibid, p. 187.
[7] Ibid, p. 225.

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a high place. Nietzsche finds, however, that the *actions* to which these qualities prompt are frequently of a kind to produce bad effects. They lead to the preservation of many persons, who, when the good of future generations is taken into account, had, on the whole, better be allowed to perish. Hence, he calls in the first instance for a change of *action* on the part of sympathetic and altruistic persons. "Do I command you to love your neighbor? I rather command you to flee from your neighbor and to love the most remote. Love unto the most remote future-man is higher than love unto your neighbor. And I consider love unto things and ghosts to be higher than love unto men. This ghost which marcheth before thee, my brother, is more beautiful than thou art. Why dost thou not give him thy flesh and thy bones?" [8] "What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal." [9] "Thus my great love unto the most remote commandeth: 'Spare not thy neighbor! Man is something that must be surpassed.'" [10] "Myself I sacrifice unto my love, and my neighbor as myself, thus runneth the speech of all creators." [11] That this is not an easy or a light thing Nietzsche, himself tender and pitiful, feels most keenly. "This is hardest," exclaims Zarathustra, "to shut one's open hand because of love." [12] "This, this in *my* declivity and my danger, that my glance hurleth upward and my hand would fain clutch and lean upon—depth!

My will clingeth round man; with chains I bind myself unto man because I am torn upwards unto beyond-man. For thither mine other will is longing." [13]

"*Love* is the danger of the loneliest one, love unto everything *if it only live.* Laughable, verily, is my folly and my modesty is love." [14]

"In sparing and pity lay always my greatest danger, and all human kind wisheth to be spared and endured. With

[8] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 81.
[9] Ibid, p. 8.
[10] Ibid, p. 296.
[11] Ibid, p. 125.
[12] Ibid, p. 113.
[13] Ibid, p. 208.
[14] Ibid, p. 225.

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truths kept back, with a foolish hand and a befooled heart, and rich with the small lies of pity, thus have I always lived among men." [15]

This pity could with sternness be beaten down for the wretched and the small, but to beat down pity for the higher man, that was the *last sin* to which the evil announcer summoned Zarathustra. "Then Zarathustra was silent and confused and agitated. At last he asked like one hesitating: 'And who is it whom thou callest so?'

" 'Thou knowest well,' answered the fortune-teller, hotly. 'Why dost thou hide thyself? The *higher man* it is who calleth for thee!'

" 'The higher man?' shouted Zarathustra, horror stricken. 'What wanteth *he?* What wanteth *he?* The higher man! What wanteth he here?" And sweat brake out all over his skin.[16]

" 'Unto my last sin?' cried Zarathustra, and angrily laughed at his own word. '*What* hath been reserved for me as my last sin?'

"And once more Zarathustra sank into himself and again sat down on the great stone and meditated. Suddenly he jumped up.

" '*Pity, pity for the higher man!*' he cried out, and his face turned into brass. 'Up! *That* hath had its time.' " [17]

There can, I think, be little doubt that in all this there is a certain confusion between states of minds and conduct resulting from them. It is not really sympathy for his neighbor that Nietzsche condemns, but certain kinds of anti-social actions resulting from that sympathy. This, I think, is clearly shown in a passage in "Beyond Good and Evil," in which he refers to the so-called *paramount* religions. The passage runs:

"One has to thank them for invaluable services, and who is sufficiently rich in gratitude not to feel poor at the contemplation of all that the 'spiritual men' of Christianity have done for Europe hitherto! They have given comfort to the suf-

[15] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 274.
[16] Ibid, p. 357.
[17] Ibid, p. 488.

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ferers, courage to the oppressed and despairing, a staff and support to the helpless!" [18] This and the spirit that prompted it he does not condemn, but rather praises. What he does condemn in them is that "they have kept the type of 'man' upon a lower level—they have preserved too much *that which should have perished.*" For to work for the preservation of all the sick and suffering "means indeed and in truth to work for *the deterioration of the European race.*" [19]

It is thus a misunderstanding of Nietzsche to assert that he condemns sympathy and love even as a means. What he condemns is the direction which it at present takes, and it is only when he finds it impossible to alter its direction that he is driven to his sternest cry that the good men who will not change in this must perish for the sake of the greater good of the whole. This is the meaning of Zarathustra's cry:

"Oh my brethren, understood ye this word? And what I said of the last man?

"With whom is the greatest danger for the whole human future? Is it not with the good and just?

"*Break, break the good and just!* Oh, my brethren, understood ye this word?" [20]

II.

This completes the first half of my paper. I now pass away from the problem of practical ethics and turn instead to the fundamental problem of theoretical ethics, the problem of determining what things are good in themselves. Nietzsche's solution of this problem is found in his discussions of Beyond-man. With most modern writers he holds that ultimate goodness does not belong to anything but conscious persons, and in these discussions he tries to display the kind of conscious persons to whom it does belong. Those persons are beyond-men. "Beyond-man is my care; with me, *he* and *not* man is the first and only thing. Not the neighbor,

[18] "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 83.
[19] Ibid, p. 83.
[20] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 317.

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not the poorest one, not the greatest sufferer, not the best one;" [21] and again, "I teach you beyond-man; man is something that shall be surpassed; what have ye done to surpass him?" [22] Our business is to examine this conception of beyond-man who is thus announced as the repository of all good. Before, however, that can be done profitably, the ground must be cleared of certain actual or possible misunderstandings.

It is hardly necessary, perhaps, to say in the first place, that Nietzsche's conception of the beyond-man has nothing to do with any higher form of existence to which actual men may attain after bodily death. He definitely repudiates any such idea. "I love those who do not seek behind the stars for a reason to perish and be sacrificed, but who sacrifice themselves to earth in order that earth may some day become beyond-man's." [23] "Remain faithful to earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of super-terrestrial hopes." [24] It is easy to recognize here a literary kinship with George Meredith. Beyond-earths and Paradises have no place in Nietzsche's philosophy.

The second preliminary point is more difficult. Is beyond-man, in whom alone ultimate good resides, conceived by Nietzsche as future or as present? Comte, it will be remembered, and George Meredith find the goal of their endeavor in the future exclusively. The sole function of this generation is, in their view, to sacrifice itself for posterity. That far-off divine event commands their lives.

> "The young generation! Ah, there is the child
> Of our souls down the ages."

Nor is Nietzsche without analogous passages. Angered by the pettiness of the men around him, he often seems to say that beyond-man is in no sense to be found among them. "Ye become ever smaller, ye small folk! Ye comfortable ones,

[21] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 429.
[22] Ibid, p. 5.
[23] Ibid, p. 8.
[24] Ibid, p. 5.

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ye crumble away." [25] "Strange and a mockery to me are the present ones unto whom my heart hath driven me of late. Banished am I from my fathers' and my mothers' lands. Thus I love only my *children's* land, the undiscovered, in the remotest sea. For it I bid my sails seek and seek." [26]

I do not think, however, that this passage is really decisive. No doubt Nietzsche looked to the future as a more secure seat for beyond-man than the present; but this does not necessarily imply that he regarded it as his *only* seat. There is still an ambiguity analogous to that involved in the Kingdom of God of Christian Theology. That kingdom is regarded by the New Testament writers sometimes as a future form of world polity, at other times as a state of heart which may exist in people at any period in the worlds' history. In like manner, it is not entirely clear in Nietzsche's writings whether beyond-man is a kind of man who, it is hoped, will appear in the future, or whether, as we may say, beyond-man is within you now as well as then. Further, it is not only, as I think, the difficulty that is the same in the two cases. The solution also is the same. Beyond-man and the Kingdom of God both mean in their deepest use a state of heart. There is no reason inherent in the nature of things why this state of heart should not be found in greater or less measure among people as they are here and now. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so found to any large extent. Consequently, Christian theology and Nietzsche alike look forward to a future time when this good thing, now rarely and spasmodically seen, will dominate the world. The Kingdom of God and beyond-man—the case is the same with both—are at once present *and* future.

If this be so—if beyond-man is a kind of concreted whole summarizing Nietzsche's views of what qualities are good in themselves and as ends—to promote beyond-man means simply to promote the development of those good qualities whether among present or among future people. We may, therefore, pass to our final question, that of determining what qualities

[25] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 251.
[26] Ibid, p. 173. *Cf.* also p. 303.

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Nietzsche considered to belong to beyond-man and so to be good in themselves.

On this point the evidence in the two books that are reputed to contain the gist of his ethical teaching, "Thus spake Zarathustra," and "Beyond Good and Evil" is scanty but fairly explicit. We learn that beyond-man is a person of "lofty spirituality." His morality is the noble morality as distinguished from the slave-morality; and "faith in oneself, pride in oneself, a radical enmity and irony towards all 'selflessness' belong to the noble morality."[27] Again: "Brave, unconcerned, scornful, violent—thus wisdom would have us to be; she is a woman and ever loveth the warrior only."[28] Again: "What is good, ye ask? To be brave is good."[29] And yet again: "Free from the happiness of slaves; saved from gods and adorations; fearless and fear-inspiring; great and lonely; this is the will of the trustful ones."[30]

The same view is implied indirectly in Nietzsche's manifold denunciations of men as they are. "Verily, I laughed many a time over the weaklings that thought themselves good because they had lame paws."[31] "Not your sin, your moderation crieth unto heaven; your miserliness in sin even crieth unto heaven."[32] "Oh, that ye would renounce that half-willing and resolve upon idleness as one resolveth upon action! Oh, that ye would understand my *word:* 'Be sure to do whatever ye like—but first of all be such as *can will.*'"[33] "Verily, like preachers of penitence and fools, I proclaimed wrath and slaughter against their great and small things. 'Oh, that their best things are so very small! Oh, that their evilest things are so very small!'"[34] "Not unto *that* stake of torture was I fixed that I know man is wicked.

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[27] "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 229.
[28] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 49.
[29] Ibid, p. 60.
[30] Ibid, p. 145.
[31] Ibid, p. 169.
[32] Ibid, p. 7.
[33] Ibid, p. 252.
[34] Ibid, p. 293.

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But I cried, as no one hath ever cried: 'Alas, that his wickedness is so very small! Alas that his best is so very small!' "[85]

Strength and energy then, I take it, is for Nietzsche the primary quality of beyond-man. It is an essential ingredient in all real goodness. But it is not the only ingredient. It is also necessary that there be no one-sidedness. This is the theme of Zarathustra's very striking speech about Reversed Cripples:

"And when I came out of my solitude and crossed this bridge for the first time I trusted not mine eyes, and gazed there again and again, and said at last: 'That is an ear, an ear as great as a man!' I gazed there still more thoroughly. And really, under the ear something moved, which was pitifully small and poor and slender. And, truly, that immense ear was carried by a small, thin stalk; and the stalk was a man! He who would put a glass before his eye could even recognize a small envious face; also that a little bloated soul was hanging down from the stalk. The folk, however, informed me that that great ear was not only a man, but a great man, a genius. But I never believed the folk when they spake of great men—and kept my belief that he was a reversed cripple who had too little of all things and too much of one thing."[86]

The difficulty about this illustrative statement is its merely negative character. Its positive correlate and the ideal to which it points is of course that of wholeness, the full and harmonious development of all our capacities. On this aspect of things, indeed, Nietzsche says little, but enough to reveal his mind. Thus he tells us that in beyond-man even the evil qualities must be present. "The evilest is necessary for the best of beyond-man."[87] It may be interesting to note too that sympathy, which as I have already said, is popularly supposed to be totally condemned by Nietzsche, is accorded a place: "Be sure to love your neighbor as yourselves, but first

[85] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 326. *Cf.* also pp. 282, 283.
[86] P. 201, 202.
[87] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 430.

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be such as love themselves." [38] And again: "A man who is *master* by nature; when such a man has sympathy, well! that sympathy has value." [39]

The manifold difficulty of this view is well known. Others beside Nietzsche—T. H. Green, for instance, at one of the discordant poles of his thought—have held the good life to consist in the full and harmonious development of all our capacities. But in every case the same objections hold good. It is not merely that human beings possess capacities that, so far as experience goes, are in large measure mutually exclusive; that we do not find the pitiless man also markedly pitiful or the rash man markedly deliberate. For, conceivably, under some "ultimate angels' law" these psychological incompatibilities might be found lying together in unity. But what is the precise significance of "fullness" and "harmony" of development? If we try to give clear meaning to these ideas, are we not reduced to saying that our various capacities ought to be developed in "right" or "proper" proportions? Unfortunately, however, an ideal framed in that way is no solution to the ethical problem. It does not answer, but merely states that problem; for the whole difficulty is to determine *what* proportions are right or proper.

To this difficulty Nietzsche at one place in "Beyond Good and Evil," does indeed suggest an answer. The capacities ought to be developed, he seems to say, so far as they make for life—serve "as factors which must be present, fundamentally and essentially, in the general economy of life (which must therefore be further developed if life is to be further developed)." [40] I do not know how far this suggestion is to be taken seriously. Its inadequacy, I think, is obvious. Mere quantity of life does not present itself to our consciousness as the only good thing; it may not even present itself as necessarily good at all. What we want to discover is the nature of the *good life*. It is contrary to our whole ethical experience to believe that the good life is merely life,

[38] "Thus spake Zarathustra," p. 252.
[39] "Beyond Good and Evil," p. 259.
[40] Ibid, p. 33.

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and that all sorts and conditions of life are equally good. I conclude, therefore, and I suspect that in most moods Nietzsche would have conceded, that the nature and qualities of Beyond-man have not been determined. He is still the ghost that marches before us, more beautiful than we are, but only dimly seen. He does not stand out clear-cut against the sky as an artist in ethics would wish. Still, for Zarathustra, the man of practice, he suffices; for he points him the way to his work.

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EVOLUTION AND THE SELF-REALIZATION THEORY.

The doctrine that self-realization is the supreme end in the moral life has many advantages over rival theories in ethics. As the chief of its merits, this view of morality affirms the dependence of the Good upon the nature of man. Authority is attributed to the Ideal because it represents the whole nature of the human individual, and indicates the conditions to be fulfilled if he is to realize all his capabilities. Thus the self-realization theory relieves morality of that arbitrary and external character which it has when the authority of the Ideal is derived from an extrinsic source. Intuitionism proved untenable because it maintained that the different moral laws possessed absolute and arbitrary authority. We believe that to hold such a view and to consider duty as an injunction laid on man from without, regardless of his needs and inclinations, is to declare morality essentially irrational and the ethical problem by nature insoluble.

But if "self-realization" is especially reasonable because it shows how the *summum bonum* is grounded in human nature, the great danger which lurks in the theory is a consequence of this very insight. Emphasizing the relative character of morality, it is apt to neglect the authority which attaches to its behests, and to interpret the moral life as an intelligent

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pursuit of self-interest. In fact the chief defect of the theory is this tendency to become a merely prudential or even egoistic scheme of life. The existence of such a tendency is easy to explain. The Good is interpreted as the realization of all the capabilities of human nature. As that which satisfies all his needs, the moral ideal expresses the whole interest of the individual. It corresponds, therefore, to the demands of an enlightened prudence. Prudence and goodness are thus identical. As their identity becomes more plain, it tends to appear more direct and immediate. Hence to the individual the pursuit of virtue becomes equivalent to that ordering of conduct and regulating of impulse which prudence requires. Goodness is reduced to a calculation based on self-interest. Attention to his own interest makes the individual self-centered and oblivious of the good of others. This movement naturally culminates in a frank egoism which finds the good of each individual in the gratification of his own desires.

The older, self-realization theories tried to avoid this danger by the hypothesis of two "selves" in each individual. Every human being was supposed to possess, on the one hand, a higher rational self whose good was universal and identical with the good of all other intelligent beings. It is this higher self whose possibilities are realized in the moral life. But, on the other hand, man has a lower natural self whose narrow interest and selfish desires are often opposed to the Good. Hence the lower self must be frequently coerced and constantly disciplined in the course of moral development. Moralists who made use of this conception of two selves naturally connected the higher self with the specifically human attributes of intelligence, freedom, etc., while the lower self was supposed to express the self-assertive tendency of our animal nature. The ethics of T. H. Green furnishes a classic example of a self-realization theory based on the hypothesis of two selves. The Good according to Green consists in the realization of all the capabilities of man as a self-conscious subject, and thus a partial reproduction of the Absolute Consciousness. The individual can realize himself only in the society of his fellows; but the possibility of such a society

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depends on the self-conscious personality of the individual; since it is only by virtue of this part of his nature that he is able to treat other individuals as ends in themselves and thus make their good his own. His natural or appetitive self, to the contrary, tends to treat all things, including other individuals, as means to the gratification of selfish desire.

The conception of two selves has real value, and no doubt expresses a profound truth. But it has serious difficulties. The unity of personal character seems to be violated by the supposition that it includes two selves. Such a conception falls under the condemnation inflicted at present on all theories which divide the self up into faculties or principles. The organic unity of the individual consciousness seems to forbid the existence within it of two distinct principles or selves. Again the hypothesis in question may lead to a violation of the continuity in development which is so strongly emphasized in these days. If we understand the higher self as an exclusively human possession not shared by the lower animals, we must suppose that it originated at a certain time in the process of organic evolution, and was exactly coincident with the appearance of man. Green allows himself to speak as if the Eternal Consciousness supervened at a certain time upon an animal organism, vesting it with the character of self-conscious personality.

These difficulties have led to a general abandonment of the conception of two selves in recent self-realization theories. Instead, the inclination of the present is to give a naturalistic interpretation to the theory. The *summum bonum* is described as the harmonious realization of all the natural capacities of man. Each natural impulse—so it is affirmed—should receive a measure of gratification proportionate to the claims of all the rest. Since the social impulses are natural like the others, the individual who realizes them all in due proportion will perform his full duty toward his fellow-men. Mr. Alexander's "Moral Order and Progress" furnishes an excellent example of a self-realization theory of this type. Goodness, he tells us, may be understood either as (1) an adjustment of activities in the individual, or as (2) an ad-

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justment of the individual in society. These forms of adjustment are identical in process and in result. Hence the individual who gives harmonious expression to all his impulses, at the same time discharges in full his obligation to society.

Now when the self-realization theory discards the idea of a higher self and finds the Good in the realization of all the natural impulses of man, it shows the tendency—which we noticed was inherent in it—to approach a merely prudential scheme of life. If moral endeavor is entirely absorbed in an expression of our natural impulses, it is too obviously a matter of simple prudence. If the effort of each individual is concentrated on producing such a harmonious adjustment of his desires that each shall receive the maximum of satisfaction, self-interest becomes the guiding principle in morality. Thus our theory seems to approach dangerously near to egoism. Moreover, self-realization so interpreted does not explain the authority which attaches to the Ideal and the coercion which it exercises over the individual. Duty rules over him as an authority external to himself, and often opposed to his interest as he views it. Self-sacrifice also receives no adequate explanation from this rendering of the self-realization theory. Self-sacrifice is not a matter of compromise between different impulses in the individual. It is a case of opposition of interest between individuals, in which one deliberately surrenders what he believes to be his good in order to promote the welfare of another. When an ethical theory can give no satisfactory account of such features as these, essential to everyday morality, it certainly stands in need of some additions. If the hypothesis of two selves is untenable some other idea or principle should be supplied to account for the facts left unexplained.

May not the idea of evolution incorporated in the self-realization theory furnish just the aid needed to prevent its degenerating into a mere prudential calculus? Under its influence we recognize that the moral agent or self passes through several distinct stages in his development. From the evolutionary standpoint we can distinguish clearly between

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the actually existent self of any stage and the more complete self merely implicit at this stage, and to actually exist at a later period in the development. Hence we can see how the Good may realize all the capacities of the self when these are fully developed at a late stage, and yet be external and opposed to the interest of the same self at an earlier period when many of its capacities remain latent. Thus a good which includes the welfare of others may completely realize all the impulses of the individual when his character is fully evolved and his latent tendencies to benevolence and coöperation have become actual. But this same good may be partially opposed to his interests at a previous stage when his altruistic tendencies are undeveloped, and consequently the good of others is external to his self-interest.

Let us follow out this interpretation of the process of self-realization as an evolution of character or personality, and see if it does not throw light upon some points which "self-realization" alone does not explain. Such an evolution involves an organization of the primitive material of character into a completely articulated system.[1] Man's original impulses, which are at first chaotic and discordant, must be adjusted into a coherent and harmonious whole. In this process two distinct steps are necessary: First, the organization of single impulses in the individual and, second, the adjustment of the definite individuality thus created into the larger social system.[2] During the entire course of this development the character of

[1] This interpretation of moral development as an evolution of character or personality is explained somewhat more fully in an article by the writer, "Evolution and Ethical Method," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 59.

[2] The facts of moral evolution conflict with Mr. Alexander's view that these two forms of adjustment are identical in process and result. The second step mentioned, the adjustment of the individual in society, depends upon and is conditioned by the first, the formation of a coherent individuality through the organization of different impulses. Hence these two processes cannot be merged into one, and the account of moral evolution given in this article hinges entirely upon a recognition of their distinctness and the consequent impossibility of interpreting the moral life as a simple matter of adjustment and compromise between the various desires of the individual.

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the individual is changing. His different impulses are becoming more clearly manifest and more precisely defined. His latent capacities are being progressively realized. His many single desires are combined into a less number of more inclusive purposes. The attainment of these purposes represents to the individual his good. What the individual thus believes to be his good at any stage in the evolution may be termed his *interest* to distinguish it from the complete good which he only recognizes at the end of the process when all his possibilities are unfolded. The interest of the individual, of course, changes as his character evolves. It constantly enlarges in the sense that it becomes more complete and comprehensive. It expresses more and more of the intrinsic capacities of the self. As self-interest becomes in this way broader, it will embrace ends and objects not heretofore included in it. Thus at higher stages it will include elements which at lower stages have been outside and even opposed to the good of the individual *as he understood it then.*

The Good, as the ideal of goodness, is identical with the interest of the individual person when his character is completely evolved. When all his capacities are developed the good which he recognizes as his own, is the complete realization of himself. The satisfaction of the desires he feels is then equivalent to true self-satisfaction. We are sufficiently acquainted with the trend of moral evolution to understand in a general way the nature of the good of the fully developed self. Man finds his true good in the furtherance of social welfare. He realizes himself by discharging with perfect efficiency his functional office in society. His mind, when fully enlightened, perceives that all men have a common interest in virtue of the intelligent personality which they all possess. His will, when thoroughly trained, prefers to promote those larger ends which have a permanent significance for the entire human race. His sympathy when sufficiently broadened extends to all mankind and makes him feel their joys and sorrows as his own. But this larger good, which satisfies the desires of the whole self, is the actual interest of the individual only at the end of a long struggle upward.

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Only then, when this process is consummated, does the voice of self-interest harmonize with the call of duty. Only then is the moral vision sufficiently illumined to reveal things in their true proportions, not distorted by the warping effects of self-interest.

But before the good of moral evolution is reached a large discrepancy is sure to exist between the true good of the individual and his actual interest. Self-interest—as the conscious expression of individuality—is the result of the organization of many impulses into a unitary system. It stands for the individual in his individuality as a single unit among many. When it first emerges from the confusion of opposing impulses, its exclusive character is strongly marked. The individual is sharply conscious of himself as possessing plans and purposes—in short, an interest—which is entirely his own and quite different from the interest of every other human being. Hence one prominent part of the true good is external to self-interest at this stage. The welfare of others, which constitutes so important an element in the good when completely realized, is largely absent from the interest of the self when this is first defined in moral evolution. The cost of increasing coherence is at first increasing narrowness of character. The immediate result of concentration may be accentuated selfishness. When a man by the ordering of his various impulses awakens to the existence of his own individuality his attention is naturally centered on himself, and upon his hopes and plans as a separate individual. He finds that his ambition often conflicts with the purposes of others. The whole tendency of his awakened self-consciousness is to fulfill this ambition of his, to satisfy his own desire at any cost, regardless of the welfare of others and the suffering he may cause among his fellow-men. If, notwithstanding his natural inclinations, he feels obliged to promote another's interest at the expense of his own, he regards the good which he realizes as entirely external to himself. Duty appears to him as foreign authority coercing him against his will and compelling him to give up his own good. Such is the "natural" self whose narrow interest and aggressive

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selfishness have frequently and with justice been contrasted with the broader altruistic tendencies of the "spiritual" or more highly developed self.

Thus in all stages of incomplete development the actual interest of the moral agent is only partially identical with his true good. But those elements of the good not consciously included by the individual in his interest are, to be sure, represented in his nature. They appear in that Ideal of Goodness whose authority over the individual testifies to the presence in him of capacities undeveloped, of a larger self as yet unrealized. The obligation he feels to pursue another's welfare at the expense of his own interest is itself a tacit admission that his good includes the welfare of his fellows. But there is a notable difference between preferring another's well-being as a hard duty enforced by conscience and promoting it as a matter of course because a recognized part of self-realization. Hence, while we assume with the self-realizationist that the Good is the true interest of the self, still we must not fail to recognize that the conditions of moral evolution are such that until the very end of the process—which, it must be confessed, is more an ideal goal than an existent state—the actual interest and the true good of the individual are always different and often opposed. Although we must affirm the ultimate identity of goodness and self-interest, yet to identify them in an immediate and offhand manner is to misinterpret moral development by neglecting this feature which we have been considering. Goodness and self-interest are necessarily different and in frequent conflict during the whole of the evolution of character and their identification is achieved only in a final synthesis which transcends every opposition and contains all differences completely reconciled.

Nor can the conflict in question be removed by teaching the individual that goodness and self-interest are ultimately identical. It does not suffice to inform him that the Ideal represents his real interest. He must be trained in the hard school of moral experience. Not a change in his ideas but a change in his character is necessary if he is to fully appre-

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ciate the extent of his true interest. His nature must be transformed. The latent capacities of his larger self must be evoked. Then new desires and tendencies will manifest themselves which find satisfaction only in the furtherance of the broadest human well-being. This development of character is accomplished by rigorous obedience to duty and continual self-sacrifice. In this way the hampering confines of a narrow self-interest, incident to an immature character, are broken down, and the individual finds that what he took for a foreign exaction is in reality a part of his own good and a condition of his own self-realization.

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THE ETHICS OF STATE INTERFERENCE IN THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

State interference in the domestic relations is expressed in laws and penalties concerning marriage, divorce, and remarriage. If two persons wish to marry, they may find that their marriage would be pronounced void by the State. If two married persons wish to become divorced, they may find that the law refuses to permit the separation. If two divorced persons wish to marry again, they may find a long delay necessary, or the way to remarriage closed. Most of the States of the Union require at least one year's residence in the State before divorce may be granted; many States require two years' residence; one State (Connecticut) requires three years' residence in some cases; and there are further requirements concerning causes, and the filing and publishing notice of suit, before divorce may be granted. The State of South Carolina allows no absolute divorce. Concerning remarriage after divorce, many States have restrictions and prohibitions. In Vermont, the defendant may not remarry within three years, unless with the plaintiff; in Maryland, the court may decree that the defendant shall not remarry during the lifetime of

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the plaintiff; in South Dakota, the guilty party may never remarry, unless with the plaintiff; in the District of Columbia, only the innocent party may remarry.[1] The individual is thus hemmed about by the State with all manner of restraints, and there is even a growing tendency to increase this interference with the liberty of individual action.

The question naturally arises, Has the State a right to interfere in the domestic relations? It is often stoutly denied that the State has this right.

In the first place, it is held that State interference is only an enlargement of the unreasonable and unjust inclination in an individual to force other people to think and act as he does. It seems almost instinctive to desire that other men should act as one would like, and even to feel that they should be compelled so to act. The individual would impose his likes and dislikes upon all as the rule and law of conduct. In many people this disposition is restrained by nothing except lack of power; and when such people have the support of a number of others of like opinions and inclinations they do have the power and do attempt to enforce their views as rules of conduct for all. They would regulate every part of private conduct if it were possible to do so. They would exercise an absolute despotism over the individual who happens to dissent from them. But from the standpoint of liberty and equality, other people's opinions and preferences are as good and valid for them as his are for himself. A disposition which is not right in an individual is not right in a collection of individuals merely because they have power enough to enforce their views. Might does not make right, and this practice in society is no better than the condition of brutes where no law rules but that of the strongest.

Another argument against the State's interference is that of the anarchist. A man, he says, is to live wholly from within; no law can be sacred to him except that of his own nature; the only right is that which is after his own will; the only wrong is that which is against it. He is to bear himself in

[1] Hirsh, "Tabulated Digest of the Divorce Laws of the United States."

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the presence of all opposition as if everything were trivial and ephemeral but himself; he is to be doctrine and law unto himself; he should be subject only to self-control, with those penalties and rewards only which come from his own nature. No external authority, constraint, or penalty should control him; he knows no law but himself, the unfolding of his own nature. Every form of external authority is bad, whether coming from another individual, or a ruler, or the collectivity of men, or God; all authority, legislation or restraint is an unjustifiable interference with his liberties and rights. In this wholesale denunciation of external interference, interference in domestic relations is, of course, included.

A third protest against State interference in the domestic relations is that of romantic sentimentalism. This view holds that love is the most intimate part of man's life, and therefore should be free from interference by other people. To exercise a censorship over this part of man's nature, to drag one's affections before the gaze and judgment of other people, is an impious profanation of sacred things. To attempt a surveillance of one's love, to supervise its workings, to bind it by the chains of custom, or to regulate its behavior according to the opinions and practices of the unfeeling herd, is shameless. The heart is the individual's sacred temple, and into its Holy of Holies none must penetrate save high priest and priestess.

A fourth aspect of the same reaction is represented by the Utopian view that man's attempted regulation in matters of love is an unwarranted bungling in affairs that are much better carried on by the race-spirit. The race-spirit is that mysterious natural force which secures the continuance and development and improvement of the race—a force operative in every living thing, sometimes driving it on to race-preservation even at the cost of individual extinction. What company of legislative Solons will arrogate to themselves this office? Visit any museum of natural history and study its specimens. Consider the wonderful variety of the birds, the marvelous richness and detail of plumage and coloring, and then say whether any legislation could have produced this perfection of develop-

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ment! Would there not, on the contrary, have resulted a Puritanical severity of form and a monotonous black or gray? So, among men, let not a few fallible individuals attempt to direct and regulate the unfolding of human nature. Let the race-spirit work out the variety, richness, individuality, and perfection which it has in view for the future of the human race.

A fifth position is assumed by defining the function of the State as a police function, the maintenance of justice between individuals. This limitation of the State's authority is familiar through the teaching of Spencer and Mill,[2] although they did not apply it to the domestic relations. The State's right of interference with the individual's liberty of opinion and action, according to Mill, is for self-defense alone. So long as the individual abstains from injuring the interests of others, he should remain unmolested. So long as the individual's acts affect only himself, or affect others only with their free consent, the State has no right to interfere. No other individual, no group or collection of individuals, no State, has the right to compel the individual to act or to refrain from acting on the ground that it is for his good, or that it would be prudent for him to do it, or that it would be wise or even morally right for him to do it. These are good reasons for remonstrating, advising, instructing, persuading, but not for compelling. In all that realm of thought and action which affects only himself, the individual is the final judge. He is to have perfect freedom in conscience, entertaining and professing whatever opinions he may please, and perfect freedom in action, carrying his opinions out into practice, living according to his own tastes and likings, so long as the interests of other people are not injured by him; and he is to have perfect freedom to unite with others of like mind, the liberty of combination. No other individual, no collection of individuals, not even all other individuals, have the right to interfere with him any more than he would have the right to interfere with them if he had the power. Such interference is an assump-

[2] See Mill, "On Liberty," and Spencer, "Man *versus* the State."

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tion of infallibility. But the individual understands his circumstances better than any one else. His life is his own to live according to his nature. Different people have different characters, and require different conditions for their development. One's parentage is different from that of other people, one's training has been different. His life is his own, and he has a perfect right to live it according to his own nature, so long as he does not interfere with the like liberty of other people. A person's own character, not the traditions and customs of other people, should be the rule of his conduct. A human being has better faculties than the ape-like faculty of imitation. Free scope should be given to varieties of character. The State has the right to regulate only that part of the individual's life which concerns other people. It is only when definite damage or definite risk of damage ensues to the interests of others that the State has the right to interfere with the individual's liberty of action. The State's sole duty and right is to be the guardian of liberty. It is held by many (though not so by Mill and Spencer themselves) that marriage, divorce, and other domestic relations belong to that class of relations which concern only the consenting parties, and that the State is violating its legitimate authority when it interferes in these matters.

Such are the arguments which deny the State's right to interfere in the domestic relations. Is there anything to be said in reply? Must we conclude that this interference by the State is unjustifiable, or may we still find sufficient grounds to justify it?

In the first place, even if the function of the State be restricted to the maintenance of justice, to the exclusion of benevolence, fraternity, or love, there is still something to be said in justification of the State's interference in the domestic relations. Marriage, divorce, and remarriage are not subjects which have no concern with the public good. Domestic relations touch society at many and vital points, and if the State did not interfere with and regulate these matters, the State would be permitting a crime against the other members of society. Thus, for example, the domestic relations affect the

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State in the matter of property. In buying, selling, or mortgaging, in paying taxes, in bequeathing or inheriting, there is often the question of the rights of husband and wife, of children, or of heirs. That family relations are closely connected with property is attested by the attitude of most scientific socialists. They hold that the greatest barrier against the advance of socialism in property is the institution of the family. The family and private property are, in their judgment, so intimately related that property cannot be socialized until the institution of the family is socialized also. Again, marriage, divorce, and the other domestic relations concern society through the children, who are to become future competitors in the economic struggles, future citizens of the State, and factors in all the affairs of social life and activity. Obligations arise on the part of the uniting parties toward these third persons, the fulfilment of which obligations, and the mode of fulfilment, must be a concern to the State. Bringing into existence a human being is one of the most responsible acts of human life; and to hold that the exercise of this responsibility is the concern of no one but the persons uniting is unwarrantable. A life which may be a blessing or curse to itself and to society is something of which society may reasonably take account. Society has the right to insist that the interests of this life be regarded, or society is an accomplice in the crime against that life. Society may demand reasonable assurance that this life shall have proper chances of livelihood, that it shall not be thrown upon society a pauper and grow up to be ignorant or criminal, that it shall not be afflicted with frightful disease and become a curse to itself and a menace to others.

Domestic relations, then, concern not only the individual or other freely consenting individuals, but society at large. Society must protect the rights of these future citizens and must protect itself against injury through them. There is thus a double duty of the State to interfere in domestic relation—as regards children on one hand, and as regards other members of society on the other. It is within the just limits of State action to erect safeguards against mischief and injury

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to its present and future citizens through the procreation of children.

Society has the right and the duty of restricting the marriage or cohabitation of idiots, weak-minded, insane, epileptics, criminals, habitual drunkards, the scrofulous, the tuberculous, and the venereal-diseased, whose progeny may inherit criminality, defects and diseases dangerous and burdensome to society. The social cost of crime, the enormous burden and the terrible danger to society, demonstrate the importance of State regulation of the domestic relations. Mr. Eugene Smith, in a paper read before the Annual Congress of the National Prison Association in 1900, discussing statistics from city, county, and State budgets concerning taxation chargeable to crime—the share of the public expenses connected with maintaining the police, the courts, the fees of witnesses, jurors, and counsels, the prisons, the district attorney's office, and the sheriff's office—was led to estimate the rate of crime taxation in the United States as at least $3.50 *per capita* in the cities and $1.00 *per capita* in the country, or a total of $200,000,000 each year. "It greatly exceeds in amount every other object of public expenditure, except only that of our military establishment in time of war. The item that most nearly approaches it is the cost of public education, the expenditures for which throughout the whole United States amounted, according to the census of 1890, to $139,000,000. But vast and oppressive as is this burden of taxation, it represents an outlay in *prevention* only of crime." [8] It is no complete measure of the damage caused by crime. To this must be added the losses sustained through theft, forgery, burglary, arson, and similar crimes. From statistics concerning the number of convicts in the United States, Mr. Smith estimates it as conservative to conclude that there are 250,000 habitual criminals in the United States, and that on an average each of these preys upon society to an amount of $1,600 a year. This gives an annual sum of $400,000,000 to be added to the yearly taxa-

[8] "Proceedings of the Annual Congress of the National Prison Association," 1900, pp. 318, 319.

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tion caused by crime, an amount exceeding the value of the entire cotton crop or the entire wheat crop of the United States. But this also represents but *part* of the cost of crime. Locks, bars, bolts, safes, burglar alarms, weapons, and the numerous other means of social defense must be added as items of cost; and finally, who can estimate the value of the more than ten thousand lives lost each year in the United States through murder, or the amount of suffering, agony, ruined homes, and despair resulting from crime, and the constant terror in which all the people live?

How, then, can it be maintained that domestic relations are not matters of concern to others when the consequences of these relations may involve wretchedness and depravity to offspring and manifold evils to the other members of society? The State must become more keenly sensitive to the duty of regulating the marriage relation. By increasing the reproduction of the fit, and by decreasing or stopping the reproduction of the unfit, society may be coworkers with the "race-spirit," taking part in the selective improvement of the human stock, adding to "natural selection" the human or rational selection.

The foregoing considerations alone might be claimed sufficient to justify the State in its so-called interference, or the maintaining of supervision and control over the domestic relations; and they are valid without reference to whether the two contracting parties are "freely consenting," or "exercising equally their rights." It must, however, be further remarked that it often happens that the two parties are not exercising equally their liberty. One or the other party may be injured, and needs to be protected by society. It is the concern of the State to see that justice is done. When a person has encouraged another to rely upon his continuing to act in a certain way, to build expectations, and stake any part of his or her life and interests upon that supposition, a set of obligations arises on his part toward that other person which it is the concern of the State to see fulfilled. The State, as the guardian of the liberties of all, must see to it when contracts

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are made and while they are being carried out, that justice to all parties concerned is done.

The foregoing counter-arguments are based on the concession that the State's action is to extend no farther than social defense, and is not to cover the sphere of social betterment, to insure justice, but not to promote benevolence. If to this negative function of securing to the individual the opportunity of self-realization by protecting him from the encroachment of other individuals, there be added the positive function of providing and improving the conditions of the ethical life of each of its citizens, State interference may be defended by additional arguments.

There remains to be considered the underlying ethical principle involved in State interference, or the principle by which justice is determined. Justice denotes a relation between persons. What principle directs us in determining a just relation? In concrete terms, suppose the person interfered with by the State demands a reason for the interference—suppose he asks, "Why are you interfering?"—what answer is to be given? Man is a reasonable being and has a right to demand reasons for the State's interference with his liberty.

This fundamental principle, it may be first of all suggested, is the sanction of religion. Most religions deal with the questions of marriage, divorce, and the other domestic relations, with express teachings, commandments, and prohibitions; and the opinion is fairly current that these questions are settled by assigning as a reason, "Such is the teaching of the word of God." May, then, the State's interference in these matters be rightfully based upon a religious creed or theological code?

Mill, in his chapter on "The Liberty of Thought and Discussion," [4] has furnished a sufficient answer to this question. A religious creed may be accepted by an individual as the rule and guide of his belief and practice. He may consider its precepts binding upon his conscience; and he may rightly search for its teachings on all questions and regulate his life in accordance with those teachings. But he has not the social

[4] Mill, "On Liberty," ch. II, pp. 33-99.

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right to force his views upon others who may entertain different views. Conscience is a sacred part of the individual's liberty. In the case of religious belief, the claim of some individual or of the whole of society to exercise authority over a person who dissents is to be denounced as a violation of social right; and no human being is to be held accountable to other human beings for his religious belief. This position has been won in the world through long and sad experience. It is now generally recognized and asserted as a principle, but in practice, religious freedom is hard to realize. Intolerance seems natural to men in those things for which they most care. But it must be vigorously asserted that the State shall place no restrictions on conduct on the ground that such conduct is religiously wrong. The notion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious, and that the first fulfills his duty in compelling the second to be religious, is the foundation of religious persecution. The spirit of persecution is the determination not to tolerate others doing what is not permitted by the persecutors' religion. The persecutors believe that God not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but will hold the persecutors guilty if they do not persecute the misbeliever. History abounds with society's mistakes along this line. Socrates, who is now regarded as the most virtuous man in his age and the model of all subsequent teachers of virtue, was put to death on the charge of impiety and immorality—impiety in denying the gods of the State, and immorality in his teachings to the young men of the State. Jesus was put to death on the charge of blasphemy, and regarded as the personification of impiety. The Inquisition persecuted and put to death on religious and theological grounds thousands of good persons. Evil results have always come from attempting to conduct a theocracy on earth. Neither the State nor its officers hold a commission from on high to avenge supposed offenses against the divine. The old Latin proverb that "Injuries to the gods are the care of the gods" should restrain us from attempting to be their avengers. To base the State upon a religious creed means the exaltation of a priestly class who must be accounted the vicegerents of the

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Most High; it means the impossibility of experiments in government and the correction of mistakes through experience; it means the deterioration of the individual's powers—he is deprived of self-government and made the slave of a despot. Even where there is not the identifying of church and State, great evils to society may result from regulating the State by a religious code. The English law prohibiting a man's marrying the sister of his deceased wife, a law based on the Canon Law in the Old Testament, has caused much distress, and has recently been repealed, to the discomfort of the Church of England.

If we hold, then, that State interference and regulation in these matters is not to be based upon the religious creed which happens to be received by the majority of the people or the persons in power, upon what shall we say that it is based? May we not hold that it is based upon social well-being? The collective well-being is the proper aim for the collectivity; and just as in the individual's life it is impossible to have all the desires satisfied at the same time, so in the social body it is impossible to have all the desires of all the individuals satisfied at the same time. The social condition is an unalterable fact of man's existence. Men are constrained to live with one another. The sphere of one man's activity cuts necessarily into the spheres of activity of other men; and there is necessary an adjustment between the individual and society. The freedom of each is necessarily limited by the like freedom of others. The world does not afford room for the unrestrained activity of the individuals. Right or justice affirms that every man may claim the fullest liberty compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man. The State is to secure this. The common good lies in bringing about such a condition of society that each member shall have full scope for realizing himself without diminishing other men's spheres of activity. The common good is in securing the largest amount of collective freedom with the least individual restraint. That organization of society should be sought which will make possible the full development and expression of human nature, the perfect realization of human capacities and possibilities.

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This is the aim that society should have in view in its collective activity, and this principle of social well-being may be given as the ground for interference with the liberty of action of any member of society. On this basis society has a reasonable justification to offer to the individual. This interference is necessary for the social well-being—the well-being of the individual himself and of all other individuals. The State exists not for one, not for a few, not for the majority, but for all. The true function of the State is to secure the fulfilment of the personal life of its citizens. The State is the vehicle by which the citizens attain to their full personal development. The State does not "interfere"; the State intervenes to protect the person and maintain the possibility for unhindered development of personality, by seeing that no individual encroaches upon other individuals, but that all have full opportunity of ethical self-realization. The principle of State action should be this: To secure such an organization of society that in it all persons may have full opportunity to live their largest lives.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

MORALS IN EVOLUTION: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ETHICS. By L. T. Hobhouse, late Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Corpus Christi College; formerly Fellow of Merton College. Two volumes. Pp. vxii, 375; vii, 294. London: Chapman and Hall, 1906.

"The purpose of this work is to approach the theory of ethical evolution through a comparative study of rules of conduct and ideals of life. In this branch of evolutionary science theory and fact sometimes tend to fall apart. Hypotheses may be formed by the method of brilliant conjecture without any firm basis in the actual history of the moral consciousness, while that history as revealed in the mass of recorded customs and doctrines concerning conduct sometimes tends to be lost in a mass of anthropological detail wherein it is impossible to see the wood for the trees. The attempt made in these volumes is to ascertain the main features of development, and by piecing them together to present a sketch in which the essentials of the whole process will be depicted in outline" (Preface). These words accurately describe the merits and at the same time the limitations of the work. While the author has succeeded in avoiding the dangers of mere conjecture, unsupported by historical fact, on the one hand, and of presenting a mere "mass of anthropological detail" on the other, all that he is able to attempt is a mere "sketch" or "outline" of the process of moral development. The story of that development as it passes through the various stages of primitive savagery, of barbarism, and of earlier and later civilization, oriental and western, is obviously far too long and complex to be told exhaustively in a single treatise; and while the reader is constantly impressed by the broad sweep of the writer's range of acquaintance with the facts and his grasp of their essential significance and comparative interest, he cannot help feeling that an investigation of this kind, if it is to yield results of real importance and to contribute substantially to our understanding of the problem, must be done on a smaller scale and in greater detail. Although Mr. Hobhouse's mastery is undoubtedly superior to Herbert Spencer's, we are too often reminded of Spencer's miscellaneous assortment of facts and too rapid generalizations from them. At the same time the book should prove useful, as

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at least a provisional statement of facts and conclusions on this very important subject, and the period of its usefulness can only be determined by the rate of progress of research along the lines which it follows.

The comparison with the cognate investigation of Dr. Westermarck cannot but suggest itself. The author remarks that "Dr. Westermarck's important work on the 'Origin and Growth of the Moral Ideas' would have been of immense value to me had it appeared a little earlier. It is particularly satisfactory to me to find that so far as we cover the same field my results generally harmonize with his, and this notwithstanding a material divergence in ethical theory" (Preface). The divergence in ethical theory is significant for the entire treatment and interpretation of the facts of moral evolution. While Dr. Westermarck finds the origin of all our moral ideas in "the moral emotions," which he describes as "retributive emotions," and punishment thus assumes a place of central importance for his scheme of development, Mr. Hobhouse finds a rational element at the heart of the moral consciousness and assigns to punishment a place of subordinate importance in the development of morality. We have only to compare the different ways in which the two writers lay out the ground to be covered by the inquiry, to appreciate the philosophical superiority of Mr. Hobhouse's point of view. According to Dr. Westermarck "the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness of mankind is concerned . . . may be conveniently divided into six groups. The first group includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as directly concern the interests of other men, their life or bodily integrity, their freedom, honor, property, and so forth. The second includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as chiefly concern a man's own welfare, such as suicide, temperance, asceticism. The third group, which partly coincides with, but partly differs from, both the first and the second, refers to the sexual relations of men. The fourth includes their conduct towards the lower animals; the fifth, their conduct towards dead persons; the sixth, their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that they regard as supernatural." (Vol. I, p. 328.) Contrast with this Mr. Hobhouse's statement of the scope and main divisions of the inquiry. "Ethical evolution, which is our subject, is not the same thing as social evolution, but it is intimately connected with it. The strictly ethical element is the conception of the good, whereby

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man seeks deliberately to regulate his conduct. The modifications of this conception are connected by countless actions and reactions, on the one hand, with the economic and political development of society, and on the other with the development of religion, or more generally, of thought concerning the nature of the world and man's place therein. The object of comparative ethics is to distinguish the main types of ethical conception, and classify them in such wise as to throw the greatest light on the conditions and character of their development. Among ethical conceptions we distinguish broadly between the rule of action, and the reason given for obeying it. The first is embodied in custom and law, and with these our investigation begins. Our object will be to describe and classify the leading types and customs that we find in each great department of social life. Further, with a view to obtaining what light we can on the general character of human development we shall not only distinguish the various forms which custom assumes, but shall endeavor, as far as possible, to set forth, with due note of exceptions, the type of institution which predominates at each stage of social evolution. This comparative study of institutions forms the first part of our work. Upon this follows the study of the ideas underlying the social or ethical order, the reasons which men render to themselves for making and obeying laws of conduct. This will draw us to the comparative study of religion, and of the great ethical systems of history. These ideas we shall have to examine and classify in the same manner. From this classification it may in some degree appear how far there is evidence of an advance from lower to higher conceptions, and if so, how far the higher ethical and religious ideas have actually moulded the practice of men. These I take to be the main problems of Comparative Ethics" (Vol. I, pp. 40, 41).

The work thus falls into two parts, the first dealing with "The Standard," the second with "The Basis," each occupying a volume. While a more convincing terminology might with advantage have been adopted, the author's meaning is sufficiently clear. Part I investigates the evolution of customs, laws and institutions; Part II traces the evolution of moral ideals, and of ethical theories, against the background of religious conceptions and theological doctrines. The several chapters of Volume I deal with the forms of social organization, law and justice, marriage and the position of women, women in the civilized world, the relations be-

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tween communities, class relations, property and poverty; and the general conclusion is thus summarized: "In proportion as obligations are determined by human nature as such, they overstep national and racial as well as family and class limitations, and apply to humanity as a whole. Hence . . . the double meaning of 'humanity' as an expression for a certain quality that is in each man, and as an expression for the whole race of men, is not a mere ambiguity. The two meanings are intimately related, for 'humanity' as a whole is the society to which, by virtue of the 'humanity' within each of us, we really belong, and these two meanings are the poles between which modern ethical conceptions move. Thus if we are to sum up the whole process sketched in this volume in a phrase we may say that it is in this double sense to realize humanity" (p. 368).

As the author says, "Such an inquiry encounters many difficulties of its own. Vast and complex subjects must be handled with a brevity which to one specially interested in them will appear quite inadequate. The conclusions of a hundred specialists must be used by one who from the nature of the case cannot himself be a specialist in any of them. Hence the openings alike for error of detail and for disproportion of general handling are great." (Preface.) All that can be said as to the success of the effort is that it is as great as could reasonably be expected in the circumstances, that it always gives the impression of fairness, industry and conscientiousness in the ascertainment of the facts, and that the main thread of the inquiry is kept well in hand. It should be added that, in Mr. Hobhouse's view, "for the study of development, the ethics of civilization are not less, but if anything, more important than those of savagery, and have therefore received closer attention in this work." In this more important field of comparative ethics there is perhaps greater opportunity for fresh and original work; at all events it is here that the author's best work is done.

"The history of law and custom gives us one aspect of ethical evolution. It sets forth the standard of conduct, or rather the standards recognized by different societies at different times. But behind the question of the moral standard is that of the moral basis, the grounds on which morality rests, the spirit in which it is conceived. . . . In other words, behind the question of the moral standard there is the philosophical question of the nature of moral obligation, of moral authority, of the moral

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sanction, or, to use one expression for them all, there is the question of the basis of the moral order" (Vol. II, p. 1). This is the problem of Part II. "But to understand ethical evolution on this side we have first to turn to departments of thought that are not in their origin ethical. For men's views of what is right are necessarily steeped in influences derived from their whole outlook upon the world, the range of their mental capacity, their conception of the creating, sustaining, and governing causes of things, their theories of human life and society. We cannot therefore thoroughly understand the history of ethics without knowing something of the general development of thought" (p. 2). The earlier chapters of Part II are accordingly devoted to the study of the gradual differentitiation of the ethical from the magical and animistic elements in primitive religion, in the higher barbarism, and in the polytheistic religions of early civilization. This leads to the investigation of the place of the ethical element in the "spiritual religions," in which "the awakening reason demands a theory of the universe and ceases to be satisfied with the patchwork schemes of mythology. The moral self, coming to partial consciousness of its nature and scope, demands a higher rule of life and a deeper understanding of its relation to cosmic forces. Instead of inventing stories about the beginning of things and the origin of laws, the mind begins to search for the general truths underlying or permeating experience and giving unity and meaning to human purposes" (p. 85). Spiritual religion assumes various forms, pantheistic, mystic, as well as monotheistic; but all these forms may be grouped together, since "all are or are on the way to become spiritual religions, resting on and involving a certain ethical idealism, and that power of handling conceptions which we take to imply a distinct stage onward in the growth of thought. . . . The spiritual is opposed to the sensible world, the spirit in man to his grosser elements, as the underlying spring of what is good and wise and beautiful, and as the bond that connects him with the sources of all that he finds of goodness and wisdom and beauty in the order of things. Finally, with this conception of spirituality a distinct set of ethical conceptions is connected. The individual must enter into relations with the universal spirit, and to do so he must put off his individuality. He must subdue the senses, and not only the senses, but all things that make for his own self-assertion, and hinder his perfect communion with the spiritual

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world. Pride must give place to humility, resentment to forgiveness, the narrow love of kinship to universal benevolence, family life to the selfless impersonal brotherhood of monasticism. For the spirit is not yet of this world. The first step towards realizing it is to conceive it by contrast to common workaday experiences. To understand how it may transform experience, to bring it back to earth without losing its warmth and glow upon the downward journey, is the unfulfilled task of a higher mode of thought" (pp. 86-88).

Mr. Hobhouse's account of Christian ethics, alike in its historical influence and in its essential significance, is so carefully balanced that it tempts to extensive quotation, but a few leading sentences must here suffice. "Christianity, like other movements, in descending from the mount to the plain, loses much of its purity, while in turn gaining something from the impulse of other movements and contact with a wider life" (p. 155). "If, however, we take the Christian teaching apart from all inadequacies of historical application as a statement of an ethical ideal," we must admit that, while "it carries one side of ethics to the highest possible pitch of perfection, . . . it leaves another side comparatively neglected. The conception of a brotherhood of love based on the negation of self is demonstrably inadequate to the problem of reorganizing society and intelligently directing human efforts. Even on the personal side it is deficient, for human progress depends on the growth and perfecting of faculty, and therefore requires that provision be made for a self-development which is not selfishness, but builds up a better personality on a basis of self-repression" (p. 157). Christianity is a form of "supernatural ethics," and "supernatural ethics fail in that they do not recognize the ideal element in the performance of natural duty" (p. 159). On the other hand, "fortunately for the Western world, supernaturalism was but one side of Christianity. Christ himself was no anchorite, and his teaching, if exacting, was also tender. There have never been wanting individuals to show the world that it was possible to follow in his steps, and live externally the ordinary life of a commonplace citizen, while their souls within them are filled with their Master's teaching and overflowed in charity to all mankind. It is here, in the simple personal following of Christ, that the strength of Christianity will always lie" (p. 159).

But there is another way in which an ideal dawns upon

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humanity than through "the religious conception of a spiritual being which is the embodiment of all that man can dream of perfection," namely, "through reflection upon life and man's place in it, upon human nature and its potentialities, upon human action and its ends. Following this road thought proceeds by the deliberate examination of human experience, and seeks thereby to determine where man's true purpose lies. By this method, with little or no reference to supernatural sanctions or even to divine commands, it may make for itself an ideal of conduct, to which it calls man to conform simply because such conduct is best for himself and for humanity. In such a method we have the beginning of an ethical system conceived as the basis of a conscious ordering of human life by the deliberate efforts of the best and wisest members of the human race" (p. 161). After a very interesting account of the ethical teaching of Confucius and Mencius, Mr. Hobhouse concludes with an excellent statement of the movement of "Philosophic Ethics" in ancient Greece and in modern England.

The final chapter of the work, on "the line of ethical development," reaffirms, in the light of the further investigations of Part II, the main results already reached at the end of Part I. The statement here of the relation of ethical to social evolution may be quoted. "Social and ethical development do not always advance together. Social changes are in large measure unconscious, uncontrolled by any intelligent direction, and the more completely so the further we go back into the beginnings of history. Hence they do not run precisely parallel with the growth of mind, but at times impede, at other times again forward it. But as the higher phases are reached the two processes fuse into one. For the State rests on a measure of Right in the relations of men, and is so constituted as to be modifiable by the deliberate act of the community. In the method in which changes are effected indeed we find a definite evolution from the unconscious and unnoted changes of custom, through the deliberate changes introduced on occasion by the fiat of authority, to the organic legislation of the modern world, in which at its best there is an effort to determine social progress in accordance with a rational ideal. When this stage is reached, social and ethical evolution become one" (p. 279).

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THE THEORY OF GOOD AND EVIL. A Treatise on Moral Philosophy. By Hastings Rashdall, D. Litt., D. C. L., Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford. Two Volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

These volumes are another proof that Oxford University still holds its own in the front of the philosophical criticism of moral and social life. The subjects with which they deal, "The Moral Criterion," "The Individual and the Society," "Man and the Universe," afford opportunity for the discussion of nearly all the great subjects of theoretic or practical interest connected with it. It is needless to say that they are treated by Dr. Rashdall with a breadth of sympathy, a distinction of style and a lucidity of illustration which are quite uncommon. More particularly the illustrations gain in value from the writer's wide historical and theological knowledge enabling him to speak with authority on subjects which ethical writers commonly avoid or touch with a hesitating hand. But the chief value of his book, from a general point of view, is the concreteness and wise balance of judgment with which particular topics are handled, of which the treatment of Socialism (I, p. 274), the State and Morality (I, p. 299), the Intellectual and Artistic Life (II, p. 91), Athleticism (II, p. 191), Asceticism (II, p. 70), the Choice of a Profession, and the Doctrine of Vocation, and Internal Circumstances (II, p. 94), are merely a few out of many. The point of view from which the author approaches these subjects is sufficiently indicated in the dedication in which the names of T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick are coupled together. Dr. Rashdall is not an Intuitionist, still less a Hedonist. Yet he holds that the Intuitionism and the Hedonism which are represented in Sidgwick's philosophy are not without their relative justification: the first in the immediate judgments wherein consciousness makes known to us the relative value of particular elements in the good; the second in the recognition of pleasure, if not as *the* good, yet as a good existing alongside of and comparable to the other elements, of which morality or the good will, intellectual and æsthetic culture are the chief. With Green, on the other hand, he shares the idealistic theory of knowledge derived from Kant, only parting from him (or perhaps he would prefer to say, from the disciples of Green who have, in his veiw, turned the master's suggestive mysticism into dogmatism) in asserting the independ-

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ent value of pleasure and in dissociating himself altogether from Green's ethical formula of self-realization.

It is in these latter criticisms of "established idealism" that the storm-centre, if so violent a word can be applied to so gentle and urbane a writer, is likely to be found. Before venturing within its area I wish to acknowledge my personal debt for additional light on particular doctrines which I have myself, perhaps, elsewhere expressed ambiguously. The doctrine of desire in the first volume is stated with admirable lucidity so as to bring out the fallacy of the doctrine that the object of desire must necessarily be "a state of consciousness" of the subject. The distinction between the satisfaction and the fulfilment of desire so well brought out in some recent articles in this JOURNAL by Dr. Wodehouse has put this beyond all doubt and agrees with the view here set forth. The passage also (II, 93) which deals with the more serious difficulty of Bradley's antinomy between self-assertion and self-sacrifice and its admirably stated conclusion that "the collisions between self-realization and self-assertion (sacrifice?) are difficulties created for ethics by Mr. Bradley's particular system of metaphysics—not difficulties created for metaphysics by ethics," are likely to meet with assent from more conservative Idealists. Although his main contention as to the place of pleasure in the good is open, I believe, to fatal objection, there is much in what he says as to the possibility of valuing an object for its pleasure-giving quality, *i. e.*, of desiring pleasure, to the truth of which nothing but a "thesis" can blind the reader. Yet the philosophical framework of Dr. Rashdall's work as a whole seems to me so inconsistent with the "thoroughgoing idealism" with which he desires, I think rightly, to identify himself, that at the risk of apparent ingratitude I have given the major part of this review to negative criticism.

I have already mentioned the three points in which Dr. Rashdall departs from current idealistic ethics. To take them in order: 1. There is of course a sense in which intuitionism may be said to be a part of all idealistic theory. The "ideal" it must hold is prescribed by the characteristic features of human nature. The logical ideal is of the essence of intelligence; the moral ideal of the will. The harmonious albeit relative and human whole for which each stands is spiritually, *i. e.*, intuitively discerned. This means that particular things or functions that are in essential relation to this whole, come to us with a particular tang,

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whether as "fine" or as "good," different from that of others and each from the other. But this is not, I think, all that Dr. Rashdall means. His doctrine, as I understand it, is intended to deny any real analogy between the ideal of the theoretic and the ideal of the moral reason, seeing that in the latter we start from isolated judgments of the value of particular elements which in their mere union, apart from inner apprehended connection, make up "the whole." "If these elements," he says, "were not each by itself the object of a judgment of value there could be no judgment of value of the whole." It is true he immediately corrects this with the note, "Of course we could form no judgment upon the worth of an act or state of mind without some general knowledge of its relation to life as a whole." But this is only an instance of a certain elusiveness in his philosophic statements which makes it often difficult to say what his ultimate view in reality is. In the present case these two propositions seem to me to conceal two perfectly different theories of the nature of the "moral reason" to which appeal is made throughout these volumes—the one compatible, the other incompatible with a thoroughgoing idealism.

2. Coming to the second point, the place of pleasure, the critic is here somewhat at a loss, owing to the confessed absence of any attempt to define pleasure and displeasure. He seems bound to assume that so well-informed a psychologist as Dr. Rashdall has carefully considered the most widely accepted view of pleasure as the sign or measure of value to a conscious organism differing in degree according to certain well-recognized though still obscure conditions and in "quality" according to the intimacy of the connection between the function and the "nature" of the organism as a whole. This view of pleasure and *mutatis mutandis* of its opposite is in harmony with the theory which refuses to admit it as an element in the content of good itself. On the other hand, it seems quite incompatible with a theory which seeks to interpret it as "a part" of the good. Yet there is no adequate criticism nor any attempt to substitute a better. The evidence for the view in the text seems to consist in such empirical facts as our judgment that a given good, whether an act of charity or a dinner, is *better, ceteris paribus,* if it gives pleasure to those concerned, *worse* if it fails to, and what apparently the author receives as an intuitive revelation of the moral reason, that, *ceteris paribus,* or in the absence of any higher good to be realized,

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the duty of increasing the sum total of pleasure and diminishing the sum total of pain remains. To this he adds, in the disquieting chapters on the summability and commensurability of pleasures not only with one another, but with "higher" forms of good, the suggestion that there are occasions on which "a little intellectual or æsthetic good has to be sacrificed for a much larger quantity of pleasure or freedom from pain." It would not be fair to make Dr. Rashdall responsible for the maxim that the practical man would be likely to deduce from the first of these doctrines: "When in doubt play pleasure." Nor, seeing that he presumably rejects the common doctrine of pleasure, would it be relevant to urge the retort that the second amounts to the suggestion that a sufficient number of vouchers can normally be equated with an additional cheque. But one should have thought the doctrine, as it seems to follow from the premises, sufficiently paradoxical to have roused a suspicion in the author's mind that there might possibly be something wrong. The problem here raised as to the principle of moral judgment in a case in which life is bereft of all significance save as a source of pleasure or pain is surely one of those "hypothetical and abstract questions which postulate a human nature different from anything we know," against which Dr. Rashdall knows on occasion how to protest. What enables him to raise it is that he has failed to grasp the principle for which idealism has always stood, that our judgments of "good" as distinct from pleasure always carry along with them a reference to a whole of human nature from which we cannot abstract without ceasing to be rational. For a thoroughgoing Hedonist, it is of course possible to maintain that the conception of our lives as a series of pleasant senses can supply the needed basis of distinction between "good" and pleasant, but I do not understand Dr. Rashdall's concession in favor of the possibility of a "sum of pleasure" to be meant to be taken in this sense. If it were, he would have proved more than he intended and armed his utilitarian opponents with an argument whose edge he would find it difficult to turn.

3. The problem of the relation of the individual to society brings out still more clearly the distance that separates Dr. Rashdall from a thoroughgoing idealism. Nothing indeed could be better than the treatment which it more than once receives where he is handling concrete questions. It is when he comes to the theoretical statement of it in its abstract form, as he does

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in II, p. 68, that the difference emerges. He there argues against Bradley's proposition "others are involved in my essence" that "these experiences of a soul may be *like* those of another soul; they may be caused by and dependent upon the experiences of another soul. But the experiences of one soul cannot be or become identical with the experiences of another soul: The content of two consciousnesses may be the same—the universal abstracted from the particular—but not the reality; neither therefore can the good of one soul or self be the good of another, or be included in it or be a part of the good of another." No, truly, if identity means numerical sameness and if reality and content, the particular and the universal, are to be cut asunder. But neither on this showing could any soul be the same as *itself*, and the argument would prove as fatal to the author's own philosophy as to that which he is attacking. It seems hardly necessary to say that the doctrine of identity which idealism has taught from the time of Plato is the precise opposite. As the depth of the individual intelligence depends on the extent to which its perceptions and images reflect an intelligible world which is common (I fail to see what other word we can use), so the individual will finds its truth (why not reality?) just in so far as its particular purposes reflect the meaning of the moral world which is common to itself with other wills. It is likely enough that this doctrine is inadequately expressed by the formula of self-realization through this, I take it, is a translation of Aristotle's ἐνέργεια, which Dr. Rashdall seems to approve. It is further possible that the ultimate identity of individual and social good will have to submit to a more fiery trial of criticism than it has hitherto had to bear. But it can have nothing to fear from attacks based on a conception of identity which it may be said to exist to repudiate. Dr. Rashdall's failure to understand its teaching on this head is, I believe, the central defect of his book and will, if I mistake not, undermine its usefulness as a contribution to the philosophy of this part of the subject. I cannot believe that in so open-minded a writer it is irremediable. To remedy it will involve the recasting of considerable portions of its underlying structure, while leaving what is at present its main merit, the suggestive concrete discussion of particular subjects and its common sense treatment of extreme views, untouched.

Birmingham. J. H. MUIRHEAD.

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STUDIES IN HUMANISM. By F. C. S. Schiller, M. A., D. Sc. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1907. Pp. xv, 492.

Those who dislike the accumulation of magazines on their shelves must feel relieved when the more valuable part of their contents becomes obtainable in a separate volume. Dr. Schiller has here collected from various quarters his more recent essays in defense or furtherance of the philosophy which in twenty years' time is to prevail wherever reason, or will, can penetrate or be made to penetrate. Some of them are controversial, directed against Absolutism and Intellectualism; some are constructive (or tentatively suggestive of possible constructions) and deal with Humanism in relation to Freedom and Religion; others literary, such as the paper on the "Dissociation of the Absolute," and two dialogues expounding the conjectural philosophy of Protagoras. They have a certain unity of subject, and abound in incisive dialectic, eloquent dissertation and the characteristic humor that is so very disconcerting to those who have none. Dr. Schiller is pleased with the vogue that the "new philosophy" has already obtained; and his list of adherents comprises the names of so many genial souls that one shrinks from the danger of saying anything unkind about it. Far from shunning criticism, however, Humanism may be said hitherto to have lived upon it; rejoinders, sur-rejoinders, and rebutters have spread its fame from the Rocky Mountains to the Apennines.

But is it a *new* philosophy? It seems to me to be essentially the Empirical Philosophy, with some additions that are accidental and by no means improvements. These additions are of two kinds; first, certain exaggerations and paradoxes connected with the doctrine of Voluntarism, and secondly, certain approximations to popular beliefs, depending upon a loose conception of the requirements of verification.

In the first essay Dr. Schiller distinguishes Humanism from Pragmatism. Pragmatism is the epistemological doctrine that we are only concerned with *human* knowledge, that truth is a valuation, and relative to some application and purpose. Humanism is the carrying of the spirit of this doctrine into all branches of philosophy: it "demands that man's integral nature shall be used as the whole premise which philosophy must argue from wholeheartedly, that man's complete satisfaction shall be the conclusion philosophy must aim at" (p. 13).

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That actual knowing is purposive need not be disputed; the great body of knowledge, at least, is acquired by diligently seeking for it. But if knowing is purposive and therefore volitional, volition, in Dr. Schiller's view, has some kind of superiority to cognition; "theory is an outgrowth of practice and incapable of truly 'independent' existence" (p. 128). "Truth is a product of our volitional activity" (p. 357). "In theory, at least, the 'goods' and therefore the 'truths' of all the sciences are unified and validated by their relation to the Supreme Good" (p. 153). Now are not these exaggerated and one-sided statements? Whilst it is true that human knowing is for the most part volitional (voluntary, rather), it is no less true that volition is guided by knowing, and that that is even the differentia of volition in the stricter use of the word; whilst, again, if it may be said that true and false are a kind of good and bad (namely, for understanding), it may equally be said that "good" and "bad" involve judgments which are true or false. Why then should "practice" or "will" be given any primacy over truth or reason? That the ethical conception of Good has "supreme authority over the logical conception of true," has been the ground of all sincere persecution on the part of those who were confident of already knowing the good.

It is a foible of this philosophy that truth and fact are "made," whereas we have been accustomed to say that they are discovered. Dr. Schiller argues that "it is folly any longer to close one's eyes to the importance and all-pervasiveness of subjective activities in the making of truth. "The futile notion of a really 'independent' truth and fact, that cannot be known or related to us or each other, must be abandoned" (p. 182). He grants that, in the act of knowing, a basis of fact must be "accepted," but then "the acceptance must not be ignored, and is fatal to the chimera of a 'fact' for us existing quite independently of our 'will'" (p. 186). The Pragmatist thinks that the coerciveness of "fact," is "mitigated by his acceptance, by which it ceases to be *de facto* thrust upon him, and becomes *de jure* 'willed'" (p. 189). A sort of primary reality "may certainly, in a sense, be called independent of us," "not 'made' by us but 'found.'" But, "as immediately experienced, it is a meaningless chaos, merely the raw material of a cosmos, the stuff out of which real fact is made." Our cognitive procedures "make it into 'fact' in the stricter and more familiar sense (with which alone scientific discus-

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sion is concerned) by processes of selection and valuation" (p. 187).

I have quoted so much upon a point uninteresting in itself, to bring out a characteristic trait of Voluntarism, the disposition to get the bit between its teeth and gallop, disregarding the bridle of reason. For consider: "Primary reality," antecedent to fact in the stricter sense, with which alone scientific discussion is concerned, comprises not only the perceptual plane of animal life (which is no chaos), but even the external world of all men who are not scientifically educated. Is that "a meaningless chaos"? So much then may, in a sense, be called independent of us, not made but found. But only in a sense; for certainly it is accepted, and acceptance, it seems, as volition! Does then anything pragmatic or human turn upon the question whether we discover truth or make it? Nothing that I can see. In the middle of works devoted to a philosophy whose claim it is to discard every question that does not make a difference, we find many pages of discussion upon a point that makes no difference.

If the reader, on getting further into this book, should feel uncomfortable at finding that it is a question whether, indeed, we do not "make" reality itself, let him cheer up. We do; but only as we are already well aware of doing it. Knowledge alters subjective reality in the knower, and the application of knowledge alters objective reality (p. 438). Who will quarrel with this? Except indeed the Absolutist, who thinks that reality (in a different sense) is complete. That knowledge is a means of culture and of power, and that social reform is worth attempting, these things are generally admitted; yet Dr. Schiller stirs them up into an entertaining paradox. And to what end? Does it make any difference? For example, is "The Making of Reality" a more inspiring legend for the banners of progress than "Greatest Happiness," "Duty," "Fraternity"? I think not; it needs too much explanation.

More serious issues are connected with the Pragmatist's doctrine of verification—if I understand what it is. When we read: "All truths must have shown themselves to be useful; they must have been applied to some problem of actual knowing, by usefulness in which they were tested and verified" (p. 8), we admit that the statement includes scientific experimentation, but it may include so much more as to be quite indefinite. Or take this: the mind, in knowing, "experiments upon the situation by some voluntary

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interference, which may begin with a mere predication, and proceed by reasoned inferences, but always when completed issues in an *act*. It is guided by the results ('consequences') of this experiment, which go to verify or disprove its provisional basis, etc." (p. 185.) Here we have a string of familiar logical terms—"experiment," "inference," "verify"—but no logic, no indication of how the mind is to judge of the experiment. And turning to p. 362, we find that "the presuppositions of scientific knowledge and religious faith are the same. So, too, is the mode of verification by experience. The assumptions which work, *i. e.*, which approve themselves by ministering to human interests, purposes, and objects of desire, are 'verified,' and accepted as true." It is this prominence of the idea that usefulness, results, working, is the test of truth, without a definite appeal to any rational principle, that led me elsewhere to class Pragmatism with Skepticism; but Skepticism is clearly so remote from the intention of the Pragmatists that I shall be happy to withdraw the charge if they either explain that they trust entirely to scientific verification, or definitely formulate some other criterion. Should they select the former alternative, Pragmatism will not differ from Empiricism.

But apparently the new philosophy is expected to lead to results that could hardly be justified by the old Empiricism. For example, whilst the position that axioms are postulates might be supported by the opinions of Spencer and Bain, we could not find in them any sanction for the further position, that therefore they are perhaps untrue. Yet this frivolous illation has now become fashionable. It seems that the strong sympathy of some scientific men with popular religious beliefs induces them to minimize the "opposition between science and religion," and in that design to disparage the certainty of scientific evidence in order to find a footing for the supernatural. I share their sympathy, but am convinced that they have taken the wrong way to the end they have in view. The cumulative scientific evidence is overwhelming. It is only by forgetting this for the time that we can seem to ourselves to doubt it. Uniformity, continuity, causality, whether we call them axioms or postulates, admit of no exception; and the evidence for them is incomparably greater than for any other beliefs.

Yet Dr. Schiller thinks so lightly of them that, in a chapter on "Freedom," he not only supposes the possibility of Indeterminism in human conduct, but is willing to extend it throughout the

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organic and inorganic worlds. Let us take a rapid survey of his arguments: (1) The scientific postulate of causality, he says, is opposed by the ethical postulate "that our actions shall be so conceived that the fulfilment of duty is possible in spite of all temptations, in order that man shall be responsible and an agent in the full sense of the term" (p. 394). But this begs the question; for no determinist admits such a postulate, or that it is implied in responsibility and agency. Indeterminism destroys both. (2) A free act is incalculable; but the metaphysical truth of freedom (indeterminism) does not affect the *methodological* use of the determinist principle; and, therefore, the scientific objection to a doctrine of freedom is strictly limited to its introduction of an unmanageable contingency into scientific calculations. "It would hold against an indeterminism which rendered events incalculable, but not against a belief in Freedom as such" (p. 399). That is to say, Freedom being a belief and causality *only* a postulate, there is no collision between them. But for some of us causality is a belief, and it absolutely excludes indeterminism. Such is my own case: repudiating the anæmic quibble that scientific postulates are not beliefs. (3) The good moral life may be conceived without indetermination. "It is only when we deal with the bad man that it becomes morally necessary to insist that an alternative to his bad life must be really possible." The moralist "wants to be able to say to the bad man: You need not have become the leper you are. Even now your case is not quite hopeless" (p. 400). But these two sayings are quite diverse: "You need not have become, etc.," is false; "Your case is not hopeless" is true, not because of indeterminism, but because real causes, such as good counsel, reflection or a change of circumstances and companions, may change his reactions. (4) The scientific and ethical postulates may be reconciled if we consider that free acts always seem to spring from the given situation; "if the alternatives always seem to exist for a particular mind under particular circumstances, does it not follow at once that whichever of the alternatives is chosen, it will appear to be rationally connected with the antecedent circumstances" (p. 404)? In the first place, I answer, No. It is not enough that in a case of choice "both alternatives should appeal to us" (p. 402); an action is not rationally connected with our former life, merely by realizing *some* impulse or desire; it must agree with our character. Now "agreement with our character," though it has a meaning in everyone's experience, cannot be known

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completely by simple inspection, because our present character is never entirely known to us, and moreover it develops. Therefore, I say, secondly, that the interpretation of our actions depends upon the belief in causality; and, thirdly, that this belief cannot be reconciled, in the interpretation of choice, with the belief in indeterminism, because the two are contradictory. But whereas the belief in causality is not only found to be a necessary postulate of science and business, but is enforced by continual experience, the suppositious indeterminism is not needed to interpret morality, cannot interpret it, and rests upon no experience but the most superficial introspection. (5) "The determinist regards the scientific postulate as the expression of an ultimate truth about reality." But he knows that the whole course of events never will be calculated. "Why then should he repine at learning that the impossibility of his ideal rests ultimately on the inherent nature of reality rather than on the ineradicable weakness of his own mind? Practically it makes no difference" (p. 407). Such is Dr. Schiller's insight into the minds of other people. Why should we care if our beliefs are false, why trouble about mere theory? Yet he seems concerned that *his* beliefs should be true, although "practically it makes no difference." (6) At page 409 we find "plastic," and at page 411 "variable" used as equivalent to "indeterminate." At page 409 we read that, "Regarded objectively law means nothing but habit;" whereas habit is something that may be acquired and lost, exactly the opposite of the action described by a law. At page 416 we may "entertain the idea that the constancy of matter may be merely the stability of an average;" as if the stability of an average could have nothing to do with causation. (7) Dr. Schiller has minimized the influence of Indeterminism, so that it may not disturb scientific calculations, and "practically makes no difference;" yet he trusts to it as the great means of ameliorating the lot of mankind. At page 412 he shows how much this is under our control; but all the improvements there mentioned might be brought about by enlightened self-interest, were there no other motive; whereas Indeterminism can give no ground for hope of any kind. It is an entirely empty concept. The most that can be said is: "Here are certain phenomena which we cannot otherwise explain;" but Indeterminism can never explain them. In attempting to predict phenomena ascribed to Indeterminism, we cannot even appeal to that last resource of our ignorance, the hypothesis that

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the chances are equal; for even that implies that the causes, though unknown, may be equally distributed. Dr. Schiller supposes that freedom, or the plastic indetermination of habit, may be common to all things in the universe, and that the more they have of it, "the more plastic to good purposes we may expect to find them" (p. 448). But Indeterminism has no more relation to purpose than to mechanics.

It seems that Pragmatism is opposed to Naturalism. In a sort of epitome of P. III of Spencer's "Psychology," Dr. Schiller says: "Biologically speaking, the whole mind, of which the intellect forms part, may be conceived as a typically human instrument for effecting adaptations, which has survived and developed by showing itself possessed of an efficacy superior to the devices adopted by other animals. Hence the most essential feature of Pragmatism may well seem its insistence on the fact that *all mental life is purposive*. This insistence embodies the pragmatic protest against naturalism, and as such ought to receive the cordial support of all rationalistic idealisms" (p. 10). Why, by the way, is there any incongruity between Idealism and Naturalism? I see none, unless idealists are so short-sighted as to force it on. But does it not need some force to derive a protest against Naturalism from the biological theory of adaptation? And why protest at all? Not long ago Nature was conceived of as the living garment of God. Are you sure that the reaction against that sublime sentiment will last much longer? There is no falser antithesis than the opposing of Nature to Spirit. It is essentially Manicheism, the root of all that is fanatical in morals and benighting in metaphysics, and the first error that must be overcome if we are to reconcile science with religion.

In a courageous chapter, Dr. Schiller has advocated psychical research as a hopeful method of verifying the doctrine of immortality; and in a chapter on "Faith, Reason and Religion," he has explained how far the Pragmatist method may be considered favorable to religious beliefs. All the efforts of mankind toward mutual understanding are most commendable; but philosophy can never be at one with popular thought, except by recreating it. On comparing the postulates of science and religion, is it not plain that, unless science is to be overthrown, some way entirely different from popular religion must be found for the redemption, or moral strengthening and consolation of mankind? And would it not well become those who have the power both of philosophy and

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literature—of whom there are eminent examples amongst the Pragmatists—to devote themselves to discovering and preparing such a way of peace? Or perhaps, in order to reach the great world, it is necessary first to inspire those who, in quick and comprehensive sympathy, stand nearest to it. Philosophy must indeed, as Dr. Schiller says, "aim at man's complete satisfaction;" but philosophy itself can never satisfy any but the philosopher; that is, human nature as modified by philosophizing; it is impossible that the same thing in the same form should satisfy those who have not philosophized. To spread philosophical ideas amongst mankind, is the task of literature, eloquence and poetry.

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THE MORAL IDEAL. A Historic Study. By Julia Wedgwood. New and revised edition. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1907. Pp. vii, 504.

This is an able and a delightful book. It is difficult to give a good summary of it in a short space, because its range is so wide and its peculiar merit lies not so much in any startling novelty of view, as in the many fresh and stimulating *aperçus* with which it is filled. Moreover the work, though anything but incoherent, is not, and does not pretend to be, closely systematic; it is a series of separate studies on important types of moral aspiration, found in civilizations so diverse as those of Egypt, India, Persia, Greece and Rome. Unity is given by the writer's strong personality and her unfailing grasp on those principles she considers of permanent value. Among these stands chief the spirit of what she well defines as "Spiritual Democracy—the sense of an indefeasible claim on human sympathy in every human being" (p. 459). "This," she says, "is in any vital sense a thing of yesterday," and it has been vitalized, she holds, in great part by the growth of the nation as distinct from the city. In this way: The nation's own limits are so wide as to force its patriots into a more comprehensive veiw; it *collects* and does not *select* its citizens; "the love of the nation is the love of the neighbor" (p. 89), that is, I take it, the love of those to whom we are bound more by the ties of common humanity than by any special choice or individual preference. There is a great deal in this, and it gives a freshness to the distinction between modern states and the states of

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classical antiquity (though of course Miss Wedgwood will not deny that there *is* an element, and a large one, of special preference in the love of the nation).

It is impressive in this connection that she opens her book with a recognition of Egypt as the first united kingdom: as in this respect the most modern as well as the most ancient of nations, (p. 11). And in another respect Egypt is held to be modern: in its concern with death, and its hope of immortality. Miss Wedgwood is aware that this dictum will seem paradoxical to some; to the present reviewer it appears indubitable; the exquisite quotations given from Egyptian literature speak directly to us, whatever our beliefs, for none of us can forget that

> "Une immense espérance a traversée la terre:
> Malgré nous vers le ciel il fout tourner les yeux"

(quoted on page 264).

In dealing with India, stress is laid on the remarkable change in temper and thought revealed in the Indian Bible. First, the Aryan hymns showing "an exuberant enjoyment of the whole of Nature, a fearless appropriation of all its good things" (p. 62), and then the emergence of profound asceticism, indiscriminating Pantheism. No full explanation is given for this change; perhaps, without more knowledge than is attainable, none could be. The dominance of caste is explained as due to an inevitable reaction from the creed that tried to crush out distinctions. This is striking, but not quite convincing. An outsider might venture to suggest that, on the contrary, caste must have been in a direct line the natural result of crushing out individuality. More convincing is the statement that, whatever the horrors of the system, it did obtain its hold on men's hearts by enshrining one great idea, the idea of vocation.

In contrast to the indistinguishable unity adored and submitted to by India, we have the Persian conception of a sharp distinction between right and wrong; a distinction going so deep into the nature of things that the conflict between good and evil is not only world-wide, it is actually the cause of the world. The earth is a bastion against the powers of darkness, and this idea, Miss Wedgwood suggests (and the suggestion is pregnant), fascinated the vast imagination of Milton. Alike in "Paradise Lost" and in the Persian mythology, "it is the antagonism of a supernatural

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being which starts the course of terrestrial history; the creation is its result" (p. 144).

Opposed to Persia again is the spirit of Greece, essentially the artist-people, for whom "in the rich garden of humanity there were many fruits, and of none was it said, 'Thou mayst not eat of the tree which bears it.' All experience was fruit —all was seed. To the Greek spirit none was poison" (p. 174). This is admirably put, and admirable, too, is the account of the paternal despotism of Rome, preparing the way, among other things, for the tyranny of the Holy Father.

We pass to the emergence of the burden of evil and suffering in men's minds, when, the city broken and the nation not yet born, the individual was flung back upon his own soul, when Epictetus preached the omnipotence and not merely the strength of will; when Marcus Aurelius clung to the spirit within himself that was more than himself, "the immortal and inseparable comrade," a conception that held "a promise of immortality" which he himself could not see (p. 317).

But the attempted solutions of the Stoics in all their forms (one may include Philo and Plutarch among the Stoics) could not satisfy Christians who had to face the failures of official Christianity and the shocks to the falling empire. Thus the Persian idea of something inherently evil in the world returned with great force, and with it the conception of man's work as essentially one that is to redeem the time. Redeem it from what? This is still the vital question for us, and Augustine's answer, though it cannot be ours, appears, as stated in this book, of singular interest. From bondage to the flesh, that is the answer; and this means that the pleasures of the flesh are to have no part whatever among the desirable *desiderata* of man. Augustine's position is distinguished, intellectually, from the Manichæan by the refusal to allow that matter in itself can be evil; only choice can be evil; but it is inspired by the Manichæan distrust of matter. "It is not any bodily condition which in itself is evil, he [Augustine] writes, but the fact that the bodily condition should dominate the will" (p. 431). Hence, his rooted distrust of marriage, on which, although he admits it as necessary, he has flung "the blight of the second-best."

This is set in effective contrast with the Northern (or modern) view of life, when "the love of woman changes from the centre of human temptation to the centre of human interest;" and "human

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passion appears in connection with whatever is stately, whatever is vigorous, whatever is pure" (p. 453).

The book closes with an inspiring working out of the antithesis between the *ought* and the *is*.

London. F. MELIAN STAWELL.

AN INQUIRY INTO SOCIALISM. By Thomas Kirkup. Third edition, revised and enlarged. Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Pp. vi, 216.

THE LIBERAL STATE: A SPECULATION. By Thomas Whittaker. London: Watts & Co., 1907. Pp. ix, 202.

Mr. Kirkup's inquiry into socialism is, or should be, too well known to need special or detailed notice. Nothing could be more opportune than the reissue in a substantially unaltered form of this eminently catholic as well as eminently reasonable statement of the socialist case. Socialism is not, in Mr. Kirkup's view, a stereotyped system of dogma, but a regulative idea of industrial organization, depending for its realization on "the irresistible momentum of two great revolutions—the industrial revolution and the political revolution named the new democracy." The aim of socialism is nothing less than to "render the mechanism of the industrial revolution really subservient to human welfare, and to realize a social and economic freedom suited to the political freedom proclaimed in the modern democracy. . . . Like the democracy, socialism aims at the realization of freedom for the mass of mankind." Certainly there is no inquiry into socialism that is better calculated to fulfil the aim the author has set himself—"to bring out what is fundamental in socialism, both as contrasted with the prevailing social system and with theories for which it is usually mistaken."

Among these theories, Mr. Kirkup has anticipated in advance what seems to be a fixed idea in Mr. Whittaker's conception of socialism. By the "Liberal State" is meant a State that "accepts democracy (not necessarily untempered) and intellectual freedom, not as mere temporary phases of a transition, but as permanent elements of an ideal polity. . . . The real opposition to the Liberal State is to be found in a hierarchical or bureaucratic State in which a caste or an order of experts as the representatives of a doctrine govern without systematic control." The

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Liberal State is therefore opposed to the Socialistic State, which is regarded as equally inimical to culture and to freedom. "The rulers of the State, according to the very principle of the system, would be its industrial directors; hence the ideals of the State would be more, and not less, stringently commercial than they are now. The individual would be rigorously a portion of the industrial mechanism. His essence would be conceived as efficiency of function in relation to this." It is somewhat surprising that Mr. Whittaker should take this to be the logic of socialism. It is true that certain representatives of what is sometimes called administrative socialism lay so much stress on regimentation that the liberty to be secured by the regimentation seems to "drop out of their reasoning;" but—to take the witness of Mr. Kirkup—"the regimental or bureaucratic socialism which seems to be presumed by some writers, is absolutely alien to any reasonable conception of socialism." On the contrary, "socialism is a type of economic organization that may take form in a thousand diverse ways . . . the type will be always changing; the ideal will always grow more exacting." It is indeed from the point of view both of culture and of freedom that "the claim of socialism to hold the field as a fitting system for the progressive evolution of the future becomes more urgent as time goes on." Mr. Whittaker himself is indirectly a witness to what Mr. Kirkup describes as the "plasticity" and "adaptiveness" of the socialist principle. Socialism is indeed dismissed as involving the suppression of private property and as a direct consequence the suppression of liberty. That is, it is made identical with communism or with what is only a particular and partial method of socialism. All that socialism implies is the collective control of industry for the common good, and for the realization of what Mr. Whittaker calls with truth the ends of life. Mr. Whittaker's own program —the state-control of capitalist industry—is just as much a form of socialism as state-ownership of capital; and it includes not only "systematic state regulation of industry," but "direct curtailment of the possibilities of acquiring social predominance by the accumulation of wealth." Mr. Whittaker seems to think that this conception of "state-direction" "leaves the rights of property in general as they have nearly always been conceived; that is, as subordinated to the commonwealth, not abstract and absolute." Not only is this a somewhat hazardous statement in itself, but surely Mr. Whittaker is taking up what would appear from

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his general argument to be an uncongenial attitude of dogmatism and finality when he endeavors to determine *a priori* the kind and degree of "subordination to the commonwealth" that may be demanded in the interest of social welfare from the institution of private property. On the whole, Mr. Whittaker's treatment of socialism seems rather too academic to be particularly pertinent or profitable, though it may serve as a useful corrective of the more abstract and mechanical renderings of the socialist idea that are undoubtedly current.

On the other hand, Mr. Whittaker's defense of the "Liberal System" is full of interest and instruction. It is a rare pleasure to read a book which is characterized by so much distinction both of style and of thought, and combines within a small compass such a variety of fruitful and constructive ideas. Mr. Whittaker selects as his starting point for a political speculation "in which the idea of liberty is supreme" Comte's sketch (in the "Positive Polity") of an ideal society; and the way in which he works out his idea of the Liberal State by selecting the elements of permanent value in the "authoritative" idea of Comte on the one hand and Plato on the other, is particularly interesting. Mr. Whittaker appeals to both popular and philosophical opinion in holding that "justice and freedom" is a better watchword of the State, claiming to be the true organ of humanity, than "order and progress." In the discriminating discussion of "natural rights" full justice is done to the fallacy of the abstract ideal: what is wanted is a reference to a common good—which again must be "a kind of good that is distinctively human and that can be shared." This human and sharable good Mr. Whittaker finds in "culture" as distinguished from material luxury. The political form most fitted for the realization of the human end is the self-governing, national State—"the highest collective form taken by humanity," and "the supreme political problem is to develop it as the basis for the best individual life;" while the social order involves the control of the State over industry—the proper part of the State being to regulate the conditions of employment rather than to be itself the employer of labor. With this general conception, as also with the author's view on the employment of child labor ("the very worst feature of modern capitalization") and his interesting speculation on the endowment of the professions (already outlined in Appendix I to "The Neo-Platonists"), Mr. Whittaker is well within the circle

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of socialist ideas. In two concluding chapters Mr. Whittaker considers (rather slightly perhaps, but with considerable freshness and insight) the problem of the State and Religion, and Education. Under the latter head, the conclusion is drawn that a predominating part in the higher education should be given to literature, the reason being that "from nothing else can such a view of the whole be obtained;" while special importance is attached to history (mainly the history of Europe), not only in higher, but also in primary education. This is the kind of political thinking that was never more wanted than it is in these times of dissolving views, and students who desire *multum in parvo* cannot do better than study this sketch of a political ideal "going in some respects beyond the present order, but having its roots in the European past."

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MAN, THE SOCIAL CREATOR. By Henry Demarest Lloyd. New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1906. Pp. 279.

The death of Henry D. Lloyd has removed from contemporary life one of the sturdiest, wisest, and noblest champions organized labor and social reform have had in America. In strength of character, purity of motives, warmth of sympathy, courage of conviction, gentleness of spirit, and power of lucid expression, he reminds one of Henry George. But while he lacked the persuasive eloquence and the capacity for leadership of the great advocate of the single tax, his outlook upon life was broader, his independence of religious and political traditions more complete, and his prophetic insight deeper. Strange as it may seem, his ringing utterances constantly call to mind the great American individualist, Emerson.

This may seem an exaggerated estimate to those who have known Mr. Lloyd only from his studies of the trusts, the co-operative societies in England, and the governmental experiments in New Zealand. What made his "Wealth Versus Commonwealth" so heartily disliked and feared in some circles was the sober, dispassionate manner in which only facts duly attested by court records were introduced to illustrate the growth of trusts. What so endeared him to the rank and file of organized labor was his unselfish devotion to the immediate needs of men, in a strike or a lock-out, as legal adviser, sympathizer, and friend.

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The mass of men who revered him while he lived, and offered the most touching tributes to his memory when he was dead, knew little of the deep religious faith that prompted, sustained, and inspired him in his work. They knew only the noble fruits of this faith. It had long been his desire to voice more fully his convictions on the highest themes of life. Death put an end to his plans. All the more gratifying is it to find in this posthumous work, edited by his sister, Mrs. Withington, and Miss Jane Addams, so rich an expression of his religious views and feelings.

The present writer became acquainted with this "labor agitator" through his interest in Italian literature. He had heard of our great Dante and Petrarch collections at Cornell, and wished to know more about them. Our acquaintance ripened into friendship. He probably never knew himself how largely it was due to his suggestion and encouragement that the task of interpreting the value of Jesus' thought in its relation to the great problems of to-day was attempted in the closing chapters of "The Prophet of Nazareth," but it is a pleasure to have this opportunity of acknowledging it.

The titles of some of the chapters are very suggestive, such as The Discovery of Social Love, Social Progress Always Religious, Mere Contact Making for Spiritual Union, Social Love Creating New Forms of Social Life, The New Conscience, A New Conscience Predicting a New Wealth, The Church of the Deed, The Religion of Labor. A few quotations suffice to indicate the general character of Mr. Lloyd's religious thought. "In the sense in which Christianity, though only a variation in an unceasing evolution, was a new religion, may that also be said to be a new religion on which man is now brooding." The new thought stirring in the universal mind is this: "The Son of Man, Father in Heaven, Son of God, Heaven, Mediator, Holy Spirit—all these are symbols by which men have been picturing themselves to themselves." "The religious idea advances from the Fatherhood of God to the Fatherhood of Man." "The words and deeds attributed to the gods are in truth the words and deeds of humanity." "The revelations are self-revelations." "God is the name man gives to his own future." "Heaven is one of the Utopias. It has been created by those who do not dare to express their real thoughts for the illumination of those who would not dare to consider them." "Progress on earth, not

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perfection in heaven, is the word of the future." "Humanity sees its goal to be not perfection but progress." "Man is not the creator, nor the creator of all, but he is the greatest creator we know on earth." "We are to pray to ourselves and each other; such prayers can be answered." "There is no King God in a true democratic Heaven; every one of us citizens has his chance and his right to play God." "A people who are monarchists in their prayers at church and democrats at the polls are riding two horses going in opposite directions with the speed of runaway comets."

It may be questioned whether Mr. Lloyd is right when he asserts that "the identity of God and man is clearly insisted upon in the Hebrew Bible," interprets a Johannine epistle as affirming that man is a possible God, becomes God, if he loves, and ascribes to Jesus the sentiment that the man who does the works of the Father becomes one with the Father. The religious mystic is prone to allegorizing, is apt to forget the historic meaning, and is sorely tempted to read into ancient texts a significance not dreamed of by the original writers. Mr. Lloyd has not altogether escaped this temptation. There is, indeed, on the part of the author of the Fourth Gospel, a tendency in the direction of Mr. Lloyd's thought, but it is only a tendency, and this evangelist would have been shocked, if some one should have told him that he taught the identity of God and man. He was willing to use the epithet "god" of the incarnate Logos, but by no means of man as such. Besides, the spiritual intuitions and philosophical speculations of this evangelist should not be confused with the thought of the great Galilæan prophet.

Mr. Lloyd's religion is not one of priests and sacred books, dogmas and ceremonies, prayers and sacraments, churchgoing and almsgiving, gods and devils, heavens and hells. It is a religion of present duties and disinterested hopes, of intelligent and universal education, conscientious labor, honorable politics, ennobling recreations, pure, profitable, and joy-inspiring human relationships, of the divinity of man, the social creator. This religion was to Lloyd a fountain of living waters. He was a saint of a new order, a prophet of the new faith that is coming in the world. His creed was a vital thing with him; it made him a seer. He was carried away by his buoyant faith; he set his sails for the land of the heart's desire; he fell into rhapsodies and seemed to the unbeliever like one beside himself.

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The critics cry, "Blasphemy!" yet it is difficult to be shocked in the presence of such genuine reverence. They exclaim: "What tiresome tirades against the God of things as they are!" Yet the closing words of Lloyd's message, "There is no salvation save in the God of to-morrow," keep ringing in one's ears.

It is interesting to observe how little confidence Lloyd had in government by parties, how free he was from any superstitious faith in the ballot-box. He advocated woman suffrage and criticized the founders of our government for failing to see that "their people was only a half-people, inasmuch as they left the women outside the pale of political humanity;" and he regarded the enfranchisement of the negroes as "another step up toward the creation of our full ideal of the people." But it would be difficult to find anywhere a more illuminating exposition of the futility of our present politcal system than in these pages. "In Germany," he says, "where the people have not been exhausted by political passions, and by political overwork, there is the possibility of popular enthusiasm for a socialist campaign. But the Germans politically are beginners; we in America are post-graduates. We have given government by party politics a century's trial, and the common sense of the people knows at bottom that it has broken down." He continues: "The real universal suffrage will come only when education is universal and complete, when employment is universal, and freedom to choose any livelihood is universal." "Election by examination is the beginning of the election by education which Emerson prophesied."

There is food for thought, rich, wholesome, and nourishing, in this volume, and inspiration for every worker in the field of true religion.

Cornell University. NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

THE SMALL HOLDINGS OF ENGLAND. A Survey of Various Existing Systems. By L. Jebb. London: John Murray, 1907. Pp. ix, 445.

The author of this work was commissioned by the Coöperative Small Holdings Association to collect information at first hand about the small holdings established in England, and spent some three years over the task. Such being the origin of the book, the incompleteness of the survey of small holdings of natural

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growth will be understood. The point which Miss Jebb had especially to examine was the effect of experiments in small holdings. The material naturally groups itself according to its origin. There are, firstly, the holdings of natural occurrence, of which typical instances are given. Next stand the semi-philanthropic, semi-commercial ventures of such associations as the National Land Company and the Small Farm and Laborers' Land Company, and the more commercial enterprises of companies like the Wellington Land Company. Succeeding these classes Miss Jebb notices the creation of small holdings through the purchase and sale of land by individuals, the work of small holdings associations established by enthusiastic individuals and of those of spontaneous origin, and the effect of legislative action. Cost is fully examined. The important matter of tenure is not overlooked and the evidence given seems to show that this must be determined to some extent by the purpose to which the land is to be devoted and local custom. Further, the reader will find here valuable observations relating to the comparative values of subsistence holdings and those to provide by-employment. The book is mainly of the nature of a report upon facts, but generalizations are ventured here and there. As a report, the work is most carefully done, great judgment being shown in the rejection of irrelevancies; and the conclusions drawn by Miss Jebb appear to me reasonable and well founded. Success has been greatest where small holdings have had a natural origin, and our author believes that "where the laws of supply and demand are allowed free play in land, there is a distinct tendency to the natural occurrence of small holdings under many and various conditions." And as regards the more artificially founded undertakings, Miss Jebb is of opinion that if certain schemes "fostered by idealists and faddists" be omitted, results on the whole are not such as to compel despair. Frequently disaster has been due to antiquated methods of cultivation and marketing. And the method of its administration, not want of desire for land, explains the failure of the Small Holdings Act, our author contends. Certainly it is a disturbing fact that small holdings should be so few and need so much encouragement, if the "back to the land" tendency is so considerable as some reformers would have us believe. But the explanation of the existing state of affairs may be that the drift to the towns continues now to a large extent merely because of the persistency of social movements, once they have been set

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on foot, and that on the other hand some resistance of conservativism in estate management has to be overcome before attractive opportunities can be offered to the aspiring of the rural population. The creation of "opportunities" is, and will increasingly be, the great need. No doubt, through enterprising landowners, estate companies and coöperation, the problem will solve itself in the future; but in the present I think Miss Jebb is right in holding that legislative assistance is needed. To all who are interested in the question of small holdings this volume can be unreservedly recommended. It is admirably illustrated.

University, Manchester. S. J. CHAPMAN.

THE PROBLEM OF BOY WORK. By the Rev. Spencer J. Gibb. London: Wells Gardner, Darton & Co. Pp. xi, 96.

This is on the whole an excellent little book. The observation is carefully done and the examination of other published material has not been neglected. Nevertheless there are points to criticize. Mr. Gibb appears to regret the decay of apprenticeship, not realizing, seemingly—or thinking it mattered—that this too frequently crystallized the population in comparatively permanent forms and caused trades to be monopolized. It suited the domestic order, but something more elastic, which makes change easier, is required for the mobile economic civilization of to-day. The technical school must take the place of education in the workshop. The former is naturally more scientific and more likely to turn out the thoughtful operative. The need of this age is the thoughtful operative and not the skilled mechanic; "skilled" meaning merely "dexterous." Our author is hesitating on the matter of the raising of the school age, though he believes in school supervision continuing up to sixteen. He has little to say of the important social reactions which must accompany any improvement in bringing out the latent capacities of individuals when they are in the plastic age. He seems to think too exclusively of what directly suits existing conditions; but it should be borne in mind that these are shaped by the characters of the attainable living factors in production.

We need a higher school limit more and not less than Germany, as our author implies. Nevertheless, this book is an excellent one and we should be most unjust if we ended on a note of complaint. Our plea is merely that Mr. Gibb might have penetrated

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more profoundly into his problem than he has. Such practical advice as he gives is usually excellent. Moreover we cannot think out a reform of the evil of boy work until we are in possession of the facts, and these our author photographs most faithfully. Its worst features are found in the work that does not lead on to continuous employment and in street hawking, such as the selling of newspapers. The children who are driven to the latter occupation as a rule seem to end their lives among the dregs of society. Canon Barnett is right in seeing a large part of the secret of social amelioration in the use made of the vital years of boyhood which follow on school life, and Mr. Gibb is right in laying emphasis also upon the kind of education given in the school. Canon Scott Holland contributes a stirring introduction.

University, Manchester. S. J. CHAPMAN.

LA FILOSOFIA DELL' AZIONE. Di Giovanni Cesca. Milano, Palermo, Napoli: Remo Sandron. Pp. 330.

The writer is opposed to Idealistic systems of ethics and to all metempirical assumption in philosophic thought. His aim is to present the claims of a philosophy of action which as phenomenalism is to mediate between idealism and realism, as pluralism is to recognize the partial truth of dualism, as "solidarism" conciliates the individual and society, as "energism" gives full play to the activities of both man and his environment, and as meliorism effects a synthesis between optimism and pessimism. The author insists upon a distinction between "ideality," which in so far as it is ethico-social and not theologico-metaphysical is a justifiable and valuable concept, and "Idealism," which he regards as based upon metempirical and therefore invalid foundations. The style of the work is somewhat dry.

E. RITCHIE.

Halifax, N. S.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

MEMORIALS OF THOMAS DAVIDSON, THE WANDERING SCHOLAR. Collected and edited by William Knight. London: T. Fisher Unwin. [A biographical account of the founder of the Fabian Society and the Fellowship of the New Life.]

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EARLY CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN THE WEST, FROM CLEMENT TO AMBROSE. By Dr. H. H. Sculland. London: Williams & Norgate.

NIETZSCHE IN OUTLINE AND APHORISM. By A. R. Orage. Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis.

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Articles by writers in Great Britain or Ireland, and all books to be reviewed, except those published in America, should be sent to Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, University College, Cardiff, Wales.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1908.

THE TREATMENT OF HOMICIDAL CRIMINALS.

That the penal codes of civilized nations are invariably behind the moral sentiments and humane tendencies, if not of all, of the greater part of the peoples of those nations, is perhaps a natural condition of things. Any comparative study of the criminal laws of various countries does but serve to emphasize the fact. The dread hand of the law lies heavily upon us, and, considered from an ethical standpoint, particularly the criminal law.

The treatment nowadays meted out by an intelligent parent to the offense of a child and that which obtained in the past, the treatment of wrongdoing in school life now and in days gone by, illustrate the growth of ideas in regard to punishment. True, there are people still who for every offense, or for very many offenses, will rush to violent punishment. In most of the great historic boys' schools in England corporal punishment, for example, is still maintained, partly as a tradition, partly as a result of a conservative habit of mind, but chiefly because of the belief which lies at the root of all punishment, that *fear* is the greatest or a very great factor in the making of the moral man.

But we may at least flatter ourselves that this method of dealing with moral evil is becoming obsolete. The newer schools do not use such methods, and the products of these schools may fairly challenge comparison. For children so educated a finer sense has replaced the older physical fear to do wrong. For there is fear and fear, the fear of external

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results leading to punishment and the higher fear of one's larger self.

Like school like parent. The thoughtful parent who cannot place the fear of God's wrath, and still less the fear of the rod, before the child, is not devoid of means to the making of the moral being. Rather he is in the stronger position, for he sees what apparently the older schoolmaster and the older parent did not see or did not trouble to see—that the ill of an act does not lie in the act *per se,* but in the state of mind that found expression in the act. Hence the fundamental idea of punishment, fitting a consequence to an act, becomes for him an obvious absurdity. For none can say what the penalty is that would balance the evil deed. The doer of the deed is then not to be punished for an act of evil, but to be treated for a condition of mind which is opposed to the good of the larger self and, resulting therefrom, of society. Such treatment, as in bodily ills, may need to be hard, even repellent, and will appear to some to be practically the same as punishment. But the motive is quite different, and the moral results also.

And if this is true of ill-doing children, how much truer is it of criminals! And here I may remark that the term *criminals* must be taken to mean criminals who are caught, for it must be obvious to everyone that there is no real line in an ethical sense between criminals and the rest of society. "The seed of criminality," as it has been said, "is in each of us," and indeed if criminality means anti-social action, there is very much more than the seed in many eminently respectable people. But using the word "criminals" in the conventional sense, I suggest that our methods of dealing with such are crude and obsolete and, for ethical purposes, useless in the extreme. And as it is the child's state of mind in the performance of a wrong act that is the essential factor, and not the nature of the act in itself, and as that state of mind is so complex a matter that even when we consider it we find it most difficult to deal with, so is it true, as Alfred Russel Wallace has told us, that in regard to the criminal, "We never can know all the peculiarities of the mind, all the complex

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forces and influences of his social environment, which drove the guilty man to the fatal deed."

And yet, though we all know that this is so, and whilst even such old-fashioned criminologists as Sir Robert Anderson tell us emphatically that the punishment-for-crime theory is a moral absurdity and a practical failure, the criminal codes of Europe and America show small advance in the direction of a more intelligent idea in regard to this gigantic and ever-present problem, the problem of the criminal and what to do with him.

That this is so is borne out by a study of a recent Return issued by the British Home Office at the instance of that well-known humane reformer, Mr. George Greenwood, M. P. This document is a Return of the various punishments for homicidal crime provided by the penal codes of the following countries, *viz.:* France, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Spain, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Portugal, Russia, and the United States of America.

The English student of penology will take up this Return with much interest and hope, but will put it down with no little despair. "For surely," he will think, "we English may be 'stupid in these matters,' as John Bright told us, but from other States we shall learn wisdom." He will indeed find some wisdom, chiefly with one or two of the smaller nations, but what a field of unintelligent brutality, what a weary round of hangings, guillotinings, and electrocutions, of chains for life and *travaux forcés à perpétuité,* of *schwerer Kerker,* and of deportations. And all this huge system of law and the infliction of the penalties of the law from Moscow to New York, from Munich to San Francisco, from Madrid to Copenhagen and the North—and yet throughout all the codes of all the nations included in the Return, no suggestion of intelligent understanding or desire to understand what *is* homicidal crime, its cause, its cure and its prevention. Only the dull and stupid round of punishment for crime, penalty for act, the gallows and penal slavery. The legally insane alone receive treatment for their disease, and that not because of any effort to understand homicide, but because legal insanity is not

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now ferociously punished as in the merciless days before the French Revolution.

Take the comparatively simple question of infanticide by a mother. Any intelligent, sympathetic, humane man, let alone a woman, knows that here is a tragedy of mind, a madness, an intolerable grief and depth of despair. For no sane person believes that a sane mother deliberately kills her offspring. Here is disease, a sickness to death. If in such a state of mind the mother destroys herself, all people, even the unintelligent, pity her; and in England the coroner's jury invariably gives its verdict of temporary insanity.

And how do the criminal codes of Europe deal with these unhappy ones? What treatment for this disease do the laws of Europe provide, or what moral understanding do they show in the matter? England issues sentence of death and France death; Germany, three to fifteen years' penal servitude, Austria, ten to twenty years' hard labor; Hungary, five years; Italy, three to twelve years; Holland, up to nine years, and Belgium, from ten years' penal servitude to death. I cannot find that American law, any more than English, even distinguishes infanticide from other kinds of murder, except perhaps in those states where gradation of murder crimes has been introduced and where it is probably murder in the second degree with penalty of penal servitude. These penalties are all based on the punishment-for-crime theory. What or who or how the prisoner is, what she needs and has needed, what society owes her, what change can be effected in her mental conditions, what society owes to itself in the matter of making her again a sane and intelligent member of the community —all these most essential factors do not come into the codes at all. And so a stupid and useless and soul-destroying punishment, supposed to fit the crime, is inflicted. The law remains still in the Middle Ages.

In this Return we have some thirty or forty foolscap pages of punishments—penalties of chains, of hanging, of slavery—but never a suggestion of curative treatment to be applied. One would think that crime, like insanity and hysteria in the old days, suggested nothing to jurists but punishment. It is

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true, of course, and gladly to be admitted, that if we could put all modern ideas with regard to the criminal on one side, and could frankly accept the punishment-for-crime theory, then these European and American codes do most certainly show an advance and a great one on the ideas of criminology held by our forefathers a hundred years back. The awful punishments of the eighteenth century have nearly all been effectually uprooted. From the moment when Voltaire, with sleuth-hound remorselessness, took up the cause of the unfortunate Calas, the days of such infamies as breaking on the wheel were numbered, and penalties such as gibbeting, which a Whig government revived in England as late as 1832, would not be tolerated in any part of civilized Europe or America. The civilized public has ceased to believe in brutality, if it has not yet become intelligent enough to desist from it. It does not want, except in rare cases, to illtreat the prisoner, but a selfish fear backed by the conservatism of officialism and legality makes any change a difficult thing to bring about.

The most hopeful sign indicated by this Return is the fact that all the more advanced countries in Europe (England excepted) have introduced gradation of murder crimes. Details are not given for every state in the American Union, but at least sixteen of those mentioned recognize murder in the first and second degrees. And this I take to be a great advance, for it means that even the crime of murder is being brought within the scope of penal reform. Murder in the second degree will come within reforms in the direction of indeterminate sentences and curative treatment. This is also the case in regard to the first degree in those enlightened states that have finally parted with that remnant of a barbarous age, the public executioner.

It is interesting in passing to note these latter countries, mainly at present the smaller ones, where advances in general education and the spread of humane and ethical tendencies are more easily effected. Thus in Europe: Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, and Denmark; and in America: Maine, Kansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Rhode Island, may be cited. To these must be added Italy, Portugal, and per-

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haps France. Italy is not a very hopeful example, but it must be remembered that in that country abolition is not so much due to a general advance of the people in humane legislation as to that political unification, when the law of Tuscany in regard to this matter—a law which was the work of the great jurist, Beccaria—became the law of united Italy. And thus Sicily, which had capital punishment up to the time of union, is reported to produce some ten times as many murders in a year, in proportion to population, as Tuscany, which has had no death penalty for a century.

Switzerland offers a better example from an English or American point of view. Here the Federal Parliament abolished capital punishment in 1874, but gave permission to the cantons to severally restore it in 1879. Eight did so, but none has ever actually carried out an execution. As in Denmark and Belgium, where the law of death is still on the statute book, public opinion has advanced too far. Holland and Norway have no death penalty, and homicidal crime in these countries has steadily decreased of late years. The case of France is interesting indeed, for here is a struggle between the humane and moral perceptions of an intellectual class, to which the President himself belongs, and the selfish fears and unintelligent brutality of the crowd accustomed until the other day to public executions. The fact of an increase in violent crime due to the laxity of the administration of the law and its consequent uncertainty is a point in favor of the reactionaries in penal matters. And violence, whether in demanding flogging or hanging or the guillotine, always finds support in playing on the selfish fears of the unthinking.

But obviously with the advance of penological reform and the transmutation of methods of punishment into reformative and curative ones, the penalty of death will have to go. Perhaps the introduction of gradation, or the adoption of the indeterminate sentence or simple disuse will bring this about. Whatever the method, once the idea of punishment for crime is given up there can be no moral excuse for this ugly remnant of the good old times.

It would occupy too great a space to deal with half the

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issues in ethical conduct suggested by this Return, that is to say in regard to the state's attitude toward homicidal crime. I will mention but two, for they are characteristic. In Germany, whoever kills his opponent in a duel is not punishable for murder or for manslaughter, but for dueling. The punishment for this is detention in a fortress for from two to fifteen years. This is indeed one of those peculiar moral inversions due to military ideas. The German who kills a man in a passion commits *Todschlag* and is sentenced to five or more years of *penal servitude,* but if, using his military training, he acts more cautiously and challenges the man he desires to kill to a duel, he will get off with two or more years' detention. The French law, more logical in this matter, treats homicide in dueling as murder punishable by death. The practice, however, is probably much the same. Certainly we never hear of the execution of a French duelist.

According to Arts. 327 and 328 of the French code, it is laid down that "homicide, commanded by the law or by legitimate authority, is not a crime." Could anything better illustrate the absurdity to which the theory of punishment for crime has been reduced? For if the moral ill lies in the act, as all criminal law at present supposes, and not solely in the mental condition of the criminal, how can a criminal act cease to be so by giving legal authority for it? If murder, lying and theft are moral ills, they are such whether sanctioned by one man or a dozen or a nation. Either with Nietzsche we must get beyond good and evil and find a new basis for our moral life, or rather abolish ethics altogether in favor of the doctrine of the "blond beast," or more and more we must come to recognize that our individualistic conceptions of good and evil must be socialized and made applicable, not only in the relationship of man with man, but of man with the state and of state with state. And this, indeed, is the trend of all modern civilized life. And, as to the cause and cure of crime, a very true word has been spoken by Rev. W. D. Morrison, that broad-minded prison chaplain, whose long experience gives force to his words: "Crime springs from disorders in our social system, and until these disorders are healed or alle-

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viated, crime will continue to flourish in our midst, no matter how severe and strong you may make the penal law. Some of these disorders consist of physical or mental infirmities; some of economic hardship or vicissitudes, and some in the low standard of life and conduct which prevail in our midst. The true method of diminishing crime is to pluck it up by the roots. And the only way to pluck it up by the roots is to alleviate the social disorders by which it is produced." This is a more rational, historically justified and sane view of the case than that foolish Andersonian plan of capturing the so-called professionally criminal class and shutting it up permanently under lock and key. For prisons, police, and punishment do not effect that moral and social change without which crime, like all other evils, springs up perennially. As a writer in *The Nation* very truly remarks: "At bottom, the criminal problem is not so much a penal as a social problem."

Such a Return as that I have referred to impresses one with the crying need for the application of a larger moral conception of penology and criminal law, or rather moral and social also. Present methods are evil both in the treatment of homicidal or other crimes and both as regards the individual and society. And this is chiefly or entirely due to the absolute lack of any intelligently ethical basis. Criminal law is as haphazard as civil law. Two deeds entirely similar in the ethical reaction entail social advancement in the one case and penal servitude in the other. The worst criminals are not always those that are convicted, nor the worst murderers those that are executed. And those that are imprisoned and suffer penal servitude under present conditions are weakened in every moral, social and humane instinct by their treatment instead of being strengthened thereby.

"But this I know, that every law
That men have made for Man,
Since first Man took his brother's life
And the sad world began,
But straws the wheat and saves the chaff
With a most evil fan." [1]

[1] "Ballad of Reading Gaol."

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What, then, it may be asked, should be the treatment accorded to the homicidal criminal? Well, in the first place, it must be *treatment* and not mere punishment for crime. And in the second place, this treatment must be based on a much more elastic interpretation of the legal definition of insanity. We must recognize that the thoroughly normal man, the sane man, is much rarer than we try to believe. Thirdly, we need an extended recognition of social responsibility. With the advance in social consciousness we shall come to see that "society itself is the primary cause of murder," as A. R. Wallace tells us. And when this is recognized, and treatment replaces punishment, much more intelligent, trained and sympathetic staffs must replace our present prison warders, so that such treatment may be administered in a manner at once wisely firm and intelligently humane. I do not pretend to dogmatize as to the content of such treatment system, but often in these cases the simplest remedies are those most needed and most lacking in prison life—humane and healthy diet, open air, stimulating occupation, sympathetic teaching and wise control—all these factors, the antitheses of those provided by our horrible town life and often village life also. These are the remedies for the diseased homicide with his heavy mental cloud.

Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for so great a change. Nowhere, indeed, in his social life does civilized man so greatly need an ethical uplift as in his dealing with the penal problem. The hope of the future lies in the fact that never before has he so greatly realized it, nor have so many given of time and thought and energy to the bringing about of reform. For with realization of an ill comes insistence on a cure. And in Europe and America, with their rapidly changing social conditions, can we doubt that these evil criminal laws, like the dragon of old, will in this century meet their St. George, nay, St. George become a host?

CARL HEATH.

London.

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THE RELATION OF RIGHTEOUSNESS TO BRUTE FACTS.

"The Relation of Righteousness to Brute Facts" is plainly a subject, or a text, for a sermon. True, it has the marks of a layman or even the marks of a teacher of philosophy. But, whatever the marks, among other laymen the teacher of philosophy is sometimes constrained, or rather is sometimes very glad to preach. And this although his sermon, however deeply felt, may not be quite in character, degenerating into an essay.

As to the text, is it not very appropriate? Is not the question of the relation of righteousness to brute, or hard, facts—that is, of the relation of what is truly ideal to what is actually and uncompromisingly real—especially pertinent here and now? And when I say "here," the reference must be in general to any community to which the reader happens to belong. Only, thinking it very important to recognize the educational as well as the immediately practical interest in human life, I shall speak most directly to the college or university community, where the educational interest is highly developed and has at least an equal prominence with the practical. Vital problems of all sorts are too often considered without any clear regard for these two sides of life, which are quite inseparable and which at the same time make different demands; and then, while the terms in what follows are indeed to be for the most part distinctly local to "the educational center" or "the Athens" of any state or section of a country, nevertheless the principles involved in all that will be said must be applicable to life at large, to life as always mingling and balancing the merely practical and the educational. Such, then, both in general and in particular, being the geographical direction of this sermon or essay, a suggestion or two with respect to the peculiar timeliness of it seems not inappropriate.

Never before in the history of this country, whatever may be true of other countries, whether regard is had to politics

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or to morals and religion, to industry or to education, have the hard, brute facts of life been more in evidence. Exposure has been a passion of the day; it has been, too, as general or farreaching as it has been passionate; and accordingly the ideal and the actual have probably never before seemed so far apart. What is thus true, moreover, of the country at large is sharply and visibly true of the life that immediately affects the individual community, city or state. At every turn in the ordinary, everyday life of the community, brute facts, unideal facts, that is, facts not yet assimilated morally, are offensively in evidence. The widespread demand not merely for new legislation, but often for radically different legislation, shows this, and, of course, the demand has been directed even against the national constitution as well as against state constitutions and local statutes. Such wide interest in new legislation may be more political than moral in its first intent as well as in its first results, making the people politically active rather than morally effective. Certainly good Americans have been misled so more than once, confusing political activity with moral efficiency and responsibility. But, in any case, the interest clearly shows a popular awakening to unideal conditions.

And the educational center, besides awakening to certain brute facts in its practical, everyday life, to questions of public health, of temperance, of morals, and of entertainment, is to-day, as never before, confronting the brute fact in another character quite different from that of a practical issue. The educational center is meeting the brute fact in its character, its very important character, of an educative force. Just what this means may not be clearly understood at first, but a college or university as an educational institution, both through the peculiar life of its students and through the instruction in its classrooms, must ever busy itself with the discovery of new and disturbing facts. The students come to find out, practically and experimentally as well as theoretically, what life is; yes, what it actually and brutally is, before they enter finally and irretrievably into its fullest responsibilities. To speak especially of the college life, so-called, of the life which

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in so many different student activities accompanies the various academic exercises and disciplines, the educative phases of this life, the important parts that it takes in education, are too often and too easily forgotten or overlooked, the attention of educators being very commonly narrowed to questions of curriculum or finance; but a college or university without a vigorous student life, however successful as a bureau of information or of theoretical speculation and however successfully financed, would not be and could not be a truly educational institution. In its student life as well as in its classroom instruction, in practical as well as in theoretical ways, it must acquaint its students with life's facts.

And so, as is now made clear, the subject of this sermon, or essay, is—and is peculiarly pertinent here and now because it is—in the first place a town one, having regard to the brute fact as a practical issue, and in the second place a gown one, having regard to the brute fact as an educative force. It is, also, in the third place, unless the two, town and gown, have no relations and duties to each other, a town-and-gown one, having regard to the inseparable responsibilities of the practical life of the town and the educative life of the university. In this third character, however, which is by no means the least important, I must leave it—and I can safely leave it—to the imagination, or, still better, to the thinking of the reader.

But the brute fact itself—what more exactly is it? The phrase is not an uncommon one. Oliver Wendell Holmes speaks of the saying that one man's meat is another man's poison as a "brute fact" and quite plainly his reference is to something ultimate, to something not to be denied or avoided. Still the phrase commonly means more than may casually appear in Holmes's use of it. Thus, to be quite analytical but, be it hoped, not tedious, a brute fact is anything that shocks custom, whether of thought or conduct, that forces itself on the attention as actively and persistently real, and that is so real and above all so active as to insist upon being fairly and squarely faced and, for good or for ill, practically reckoned with. Again, a brute fact is anything that affronts one, disturbing one's complacency, challenging one's ease. In it one

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encounters something that hitherto either has not been considered at all or has been considered only casually, having been passed by, as it were, on the other side, and that at last must be recognized as part and condition of one's own life. In short, before a brute fact one is always at some parting of the ways; a problem is raised and with this a conflict, intellectual and moral, ensues; and in some manner, responsibly and conservatively or loosely and lawlessly, one is sure eventually to break with one's past. What other outcome could be expected from a real challenge of one's ease?

In very simple illustration and quite within the definition, the clock striking or someone calling in the morning before you have really finished that last nap in which you are so pleasantly half awake is a brute fact. Far more brutal is the discovery that your house is on fire. Yet illustrations like these need not be multiplied. The life of any town or city teems with illustrations, as has already been suggested, and educationally the student in the library or the laboratory, in the classroom or in his own study, is encountering brute facts every day of his life. Morally and intellectually, practically and theoretically, his complacency is constantly disturbed.

Of the brute fact in education I must speak still further. Many have conceived education to be concerned only with the maintenance of some cult, of some given set of institutions and beliefs. They have actually thought the first business of education to be to preserve a prevailing complacency instead of to shock and challenge it, to maintain at any cost an assumed and superficial optimism instead of to train for that effective and responsible living whose optimism can be genuine only when heroic and sacrificial. Such an education, however, at best only protects, and this besides: as if not to be outdone in heroism, so far as it protects at all, it protects only while it lasts. Certainly it does not educate, for it does not prepare for practical life; or rather it educates in casuistry and cant, in a life as double as it is pretentious, in a life that can be practical only as it is indirect and disingenuous. Not mere protection then, but real and straightforward education is what is called for, education in direct and genuine living; and

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such education demands that complacency be constantly challenged, that an assumed optimism be made to fear and question.

Emphatically, then, it *is* the business of a truly educational institution to bring its students face to face, to bring not only their minds, *but also their wills,* face to face with brute facts, with life as deeply and fully it really is, not as some temporary confidence and vested interest or belief would have it. Whatever may be true of other institutions, of churches or senates or city councils, at least a truly educational institution has no privilege of concealment or reservation or indirection. In its life and in its teaching its first duty (and let me add now, what is applicable also to practical life as well as to education, its greatest faith) should lie in a most obstinate loyalty to fact, however brutal and however disturbing.

And now that we know what is meant by the brute fact, and that we know also how truly it is with us both as a practical issue and as an educative force, we can turn directly to the question of the relation of righteousness to the brute facts of life. Thus in practical life as representing the town phase of this question, and still more in education as representing the gown phase, there are at least three things that a well-grounded and effective righteousness cannot get along without—these three, namely, a broad and vital sympathy, an informed but obstinate activity, and a real—perhaps I may say also deeply reverent—sense of humor. A moment ago I was saying that not only the first duty but also the greatest faith of life in general, and especially of education, should lie in persistent loyalty to fact, and now I wonder if I am not right in thinking that an analysis of the faith then referred to would reveal just these three things, sympathy and action and humor, as its chief elements. I make no pretenses to being a theologian. I confess even to some hesitancy about using the word "faith" at all, for this word has become involved in the affectations of cant and in the intrigues, usually well-meaning enough though often disastrous, of ecclesiastical apologetics. But, when all is said, certainly faith is too great a word to be abandoned even to such friendly enemies as cant and apologetics, and so, again, the relation of righteousness to

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the brute facts of life should be one of faith; *of the faith that realizes itself in broad sympathy, in positive activity and in deep humor.*

First, there is the need of broad sympathy. In civic life and in practical life generally this means, of course, that all the many agencies of righteousness should cultivate a spirit of coöperation; that in politics or religion or any other interest of life, party or sect or class should be merely a means to some end, not an end in itself. And to this meaning, wholly commonplace in these days, many tendencies, already justified by results, are important and emphatic witnesses. But, very much more than this, the required sympathy must be broad enough and vital enough actually to reach out beyond the recognized agencies of righteousness. Can righteousness ever be confined merely to its recognized agencies? There is, it is true, an idea—and many are they who have seemed to practice it—that righteousness is conveyed to some things or enters into some things wholly from without, and that the action, accordingly, by which the change is brought about is *on* or *at* the things, not in any sense *with* them. But this idea can have no case before real faith; with its manifest conceit and exclusiveness it blocks anything like a vital sympathy. In spite of appearances at any time or place, all things must somehow work *together* for what is truly righteous. The ideal which righteousness serves must somehow be able to take all things to itself—to take them all up into its arms. The broad and deep sympathy of real faith must somehow feel the possibility and if the possibility then even the actual and active presence of righteousness in all things—in all creatures however erring and degraded, in all activities however vicious, and in all facts however brutal. Of late much has been heard of the will to believe, and certainly effective action, for whatever purpose, depends on no belief, or no will to believe, so strongly as on this, that the objects to be acted upon, be these people, forces or facts, are in their own right and nature amenable to the intended action, themselves actually sharing in the very ideal which is sought. Of course on such terms belief or sympathy is not exactly easy; it must be always sacrificial and

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heroic; but effective righteousness without it, without the sacrifice and the heroism, is impossible. The demands of righteousness are so different from those of a stay-at-home or lie-abed complacency.

The brute facts of life may thus be said to have not merely a negative but a distinctly positive part in righteousness. They make righteousness get up in the morning. They save it from itself. They deepen its scope and its responsibilities. They force it to a very broad sympathy, to heroic sacrifice, even—and perhaps this is best of all, since it goes so far toward proving the sympathy—to a feeling of direct responsibility for what may seem unrighteousness. *When righteousness is able to feel as its own the sins of unrighteousness, real achievement is surely near at hand.*

But if in practical life such sympathy as this is required, if in dealing with all the many so-called agencies of evil man needs to keep in mind that they never can be without some part in what is good, that somehow they must have some positive worth even in their own intent as well as in the opposition which they constantly offer to complacency, then in education the same need has a peculiar importance. Granted, that in education there never is and never should be on the part of the students the same sense of responsibility; still the irresponsibility of students has at least the advantage of tempering or moderating the intensity of the required sacrifices. Mature, practical life, bound as it must be to conditions more or less rigidly set and established, to positive and visible institutions of all sorts, to fixed ways of life and distinctions of class and standards of conduct, can always plead its need of such definite and more or less exclusive organization against the sympathy that a deep faith enjoins; but education belongs to youth and it implies and requires plasticity, and sympathy and the plasticity of youth belong in the closest intimacy. Indeed youth, with its natural openness of mind and versatility of will—often so dangerously near to license—would seem to be a device of nature by which the life that is mature and set or hardened to certain ways is relieved, at least in some measure, of the sacrifice and heroism that in some way must

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be accomplished; and doubtless one source of the unfailing tenderness of old age for youth is the service which this relief involves. Still, not to enlarge upon this matter, it must now appear why I find a broad and vital sympathy of special importance in education.

Upon this sympathy depends plainly, not merely the possibility of real education, but also the freedom of the human spirit which is so essential to the idealism of youth. The idealism of youth is one of unbounded, world-conquering impulses, of inarticulate or only half articulate enthusiasms, and its loyalties are naturally general, not particular; spiritual, not literal; to principles, not to institutions. It would be patriotic, not partisan; religious, not sectarian; actively intellectual, not formally intelligible; moral or righteous, not conventional. And so, to draw a very practical conclusion, at an educational institution sect and party and formal doctrine, all restrictive and confining, should sacrifice their own selfish and worldly ends to the proper and richly serviceable idealism of the youth whom, as they so often avow, they would watch over. Let the sentiment and the outlook of an academic community be narrowed, let them obstinately uphold some letter instead of the spirit, and the chances for idealism, for the appropriate idealism of youth, are very seriously impaired. Instead of genuine idealism, open-minded and outwardly and wholesomely assertive, you will get, in the first place, a morbid Phariseeism, intellectual or political or moral; and in the second place an unholy and altogether irreverent, hopelessly reckless opposition. These things are bad enough and disastrous enough in mature life, but as accompaniments of youth they are prodigiously harmful. The many people who find little or no idealism among students at the present time and bitterly complain in consequence are themselves very largely to blame, since they have had a large part in perpetuating the narrowness of sentiment and outlook to which, more than to anything else, the condition complained of is due.

Already reference has been made to the protection theory of education. Possibly I have given offense to some by a seeming opposition to it. Yet I fully believe that education

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should be protective. *It should, however, protect youth, not maturity.* Primarily it should protect, not the set and always partisan life of the day, but—with emphasis from the very repetition—the free, naturally honest and naturally idealistic spirit of youth; or, if the set and partisan life at all, then this only as a sign and a means to something at once more comprehensive and more vital. Sectarian religious organizations, for example, on or near a university "yard" or "campus" undoubtedly have a right to their places there; they have just the right which their places in real life have already given them or which history and tradition have certainly established for them; they have the right, the same right, that belongs to organizations of other sorts in the life of a student body, such as athletic associations, social clubs, societies for debate, journalistic enterprise, independent intellectual activity, and the like; but certainly for them not less truly than for the others their right implies an obligation—and, for that matter, essentially the same obligation. If truly they would justify themselves, maintaining the right with which the conditions of life have endowed them, then, serving youth instead of age, they must themselves be idealistic and spiritual, not just sectarian; religious, not selfish. They must not be abstract cults but instruments, and instruments that are made spiritual just because used and moved with the educative interest of seeking, so different from that of having; with the interest, essentially sympathetic, of inquiry and experiment, so different from that of complacent assertion. Used and moved with this interest they surely will aid and *protect* instead of hindering and excommunicating the academic life of study, of genuine exploration and honest thinking. Is not study, whether of self or nature, sometimes the most prayerful, and above all the most efficaciously prayerful, thing that a man—especially a youth—can apply himself to?

Again, moved and used with the educative spirit, sectarian religious organizations, just by virtue of their cherished associations and their historical honor, can make the working out of the results of investigation in real life a truly religious service, instead of making it, as so often even to-day it is

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made to seem, irreverent and irreligious or at best only worldly practical and secular. In recent times it has been said too often and too pointedly that the most positive and effective agencies of righteousness, the most productive moral and religious enterprises, both in practical life out in the world and at the colleges and universities, are quite detached from the churches and sometimes even from anything that openly avows a moral or religious intent, and so far as this is true it certainly comes from a lack of that broad sympathy, vital and sacrificial, which I have been making the burden of this part of my sermon. It suggests, too, that if in practical life there is a crying need for the socialized or institutional church, then even more truly and appropriately in education, of course with such adaptations as the different atmosphere and environment would require, there is need and call for the same thing. Organized religion at an educational institution must be so socialized, in the first place, as to bring it into close and vital touch with all the elements and interests of student life and in the second place, as to enable some practical expression and application of the sentiment and outlook which the education naturally imparts. Why not really and honestly let religion in its relation to youth have a fair chance of being protective?

But, secondly, besides requiring a broad and heroic sympathy, effective righteousness or the real faith upon which such righteousness depends, calls for positive action. Doubtless in what has been said of sympathy this second need has been implied. Does it not take action to prove the sympathy, just as it takes action to prove any other sentiment? Professor James, in his characteristic way of putting things, would have a man, who has just deeply enjoyed a concert, go home and speak kindly and harmoniously to his aunt. But a question arises: If a proving action is called for, then what sort of action? And to this question there can be but one answer, though at first hearing a rather commonplace one: *Action that does something*. In other words, action that really goes out and overcomes; that overcomes, not only others, but self; and not only brute facts without, but narrow and equally brutal motives within.

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The world has a great deal of mere motion, or commotion, in it, for which men are directly responsible, and often this goes by the name of action. But real action it certainly is not, or at least, if it truly does anything, it only keeps a complacent people from being wholly idle; and while for a time it may save the interest in really doing things from a fatal starvation, it cannot continue long without most serious results. The brute facts and forces of life, for which the routine and bustling commotion of complacency have little if any regard, have been wont in human history to take the reins into their own hands when those who should hold them, instead of watching the road and acting accordingly, have lost themselves either in their own self-consciousness and conceits or in the mere scenery that their elevated position has afforded. Adopting and adapting a familiar phrase of John Stuart Mill, used by him in a definition of matter, I suggest that we may define fact, the hard, brute fact of life, the fact that constantly does shock our complacency, as the *permanent possibility of righteousness.* That possibility, however, never can be realized by conceit however zealously cultivated or by laziness however bustling. It can be realized only by an activity that goes out to meet the facts and that, meeting them fairly, acts as well as feels, not *at* but *with* them.

So there must be real action, not cultured routine, not domesticated ease, if there is to be realized righteousness, and this need attaches both to practical life out in the world and to college life. In college life, however, the need of information and understanding must have special emphasis. A positive righteousness requires real action, but there is little chance for such righteousness where there is no action of mind, no independent thinking, where men, young and old, are not in the habit of vital thinking, of thinking for themselves, and a college or university that does not train its students to this habit, as well as to the habit of overt action, may serve complacency, but it does not serve righteousness.[1]

[1] In an article, "Enlightened Action the True Basis of Morality," published currently with this in *The Hibbert Journal,* I have enlarged upon the need, here asserted, of an intellectual element in all real, effective morality.

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But now that the need of action, whether of mind or of will, is so clearly defined, there are some difficulties, or objections, that must be reckoned with. What is the use of trying to do anything when the chances of failure are so large? And if one withholds action, waiting for more light, how will one ever get to work? Is there not always much more to learn? In short, in its always imperfect preparation as well as in its very uncertain outcome, action appears overloaded with discouragement. All men know, and know too well, that the fear of failure has played a very conspicuous part—a rogue's part—in human life and that the noble longing for more information has exercised hardly less restraint than the fear of failure on man's will, inefficiency and education having come to pass for synonyms with many people.

As to the first of these objections, surely the courage of failure is and forever must be a condition of achievement. No one, it is true, ever would or ever could speak of failure as a motive to action; no man acts in order to fail; and yet even failure is not without its own distinct worth, and all effectively active people have a sense for the worth of it. Thus in just the sense of more achievement failure is far better than inaction. It always has an inner success quite its own. In fact the man who acts may always recognize, without overwhelming discouragement, not merely the possibility of serious failure in any particular undertaking but also the positive necessity of some failure attending every undertaking, no success ever coming wholly unmixed. Failure, then, never being unmixed and success never being unmixed, and failure actually having a worth of its own, there is left little ground for the discouragement of action from the mere fear of failure. Spiritually or morally, as well as physically, no action can ever be without some achievement. And, if more than this needs to be said, then there is left the difficulty of final judgment about either failure or success. The most conspicuously successful men of the day—how they have failed!

And the second objection is even more easily met. The search after information, which most certainly is important as preparatory to effective action and which is perhaps the

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most conspicuous interest at least of organized education, is also no natural check upon activity. It is true that, like any other interest, the interest in information may often be carried to excess or may persistently involve the sacrifice of many individuals, condemning them to what is for the most part a lifelong devotion to knowledge and wholly intellectual speculation, but nevertheless a purely abstract and formal intellectualism or gnosticism is impossible both personally and socially, both psychologically and sociologically. Thus, when all that can be said pro and con has been said, the fact remains that information and the understanding which information is supposed to assist depend on action. History and biography alike show this dependence—the dependence of knowledge on volition and the outgoing action that volition induces. Both for mature life and for college life with all its various interests and enterprises there is a rich lesson to be learned from the work of a scientific laboratory or of a thinker's study; from the spirit of positive experiment there manifested; from the courage of failure; from the faith in some achievement, and above all from the always informed and always insistent activity.

But now, finding me issue this call for action, the reader is doubtless amused. Already I have confessed myself a teacher of philosophy and it is humorous for a philosopher, or at least for the philosopher as a type, whatever may be the case with any individual, to issue the call to arms. Indeed one of the richly humorous things of the present day is that far and wide among the philosophers there is strong emphasis—a *theoretical* emphasis—not on metaphysical substance, whether matter or spirit, not on formal truth or logical consistency, but on will or on the action which will involves and which always must refuse to be tethered to any substance and must throw mere form and consistency to the winds. What this emphasis may portend, if in any way it reflects or reports a real condition or tendency in the life of the day, I will not undertake to say, but when philosophy, itself so impractical, so inactive, so innocent seemingly of anything even remotely suggestive of will, widely and with strong conviction issues the call to arms, the

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situation truly is humorous. And yet, humor and all, it is just the sort of thing, the strange meeting of things quite incongruous, that is taking place all the time. Moreover, it happens also to suggest, if not even to illustrate, what I wish to consider here in conclusion; for, as will be remembered, besides sympathy and action, humor was declared to be a condition of righteousness; an element of the real faith with which one should meet the brute facts of life.

Is humor, then, so spiritual an emotion? Has it such a real, positive part in righteousness? Am I not lending myself to a most flagrant anti-climax when to sympathy and action I add humor? Many will concede that this thing, humor, may ornament life; that it often affords relief and diversion; that it is not necessarily alien to serious living; but they may not be ready to regard it as belonging to the very substance, if I may so speak, of which faith and righteousness are made. And yet somehow life must laugh—deeply, quietly, reverently; and the more confident life is, the wider its sympathy and the more insistent its activity, the more surely and the more reverently it must laugh. Thus, not only do inactive philosophers call aloud for action and intellectually defy the will, but also such cause for humor confronts one at every turn. Is it less amusing that doctors very frequently fall seriously ill; that priests are themselves sinful creatures; or that babes have been known to speak wisely, while more than one sage has given utterance to unmitigated folly? Is it not, let me even say, one of the very deepest jests of human experience, at which, however tenderly, even the God must smile, that death is always associated with immortal life? In fact all the great truths of religion and morality are only so many paradoxes. In face of such truths, then, can righteousness survive without a saving sense of humor? Why, the paradoxes themselves are not true until one can laugh—*with* them.

In our large cities how conspicuously selfish the righteous people are; how unselfish the unrighteous. In country or in city how often the fruits of good action are gathered by those —so it would seem—who either had nothing to do with

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sowing the seed or even did all they could to prevent its growth and fruitage, while the fruits of evil fall to those—so also it would seem—who are innocent of their production. In a word, for good or for ill, the rain truly does fall on the just and the unjust; nature, who is certainly very deep, being, like man sometimes and God always, no respecter of persons.

And so man as he labors must laugh, and perhaps some day even God will be conceived and portrayed with laughter in his eyes. The laughter, however, that accords with faith and righteousness must be, only to recall words already used, deep and quiet and reverent. It must be the laughter of a sympathy that overcomes life's persistent incongruities, and again, the laughter of a labor that is confident even in the face of disaster. Let man's outlook be narrow, let his standards be confined and exclusive, let his sympathy be dead or only formal, let his narrowness make him fear, as always it must, and make life seem only a game of blind chance, as also it must, and his laughter can be only bravado or, when not that, downright cynicism. In the land of humor, narrowness and its attendant complacency have been the parents of two children, the one loved and tenderly cared for, the other usually disowned and unrecognized; the one, the shallow optimist, half blindly, half boldly laughing off responsibility, refusing ever to be serious, avoiding the action that really does something, and thinking by his laughter to make, not only others, but also himself forget the pressing duty that lies at hand; the other, the cynic or scoffer, laughing at frailty and failure, morbidly dwelling on the fear and the chance which narrowness may never escape, finding in nature's impartiality only unreason and injustice, and actually thinking so to appear broad and deep and to hide the marks of his parentage. But plainly neither the shallow optimist nor his equally shallow brother, the cynic, represents the humor that makes for an effective righteousness. This humor gives relief in responsibility, not from it; cherishes frailty; feels the success of failure, and enjoys, not less honestly than keenly, the impartiality of nature.

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Man must laugh, and to the complacent optimist or the conceited cynic there is but one thing to say: "He laughs best who laughs last." And he laughs last and best whose outlook is wide, whose sympathy is deep, and whose action, informed and insistent, is *with* the facts.

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

University of Michigan.

THE INDIVIDUALISM OF VALUE.

In this paper I shall endeavor to show that goodness and badness are individualistic in a way in which the existent reality which is good or bad need not be individualistic. In other words, even if, as I believe to be the case, all existent reality forms a single unity, in which the unity is as real and important as its differentiations—even in that case the goodness or badness to be found in that whole would not be a unity. It would be a multiplicity of separate values—positive or negative—which would indeed be added together as respects their quantity, but which, when added, would only be a mere aggregate, not a unity like the unity of existence. In other words, again, the universe as a whole is neither good nor bad. I do not mean by this that it is equally good and bad, but that the terms, in their strict sense, have no application to the universe as a whole. (This last statement of my position will require, as we proceed, a verbal modification, which need not concern us at present.)

It is generally, though not universally, admitted that nothing is ultimately good or bad except conscious beings and their conscious states. Other things and events may be good or bad as means in so far as they tend to produce goodness or badness in conscious beings, but they cannot be held to be so ultimately, and in their own right.

It is to be expected that this view will be generally accepted. For almost all people who try to formulate the good at all find it in one or more of three things—pleasure, virtue, and self-realization.

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Now if a person finds the good only in pleasure, or only in virtue, or—like Kant—places the perfect good in virtue combined with as much pleasure as it deserves, it is clear that he must hold that only conscious beings and their states can be good. For happiness and virtue, and their contraries, pain and vice, are all states of consciousness.

The same result would almost certainly follow if the good is found in self-realization, or in harmonious self-development, or some similar notion. Whether it would be possible or not, it would certainly be difficult to attach any meaning to such notions except in the case of a conscious being. And, in point of fact, the supporters of such theories do always, so far as I know, find good and evil exclusively in conscious beings, and their states.

Thus, rightly or wrongly, there is a large consensus of opinion in favor of this view. And it is a view which seems to me to be obviously correct. I shall therefore assume its correctness in this paper, and my results will entirely depend upon it, since, if anything else could have moral value for its own sake, there would be no reason to regard the good as specially individualistic.

When a judgment of value is asserted to be ultimately true, it is, of course, useless to seek for a proof, or to demand one. It must be either accepted or left alone. This particular judgment is, as I have said, one which I feel myself compelled to accept, and the fact that so many other people accept it may be taken as evidence that an argument based on this premise will not necessarily be useless.

Mr. Moore, indeed, holds that other things may have value besides conscious beings and their states. His discussion of the subject is of the greatest interest, but it has not diminished the certainty which I feel, whether rightly or wrongly, that none of these other things can possess value.

There are two points on which we must guard against misconception. In the first place, if I say that only conscious beings and their states have value, I do not mean that they cannot have value unless the conscious being knows them to have value. He might not know that the state in which he

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was conscious of being had value, and yet it might have it. He might not know that his life and character as a whole had value, and yet it might have it. If, in making a certain decision, I acted in a selfish manner, my state of consciousness might have considerable negative value, even if I did not recognize that selfishness was a vice. In the same way, the happiness of a kitten or a young child may be good, although they do not judge themselves to be happy, and do not recognize that happiness is a good.

We may, indeed, go further, and add that there is no necessity, in order that a state should have value, that it should be recognized by *anyone* as having value. If there is no omniscient being—a hypothesis which is at any rate possible—many men must have acted generously or selfishly on occasions when neither they nor anyone else recognized the generosity or the selfishness. But the acts would, all the same, be generous or selfish, and would be good or evil accordingly.

In the second place, we must remember that among the states of consciousness which may be good or bad are included, not only those which give us direct perception of external objects, but those which give us knowledge of them in any other way. This point is important, because Mr. Moore, in criticising Sidgwick's argument, takes Sidgwick's example as his text, and so—as it seems to me—rather obscures the main issue.

Sidgwick had said ("Methods of Ethics," I, ix, 4) that "no one would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in external nature apart from a possible contemplation of it by human beings." To this Mr. Moore replies ("Principia Ethica," Sec. 50), "I, for one, do consider this rational; [and] let us see if I can now get anyone to agree with me. Consider what this admission really means. It entitles us to put the following case: Let us imagine one world exceeding beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admire—mountains, rivers, the sea; trees and sunsets, stars and moon. Imagine all these combined in the most exquisite proportions, so that no one thing jars against another, but each contributes to the beauty

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of the whole. And then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing everything that is most disgusting to us for whatever reason, and the whole, as far as may be, without one redeeming feature. . . . The only thing we are not entitled to imagine is that any human being ever has, or ever, by any possibility, *can,* live in either—can ever see and enjoy the beauty of the one or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even so, supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation of human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly? Would it not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that it would; and I hope that some may agree with me in this extreme instance."

Now such words as "contemplation," "live in," "see," suggest the direct perception—by sight or in some equally immediate manner—of the world and its beauty or ugliness. And this leaves the possibility open that a world not "contemplated" in this way may still be known—by inference, or revelation—to exist. Indeed, Sidgwick's suggestion, adopted by Mr. Moore, that we should consider if it would be rational to aim at the production of it, implies that its existence or at any rate the possibility of its existence may be known. For it would not be rational to aim at the production of any result unless we knew that it was possible to produce it.

Now I should admit that there might be some value in a beautiful world which was known to exist, or even which was only known to be possible, although no conscious being ever directly perceived its beauty. The value would not, I think, be great, but, I think, the value would exist. But in this case I should say that what had value for its own sake was the knowledge which some conscious being had that the world existed or was possible, and that the existence or possibility of the world was only valuable as a means to that knowledge.

I do not suggest that Mr. Moore has confused the two questions—direct perception on the one hand and knowledge of any sort on the other. I am confident that he has not confused

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them, but I think that, by taking the rather unfortunate example that Sidgwick gives, he has unintentionally given an undue plausibility to his contention by making it easy for his readers to suppose that the only question is whether value would arise from the beauty of a world not directly perceived, when the real question is whether value could arise from the beauty of a world not known in any way.

On this question I have, as I have said, a conviction that there would be no such value. Let us suppose that a beautiful world arises somewhere of which no conscious being has had or ever will have any knowledge of any sort—nor the knowledge that it exists or might exist. Such a supposition can never, *ex hypothesi,* be verified, but we can intelligibly make it. Then it seems certain to me that the beauty of that world would have no value whatever. Of course I am as unable to give any arguments for my view as Mr. Moore is to give any arguments for his contrary view.

On this basis, then, that nothing has value but conscious beings and their states, it will follow that, unless the universe as a whole is a conscious being, the universe as a whole can have no value, positive or negative. It is neither good nor bad. As the belief that the universe as a whole is a conscious being—*i. e.,* a single person—is a very rare one, I shall leave it out of account for the present, though I shall return to it. And, leaving it out of account, it is impossible that the universe as a whole can be good or bad. Parts of the universe are conscious beings—indeed, according to one theory, all parts of the universe are conscious beings. And so parts of the universe and their states may have value. But this cannot be said of the universe as a whole.

This result may be unexpected, but I think it is inevitable. It will perhaps appear less paradoxical if we remember that we are speaking only of ultimate value—value as an end, not value as a means. Value as a means may be possessed by other things than conscious selves and their states. Thus a beautiful material world, though devoid of value as an end, may have value as a means if it produces in conscious beings a state of knowledge, or of æsthetic pleasure, which has value

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as an end. And things which are unknown to any conscious being may also have value as means, if they are the causes of desirable states in conscious beings. If a volcanic eruption, whose occurrence was unknown to any conscious being, had fitted a certain district for vine-growing, it would be of value as a means to the desirable state of consciousness of the conscious beings who, in subsequent centuries, drank the wine.

Now the universe as a whole can be of value as a means. The fact that the universe is a unity, and that it is this particular sort of unity, may be known to conscious beings, and this knowledge of it may increase their happiness, or stimulate their virtue, or may in some other way change their conscious states so as to affect the value of those states. Then their knowledge and virtue may have ultimate value. And so the universe as a whole may have value as a means of providing this knowledge or virtue.

(It may be said the belief would have the same value if it were a false belief, for the existence of which it would not be necessary that the universe should be the unity it is believed to be. But, if the truth of a belief makes it more valuable, this would not be the case. And in the case of a man who has too much penetration to be deceived on a particular subject the existence of such a unity would be an essential condition of the belief in it.)

Again, the unity of the universe, and the fact that it is a particular sort of unity, will certainly influence all conscious beings, whether it is known to them or not. They would be different from what they are if the unity of the universe were different, or if they themselves were not parts of a universe. (In the latter case, indeed, it might be maintained that they would not exist at all.) And so it will affect their natures, and therefore their values, and will itself have value as a means.

There is, once more, a sense in which a predicate may be used of a whole which is really applicable only to the parts, and to use it in this sense is quite legitimate, if only the distinction is clearly made. It is quite legitimate to say that one town is more drunken than another, although it is im-

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possible for a town to get drunk at all. What is meant is either that the aggregate drunkenness, or the average drunkenness, of the inhabitants is greater in one town than in another. In the same way, if we came to the conclusion that the average conscious being in the world was in a good state, or was becoming better, we could say that the universe as a whole was in a good state or was becoming better. But we should not be speaking of any value belonging to the universe as a whole, but of the average value of its conscious parts.

Our conclusion, if valid, is of very general importance, for, as I said before, the opinion that the universe as a whole is not a conscious being is by far the most generally accepted. It accompanies all theories of the universe which may be called atheistic, since a person who was also the universe would naturally be held to be God, except in the improbable event of his being considered wicked. And most forms of theism also hold that the universe is not a conscious being. They generally hold that all non-divine conscious beings were created by God, but they do not hold that they form part of God. Thus the universe, in the widest sense, includes both God and his creatures, but is not identical with God, and is not personal.

The belief that the universe is a person is not always found even in systems which would be classed as pantheistic. For the name of pantheism is generally given to any system which, while it denies the existence of a God other than the universe, holds that we are entitled to regard the universe more or less in the same way as theists regard God. If we can trust to its workings, approve the necessary results of its character, feel admiration, reverence or love for it, the system would be called pantheism. Now, rightly or wrongly, many philosophers have thought that the universe could be regarded in one or more of these ways without being looked on as a person, or as the work of a person. Thus Spinoza is usually classed among pantheists, although he certainly did not regard the universe as a person. And Hegel's philosophy would be called pantheistic, even by those who deny that he regarded the universe as personal.

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No doubt there are to be found, among pantheistic systems, some which regard the universe as a whole as being a single person. Lotze unquestionably accepted this view, and some Hegelians do the same. (It has been maintained that Hegel himself did so, but this I believe to be erroneous.) Those who accept such systems, and those only, would be entitled to hold that the universe as a whole had value otherwise than as a means.

But even in this case judgments of value will be found, I think, to be more individualistic than other judgments as to the fundamental characteristics of existence. If such theories as Lotze's are true, I shall be part of another person, and my state at that moment will be part of his state at that moment. But I submit that the value of myself will not be part of the value of him, but will be a separate amount which must, together with the value of all other finite individuals, be *added* to the good or evil of the personal whole, if we wish to estimate the total of the values in the universe. And, in the same way, the value of my state, which is a part of the state of the personal whole at any moment, is not included in the value of that state but must be added to it as a separate item.

The reason of this is, it seems to me, that there are certain qualities which, whenever they are found in a conscious being, possess positive value—that is, are good. There are others which, whenever they are found in a conscious being, possess negative value and are bad. Now if the view of Lotze and some of the Hegelians of the Right should be correct—a view which to me, I must confess, appears patently false—my consciousness is part of God's consciousness, but is also a finite consciousness. Hence if within God's consciousness there are x finite consciousnesses, the total number of consciousnesses is neither one nor x. It is $x +$ one.

Let us suppose that righteousness is good for its own sake. Then, if God is righteous, and I also am righteous, it will follow, even if I am part of God, that there are here two separate goods—one of them presumably much greater than the other. But the point comes out more clearly with a different case. Let us suppose that God is righteous, but that I am

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unrighteous, and that unrighteousness is bad for its own sake. Then it seems clear to me that God's righteousness is good and that my unrighteousness is evil. And it also seems clear to me that, in any attempt to estimate all existent value, these two values, in spite of my being part of God, must be placed side by side with one another, in the same way that my unrighteousness must be placed side by side with the righteousness of Socrates.

If I am right, the conclusion will be that, whether the universe is a single person or not, there are a plurality of beings who have value, and whose states have value, and that all these must be taken into account when we attempt to estimate all existent values. The value of a universe in which there is more than one consciousness, is only one value in the second sense spoken of above—as an aggregate of separate values.

I do not think that the truth of this has been sufficiently realized. We often find that philosophers, and philosophers of very different schools, have argued from the unity of the universe to a corresponding unity of value. Even in philosophies of a materialistic type, which do not regard the unity of the universe as more than a unity of reciprocal causality, we sometimes find the tacit supposition that the value of individuals is merged in the value of the whole in the same way that, according to these philosophies, the individual itself is a transitory and unimportant episode in the whole. But this is inconsistent. If, as most of the supporters of these philosophies would admit, value can only be found in consciousness, then in all questions of value consciousness is the only matter of importance, however dependent, ephemeral or limited its existence may be. These characteristics may assist in making consciousness bad rather than good, but cannot make it less important, in the true sense of important, which always, I conceive, involves the question of value.

But it is more relevant to our present purpose to recall that idealists have failed, more frequently than philosophers of other schools, to recognize this individualism of value, even when they have held that the universe is not a conscious being, and that only conscious beings and their states have value.

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The failure has been partly due to the error mentioned above —the assumption that the value to be found in a whole must have as much unity as the whole itself has. But there is another ground of error which, as a matter of historic fact, seems to have influenced idealists more than other philosophers. This ground is a misapprehension of the sense in which almost all good—and especially almost all of the highest good —is social in its character.

In any case, good is so far social that it depends largely on other men whether the state of a particular man is good. It depends largely on the action of other men, in the present or the past, whether a particular man is now learned or ignorant, virtuous or vicious, healthy or diseased, happy or miserable. But, in addition to this, the good is largely social in a deeper sense—the sense that not only are my relations to other men the essential conditions of a good state of myself, but the consciousness of those relations *is* the good in question. In patriotism, geniality, love, for example, my relation to other men is not a mere means to the good, as my relation to my wine merchant is the means by which I procure the good of wine drinking. Patriotism, geniality, love, it would be said, are themselves goods.

That there are goods of this sort would be very generally admitted (though not universally) by others besides idealists. But the idealists have emphasized these particular goods, and their superiority to others. Some of them have gone as far as to assert that among them is to be found the only true good, in which all others are summed up and transcended. And thus the social character of good has been more prominent in idealistic systems than in others.

This has, on the whole, been a distinctly valuable part of the influence of idealism. But idealism, I think, has often gone further, and, in going further, has gone too far. Because it has value for A. to be in a relation with B., it has been argued that the relation has value in itself, and that the whole which is constituted by A. and B. in relation with one another has also value. Since all things in the universe stand in relation to one another, the conclusion is reached that the whole

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which is constituted by all these beings in relation—that is, the universe itself—may have value in itself.

This, I submit, is erroneous. To love may be good in itself. And to love is to be in a relation with another person. But if A. loves B., what is good is not the relation between them, but the state of A. in being one of the terms of that relation. If to be loved is good in itself, as well as to love, then the state of B. is also good in being the other term of the relation. (And if the relation is one of reciprocal love, then, certainly, B.'s state is good.) But the relation is not good, though both of the terms are good because they have this relation. And, though there is only one relation; there are two goods. It is good that A. should love. It is good that B. should be loved. And these goods are two and not one, though they are causally connected.

This is inevitable on the hypothesis, on which we are proceeding, that only conscious beings and their states have value. For a relation between two beings is neither a conscious being nor a state of one. If A. and B. love one another, then the relation which connects them cannot be a state of one of them only, for then it would not unite the two of them. Nor can it be a state of both of them jointly, for two conscious beings cannot have the same state, though they may have similar states. Nor is it a state of each of them separately, for then you would have two states—one in each and no relation. And it is certainly not a state of any third conscious being.

It is of course true that a relation of love between A. and B. implies that each of them is in a state of love—each, that is, is in a state of having the relation. And these states have value. But then they are two, not one—and one of them is in A. and the other in B. The relation united A. and B., but it is not a state of consciousness, and has no value. The state of A. and the state of B. have value, but they do not unite A. and B.

Of course when I say that what has value is not the relation but the conscious state in each related being which the relation implies, I do not mean that the value lies in a conscious recognition or classification of that state. If A. is related to B.

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by the relation of love, he must be in the conscious state toward B. of loving him, and this has value. It is not necessary for this state to have value that A. should know it to have value, or even that he should know it to be love.

Let us pass to a few corollaries of this position. If it is true, Mr. Moore's principle of organic value will only have a limited application. It may be true that two characteristics, x and y, of a particular state of A. may have a different value when together than the sum of the values they would have had separately. But a state of A. and a state of B. cannot (as ends) have a different value together than the sum of the values they would have had separately. For A. and B. are not a conscious being, but an aggregate of conscious beings, and a state of A. and B. has therefore no value except in the sense in which an aggregate of values may be described as one value. And a value in this sense is simply the sum of the constituent values.

Again, the individualism of Hedonism is frequently made a reproach against it, even by those who hold that value depends on consciousness. But, if our result is right, it follows that any theory of value which confined it to consciousness must be, if it is to be consistent, as individualistic as Hedonism. Individualism is, indeed, more evident in the case of Hedonism. It is more *obvious* that the happiness of a country is the sum of the happiness of the citizens, than that the same is true of virtue or of other excellences. But it would not form a solid ground of reproach to Hedonism that it was more difficult to go wrong about it than about other theories.

Again, if this principle is true, it will not be true to say—as is so often said—that the individual and society are reciprocally means and end. On the contrary, while the individual is an end, the society is only a means. It will remain true, even on this theory, that the individual ought, in certain cases, to sacrifice himself to the society, but this will only be because the resulting effect on society will be a means to the creation, in other individuals, of value exceeding that which is lost in the self-sacrifice. It is really for the welfare of other indi-

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viduals that the sacrifice of one's own welfare is made in any cases where it is justifiable at all.

Once more, the truth of this principle may have some bearing on socialism. There is indeed nothing actually inconsistent with ethical individualism in the advocacy of any development, however great, of the functions of the State. For such a development is generally recommended by arguments which profess to show that the welfare of individual citizens would be greater under such a system. Thus we could logically combine an ethical individualism as thorough as Mill's with a socialism as extreme as Fourier's.

But socialism derives much of its support from other arguments, rather implied, perhaps than distinctly expressed. It is often held that to substitute collective action for individual action must be right because the State is intrinsically higher than the individuals, and stands toward them as a body does to its parts, or even as a cathedral does to its stones, which have no value except as contributing to the beauty of the whole. Socialism owes, I think, a good deal of the support of its adherents, and still more of their enthusiasm, to this view. It is, indeed, only on this view that the phrase "the religion of socialism" can be anything but a foolish exaggeration, since religion concerns itself with ultimate values.

But if what I have said is true, it will follow that, whatever activity it is desirable for the State to have, it will only be desirable as a means, and that the activity, and the State itself, can have no value but as a means. And a religion which fastens itself on a means has not risen above fetish-worship. Compared with worship of the State, zoölatry is rational and dignified. A bull or a crocodile may not have great intrinsic value, but it has some, for it is a conscious being. The State has none. It would be as reasonable to worship a sewage pipe, which also possesses considerable value as a means.

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MR. BERNARD SHAW AS A SOCIAL CRITIC.*

It may be admitted that Mr. Bernard Shaw is a somewhat questionable subject. Most respectable people fight shy of him —or at best, and not wishing to be harsh, they say frankly they do not understand him. I had an experience not long ago, going over to Europe. I noticed Shaw's "Man and Superman" passing from hand to hand in a certain group on the steamer; and as a friend had vainly tried to get the book for me before sailing, I looked on with a certain envy. Just before landing I fell into conversation with the leader of the party and asked him what they thought of the book. I fancied that whether they agreed or not with Shaw, they would be full of ideas; but he said they could make nothing of it—and should I like the book, for he had left it in his stateroom?

Two things embarrass us in reading this writer—at least two. One is that we do not know how to take him. Is he serious, we ask? The temptation is strong to think of him as saying smart things for the pleasure of saying them. He keeps us in a smile half or three quarters of the time we are reading him—often we laugh, sometimes we roar. He seems to take himself as little seriously as his readers. He says he is a "charlatan," yes, "a natural-born mountebank." What can we do with such a man except to enjoy his antics? Another difficulty is that what he says often shocks us. I do not mean merely our sense of the proprieties—any clown does that and it is a part of his humor—but our moral sense. Like a bull in a china shop, he strikes right and left at our current moral conceptions. He seems like a kind of anarchist in ethics—a deifier of license and arbitrary will. He says, either directly or through characters that we feel are his mouthpiece, that if we must choose between a race of athletes and a race of "good men," let us have the athletes; that as the age of faith has gone, so the age of reason has to go and the age of duty as well—the new evangelist must preach

* An address first given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago in Handel Hall, April 14, 1907.

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the repudiation of duty; that unless woman repudiates her womanliness, her duty to her husband, to her children, to society, to the law, and to everyone but herself, she cannot emancipate herself, and since a duty to one's self is strictly no duty at all, therefore woman has to repudiate duty altogether. We do not know whether we are on our feet or on our heads after hearing such things—if we take them seriously at all. I remember coming on some of them in his "Quintessence of Ibsenism," when making a study of Ibsen years ago, and concluding at least that here was no special inspiration for an ethical teacher. Indeed I have read nothing of Shaw since till recently: the bits about him or by him in the newspapers have simply puzzled or irritated or amused me as they have so many others; and as I am rather a prosaic person I felt no strong impulse to study a man who might after all be only joking. But curiosity got the better of me, and I will confess now in advance that gradually Shaw has taken on the proportions of a great man to my mind.

First, let me suggest what is, I think, the right cue for understanding Shaw. Underlying everything else is the fact that he is a Socialist—one of those fools or wise men (according to your point of view) who look for a new heaven and a new earth. Long ago, in a plain, straight economic essay, he made this clear.[1] He expects no good and no salvation from the individual scramble that is now named industrial order; he looks for a different order based on rational, coöperative, collective action. In a letter which prefaces "Man and Superman," he says: "The vitality which places nourishment and children first, heaven and hell a somewhat remote second, and the health of society as an organic whole nowhere, may muddle successfully through the comparatively tribal stages of gregariousness; but in nineteenth-century nations and twentieth-century empires the determination of every man to be rich at all costs, and of every woman to be married at all costs, must, without a highly scientific social organization, produce a ruinous development of poverty, celibacy, prostitution, infant mortality, adult degen-

[1] In "Fabian Essays."

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eracy, and everything that wise men most dread. In short, there is no future for men, however brimming with crude vitality, who are neither intelligent nor politically educated enough to be Socialists." This is his platform to-day, as truly as ever before. The world, as he looks out upon it, is a painful spectacle to his eyes. Pity and indignation move him. He is not sentimental, as some writers are, but the facts grind his soul.

Yet there are those who are not uncomfortable at all. They do not seem to see the facts he sees, or they do not see them from his point of view. They talk of civilization, progress, wealth, liberal institutions, and so on. He does not like it and determines to make them uncomfortable. For a while he attempted to do this from a cart or band-wagon in Hyde Park; but the comfortable-minded were not generally there. Of late he has taken to writing books and plays and he has a wider audience. "It annoys me," he says, "to see people comfortable when they ought to be uncomfortable; and I insist on making them think in order to bring them to conviction of sin." "Annoys"—notice the word; he has the sensitive, artistic temperament. He is irritated, and he determines to irritate. He goes out of his way to do this; he does it of set purpose. His "Quintessence of Ibsenism" he says he purposely couched in the most provocative terms. In a recent book, "Dramatic Opinions and Essays," he remarks, "In this world, if you do not say a thing in an irritating way, you may just as well not say it at all, since nobody will trouble themselves about anything that does not trouble them." In other words, to say the truth simply and scientifically is not his object, nor does it determine his method or style; he wants to influence people, and he is not scrupulous as to the use of means, any more than many a preacher is. The fact is, Shaw is a preacher, though of his own kind; "my conscience is the genuine pulpit article," he tells us himself, half-banteringly; and in seeking to convince men of sin, righteousness and judgment to come I have become persuaded that he is one of the most serious men in this generation.

This view of him is borne out by what he says of art. Surely, he is an artist, a comic artist if you will, though a tragic artist, too; and neither the Philistine nor the Puritan can claim him;

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and yet he pours scorn on "art for art's sake," and is a perfect foil, as some one has said, to his brilliant compatriot and contemporary, Oscar Wilde. The fact is, he has something to communicate through his art: art is only a vehicle for his overmastering idea. In an access of zeal he even calls himself a Puritan in this respect, and says that though he loves fine music and handsome buildings, if he found that they were becoming the instruments of a systematic idolatry of sensuousness, he would hold it good statesmanship to blow every cathedral in the world to pieces with dynamite, organ and all, without the least heed to the screams of the art critics and culture voluptuaries. "The pleasures of the senses I can sympathize with and share," he declares; "but the substitution of sensuous ecstasy for intellectual activity and honesty is the very devil." In a word, art has an end beyond itself; and the object of Shaw's art in particular is to make men think, to make them uncomfortable, to convict them of sin.

If we bear all this in mind we are prepared for epigram, paradox, exaggerations, and numberless extravagances, just as from a good rousing preacher. If they arouse the attention, if they irritate and make men think, they serve their purpose: the truth lying back of them men will get, once thus pricked and prodded. But it would be a great mistake, because Mr. Shaw is serious, to take everything he says seriously—I mean, at its full face value. Here is where the art of interpretation comes in—and it is a delicate art. It is the same art that Matthew Arnold used to enlarge upon with such exquisite skill. It is the art of knowing when to touch an utterance lightly, and again when to press with all our weight. Dogma, scientific definition and statement is all equally important, every part essential and true, if true at all; but literature, the expression of moods and purposes, the mixture of emotion with thought, is a fluid thing, and to treat it as dogma, to press every word and sentence, may lead to outlandish and most unintended conclusions. For instance, in that early book of Shaw's, "The Quintessence of Ibsenism," he is very bold and brave in talking about the repudiation of duty—about woman's doing it as well. If we read it prosaically and dogmatically, *i.e.*, stupidly,

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forgetting or not knowing that it is what the Germans call a *Tendenzschrift,* forgetting that, as the author himself tells us, he sets out to provoke us, we are likely—and especially self-respecting women are likely—to shut the book in disgust before we have read it very far. Really, however, what Shaw wishes to do is to suggest and urge a new duty for mankind; he wants us all, woman included, to live out our own life; it is Emerson against convention and conformity over again. But if we are to do this, we must, in the nature of the case, break more or less with old "duties." Once there was a supposed "duty" to a king; suppose men had not repudiated that duty, where would republicanism and democracy be? Once there was a supposed "duty" to the church and the head of the church; suppose Luther had not defied the pope and the church, where would Protestantism be? Once it was the duty of slaves to obey their masters, and of wives to obey their husbands; and how was progress possible but by renouncing these duties? If duty is one of the greatest things in the world, we must remember that it may be also one of the meanest. It may be a kind of sly putting of an internal bond on a person's soul and freedom, instead of an external one. Convince a man that it is his duty to do certain things for you, and you have no need to watch him—it becomes a very practical substitute for the police. There can be no doubt that the interest and trickery of the strong have often put duties on the weak. There is emancipation—manhood and womanhood—in throwing off these duties. This is the general thought, I take it, that Mr. Shaw has in mind in this little book. A new world, a new social order, he believes, is going to arise—one that will serve men, and every individual man, better than the old one has, and he wants life to be free for it and to be ready to renounce the ties that bind it to the old order. I state all this tamely, rationalistically, perhaps so as to make no particular impression on your minds; he states it irritatingly, exaggeratedly, sweepingly—and anybody who reads the book is put on pins and needles, until by thinking and squirming and self cross-questioning he gets at the real truth the author has in mind.

This is only an instance. No man can less afford to be taken

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literally, dogmatically, than Mr. Shaw. We must make allowance for the preacher's overemphasis and absolutism, the mountebank's gyrations and wish to startle and confound, in almost all he writes. Probably Mr. Shaw would be himself the first to label with the gentle epithet of fool those who took literally every sentence.

And now let us see what he has to say of present society; later we may see what he has also to say of efforts to reform society. It would be vain to attempt to take you through all his plays, not to mention his novels, and pieces of criticism like "A Perfect Wagnerite." One play [2] is a burlesque on war, or rather on the romantic idea of war (and indeed on romanticism in general): we have a very unconventional picture of the ordinary soldier, to whom war is a trade like any other and who finds chocolate quite as practical as cartridges. War or soldiering, it is suggested, is the coward's act of attacking mercilessly when you are strong, and keeping out of harm's way when you are weak. Get your enemy at a disadvantage is its maxim, and never, on any account, fight him on equal terms,—with which thought we are left to ruminate, as to the truth or half-truth of it. Another play is a charming picture of an innocent, unsuspecting, trusting, thoroughly good woman—a gay and cheerful child, according to ordinary worldly standards—who yet is more powerful in tight places (off among some wild Moors in Africa) than the sword or the law or force of any kind, to keep the peace and straighten out the snarls of life. It is an altogether delightful piece, "Capt. Brassbound's Conversion," and if there were a hundred Lady Cicelys, a corresponding number of generals and judges and lawgivers could be spared by society for other more useful employments. Still another play [3] portrays the exploitation of the poor in great cities and the entanglements it involves, the scruples it drowns and the baseness it leads to. It is the problem of "tainted money," treated fifteen or twenty years ago.

An equally sore spot in our civilization is touched in "Mrs.

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[2] "Arms and the Man."

[3] "Widowers' Houses."

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Warren's Profession." We read something about it a couple of years ago in the New York despatches to our papers, when the authorities of that virtuous city forbade (or talked about forbidding) its presentation on the stage. One of our Chicago papers called it "dramatized immorality." To my mind, it is one of the most impressive, one of the most moral plays in our literature. There is not a line in it or a suggestion that stimulates passion. There is rather the odor of the grave, of rottenness and putrefaction and moral death about the systematized sexual looseness that is implied there rather than described. It is so much less seducing than plays and operas that are given on the stage every day, that one might be tempted to think that it was the respectable keepers of immoral houses that hounded on the critics and the papers against the play. Of course, its real offense is its graphic portrayal of how economic conditions may lead to and almost force a life of shame—and of how business enterprise and capital may make money off it. Society permits the daily demoralization of young people and old people who go to our places of amusement, but it cannot permit reflections on its own integrity and its complacent theory that everyone who will can earn an honest living. Sometimes earning an honest living means slow starvation—that is all. Every adult person, capable of reflection, ought to read this play. Shaw himself points the moral of it when he says that a society which desires to found itself on a high standard of integrity of character in its units should organize itself in such a fashion as to make it possible for all men and all women to maintain themselves in reasonable comfort without selling their affections or their convictions. Yes, he applies the truth also to the men—lawyers, doctors, clergymen and platform politicians—who are daily using their highest faculties to belie their real sentiments—and he declares that the shame of these men is greater than that of prostitute women!

The first play of Shaw's I read has a most unpromising title, "The Devil's Disciple." Shaw has not a sneaking but an open fondness for devils and rebels generally. He has a preface on "Diabolonian Ethics"—and you prepare yourself for some tremendous reversal of ordinary moral standards. Now Dick

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Dudgeon does have a somewhat portentous air of irreverence about him, is a mocker, profane, loose, hates religion (*i.e.*, the Puritanic shadows of it), and he is satirical toward the law—but he can be sincere and genuine, and in various ways he shows that it is prudery, sanctimoniousness, cant that he really hates, not virtue. Indeed, he turns out to be a hero, and saves another man's (a clergyman's) life; is arrested and sentenced on the supposition that he is the other man. The man's wife thinks he has done all this out of love for her. And I really must quote his answer at length, it sounds so deep a note in Mr. Shaw's philosophy and comes so near the sublime in actual morality. Dick replies to her: "If I said —to please you—that I did what I did ever so little for your sake, I lied as men always lie to women. You know how much I have lived with worthless men—aye, and worthless women, too. Well, they could all rise to some sort of goodness when they were in love [the word "love" comes from him with true Puritan scorn]. That has taught me to set very little store by the goodness that only comes out red hot. What I did last night, I did in cold blood, caring not half so much for your husband, or [ruthlessly] for you [she droops, stricken], as I do for myself. I had no motive and no interest: all I can tell you is that when it came to the point whether I would take my neck out of the noose and put another man's into it, I could not do it. I don't know why not: I see myself as a fool for my pains; but I could not and I cannot." There, I say, is the height of morality. Indeed, take Dick for all in all, despite his profanity, irreverence, and supposably lax morals, he is the soundest, wholesomest, yes, most religious character in the play—and the fighting preacher and General Burgoyne are no mean seconds. The conventional bad and the real good lying behind it—that is another of Shaw's points of view. Do not judge after the seeing of your eyes, and the hearing of your ears—that is the moral of it.

All this comes roughly under the head of criticism of society as it is. But there are other plays that seem directed, more properly speaking, against half-fledged efforts and proposals to reform society. I know not how otherwise (despite Mr.

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Shaw's explanations) to describe the singular play called "The Philanderer." It is the picture of an Ibsen Club and of the so-called "new woman." There are two of these creatures, or rather three—and each is more terrible, or at least repulsive, than the other. If Shaw wanted to throw scorn on the whole movement, he could not have done better. But probably what he really wanted to do was to show the grotesque form which ideas may take on when people have not the mind or the character really to appropriate them. They have certain glimmerings, they assume certain attitudes and adopt certain phrases—that is all; they are not ennobled, they become ridiculous. One thinks of characters in Ibsen's "The Wild Duck," and of the spouting revolutionary heroes and friends of brotherhood whom Heine satirized. Perhaps in no better way does Shaw show that he is greater than any party or movement—that he keeps his mental and moral integrity. He stands for his ideas, not for the foolish, unripe followers of them.

In "Man and Superman," where as elsewhere he makes socialistic thrusts, he also makes thrusts at socialism—*i. e.*, at the grotesque forms which socialism sometimes takes. There is a group of brigands in the Spanish mountains near the Mediterranean; they are made up of an Anarchist, three Social-Democrats, who are not on speaking terms, besides gentlemen and Christians. A London chauffeur with his chief comes on them, or is held up by them, as they are having a discussion. The reformers contradict one another and utter each his appropriate stock phrases—and the chaffeur says, "Are we 'avin' a pleasure trip in the mountains, or are we at a Socialist meetin'?" There are other gibes. When soldiers threaten descent on the brigands, the Anarchist exclaims:

"Fools, the state is above to crush you, because you spared it at the prompting of the political hangers-on of the bourgeoisie." The sulky Social-Democrat starts in, "On the contrary, only capturing the State machine——," when the Anarchist retorts, "It is going to capture you." Then the rowdy Social-Democrat exclaims, "Ow, chuck it. Wot are we 'ere for? Wot are we wytin' for?" and the captain of the band says between his teeth, "Go on. Talk politics, you idiots: nothing sounds more

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respectable,"—in which last remark I fear we have a reflection of the mind of philosopher Shaw himself.

Criticism on reformers in a finer and more delicate vein we find in "Candida." It is a very genial portrait that is drawn there of the Christian Socialist preacher. He is truthful, fearless, plain-spoken about evildoing and with evildoers, with oceans of energy and enthusiasm—withal a great orator and master of flowing speech. So clear is his perception of reality that he prefers a scoundrel self-confessed to a model employer, made so by necessity and boasting of it. He would be almost perfect, from a reformer's point of view, but for a perfection beyond him, vaguely, incoherently hinted at by a young poet-dreamer. The preacher's wife loves him, pets him and studiously cares for him, but somehow she misses something, it would be very hard to say what, but that she has a glimpse of it in this frail, awkward youth, half-angel and half-child—perhaps I might put it, absolute reality, the absence of all self-deception. Once she claims her husband's attention and expostulates with him about his overworking. "What's the use," she says, "in this perpetual lecturing and talking? It does no good: people don't mind what you say; they agree with you and then do just the opposite. They come to you as to a play, you preach so splendidly. They are all in love with you, and you are in love with preaching, because you do it so beautifully. You think it's all enthusiasm for the kingdom of heaven on earth; and so do they. You dear silly!" Perhaps there never was a finer analysis (miserably condensed as I have given it) of the subtle temptations of a preacher, whether Socialist or any other kind. The dangers of oratory are very great. One feels so good, one *is* so good for the time—and one with many speeches may multiply those times, until one has an almost continually swimming consciousness that he is good, while as to the reality he may know nothing. Nay, one comes to live in words, phrases, rhetoric. This clergyman has at one time occasion to speak of his feeling for his wife, and tells her with measured and mournful tenderness that she is his "greatest treasure on earth"—whereat she grows cold, seeing that he is yielding to his orator's instinct and treating her as if she were the audience at a Guild

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meeting. In the young poet she feels none of this; and he truthfully divines her, "a woman with a great soul, craving for reality, truth, freedom and being fed on metaphors, sermons, stale perorations, mere rhetoric." Hence all the elements of a domestic tragedy—which is happily avoided, I need not explain how. But the point is that in Shaw's scales even the high-minded and fearless Socialist preacher is tried and found wanting. Something more than eloquence and oratory, something like what we may call reality and character, are necessary to bring in the kingdom of heaven.

But Shaw goes further and is more sweeping yet. He sometimes flouts ideals, but no man is more idealistic. He holds up standards for socialism, for democracy itself. Heine compared himself to a court jester; Shaw is confessedly critic. "Even Louis XI," he says, "had to tolerate his confessor, standing for the eternal against the temporal throne. Democracy has now handed the scepter of the despot to the sovereign people; but they too must have their confessor, whom they call critic." Shaw is not afraid to tell the new monarch what he thinks is the truth. He sees demagogues in democracy, and he lashes them like any conservative. He does not idealize working people or the tramp. In "Man and Superman" he allows the Devil, who has been walking up and down the earth, to say, "I saw a man die: he was a London bricklayer's laborer with seven children. He left seventeen pounds club-money; and his wife spent it all on his funeral and went into the workhouse with the children next day. She would not have spent seven pence on her children's schooling—the law had to force her to let them be taught gratuitously; but on death she spent all she had." He makes John Tanner, in "The Revolutionists' Handbook," say that the tramp who would like a million of money does not take the trouble to earn ten shillings. The democracy lacks energy, will. In a kind of bitterness, Tanner says, "It need not be denied that if we all struggled bravely to the end of the reformer's paths we should improve the world prodigiously. But there is no more hope in that 'If' than in the equally plausible assurance that if the sky falls we shall all catch larks. We are not going to tread those paths: we have not

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sufficient energy. We do not desire the end enough: indeed in most cases we do not effectively desire it at all." Brains are wanting, too. Tanner points to the Fabian Society, with its peaceful, constitutional, moral, economic policy of Socialism, needing nothing for its bloodless and benevolent realization except that the English people shall understand it and approve it. The fact is, says Shaw in his own name (in "The Perfect Wagnerite"), what we have to deal with is a multitude of men, some of them great rascals, some of them great statesmen, others both, with a vast majority capable of managing their personal affairs, but not of comprehending social organization, or grappling with the problems created by their association in enormous numbers. It is a day of great nations, even of great empires: Shaw sees the tendency and its inevitableness. He knows that there are no parochial solutions of social questions, that the parts of a nation or empire are so interrelated that a social policy must cover the whole. But where are the statesmen for such task, above all how are they to be got in a democracy, where statesmen do not elect themselves, but have to be elected?

Shaw speaks sometimes like a disillusioned man—it is almost painful to read him. Socialism, as he conceives it, is a problem of organization—a far higher, greater, more delicate problem than that of ordinary political administration; but it seems as if he had lost faith in the power of modern democratic societies or of any existing societies, to accomplish that work of organization. Not only does he confess in general "man's limited political capacity," but he has ironical reflections on the way "the swinish multitude" in England put the aristocrats again into power in 1885, and kept them there, I may add, two decades. The populace thereby admitted itself unfit to govern, he says,—and through Tanner as his mouthpiece he makes bold to affirm that the man is yet to be found who, having any practical experience of proletarian democracy, has any belief in its capacity for solving great political problems, or even for doing ordinary parochial work intelligently and economically. I should perhaps say that Shaw has been a vestryman himself and does not quite talk in the air. The faith in "univer-

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sal suffrage" as a political panacea arose, he tells us, under despotisms and oligarchies—and it withers the moment it is exposed to practical trial, because democracy cannot rise above the level of the human material of which its voters are made. It is a sad *impasse*—the aristocracy unwilling, the democracy incapable—yes, the aristocracy, "these college passmen, these well-groomed Algys and Bobbies, these cricketers to whom age brings golf instead of wisdom," incapable, too. Indeed, Shaw gives up all hope of progress under present conditions. He has a terrible chapter on "The Conceit of Civilization"—it reads like blank pessimism. He even raises the question whether there has been any progress in historic time. The title of one chapter in Tanner's "Revolutionists' Handbook" is "Progress an Illusion." We must frankly give up the notion, it is urged, that man as he exists is capable of net progress. There may be bustling activity, oscillations of the pendulum, action and reaction, but no real advance—while man remains as he is there can be no progress beyond the point already attained. With a scorn equal to that of Carlyle, who used to characterize the millions of British population as mostly fools, Shaw says in "The Perfect Wagnerite": "the majority of men at present in Europe have no business to be alive, and no serious progress will be made until we address ourselves earnestly and scientifically to the task of producing trustworthy human material for society."

Has this man no outlook then, we ask? Is his Socialism a mirage? Has he given us a criticism of life and of democracy from the starting-point of a nonentity? Is he simply one more despairing, undone mortal, crying, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity," and only finding it merrier to laugh than to cry?

To answer these questions would take us a long way—and I would only ask those who are interested in the matter to read carefully "Man and Superman," particularly the part that is not put upon the stage, namely the dialogue in Hell in Act III, and observe Mr. Shaw's peculiar views of marriage. Ultimately, Shaw is not at all a pessimist, but rather an audacious optimist.

WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER.

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A NOTE ON THE ENGLISH CHARACTER.

Among the great events that happened during my stay as a student in Germany was the death of Mr. Gladstone, and consequently I had the opportunity of viewing the career and character of our great statesman through foreign spectacles. Throughout the European press generally there was a remarkable unanimity of appreciation. In other countries, as in England, the years of Mr. Gladstone's retirement had rendered possible a broad, dispassionate view of his life-work, and while, of course, criticism was not altogether silent, the general verdict was one of hearty approval. Even where it was held that Mr. Gladstone's policy had been a mistaken one, no doubt was entertained that it proceeded from an earnest, sincere, and lofty purpose. In the midst of this consensus of opinion Germany seemed to stand irresolute. No people is so readily responsive to outside influence as the German; and much newspaper criticism adopted the general attitude above described. But one felt, somehow, that is was not an expression of spontaneous sentiment, and that neither the virtues nor the achievements of Mr. Gladstone appealed very strongly to the German mind. To the Junker and the Bismarckian, his liberalism appeared revolutionary; to the Liberal, his piety seemed a childish superstition; and the proletariat of intellect regarded his Homeric criticism as beneath contempt. Mutterings of this discontent were observable enough amidst the conventional platitudes of the daily press. But, by and by, it found a less uncertain voice in *Zukunft*, a weekly journal notorious for its sharp criticism of the government, the editor of which was, when I left Germany, undergoing prosecution for *lèse-majesté*.

The *Zukunft's* article was crude and inadequate; but in spite of the pain which almost any Englishman must have felt in reading it, I was deeply interested in it as an honest and outspoken expression of German sentiment. The judgment pronounced by this organ of advanced German opinion on the character of our great statesman was not merely that he was

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a demagogue, but that he was a quack and a hypocrite. And the interest attaching to the judgment lay in the confirmation it gave to an opinion I held, that Mr. Gladstone was in many fundamental respects a typical Englishman. For it so happens, and here I come to the main purpose of my paper, that the central feature of the English character, as seen by the intelligent foreigner, is hypocrisy. And all I propose to do, on the present occasion, is to offer a few discursive reflections on this interesting fact. What then should be our attitude toward it? It is not our business, I take it, to follow our first instinct and strenuously to attempt to disprove the truth of the judgment. If it is impossible, as Burke found it to be, to draw up an indictment against a whole people, it is certainly quite as impossible for the accused people to answer the indictment. Nowhere is there such hopeless contradiction as between two such conflicting moral judgments. The logic of facts, the solemn issues of history, can alone adjudicate between them. On the great question as to whether our moral instincts or those of the German are the sounder, that austere Cosmic Chief Justice, "the Great Soul of the World," is the only competent judge. But if it is gratuitous to discuss the truth of this judgment, we may still hope to gather something of its significance. Altogether unfounded we cannot call it, if only we let our minds pass in review the main features of English social life, or if we turn the pages wherein those features are faithfully reflected or brought into bold relief by skillful caricature. It cannot be by mere accident that the works of Thackeray, Dickens, and George Eliot are so full of hypocrites. I do not refer merely to those characters who are living embodiments of this vice, as Mr. Pecksniff and Mr. Chadband. What is far more significant is the diffusion of this quality over a number of more commonplace characters, and most significant of all, perhaps, is the sympathetic treatment of hypocrisy as in the case of Mr. Bulstrode. In contemplating such a masterly creation, we leave far behind the vulgar view of the hypocrite as one who deliberately plays a part to secure his own ends. Such persons there may be, but they are not specially interesting to students of national

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character, for the simple reason that a fruitful study of character must always be from the dynamic and not from the static point of view. It is only when we are confronted with a hypocrite like Mr. Bulstrode, whose self-deception is so far from being deliberate and whose hypocrisy presents itself as the blind struggle of a shipwrecked character to save the wreckage of its nobler impulses, that we realize not merely that we are all more or less hypocrites in this sense, but that such hypocrisy is the degenerate state of a high and aspiring nature—is the defect, perhaps, of our national virtue.

Let us return for a moment to Mr. Gladstone. At the time of his death, when party passions had subsided there was a practical unanimity as to the essential nobleness of his character. Many and grievous as his mistakes may have been, and great as may have been his occasional self-deception, few would question the fact that he was animated throughout his life by the loftiest motives. But we all know how far this unanimity of opinion was from existing some twenty years ago; we know how easily possible it was for honest and capable men with the strongest desire for the good of their country to regard Mr. Gladstone's motives with the gravest suspicions. I am not blaming these men. On the contrary, my point is that the peculiar cast of Mr. Gladstone's mind and the line of action it prompted him to take were such as to justify their suspicion and to render their low estimate of his motives plausible. Before we proceed to attempt a psychological analysis, let us take a historic instance of a similar misconception.

Few great Englishmen present so many points of contrast to Mr. Gladstone as Oliver Cromwell. I need not stop to point out in detail the differences between the hero of the Independents and the devoted son of the Anglican church, between the rebel of whom events made a conservative and the stern and unbending Tory who developed into a radical reformer. In spite of the undoubted contrast they were both typical Englishmen, and, in one fundamental respect at least, they had none the less in common for belonging to such different types. Both were men of action and both were essentially religious. Now it is easy enough in these post-Carlylean days, to recognize the

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true greatness of Cromwell, but we show a great lack of historical imagination if we fail to realize how easy it must have been for the honest cavalier to regard old Noll as a consummate hypocrite. And indeed I question if the modern reader of the "Letters and Speeches" who does not start with a prepossession in Oliver's favor will not come to a similar conclusion.

We may well ask, therefore, what makes it possible that two diametrically opposite constructions should be put on the motives of such eminently typical Englishmen; and the answer, if we find one, ought to shed some light on the nature of the English national character and on the significance of the foreign criticism already mentioned.

Both our examples were men of action, and both were of essentially religious temper. That is the strength of the English character. Both so spoke and acted as to lay themselves open to serious misconstruction. That is the ambiguity of the English character. Both were probably the victims of occasional unconscious self-deception. That is the weakness of the English character, leading us gradually downward through Bulstrode to Pecksniff. The great achievement then of the English character lies in the combination of the religious temper and the practical temper. In Plato's beautiful myth the human soul is symbolized by a chariot drawn by two horses, one of which tends ever downward to the earth, while the other strains upward toward the soul's native eternity. To guide such an unequal pair with skill, to preserve the enthusiasm kindled by the contemplation of the ideal, to carry it amid the distractions of everyday life and to turn it into a force for the relief of man's estate, is indeed a difficult task. There is another story of Plato's meant to illustrate this very difficulty. If our social anarchy is to be repressed, says Plato, and our ideal of the true state realized, philosophers must become kings or kings philosophers. "Ah, but the philosopher," says the ready objector, "the man of ideas, is such a feckless loon! Once bring him down from his castle in the air to be cross-examined in the law courts or heckled on a political platform, and he straightway loses his head. How can such a man have a saving truth for society?" So Plato tells the story of the cave,

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where men are bound down in darkness, hearing only the echoes of passing voices and seeing only the uncertain shadows of fleeting images. When these unhappy prisoners are unbound and led upward to the glory of the sunlight, they are dazzled and confused by the strange sights and sounds which crowd upon them, and seem at first less clear in their notions than they were in the subdued twilight of their cave. So, too, when they desire to redescend to share their new discoveries with their less fortunate fellows, they find they must grope their way blindly in the now unfamiliar darkness. They can no longer speak glibly in the language of the cave or deal deftly with its echoes and shadows, and so their new wisdom is set at naught by the benighted people whom they have come to help. Such is the parable of Plato, pregnant with truth for all time. He states the problem with such admirable clearness that we see readily why he fails to solve it. His philosopher-kings are men of mere intellect, and to the mere intellect the difficulty of constant passage between the cave and the daylight, between the ideal and the actual, is insuperable. What was impossible to the philosophic mind became possible five centuries later to the religious spirit, and we find Paul of Tarsus saying that he is "all things to all men, if by any means he can save some." The revolution introduced by Christianity was the opening of a way from the highest to the lowest states of consciousness; so that the apostle could bring his vision of the seventh heaven to bear, in his talk with the Phrygian slave or the Roman sentinel. But this triumph of reason was a defeat of logic. The Jacob's ladder which afforded this new intercourse of earth and heaven was no chain of syllogisms. Henceforward, he who would aspire to lead his fellows upward must trust to inspiration and walk by faith. Here then we have the discovery of a new method which is destined to be the main instrument in human progress, but which, at the same time, opens the way to manifold hypocrisies. We might call it a moral tight-rope performance if we could imagine that aërial exploit to be as beneficent as it is perilous; and the well-balanced moral sense needed to bring a man through in safety is rarer than the gifts of a Blondin.

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Now, while an apostle may exercise the gift of prophecy, and, ignoring the logical demands of the carnal mind, compare spiritual things with spiritual; the ordinary man of action, and still more the statesman, must have principles and attempt to be consistent. This is a highly necessary concession to human weakness in general, and to party government in particular. Strict consistency, however, is incompatible with growth or progress. As every important action is without a precedent, we modify our principles in applying them, and make a new law while professing to obey the old. In the acts of our private lives, this presents little difficulty. A healthy mind will meet each case on its own merits, and as long as conscience is satisfied will care little about consistency. But in public life it is different. The statesman has not only to act; he must explain and justify his action. It is as if the tight-rope walker were obliged, in the very act of striking his delicate balance, to discourse with convincing eloquence on the science of equilibrium. We need not wonder if he shirks so difficult a task. Perhaps while concentrating his mind on the practical performance, he will mechanically recite a few imposing commonplaces. Or possibly, in the midst of a brilliant and searching disquisition, he may fall and break his political neck. But how if he take both his functions seriously, as the English statesman who is neither a cynic nor a doctrinaire is likely to do. Then his speech will become incoherent, either with the broken and frank incoherence of a Cromwell, or else, with gifts of another order, he may find in emotional and imaginative language the power to make incoherence itself eloquent and convincing. "He has one gift," said Macaulay of Gladstone, "most dangerous to a speculator—a vast command of a kind of language, grave and majestic, but of vague and uncertain import. . . . If it is admitted into a demonstration it is very much worse than absolute nonsense; just as that transparent haze, through which the sailor sees capes and mountains of false sizes and in false bearings, is more dangerous than utter darkness; . . . and in this way he deludes first himself and then his readers. The more strictly Mr. Gladstone argues from his premises, the more absurd are the conclusions he brings out."

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True enough, but then the statesman's business is not to draw logical conclusions from unexceptional premises: but to impose a frame of mind upon others, to *infect* a multitude of followers with the convictions if not with the insight of their leader. Your philosopher who must see the end from the beginning is not cut out for work like this. And yet if progress is to be made, if practice is not to degenerate, the ideal and the actual must never lose touch with each other. "Trust in God," said Cromwell, "*and* keep your powder dry." We live in a time of more complex thought, and the poles of our consciousness are more distant from each other. It is harder to connect Mr. Gladstone's theology with his budgets than it is to conceive how the Lord General wrestled in prayer before he dismissed the Rump. Nevertheless, the art of living the great life lies in keeping up this connection; not by logic—that is impossible—but by faith—by the confidence acquired in long practice. So, too, by continuous practice is acquired the power to connect an ever-lengthening chain of subtle moral perceptions. And the peculiarity of the English character is that it is based on a much longer continuous practice than that of any other people. It has thus acquired the psychological dexterity by which the power of a distant ideal is brought to bear through hidden subtle and devious channels on the affairs of daily life. To the outsider—the unfriendly and unsympathetic critic—the obvious incongruity of our professed aims with our practice presents itself as sheer hypocrisy. Into hypocrisy indeed it may all too easily slide. For the conditions I have described, while they render possible a great elevation of character, bring with them the risk of a disastrous fall.

The great word with the Germans is "Foresight;" you rarely see a German go out without his overcoat. With foresight you may go safely but not far; and Germany is the land of moral mediocrity. The basis of English morality is Insight. With insight you may go far and do great things: but you must walk by faith. England therefore is the land of moral extremes. "For if the light which is within you be darkness, how great is that darkness."

LONDON. GEORGE UNWIN.

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TWO FICTITIOUS ETHICAL TYPES.

In more than one recent analysis of the concept of moral goodness it is maintained that this form of worth is of no very remote genesis. It is assumed in one of these expositions that the mechanical order is excluded from the moral, and even that an organic order, including presumably the functioning of both plants and animals, intervenes as a buffer between the mechanical and the moral. To this logical delimitation of the idea of moral goodness and to the supposition on which it rests, no exception need be taken, if they prove themselves of value. Such a delimitation certainly has the advantage of distinguishing clearly between the questions involved in human conduct and those of animal behavior. At the same time, however, it cuts off the light that may be had on the growth of the moral consciousness from the genetic point of view. For those who deny the evolution of the ethical sense, animal courage and even animal devotion to pack or offspring must become mere remote analogies to human virtues, and the concept of moral goodness must lose for them in inclusiveness and vitality what it gains in precision. Practically the employment of so general a word as *goodness* in so restricted a sense leads to an over-emphasis of the late-acquired, distinctly Christian virtues, and drives extreme spirits like Nietzsche to set up new moral standards and formulations. In the following pages I wish to compare with the vehemently antichristian ethical ideal of this German philosopher and poet a moral conception of a calmer, better poised and more racial sort.

This second moral ideal I find portrayed in the late Elizabethan drama, "The Two Noble Kinsmen." It is true that in "Hamlet" Shakespeare had dealt with the problem that Nietzsche conceived himself to have solved. This problem is the fundamental ethical question, how is it possible to act efficiently when the will is strictly subjected to reason and conscience? It is in our volitions that we feel the impediment

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of highly developed moral standards. Nietzsche seems to strike fetters from the will by attacking Christian ethical standards; he merely cuts the knot, but does not solve the problem. In "Hamlet," likewise, no solution is reached of this renaissance riddle, how we may be Christian without quiescence and base resignation. Hamlet, with all due qualification, is a vacillating, indecisive character. A new play with a different historical setting is needed to illustrate a robuster ideal.

That "The Two Noble Kinsmen" portrays a conception rather than a character seems indicated by the choice as hero of Theseus, the demigod, a confessed *Uebermensch,* to use the cant expression. The plot follows, in the main, Chaucer's early renaissance "Knightes Tale," which voiced the chivalric ideals of a time that aspired after a freer, nobler and more militant type than a narrow medievalism encouraged, and in doing so harked back for support to Greek story and standards —to the pagan as opposed to the Christian. Love and honor, rather than love and goodness, seem to characterize the ethical tone of the tale and the play.

It is a noteworthy fact, marking the adoption of pagan moral criteria, that the words ***honor, honored, honorable, dishonor,*** *honest,* and *honesty* occur so frequently—sixty-four times in all—throughout the scenes, along with synonyms like ***noble*** and *nobleness.* The mere frequency of these words would be hardly worth mentioning, if their occurrences were not emphatic and significant—in the title, in the prologue, in the epilogue, in important passages and odd combinations. Theseus, in defending the male sex against the rivalry of the female warrior Hippolyta, is spoken of as the champion of natural honor. In a second passage honor is opposed to sensuality. Again, honor and honesty, honesty and honor, are placed in juxtaposition. One is impelled to distinguish these synonyms. As pagan virtues are more basal than Christian, so is honesty in relation to honor. Honesty is a sort of plebeian honor. Its mention occurs frequently in the underplot—the story of the gaoler's daughter and her equals. The dramatist does not ignore the ethical needs of the masses,

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though he certainly does not treat them in a spirit that Tolstoi and Whitman would call truly democratic.

Most significant of the passages in which these catch words occur is one in which honor is set in opposition to goodness. The gaoler asks if the conditions of the combat are good. To this his friend replies that they are honorable, how good they'll prove he does not know. The motto of knighthood is not *to return good for evil,* nor to avoid resisting evil, but *to do no wrongs nor take none.* One finds in this play ideals not merely opposed to those of dogmatic ethics, but consciously opposed to them.

Perhaps the concluding words of the drama, spoken by Theseus, "Let's go off and *bear us like the time,*" may be taken as a formulation, poetical of course, of a non-Christian ethical maxim. It lacks the definiteness of the Golden Rule; it is vaguer than Kant's categorical imperative, but the evolutionist or the pragmatist might find it hard to improve upon. Altruism will not bear analysis. To follow the dictates of the tribal as opposed to the individual self supposes a distinction of which we are not, nor should we be, universally conscious. Theseus counsels a wise opportunism—a readiness to deal freshly with each fresh situation.

In the hero of "The Two Noble Kinsmen" we have a portrayal not of *the* superman, but of *a* superman. He is Greek and therefore non-Christian. So far the choice of the mythical demigod as a hero determines the treatment. But this is not all; the character has been consciously developed along psychological lines in contrast with Hamlet and in accordance with what the modern psychologist has called the *pure ideal,* in which reflection, sensibility and volition of a high order are harmoniously mingled.

It is in the first scene of the first act that one finds most clearly delineated the character of the superman Theseus. In addressing him the first Queen says:

> "Remember that your fame
> Knolls in th' ear o' the world: what you do quickly
> Is not done rashly; your first thought is more

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> Than others' labour'd meditance; your premeditating
> More than their actions; but O Jove! your actions,
> Soon as they move, as asprayes do the fish,
> Subdue before they touch."

That Theseus should be described as above all a man of action is to be expected, if our contention is to hold that he is contrasted with Hamlet and comparable in strength of will to the ethical ideal of Nietzsche, but that care should be taken to define the relation of Theseus to a reflective, deliberative type is more striking. Action is not mere movement. It is only as we get away from the automatic and habitual that real action begins, which necessarily implies deliberation, or *meditance*. To overestimate the merely motor is not to advance beyond the noble vacillation of Hamlet to the robustness of the superman.

Again, in the first scene of "The Two Noble Kinsmen" we find Theseus portrayed as possessing not merely great powers of will and reflection but a degree of tenderness and sensibility to which some critics are blind. "Theseus combines," writes one, "with touches of the godlike wisdom of Prospero and Pericles a peculiarly aimless ferocity." Yet in this very first scene we find him, as his speeches and the comments of Hippolyta show, overcome with pity at the appeal of the three Queens. The failure to act immediately is not attributable to coldness but to the struggle of feeling against feeling.

Theseus is even accused of condemning men to death with a certain oriental irrelevance. There is a directness about his decisions that is in marked contrast with the unkingly vacillation of Hamlet. This contrast of character is made striking by certain turns of phraseology interesting mainly to the literary critic. Theseus is a conscious development of Hamlet. I will not dwell on the difference between Theseus' mention of Hercules, his cousin, and Hamlet's, nor on the attitude of the two plays to the hereafter. I wish, however, to glance, from the point of view that *Theseus is an evolved Hamlet,* at the great literary crux of "The Two Noble Kinsmen":

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"Bear 'em speedily
From our kind air—to them unkind—and minister
What man to man may do; for our sake, more:
Since I have known frights, fury, friends, behests,
Loves, provocations, zeal, a mistress task
Desire of liberty, a fever, madness,
Hath set a mark which nature could not reach to
Without some imposition, sickness in will
Or wrestling strength in reason, for our love,
And great Apollo's mercy, all our best
Their best skill tender!"

I transcribe the passage and accept and offer no emendation. It seems certain, however, that the difficult parenthesis, "Since . . . reason," explains how man can surpass himself and triumph over craven scruples and the tyranny of sovereign reason. Hamlet's malady, sickness in will or wrestling strength in reason, is thrown out by Theseus as a conjecture why, without extraordinary provocation, we cannot come to our full possibilities.

Another striking feature of this play, namely, the frequent occurrence of references to or reminiscences of dramas of acknowledged Shakespearian authorship, I propose to explain in a similar way. The ethical and psychological problems dealt with in the earlier plays are rehandled in "The Two Noble Kinsmen." The ravings of the gaoler's daughter resemble now Lady Macbeth's sleep-walking, now Ophelia's mad songs. The pedant Gerrold is strikingly similar to the Holofernes of "Love's Labour's Lost." The character of Theseus had already been treated in "Midsummer Night's Dream." Moreover, "The Two Noble Kinsmen" reëchoes many of the thoughts of "The Tempest," for example, the conceptions of love and sensuality. In the grotesque Bavian one might find the counterpart of Caliban. All these reproduced views, characters, and situations I regard not as base attempts at imitation, but as wise comments, if we regard them from the standpoint of evolutionary ethics. Somnambulism, pictured in Macbeth, is the key to hysteria, the perturbation from which the gaoler's daughter suffers. This form of alienation is particularly suitable for stage representation on account of its emotional, theatrical and ideational (essentially psychic) char-

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acter. Moreover, hysteria is particularly susceptible to *mental* treatment, so that the doctor in "The Two Noble Kinsmen" is able to cure by suggestion an ailment that baffled the doctor in "Macbeth." The importance of the control of disease, that *incident of development,* as I have ventured to call it elsewhere,[1] is manifest from the evolutionary point of view.

The later play's comment on the Ophelia tragedy is from the same standpoint. Ophelia is not at the same stage of development as Hamlet. Her rôle of unrequited love is taken over by the gaoler's daughter, not even dignified with a name, whose words, "Lord, the difference of men!" strike the keynote of the solution. A touch of burlesque may well come in with the lowered tension. The broader humor is supplied by the introduction of Gerrold, the representative of *education,* which can be described as the conscious attempt to control the evolutionary process. Likewise it could be shown that the bearing of "The Two Noble Kinsmen" on "The Tempest" is explained on the ground that both treat the subject of the development of the human race. To illustrate briefly, sensuality (which had disgusted and upset Hamlet) disturbs the philosophic calm of Prospero, but is treated with great equanimity in "The Two Noble Kinsmen." Theseus recognizes that the animal nature must come under control. This is the very condition of our development. Triumphing over his impulses he says:

> "As we are men
> Thus should we do; being sensually subdu'd
> We lose our human title."

But from the evolutionary point of view the sensuality of the masses is a comprehensible and therefore a not upsetting evil. This question is treated humorously in "The Two Noble Kinsmen." Moreover, a fresh problem is presented, namely, the lack of animal instinct in the cultivated classes. This problem is handled in connection with Hippolyta's sister Emilia, whose negativeness and passivity in the choice of a husband is a mystery to some of the play's critics. Palamon,

[1] "The Evolution of 'Hamlet' Criticism." *Poet-Lore,* Spring, 1904.

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the melancholy idealist who worships at the altars of Diana, survives his rival Arcite, whose love for Emilia was of the less idealistic sort. Perhaps enough has been said to show that "The Two Noble Kinsmen," with an eye on the earlier Elizabethan plays, treats the question of selection and other matters vital to human evolution from a standpoint not incomparable to that of modern, even recent, philosophy.

If we turn our attention to Nietzsche, we find that his ethical ideal is conceived in a violently polemical spirit; it is not merely non-Christian, as the Greek ideal portrayed in "The Two Noble Kinsmen," but it is vehemently antichristian. The attitude toward compassion will show the difference most plainly. It is in reference to compassion that Nietzsche finds his philosophy at variance with that of Schopenhauer. It was the latter's homage to pity, sympathy, abnegation and self-sacrifice that lay at the basis of his pessimism. These inclinations Nietzsche regards as the great danger of mankind, its sublimest temptation and seduction—to what? to its annihilation? He regards altruistic ethics as the most dismal symptom of degenerate European culture and its betrayal to a new occidental Buddhism—to nihilism. The philosophical predilection for compassion is something new, and Nietzsche is able to cite Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld and Kant as agreeing in their contempt of pity. Certainly many who find Nietzsche's views extreme and harsh will regard him as the antidote against Tolstoiism. One suspects a sort of despair at the root of exaggerated selflessness. Why should every man seek to shift for all the rest and no man take care of himself? In contrast with Nietzsche's *Uebermensch* Theseus lends ear to the appeal for mercy, although he recognizes the dangers involved. In answer to Emilia, who has supplicated him to be merciful with an insistence not inferior to Portia's, he replies:

> "You're a right woman, sister; you have pity
> But want the understanding where to use it."

The great question with Theseus is how to pity with justice, how and when to show mercy and compassion. He allows himself to be guided by circumstances and, as part of the cir-

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cumstances, he lends ear to his *entourage*. Here he deviates from Nietzsche's express counsel: "Ye creators, ye higher men! One is pregnant only of one's own child. Let nothing be said in your presence, be not persuaded by anything." One literary critic finds fault with Theseus for *needing* to be entreated in the first scene of the first act. But Nietzsche's censure would fall on the superman for yielding to any entreaty, and above all to such an entreaty as is the whole scene, for aid. "Unlearn this 'for,' I pray, ye creators! Your very virtue wanteth you to do nothing with 'for' and 'for the sake of' and 'because.' To protect yourselves from these deceitful little words, ye shall glue up your ear. That 'for the neighbor' is the virtue merely of the petty folk." So Nietzsche entreats the creators not to be entreated.

Not unnaturally the German philosopher has much to say of the ethical categories, good, bad, wicked, noble, honest, and the like. There are two sorts of morality—a morality of masters and a morality of slaves. For the former the antithesis lies between the good and the bad, for the latter between the good and the wicked. In the first case the good takes its value from the proud sense of self-respect of the aristocratic classes, who regard themselves as the standard, and the bad signifies what deviates from the standard they recognize. From the other point of view the good is the useful and the wicked the injurious. These are the categories of the mean calculator, the coward and the plebeian. Wherever the slavish standards prevail the good becomes identified to some extent with the stupid and the commonplace, and wickedness is quite other than the worthlessness of aristocratic ethics. That which is worthy, not that which is useful, should command admiration. When we identify the altruistic with the good, we allow slaves and the receivers of benefactions to set our standards. This is the fallacy of English utilitarian ethics, which regards the good as the useful forgetful of its own origin. Nietzsche is led to a contempt of the lower classes which is at variance with the balanced spirit of "The Two Noble Kinsmen." Nothing, he declares, is to-day regarded by him as more valuable and rare than honesty. But the mob knows not what is

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straight and honest. They are innocently crooked, they always lie. To be honorable and to give respect and honor where they are due are the prerogatives of the aristocrat. Again, similarly to our play, Nietzsche recognizes a certain opposition between nobility and goodness. The noble are in the way of the good. The noble wish to create something new and a new virtue. The good wish that old things should be preserved.

Nietzsche found in etymology support for his theory as to the origin of the various ethical categories. The terms that denote moral excellence for us are derived from those signifying high rank and caste. *Edel* and *vornehm* at first meant of good birth, then morally good. Similarly a noble action is the action of a nobleman; a gentleman is not a man of gentle manners, but gentle manners are those of people of gentle birth, as courtesy emanates from the court. On the other hand *gemein, pöbelhaft, niedrig,* and *schlecht,* like the English terms *vulgar, low, common, lewd* and *base,* originally signified of inferior rank.

I will not take time to draw other parallels, such as might be drawn in reference to sense of humor and interest in posterity, between the ideal of the dramatist and that of the philosopher. Nietzsche carries very few minds with him throughout his contention. His position is essentially polemical and confessedly so. He seeks to apply hastily an evolutionist philosophy to ethical problems. Hating dogmatism, he himself turns dogmatist and deals with the question of character from a virulently antichristian standpoint. A psychological study of character based on a genetic investigation of the instincts might have led him to a conception less reactionary, and more in harmony with the ideal of "The Two Noble Kinsmen."

It is maintained then that Theseus is the sequel of Hamlet as a character study; that a Greek ethical ideal of love, friendship and honor is set, in our play, in opposition to a tamer and more democratic ideal of love and goodness; that the drama abounds in conscious references to the problems of Shakespeare's acknowledged plays; and finally that, as com-

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pared with Nietzsche's *Uebermensch,* the Elizabethan superman here depicted presents many similarities, but differs essentially in being compassionate and willing to aid. Theseus is described not merely as noble but as of boundless goodness. While following Zarathustra's advice that one should remain faithful to earth, he does not despise the benediction of those for whom he has fought, "Both heaven and earth friend thee for ever." To repeat, Nietzsche's *Uebermensch* is antichristian. Theseus is Greek and non-Christian. The play proclaims, "I am not against your faith yet I continue mine."

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THE RACIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY AND POLITICS.

RACE PREJUDICE. By Jean Finot. Translated by Florence Wade-Evans. London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1906. Pp. xvi, 320.

LA PHILOSOPHIE DE L'IMPERIALISME: I. LE COMTE DE GOBINEAU ET L'ARYANISME HISTORIQUE. Par Ernest Seillière. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1903. Pp. xli, 447.

WHITE CAPITAL AND COLORED LABOR. By Sydney Ollivier, C. M. G. (*The Socialist Library,* edited by J. Ramsay Macdonald, M. P.) London: Independent Labor Party, 23 Bride Lane, E. C., 1906. Pp. vi, 175.

The three works mentioned above are connected with each other, not only by a broad community of subject, but, in a less degree, by the attitude toward that subject which their authors assume. The subject is what may still claim to be the most popular and, to the average educated person of our time, the most plausible philosophy of history and politics. In calling this interpretation of past and current politics popular, I would not imply that it is necessarily and always favorable to popular or democratic ideals; as we shall see, and it is obvious without special illustration, racial theories may assume a luridly anti-popular and aristocratic character. It is popular in the sense of being prevalent in one form or another among the reading public, and especially among persons who

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claim to possess average or more than average historical knowledge; it is popular also in that it appeals to sentiments which are widely diffused and sedulously fostered by the traditional school method of teaching history.

The growing mind of our youth sees in contemporary international politics, somewhat later in domestic politics as well, certain vague and ill-understood antipathies of nation to nation in the first case, of social class to class in the second. In the history of the past we discover similar antipathies finding expression in wars and revolutions. We seldom escape being infected by these antagonisms. The successes of our own nation in war come to appear to us as the preëminently worthy turning points in the world's history, and its reverses as transient incidents which only serve to render the final triumph more complete. When at last we come to reflect upon these rivalries, we very naturally connect the emotion of national pride with the pride of family and descent; and we are fain to ascribe the triumphs of our nation and social class to the primordial and secular superiority of the stock to which they belong. Our more extensive acquaintance with the imperfections and varieties of the individual members of our own society makes it difficult for us to formulate a definition of its "national character" which shall satisfy ourselves, still more difficult to win for our definition general assent. But we have seldom the like difficulty in persuading ourselves that the vices which doom our neighbors to relative extinction and impotence have been discovered, and that they are the commonplaces of every history worthy of the name. History and politics, international and even national, are likely to be summed up as a secular conflict, interrupted, but not terminated, by interbreeding of homogeneous human stocks, to which we shall apply the name of races. The typical racial philosophy aims at classifying mankind according to physical and mental characteristics, between which two sets of differences it professes to discover certain empirically established coexistences. This correlation is suggested to us most readily by certain marked differences between the physical appearance of the black, white and yellow divisions of humanity, which we find co-

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existing with striking differences in degree or kind of civilization. Developing this line of thought, we may expect important sociological conclusions from a minute examination of the less obvious physical differences according to which a relatively homogeneous population such as that of western Europe may be divided. Basing ourselves on historical, archæological, or contemporary statistical data, we may come to attach supreme importance, as indicating momentous psychical differences, to color of hair and skin, stature, length and breadth of head, and innumerable other physical characteristics. In spite of the bewildering confusion presented by the conclusions to which, by various investigators in this field, the data are said to point, the conviction that in the end some certain and valuable results will be attained is not easily overthrown.

For obvious reasons a racial theory which takes much account of physical and measurable data is more likely to convey the impression of scientific exactitude; yet there are cases in which physical differences are relegated to a very subordinate position, the stress being laid upon certain mental and moral characteristics continually revealed by various peoples throughout the course of their history, and, it is assumed, susceptible of verification even at the present day. The fantastical speculations of the Comte de Gobineau, to which M. Seillière's acute and good-humored criticisms are devoted, make little use of exact anthropological details; in so far as such details are introduced, they commonly conflict with each other and impair grievously the consistency of the argument. For Gobineau, as for most racial enthusiasts of our time, the "Aryans" are the noble race of men. "Let us first examine," writes M. Seillière, "their physical conformation."

"'There is no doubt that this race was the most beautiful ever heard of.' These heroes constituted the most splendid race of men, *'whose aspect might fill heaven and earth with joy . . .'* We shall find, however, in Gobineau even here, a very characteristic peculiarity of his profoundly individual temperament. In fact, when we study more closely his writings as a whole, we find to our surprise that the Aryan does not assume with any precision in Gobineau's view the anthropological characters which contemporary scholars are agreed in assigning to him: great stature,

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fair skin, rosy complexion, fair hair, blue eyes; in short, the Germanic type, which in our time would reflect these characteristics most exactly. To be sure, we notice occasionally some of these features in his descriptions; but it is with variants which would deeply offend the most recent Aryanists, educated in the school of natural science. Thus it is that the knight who is to embody Aryan nobility in the Middle Ages in Gobineau's romance, *l'Abbaye de Typhaines,* has 'black eyes well formed' and brown hair. In the *Histoire des Perses,* he will quote, as inspired by Aryan ideas, the testimony of Mussulman authors; these, however, consider blue eyes a mark of the devil, and discover them in the hated Kedas, one of the murderers of the camel of the prophet. . . . Harriett, the lovely Englishwoman of the Pleiades, has black eyes. Finally, in his best work, in which he rises to the summit of Aryanist exaltation, the ideal type of the German, Amadis, has 'long brown hair,' and so far from displaying itself in athletic limbs his strength conceals itself under a youthful and 'still somewhat frail' appearance. The explanation of these negligences or even of this preference [for dark hair] is fairly easy to find. Gobineau takes little account of the anthropological characteristics of the Aryan, simply because he did not himself possess them. Now, as he considered himself to have issued from the purest stock of this race, as he believed that he had preserved or renewed in himself all its energies, physical features were bound to assume a secondary importance, the preponderance remaining with the moral side of the ethnical contrast."[1]

Racial philosophy, again, may be aristocratic and exclusive, and consequently, in view of modern redistributions of political economic power, profoundly pessimistic: a dolorous picture is given by Gobineau of the present and the future of Europe and the world. Differing from the Renaissance tradition, Gobineau had the profoundest contempt for Greek and Roman civilization, which he never wearies of denouncing as "Semitic." His German followers, who are numerous, and his less numerous French admirers and fellow-worshipers of race, refuse to follow him in sacrificing to a non-Aryan or inferior race the glories of Greece, and especially of Athens. The continued importance of Great Britain in the politics of the world, and still more the achievements, military and commercial, of the German people,[2] coupled with certain disquieting features in the conditions of the so-called "Latin" peoples,

[1] Seillières, pp. 45, 46.

[2] These countries, it should be noticed, are, according to the Aryanists, the countries in which the Aryan blood is purest and least overwhelmed by inferior stocks.

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has given to German imperialism a bolder and more hopeful tone; and the dominant philosophy of this imperialism may be conveniently summed up in the word Aryanism. English imperialist philosophy is also predominantly hopeful and exultant, and its employment of racial formulæ is sufficiently strident and persistent; English racialism is, however, predominantly psychological in its tendency and does not generally deck itself out with elaborate physical measurements and anatomical generalizations. These are rather mentioned and alluded to than employed as a basis for original and far-reaching speculations.

An exception must be noted to the prevalent optimism of English racialism as well as to its reliance upon mental characteristics. The facts which are comprised in the term physical degeneration, the declining birth-rate among the wealthier classes, have forced upon sociologists the investigation of the relation between recent political and economic changes and the physical basis of national existence and progress. "Eugenic" and "telogenic" proposals for the improvement of the national stock are assured, if not of approval, at least of an expectant audience. A definitely racial tone is seldom assumed by our eugenic theorists; but their proposals have a close analogy to the proposals advanced in Germany for the preservation of the Aryan or Germanic stock. We may here quote from M. Finot:—

"Finding it impossible to identify races with our modern nationalities which are mixtures *par excellence* of the most diverse ethnical elements, the doctrine of races endeavors to divide peoples according to their component parts. No longer able to set races in opposition to one another from outside, it incites them to quarrel from within. Examining the skulls and noses within the frontiers of the same country, it tries to frighten us by revealing hostile elements wrongly amalgamated. . . . Pretexts for mutual strife have become innumerable. The Americans tell us that no way is possible of making white virtue enter into the black body of a Negro. The German maintains the necessity of exterminating, if not the Slavs, at least the Poles, whom they regard as culpable for not wishing to lose themselves in the German stock." (Introd., pp. ix, x.)

According to an influential school of racial theorists, it should be explained, the Aryan or Germanic stock is repre-

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sented only by a small and diminishing fraction of the population of Europe. But the future of each nation depends on the number and the predominance of its Aryan constituents. In the "Latin" peoples the Aryans are usually supposed to be so completely overwhelmed by a heterogeneous rabble of inferior stocks that the doom of these nations is pronounced with perfect assurance; but for the "Anglo-Saxons" and the Germans there would appear to be still hope, though the struggle against degradation must be desperate and sanguinary. Again, according to the dominant school of racial anthropologists, the Aryans are to be recognized by certain physical features, some of which have already been mentioned in the quotation from M. Seillière. To them may be added "dolichocephaly," or relatively great length of the skull in proportion to its breadth. It is now commanded that Aryans should, in the choice of their mates, avoid above all the mixing of their blood with that of non-Aryans, but should insure that their offspring shall, like themselves, be of pure Aryan stock. If we could reckon without the obstinate vagaries of intersexual choice, this plan might, at first sight, at least, be fairly practicable. More dubious, perhaps even fatal to the Aryanist scheme, would be the adoption of certain proposals which the same theorists urge with a view to furthering Aryan predominance, and which remind us forcibly of the more moderate proposals of our own "Eugenics." They advocate, for example, the securing the position of the wealthier and more powerful classes in the community or certain sections of them by pensions, larger salaries and by other political and economic privileges. Thus German conservatism had found fervid allies in certain German Aryanists, who are doubtless inspired by the belief that the Aryan, where he is still found, cannot fail to occupy the supreme place even in our imperfect political system. The distribution of voting power according to income or ratable property, realized most deliberately in the franchise laws of certain German states—and known as "das Dreiklassenwahlsystem"—has accordingly enjoyed the zealous advocacy of some of the Aryanists. A mischievous critic of modern theories of race examined from this point of view the voting

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lists of an important German city: the highest and least numerous class of voters was found to consist exclusively of Jews! Aryanist telogenics have to thread their paths through slippery places.

To the apparent defects of the Aryan race which have brought them to their present more or less desperate condition, including their persistent propensity to "mixed" unions or ***mésalliances,*** joins itself the question how will the other races behave in the face of these efforts at their subjection. Again the past seems to suggest that they will not find themselves wholly without resources.

"Inasmuch as the fair-haired people with narrow skulls, that is, the dolichocephalic, only number about fifty millions out of the four hundred millions who at present occupy Europe, how will they succeed in becoming masters? What is to be done with those particular brachycephalic and brown-haired dolichocephalic who are determined not to disappear? What is to be done with their progeny?

In their burning desire to save the future of humanity, the priests of the new cult go so far as absolutely to forbid the majority of men and women from having children. The most lenient among them are content to allow abortion and infanticide, if not to impose it. Here their courage fails them. Where, however, French anthropologists fear to tread, those of Germany step forward with frenzied zeal. *Savants* like Ammon advise that the same methods which European civilizers use in the case of negroes and savage tribes should be used in the case of those whom they consider 'degraded' in the matter of race. Let them be soaked with spirits supplied gratis, let them be attracted to places where debauchery is rampant, let them even be led to contract all kinds of diseases, and so, exhausted, depraved and enfeebled, they will finally disappear from the earth."[8]

It is possible to imagine a society in which the stronger classes might to some extent guide the destinies of the weaker along the ways here suggested. We might, indeed, doubt whether any class of men possesses that degree of conscious racial "virtue" which would preserve them during the exercise of such a regimen from moral ruin and even from physical extinction. In all societies the ruling class can, to a greater or less extent, control the moral destinies of the classes subject to it. But ages of dream-existence would surely be needful before

[8] Finot, p. 21.

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the fair-haired, long-headed population, say of Great Britain, would be brought to adopt such a policy toward its kinsmen of diverse pigment and stature.

Of the data on which these prognostications of anthropological hostilities are based I shall speak later. Meanwhile, it should be noticed that a distinguished French anthropologist anticipates an early outbreak of the racial conflict in which the destiny of humanity shall be decided. M. Vacher de Lapouge predicted in an often quoted passage, written twenty years ago, a fully race-conscious war between the dolichocephalic and the brachycephalic inhabitants of Europe. "I am convinced that in the next [the twentieth] century, millions will cut each other's throats because of one or two degrees more or less of cephalic index. This is the sign, which is replacing the biblical shibboleth and linguistic affinities, by which people will recognize one another as belonging to the same nationalities, and by which the most sentimental will assist at the wholesale slaughter of peoples." [4]

A more sanguine and genial tone, as already noticed, pervades the historical and political speculations of England, tinged though they often are by pride of race and stock. Anti-semitism, which is a perennial source of inspiration to the racial theorists of the continent, excites among ourselves comparatively little interest; nor are we confronted like the white inhabitants of some British colonies and of the United States with the immediate exigencies of a "color" question. The Irish people have indeed endured their share of condemnation for their "Celtic" faults of race, but the anti-Irish argument, as pursued on the basis of race, is advocated in a dilettantist temper, no great pretence being made to scientific exactitude. The relatively low esteem which intellectual speculations enjoy in our country has many evil results, but it brings some compensation in the comparative absence among us of the extravagant fanaticisms of continental *savants*. To the practical problem of dealing with less civilized or diversely civilized peoples, our countrymen have devoted a full share of their interests and

[4] Finot, p. 16.

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energies. But pure theories of race flourish chiefly in the land of professorial patriotism, the German Empire, France and Italy contributing a more modest share.

M. Finot's book is the widest in its scope of the three works before us, the author addressing himself to every aspect of the racial theories which he assails. The first part is devoted to the physical differences between human beings on which Continental racialism is now disposed to found its theories. The second part confronts these differences with modern theories of variation and modifications of plants, animals and men by their environment. The third part discusses the alleged ineradicable psychical and moral differences between peoples, on which, as we have noticed, Gobineau was more disposed to rely. Part IV is historical, seeking to demonstrate, from archæology and history, "the mysterious or uncertain origins of peoples and races." Part V treats mainly of the negro problem under the heading, "Are There Peoples Condemned to Remain Eternally Inferior to Others?" The first two parts appear to me the most successful. The third part is the least successful, as might be expected from the less tangible and verifiable nature of its subject-matter. One who sympathizes with the intentions and the opinions of the author is all the more pained by puerilities like the following: "The English people were noted in the first third of the nineteenth century for their immorality; to-day they are entirely devoted to moral improvement, temperance societies and piety" (p. 212). I hasten to add that I consider some of the author's strictures on British self-complacency well deserved, whatever may be thought of the right of other nations to cast the first stone.

The bewildering variety of the divisions of mankind according to physical characteristics forms the subject of the first and most successful part of M. Finot's argument. He adverts to the difficulty of obtaining exact measurements of the physical features in question, and to the discrepancies between the methods of various observers, which he contends render the results of no value. M. Finot gives abundant illustrations of the contradictions and absurdities to which these in-

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vestigations lead. Pages 53-56 give some account of the diverse historic subdivisions of the human species, and of the more minute subdivisions which the refinements of modern racial speculation have suggested. His introductory considerations might well cause hesitation to those who are disposed to adopt facile and superficial divisions, and to found far-reaching sociological conclusions upon them.

"Now the number of the elements which enter into the classification of human beings is very considerable. The anthropologists of the ship *Novare* (see the works of Weisbach), adopted forty-two methods of measurement, whilst anthropological instructions generally demand from observers from twenty to forty necessary data. Broca takes note of thirty-four of the first order, Topinard eighteen necessary and fifteen optional ones, whereas Quetelet points out forty-two in his *Anthropométrie.* And when it is considered that though essential they are not identical in all authors, the . . . facility with which human races may be created at will can be easily imagined! Far from being astonished at the number already extant, we must bless heaven for having preserved us from a thousand million races and consequent classifications" (p. 54).

The confusion is illustrated as follows:—

"Subsequently the classifications, being multiplied and ramified to suit the convenience of *savants* and their more or less exact notions of human conformation and qualities, varied from the three races of Cuvier, the four of Leibnitz and Kant, and the nine centers of Agassiz, and at length reached a hundred. Even one hundred and twenty have been proclaimed in certain archæological congresses. Isidore Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire divides human beings into *orthognathic* (oval face with vertical jaws), *eurygnathic* (high cheek bones, Mongolian type), *prognathic* (projecting jaws, Ethiopian type), *eurygnathic and prognathic* (cheek bones far apart, projecting jaws, Hottentot type).

"Gratiolet distinguished *frontal, parietal* and *occipital* races, characterized by the prominence of the front, middle and back parts of the skull and brain.

"According to Huxley, men are divided into two capital sections, the *ulotrichi,* with woolly hair, and the *leiotrichi,* with smooth hair."

M. Finot is able to point out, not only discrepancies between the methods of different observers in respect of the same physical characteristic, but between the estimates formed by various recent and contemporary racialists of the importance of particular marks. Thus dolichocephaly and brachycephaly, which, according to M. Vacher de Lapouge, will be the watchwords of the Armageddon of the twentieth century, are, ac-

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cording to Broca, Manouvrier and others, among the least important differences between human beings.

"Manouvrier dwells on the difficulty of connecting the numerous variations of the skull with the variations of intelligence or character." According to him, "it is absolutely erroneous to make of the variations of the cephalic index[5] a sort of phrenology of races, for no biological fact justifies it." "On the contrary," he tells us, "the variations of the cephalic index are the most insignificant physiologically. In the brachycephalic, the skull gains in breadth what it loses in length."

The curious collocation of the various peoples of the earth which results from classifying them according to the cephalic index supplies one of the happiest of M. Finot's arguments. They will be found on pages 62-64. A passage may be quoted on the distribution of dolichocephaly or the low "cephalic index":

"The dolichocephalic index (under 76) is to be found in particular among the Hottentots, the Krous Negroes, the Muchikongo and Bakongo (73), and the Ashanti in Africa; the Papuans of New Guinea (74), diverse Australians, the islanders of the New Hebrides and the Tasmanians in Oceanica; also among Hindu tribes (Kota, Badagas, Todas of Nilghiri), the Ainos of Saghalien, the Pathans of the Punjaub, etc., in Asia; the Eskimos, Hurons and Botocudos in America; whereas in Europe it is especially the Corsicans and Portuguese who appear to embody the ideal of M. Gobineau and M. Lapouge" (p. 63).

Similar results follow from the proposed divisions of human beings according to other physical characteristics. That physical features are modified by exercise, as, for example, that the head is enlarged by exercise, is what we might expect, and this is the result of observations made by many inquirers, notably Parchappe and Broca (pp. 66-67). In some cases physical features are the results of deliberate modifications of the infant body. Again differences of soil, climate and diet are found to modify animals and plants, and men, even, within narrow

[5] The cephalic index represents the ratio of the breadth of the skull to its length. Thus the dolichocephalic have a low, the brachycephalic, a high cephalic index.

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geographical limits. Of this many striking instances are given in Part II, "Towards the Unity of the Human Type." One instance may be quoted:—

"Delpon tells us that in the ward of Figeac (department of Lot), whereas the inhabitants of the calcareous and fertile plateau of the Canton of Livernon are strong and vigorous, and have a mean height of 1.632 metres, those of the mountainous Canton of Latrouguière, with a granite and sterile soil, producing only rye, buckwheat, potatoes and chestnuts, are remarkable for their narrow shoulders, tight chests and lymphatic temperament, and attain their maximum height only at twenty-two or twenty-three, which height is on an average about 1.599 metres, decreasing to 1.579 metres in the Commune of Montet. Lagneau has shown that in granitic countries which lack phosphates, animals, plants and men do not attain their normal height" (p. 133).

A better known and very striking instance of the speedy modification of physical traits by the *milieu* is supplied by North America, where a characteristic physical type has been produced in a few centuries, a type, moreover, which corresponds in many startling details with the earlier North American or Red Indian. The diversity of the "races" which have contributed to the North American population, both from each other and from the type to which they tend to be assimilated, is well known and needs no elaborate archæological or historical proof.

Another masterly argument of M. Finot's for the fundamental unity of the human type is derived from the investigations into the variations of plants and animals, which variations, according to received biological doctrines, result, in favorable circumstances, in new species, hardly to be recognized as cognate with the common original. Such new species are further separated from each other by the sterility of their unions. No such separation can be observed between the several "races" of human beings. The unions of diverse human types are often fruitful in the highest degree; and M. Finot traces the happiest results from the "crossing" of races in the past, and expects no less happy results in the future. These considerations seem fatal to the theory, and fatal, in the long run, to the practice of racial antagonism (see pp. 151-167).

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So much inferior are the third and fourth parts to the earlier divisions that one is moved to regret that the first parts were not made the subject of an independent work. The great difference between the competence which the author displays in handling the anatomical, the psychological, or historical aspects of the problem, leaves me little hesitation in concluding that M. Finot's professional education has been medical, his excursions into history and politics being those of an ardent but neither learned nor critical amateur. The conjecture as to M. Finot's profession is confirmed by the repeated references, which will be painful to some of his readers, to vivisectional experiments and to serotherapy. In psychological insight and critical power, the book compares unfavorably with the two other works before us; and more particularly in respect to historical criticisms, the book is immeasurably inferior to the sociological writings of an English assailant of racial theories, Mr. J. M. Robertson. The illustrations which are given of the modifications under diverse influences of the minds of peoples are indeed valuable, and sometimes very convincing, but they seldom give the impression of real originality and weight. From the point of view of the influence of the book on British thought, at all events, the inferiority of this part of the work is much to be regretted; for among us, facile psychological generalizations from fragments of poems, from ill-understood historical data, is a much more fertile source of racial prejudice than are recondite "craniological" observations. One very serious criticism can be made on many of the arguments of Part IV on "The Mysterious or Uncertain Origin of Peoples and Races," and that is that M. Finot does not appear to possess any adequate method of evaluating anthropological data. He shows himself willing to accept such ethnical speculations as suit his own purposes without inquiring whether such inferences from the dimensions of skulls found in caverns, etc., possess much or little value. The following passage will show how easily M. Finot lapses into loose and facile ethnological declamation when his own argument has fairly started on its triumphant course:—

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"At the time of Julius Cæsar . . . France counted among its inhabitants three peoples differing in manners, tongue, and even in race.[6]. . . According to the anthropologists, the Aquitani belonged to a race with black hair, whose type is now preserved among the modern Basques. The Gauls were divided into two distinct groups, the Galli and the Cymri. The latter came from the Black Sea and constituted what we are agreed to call the Belgians. Whereas these last had light eyes and fair hair, so Thierry tells us, the Galli had brown or black hair and eyes. Following Thierry, the historians have recounted real romances[7] on the respective life of the Aquitani, the Cymri, and the Galli, and we are told that *already* at that period they were mixed by way of marriage and were undergoing reciprocal influences.

"We must not forget the existence of the autochthonous race, the Ligurians, of whom we have already found numerous and imperishable traces. All these ethnographical elements have to be combined, and even supposing that there were no other forgotten elements, they furnish us with a singular opinion of the 'Gaulist' doctrine, which reduces Gaul to France and identifies the French with the Gauls" (pp. 239, 240).

It is surely a grave error to understand the observations of ancient writers on the populations of Gaul and Britain, for example, as first-rate "anthropological" investigations. Rather they are to be classed with the observations which an intelligent foreigner might at the present day make in a strange country on the physical characteristics of the inhabitants. A visitor from southern Europe would probably still be impressed with the tall stature and the fair, ruddy complexion of the inhabitants of the British Isles. European travelers in America and observers of American tourists in Europe have already satisfied themselves of the existence of an American "type." Closer scrutiny would indeed reveal innumerable deviations from this type, and might well show that the type did not even represent a predominance of the characteristics implied in it. In accordance with well-known psychological laws, the features which contrast most strongly with those familiar to us are most likely to attract our attention. Is it not most reasonable to suppose that the inhabitants of a particular region in the time of Julius Cæsar would contain instances of as many diversities of type as they offer at the present day?

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[6] *The Aquitani, the Belgæ and the Galli.* See Cæsar, "De Bello Gallico, I, 1.

[7] An unintelligible expression.

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And if it were possible to establish some considerable difference in the distribution, say, of the dark and the fair, might not this be best explained by modifications in modes of living, in climate, in diet, rather than by the migrations of unsuspected "Aryan" or "Semitic" intruders?

M. Seillière is at great pains to establish the close connection between imperialist philosophies — and especially of racial philosophies—and the political conditions and ambitions of the peoples among which they arise. He shows in particular how the Germanist theories of the origins of French civilization, having served the purpose of supporting the pretentions of the French nobility against monarch and people, became in the eighteenth century the historical basis of the leveling and humanitarian aspirations of the prerevolutionary thinkers. Count Gobineau, on the other hand, returns, in respect to French history, to the standpoint of Boulainvilliers: the Germanic invaders become once more a haughty aristocracy; and the course of French history through absolute monarchy to democratic revolution is the story of the supersession of the born rulers of mankind by the black and the yellow "canaille." Gobineau's Aryanism is in fact but the extension to the whole of recorded and conjectured history of the count's Germanic, that is aristocratic, prejudices. It is instructive to contrast this view with the Germanism which is most prevalent in English popular historiography, in which the Germanic freeman appears not as the lord of an inferior servile stock, but as a tiller of the soil who is at the same time the peer of kings.

Gobineau divided humanity into three races, the black, the yellow, and the white or Aryan. He is very far indeed from claiming for the white race the possession of all the excellences which have contributed to what is generally understood as civilization. Artistic inspiration is characteristic not of the Aryans, but of the black race; the industrial and commercial virtues are to all intents the monopoly of the yellow race. Indeed, it is the vagueness of the Aryan virtues which must first strike the attention of the student of the Count's numerous works. Gradually out of a medley of fantastic incon-

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sistencies emerges the perception that the ineffably noble Aryan is only the reflection of the Count's own extravagant political prejudices. Moderation in political strife is naturally recognized by all as a valuable virtue and it is, perhaps with some justice, claimed as especially characteristic of the peoples of the temperate zone. It is therefore not unnaturally attributed to the fair-skinned race as such, and so to the Aryans of popular history and Gobineau's speculations. But Gobineau does not understand by it openness of mind, the habit of looking at both sides of a question, the disposition to accept a practicable compromise. On the contrary, the moderation of his Aryans consists in avoiding humanitarian sentiments toward the inferior races by nature their slaves on the one hand, and submission to the blind cult of monarchy and absolute power on the other. Not only so, but the true Aryan recognizes in his heart no gods but himself and his fellow Aryans. For all this, the history of his imagined Aryans is a history of treachery to their ideals and eventually of decline to the danger of extinction.

The preceding remarks may derive additional interest from the mutual admiration of Richard Wagner and Count Gobineau. Their relations with each other and the strange incongruity of their fundamental tendencies are described by M. Seillière with infinite humor and delicacy. Wagner, a passionate lover of humanity and of the animal species, looked to the German peoples for the redemption of the human race from every kind of cruelty and wrong. In his eyes, the German people is preëminently the Christian people, whose mission it is to realize on the world's stage the Saviour's ideals of love and brotherhood. Such aspirations are wholly foreign to the theories of Count Gobineau. To him, the Christian religion has been in all its stages the religion of a degraded civilization; its principles have nothing in common with the aristocratic exclusiveness of the Aryans. Gobineau's Golden Age lay exclusively in the past; Wagner's had indeed existed in the past, but was to reappear, amplified and glorified, in the future. In spite of this, the friendship of the two men results in the close association in Germany of the disciples of

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Wagner and Gobineau; the agreement between the respective views of the two masters, however, hardly extends beyond certain forms of expression and a "profound" anti-Semitism.

As might be expected, Sir Sydney Ollivier's contribution to "The Socialist Library" is replete with the learning which is so much superior to mere book-learning—the learning, namely, that comes from the practical experience of the humane official and administrator who, without class or national prejudices, insists on becoming acquainted with the facts at first hand. He gives a vivid picture of the diverse human materials of which our imperial civilization is composed, and traces to their selfish and narrow source the convenient generalizations of the capitalist class which thrives upon the subjection of the colored members of the human family. He is naturally more successful in demonstrating the crudity and barrenness, in the scientific sense, of "the short view" of the European capitalist, which sees in the colored peoples only more or less tractable tools, than in resolving all the moral problems which are raised by the relations of white and black; but he is able to point with legitimate pride to the practical solution of many of these problems in the British West Indian colonies.

His more general treatment of the problem of race is truly philosophical and broad. He is fain to retain the name race, understanding by it a specific human type, the product mainly of local conditions. "The ancient race-theory—the myth of actual race-parentage—is practically the true account of the greater part of the matter. Whatever may be the cause or creative force of humanity, the cause and molding force of race appears as local environment." The political thinker and the statesman must take account of the fundamental aspiration of all men toward brotherhood and equality and of the certain refusal of the diverse human types or races to be merely merged or absorbed in a neutral mass. "The principles by virtue of which the white European has obtained a leadership which even Islam cannot contest with him are principles which deny race distinctions. There is his strength. If he goes back from them, he becomes himself a barbarian, and, though he

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may exterminate the black, he cannot lead or live with him" (p. 174).

The conclusion seems justified that the true philosophy of our relations to other "races" is nothing fundamentally diverse from a democratic philosophy of the relations of individual members of the same society to each other: this is the recognition of fundamental unity and equality amid a diversity of gift and aspiration which lends to the unity completeness and character. To this should be added faith in the future and its illimitable possibilities of good. To decline upon measurements of the merely physical and subhuman is not only to sacrifice to self-interest our humane aspirations, but to hide away the key of knowledge.

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IS AMERICA MORALLY DECADENT?

In every period of human history, when great social and political changes have occurred, the irreconcilable pessimist has wailed loudly and long. This wail is a natural phenomenon; it follows certain happenings as night follows day. Conditions are now ripe for pessimism; and the pessimist is abroad in the land. To-day is not the time for blind optimism; but are the American people becoming morally weak? Evils grave and dangerous confront us; but is it a fact that the first decade of the twentieth century is a uniquely degenerate period when viewed from the standpoint of morality? Are the heart and conscience of the American people corrupted? Is our civic life more rotten and degenerate than it was in earlier periods of American history? Is the golden age of American history in the past? Are the writers and lecturers accurate when they tell us that civic virtue is dead, that bribery and corruption run riot as never before, that wealth has corrupted young and old, that the young of to-day are less upright and righteous than those who lived a few decades ago?

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Or is this loud-swelling cry merely the echo of the voice of pessimists who have gone before? Pessimists have their value; but an oversupply of their doctrine leads to stagnation and despair. Let the present be weighed in the balances, and be compared with the past. We are prone to emphasize the virtues of the leaders and of the masses who lived and died in the earlier years of our history; both teachers and writers too often slight the dark and gloomy features of our past national life because of a warped and mistaken view of patriotism. It is the purpose of this article to calmly and dispassionately present some evidence, chiefly contemporary, as to the real moral standards at various stages of our national development.

A colonial clergyman, Jonathan Boucher, of the period immediately preceding the War of the Revolution bewailed the evil and degenerate conditions of the prerevolutionary era in terms which sound strangely familiar. The general virtue of people had sadly declined, he declared; and in proof of the assertion, pointed to the irreverence of the children, the unsympathetic attitude assumed by the rich toward the poor, and the shocking infidelity to the marriage vows. The mature man always emphasizes the untoward actions of the rising generation; the good old times of his boyhood invariably take on the roseate hue of enchantment. But perhaps this clergyman was mistaken or a dyspeptic; possibly his picture is all awry. Unfortunately, history calmly and unsympathetically teaches that many of the men of the Revolutionary period were smugglers, that they had accumulated their wealth in ways as dark and devious as any followed by our modern corporate buccaneers. Indeed in the midst of the turmoil of the war—a period often quoted as one of high and noble endeavor—Washington cried out: "Speculation, peculation, engrossing, forestalling, afford too many proofs of the decay of public virtue." Turning our attention for a moment to a later period of national danger, we are placed face to face with similar shameful events. The history of the Civil War tariffs is a depressing story of human greed and selfishness. Smuggling again grew to be an organized system. Traders and manu-

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facturers cheated the government right and left. One investigating committee discovered $17,000,000 of pure graft in a contract amounting to $50,000,000. Men in high positions were accused of "winking" at the sending of supplies through our lines into the South. The canned beef scandals do not look so enormous when placed side by side with those of the so-called halcyon days of civic virtue and patriotic fervor.

It may be urged that these were periods of extraordinary stress; and that a war always brings the evil passions of men to the surface. What were the moral conditions when the land was not troubled by war? In 1837 a newspaper presents this picture: "It is scarcely possible to realize the extent to which public morals in the United States have degenerated within the period of the last six or eight years. A new age, indeed, seems to have sprung suddenly upon us. We look in vain among our public men—we mean among those who are in authority—for those high examples of political integrity and elevated moral worth which once distinguished the councils of our country." In 1835, another paper speaks of the "grasping avarice and monopoly" which has "shorn us of many of our rights." In the good old days when James Monroe was President, a newspaper printed this gem of pessimistic literature: "Bad Times.—*Honesty* has fled from the world, and *Sincerity* is fallen asleep; *Piety* has hidden herself, and *Justice* cannot find the way; the *Helper* is not at home, and *Charity* lies sick; *Benevolence* is under arrest, and *Faith* is nearly extinguished; the *Virtues* go a-begging, and *Truth* has long since been buried; *Credit* is turned crazy, and *Conscience* is nailed on the wall." No modern "muck raker" or yellow journalist has been able to paint a darker picture than this drawn by his predecessor of three generations ago.

The political "machine," the "boss," the bold and unscrupulous lobby—surely these excrescences upon our body politic are recent growths, the products of the evil times which have fallen upon the land since the Civil War. Again, the tradition of the good old times proves to be false when it is dragged out of the mists of hearsay and placed under the white light of investigation. In 1834, an Albany newspaper declared:

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"The power of the lobby is almost irresistible— it is exercised in various ways—either by holding out inducements of gilded bait, or threats of coercion and pecuniary embarrassment." Van Buren, Weed, Clinton and Burr were "machine" politicians of a high order; their successors have only added a few cogs and levers. The machine is now more complex, but the fundamental principles remain almost unchanged. Corruption in cities is by no means a phenomenon of recent growth; the work of Tammany did not begin with Tweed. In 1830, a New York newspaper made the following illuminating statement as to the importance of this political machine: "The Tammany grinding machine has turned out the following names, which all who hold office or even expect to get any, are ordered to vote as the assembly ticket." It is clear that, at this time, the gentle art of "packing a meeting" and of "howling down" an opponent was frequently and effectively practiced. In New York City, a few years later, "shoulder hitters" were utilized to force nominations at conventions.

The political manipulators of earlier times were not, however, restricted to these crude and forceful methods of political chicanery. The following extract, quoted from a history of Tammany Hall, clearly shows that the "gum shoe" politician of to-day cannot mix oil and water in the political cauldron more successfully than did Fernando Wood of New York half a century ago. "Though backed by the dregs of the city on the one hand, Wood did not neglect to secure some 'respectability' on the other. During the campaign he received a testimonial signed by some of the leading bankers and merchants, praising him and his administration and expressing the hope of his reëlection. Nearly all of the signers, it was afterwards disclosed, profited by Wood's placing of city funds or buying of city goods."

Gambling and speculation, it is often asserted, are on the increase; the mass of the people, we are told, are becoming infected as never before by the gambling mania. Omitting any account of the vast amount of speculation which has accompanied the settlement of the Western portions of the United States, of which much might be and has been written, a brief

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consideration of the prevalence of the lottery during the early part of the nineteenth century is sufficient to forever dispel the notion that gambling is more general to-day than it was in the days when the republic was young. During the first quarter of last century, churches and schools raised money, bridges and roads were built, and taxes were collected by means of the lottery. The advertising columns of the newspapers were sprinkled with notices of lottery drawings. Everybody —rich and poor, young and old, men and women—bought lottery tickets. In Philadelphia alone, in 1833, over two hundred offices were open for the sale of lottery tickets. In 1832, in nine states, it was estimated that over $66,000,000—an enormous sum at that time—were spent in the purchase of the opportunity "to get something for nothing" in a lottery drawing. The evil reached such enormous proportions that anti-lottery laws began to appear upon the statute books of different states. The gambling spirit remained unquenched; in 1843, a reputable Philadelphia newspaper estimated that over $3,000 had been recently raised in order to effect the repeal of the anti-lottery law of the State of Pennsylvania.

Nearly fourscore years ago, the Prison Discipline Society, after a careful investigation, estimated that in four of the original thirteen colonies—Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland—not less than twenty-three thousand persons were annually imprisoned for debt—for debts which, in the great majority of cases, were under twenty dollars each. These human beings were incarcerated, not in Russia or in Turkey, but in "the land of the free" at the time when Andrew Jackson lived in the White House. Indeed, one case is on record in which a man was imprisoned for thirty days because he owed a debt of two cents. And this is not all. In many cases the fuel and food furnished these imprisoned debtors—not criminals—were forthcoming only through the bounty of the Humane Society or of some individual. Is it necessary, in order to complete the details of this dark and repulsive picture, to point to the frequent resort to cruel and degrading methods of punishing criminals or to the brutal treatment of the insane? Is it necessary to relate the revolting facts about the public flog-

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ging of persons convicted of crimes, or to speak of the gala days when public executions took place? The good old times, when placed under the microscope of the real historical investigator, reveal political corruption and chicanery, oppression of the poor and the weak by the rich and the strong, gambling and drunkenness, viciousness and licentiousness, avarice and greed.

The man who adulterates his products or who does not live up to his building contract is in reality closely akin to the individual who puts all the small potatoes in the bottom of the bushel basket, or to the famous enterprising Yankee who sold wooden nutmegs. The industrial magnate who foists well-watered stock upon an unsuspecting but eager public is the modern prototype of the frontier horse trader who thoughtfully doctored his decrepit animal just before the anticipated arrival of the prospective purchaser. Electricity, the railroad and the large factory have modified the art of the grafter and of the genteel swindler by making it more intricate and more illusive, and have increased the absolute amount of graft; but it is very doubtful if they have caused a lowering of the moral tone. On the contrary, it may well be urged that concentration of population and of industry, going hand in hand with a larger market area and greater mutual interdependence, are tending to accentuate those altruistic and humanitarian sentiments which deprecate graft, parasitism and plunder irrespective of the particular guise under which these evils appear.[1]

Graft is as old as government itself, but it is relatively less, rather than more, important to-day than in preceding eras. It is not proven that the American people are entering upon a period of moral decadence. On the contrary, the public conscience seems to be growing more tender. It responds readily to the misfortunes of the weak and the inefficient; it cries out against corruption in high places, and it is touched by acts which in earlier times would have passed unnoticed. This is evidenced by the recent outcry against the acceptance by party managers of contributions made by corporations, by the execration of the

[1] See "Humanitarianism, Past and Present," by the writer. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1906.

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insurance magnates, and by the recent bitter struggles against municipal corruption. The average public man of to-day has as high, or a higher, moral standard than had his predecessor of past generations; but more is required of him. He must walk more circumspectly than did the politician of 1830, 1856, or 1876. While it is commendable to emphasize the virtues of the great men of the past, it must not be forgotten that they were human, not superhuman. They were biased and prejudiced by personal and business interests; they were liable to err and not immune from corruption; they wished "to get out the vote" and to reward their friends. Too great emphasis upon the glories of the past, accompanied by forgetfulness as to the dark side of our history, gradually evolves a carapace which shelters the pessimist from the darts of earnest men of hopefulness. The earlier writers of our history text-books, blinded by an absurd idea of patriotism, have much for which they must answer. The *meliorists* are the hope of the nation; extreme bigoted pessimists or blind optimists are equally dangerous.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

NATIONAL IDEALISM AND A STATE CHURCH: A constructive essay on religion. By Stanton Coit, Ph. D. London: Williams & Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, W. C., 1907.

The turn of the century has been marked by developments of religious thought which seem not without import for the future of our Angle-Saxon culture. In no department of that culture have the disintegrating tendencies of the last thirty years been more marked than in that of religion, and nowhere else has the longing for the unity of a common belief seemed at once so wistful and so hopeless. But lately there have appeared on the religious horizon phenomena which it may not be rash to interpret as the first faint signs of another day. It is surely significant that now, with the noise of the battle between religion and science hardly yet behind us, we should find in our midst a leading scientist endeavoring to devise a new Christian catechism, and a leading popular preacher rationalizing Christian theology, both enterprises meeting with so much acceptance and—what is not less significant—such intelligent opposition. In one way, of course, this is not new. All through the conflict there have been thinkers who would fain harmonize science with the spiritual life of man. But somehow none of those older apostles of conciliation could ever strike the true note of sincerity. The old-fashioned "Christian philosopher" might patch up a truce with science; but he never convinced us that he had come to an understanding with it. The secret was that he could not settle accounts with a power which neither he nor his age really knew. As yet the scientific spirit had not sufficiently penetrated general culture to make people conscious how uncompromising its demands really were. It was still possible to fancy that science might waive its claims at points if other interests became too deeply involved. Reconciliation therefore could never be more than temporary compromise. Things have rather altered now. Recent movements of religious thought seem to prove it possible for a writer to give the scientific consciousness its full and unrestricted due, and still appeal to a religious public. Among such symptoms this book from the hand of the founder of the ethical movement is one, and one to which we do not hesitate to give an important place.

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Doctor Coit has two fundamental tenets in his creed. He believes in science, and believes in democracy. The task of his book is to show how the reintegration of England into a religious unity could be brought about if the state church would divest itself of everything inconsistent with these two principles.

The program is sufficiently bold. It will be a misfortune, however, if either its boldness or the occasionally prophetic, sometimes even a little bombastic tones in which it is set forth should repel sober readers or induce them to dismiss the book as hare-brained. It is really very far from being so. It is the work of one who is laboring, unless we are very far mistaken, in the midstream of English religious development, and who has something of real importance to say to his generation.

Doctor Coit opens his work by an attack upon a certain anti-scientific and anti-democratic traffic in the occult, which has characterized some recent religious psychology. Religion is degraded, according to the author, when it is taken (as it is, *e. g.*, by Professor James) to be a private dealing of the individual soul with some mysterious, eruptive, psychical power welling up from within himself. The religious life of the individual is really but the focusing in a concrete personality of powers already latent throughout society. Ecclesiastical institutions, so far from being, as Professor James would imply, superfluous to religious genius, are its indispensable engendering and nourishing media.

The contention that the community and not the individual is the true religious unit presents all the apology required for undertaking the work which the author conceives as the mission of his book. In being a community at all, England is already potentially a religious whole; but actually—to her great spiritual loss—"her religious forces remain to a large extent in a state of anarchy and chaos." But a true unity is within the reach of religious leaders, were they to undertake a conscious reconstruction on a wise and courageous scale. The quasi-scientific objection to such a scheme of religious transformation, *viz.*, that great developments of a nation's spiritual life cannot be consciously planned but must come by a natural growth, may be dismissed. According to the author, it is but a "colossal and lamentable blunder," due to our foisting conceptions derived from biology on the facts of human society. It is just the distinctive feature of human as distinct from animal history, that its upward evolution has been everywhere conditioned by conscious effort.

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Is it possible, then, that the state church should be so transformed as to reabsorb the national religious life which has already grown so far apart from it? What separates it from the general culture of the nation? According to our author, it is its anti-democratic character and its supernaturalism. The path of true reform, therefore, lies in democratizing the church; *i. e.*, receiving back into its fold the sects which have broken away from it and now war against it, admitting them as parties within it just as the political parties are admitted within the nation; and, secondly, in withdrawing from the church's forms of worship whatever offends against the scientific spirit.

Doctor Coit's scheme is plainly drastic; and he does not at all think the Church of England is going soon to adopt it. Yet it is hard to withstand his claim that the ideas he is expressing meet with private acceptance by thousands of thinking people within the church as well as outside of it. In fact, if one thinks of the substance of his proposal rather than its accidents and details, it almost inevitably appears as advanced rather than eccentric—as a proposal which, twenty years ago, would have met with much less acceptance than now, and which, twenty years hence, may meeet with much greater acceptance. The test question, of course, is here as always: Is it possible that the spirit of the time should work with the reformer? The non-revolutionary spirit of our age is fain to preserve the identity of its ancient institutions. Would the identity of the original institution, then, really survive the shocks of such a transformation as Doctor Coit proposes? Suppose the plan carried out, should we still have a Christian religion and a Church of England?

The author's answer, of course, is in the affirmative. The justification for it must be gathered from various portions of his book.

In a chapter on the "Growth of Liturgies"—to begin with that—the writer seeks to justify his position from history. He shows how, all through the past, conscious effort on the part of reverent and gifted minds has modified old forms without discarding them—reshaped creeds, prayers and hymns to serve new needs. And in a tone which reminds one of Plato he calls upon the imaginative genius of our own day to discharge its debt to the state by the creation of a new national manual of religious services. Why should the clergy, to the profound regret of so many of the best of their own number, remain bound to the rubric and unable to accept any variation of the prescribed service? Had they had

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such a privilege and had it always, there would not now have been that apathy of the literary laity which makes it so impossible to enlist their interest in the idea of a great national ritual. Had the Church been commissioned from the first to keep adapting her prayer-book as well as her other appurtenances according as need arose, what a difference might have been! She might have employed as great a portion of the dramatic and literary genius of Christendom as she actually has employed of its architectural or musical genius. She might have had Shakespeare in her service as well as Michelangelo. In our own day, too, it might have been as natural as it is actually impossible to think of such representative men as Mr. Kipling, Mr. William Watson, Mr. Chesterton, or Mr. Shaw writing for the Church. For genius should come to the service of religious ideas if they are universal and living. It did come to the Church when her ideas were living.

But how to make the ideas of the church really live? Dr. Coit reserves the detail of this task for a future volume. He is shortly to publish a study of the Book of Common Prayer, showing how much living truth he thinks it contains. Meanwhile he expresses, in a chapter on "A Revised Prayer-book," the guiding principles of such an undertaking. He believes that there is a deep and widespread craving for a form of religious service in which thinking men and women can take unreserved part. That is attainable only when the already mentioned conditions are fulfilled; *i. e.*, when our historic manual of religious services is made thoroughly democratic in spirit and purged of the whole supernatural element. In such a manual the author places a very large faith. He conceives it as standing, somehow, so near the focus toward which the silent logic of the time is leading serious men of every creed, that if it be but properly formulated it must eventually form a bond of religious cohesion round the best minds, not only Protestant and Catholic, but Christian, Jew and Agnostic; and that it is capable at last of gathering round it the masses of the English nation and welding them once more into a religious unity.

In two chapters, entitled, "Anglicanism plus Humanism," and "Anglicanism plus Democracy," the author seeks to show some of the changes which the introduction of these principles into our religious forms would involve. It would necessitate the definite rejection of all belief in the work of supernatural agencies in the spiritual life of man. All the redemptive power, for instance,

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of which the human soul can avail itself must be regarded as latent and working in society, not derived from supernatural beings beyond society. The conceptions of God, Christ, Devil, and so forth, if they imply agencies external to man, actuating him in his good or bad deeds, are to be discarded as false and fundamentally pernicious. It is the principle of all moral responsibility "that no crime and no good deed that happens in this world shall ever be traced to any other moral agencies than those actually inhabiting living human bodies and recognized by other human beings as fit subjects of human rights and privileges." This formula, Doctor Coit avows, expresses the principle on which his whole reconstructive effort is based, a principle which he believes is widely prevalent among the thinking and ruling classes in England, and which for want of a better name he calls Naturalism.

Besides purging and supplementing the church's ritual, this principle would change the fundamental character of its preaching. The author vents some sarcasm in this chapter upon the unaffected blindness of our religious leaders who, in seeking a reason for the loss of their hold upon the masses, have found it in every possible circumstance except the obvious one, namely, that they were preaching the wrong thing. The masses are really hungering for preaching which will mean something to them. If it be asked where they will get it, the author replies, in sermons like John Ball's, inspired by a rational faith in the coming of the kingdom of heaven among the masses of men in the form of an ideal democracy already foreshadowed in the constitution of the church.

The author does not disguise from himself or his reader the magnitude of such a program. He asserts, on the contrary, that its full accomplishment can only be the work of first-rate religious genius. His own work he justifies on the ground that we cannot fold the hands and wait for genius. We must prepare its way—strive to create the demand which it will come to fulfil. But how much of the identity of church and faith and ritual would such a program of reform leave? This is the really important question; and it is to be feared the reader will find it hard to draw any very satisfactory answer to it from Doctor Coit's statements.

What is wanted, according to our author, is a scientific religion. He acknowledges that this would be something new in the his-

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tory of religions. Yet, he holds, it would be only relatively, not absolutely new. This can only mean that it would be continuous with—a legitimate and necessary development of—whatever is the true essence of ordinary supernaturalistic Christianity. It is chiefly in his two penultimate chapters that Doctor Coit specifies what part of this currently accepted religion the "Naturalist" can preserve. A religion of Naturalism would still admit, he says, of prayer, and would utilize almost all the current religious terms and phrases. The essence of prayer, the author holds, is petition to some outside being or beings for blessings which actually come in response. A religion of Naturalism might believe in this; for quite apart from supernaturalistic presuppositions it is possible. In fact, it is always happening. "Men and women out of work insert in the daily papers a statement of their predicament; and their prayer is answered." The head of an institution circulates an appeal and gets what he needs. "Suppose a person were to utter the petitions, 'Give us this day our daily bread,' and 'Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil,' to the men and women about him, believing that they could give him the physical and moral support he needed. Suppose he were filled with a profound sense of his dependence upon them and upon their willingness. Then all the elements of religious intensity and hope would be in him. Also there would be powers at hand mighty to save, needing only to be asked in sincerity. How then can it be said that these two clauses of the Lord's Prayer have no meaning unless we believe in a supernatural personal agency?" (p. 241). To the "Naturalist," then, prayer is real and efficacious; and that not merely because of its reflex action—not merely because it implies aspiration, and aspiration is good for him who aspires—but because it also is positively answered by outside beings and powers. Nor need our petitions be directed to the living only. We may address the great dead, as Wordsworth addresses Milton, and get our fresh baptism of their spirit in return.

Finally, the "Naturalist," because he retains religion, is justified in retaining religious terms. He will retain the term "religion" itself, for instance. Religion does not necessarily imply belief in anything supernatural. People are religious when they "focus their attention steadfastly and reverently upon some being from whom they believe that they derive the greatest benefits, and from which they believe that this focusing of the attention

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will occasion their deriving still further benefits" (p. 290, 291). This the "Naturalist" may do with perfect sincerity and intelligence. Again, "People ask: What is God? But they forget or have never realized the import of the question they put. They mean: What is that real being which men ought to focus their steadfast and reverent attention upon in order to derive from it those benefits which are really the greatest blessings to mankind? They are asking a moral and scientific question" (p. 295). Seeing the answer to such a question is a statement of fact continuous with all natural fact, this term too may be retained by the "Naturalistic Humanist." Similarly with the word "Christ." Though we discard all his traditional supernatural offices, the name may be retained to designate that ideal life portrayed in the Gospels, and the "Redeemer-principle" which rose into self-consciousness for the salvation of the world, in the man Jesus. Pleas are advanced on similar lines for the retention—even the reinstatement—of other religious terms: Sin, Salvation, Heaven, Hell, Devil and many more. The author closes his book with a long and effective plea, full of acute observation and analysis, setting forth the urgent necessity of having our enlightened faith embellished with all the solemn charm of a noble ritual.

Despite their earnestness and extraordinary skill, these later chapters of the book are not genuinely successful. They are perhaps the chapters which the serious and thoughtful reader will linger longest over. But we believe that when he tries to gather from them those elements of the accepted religion which survive Doctor Coit's analysis, he will hardly persuade himself that he has retained the essence of it; or at least he will not easily maintain himself at that point of view. Not improbably he will be distracted between two contradictory impressions—on the one hand the glad surprise of discovery that the forms of his religion contain truths deeper than he ever knew, and on the other hand the sickening suspicion that they are all but dead leaves. The source of the inadequacy is partly no doubt simply that the book is philosophical and not the expression of religious genius. But it is possible, we think, to locate the trouble nearer than that. Doctor Coit writes with all the power of a mind which from sheer spiritual necessity has had to beat out for itself a track from science to religion. But he has not clearly thought out the relation of the two spheres; or else he does not succeed in keeping

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their relation steadily before his mind. Hence an incompatibility —which will be felt even by the reader who cannot formulate it —between the constructive effort of the work and the overweening frankness of the writer's negative statements. He insists so relentlessly on the banishment of supernaturalism and all its works, that his retention of the terms of supernaturalism—particularly his somewhat curious anxiety to retain its vocabulary in full—carries with it an unavoidable air of whimsicality. The same applies to his statements about agency. He declares roundly that no author of human deeds can be admitted except one that inhabits a human body and is a subject of human rights. Yet the whole spirit of his book betrays a consciousness, keen almost as Wordsworth's, of the presence of agency in the universe far beyond what ever was or will be focused in the heart of any mere man. His scientific horror of the supernatural makes him deny to it any shred of truth whatever, and obscures to him the all-important fact that even supernaturalism *misrepresents something*—and something important, namely, the transcendent aspect of spirit. It is his failure to lay hold of this essence of supernaturalism and carry it forward that we think the weak point of his book. Yet, if the distinction be permissible, the inadequacy lies only in the philosophic unsteadiness of the author's thinking, not in the fundamental nature of his case. It is well, in a book like his, to err by sounding the negative note too loudly. This is what divides his work from the feeble compromises of the past and places it in a new category. It is impossible not to believe that his ideal of an enlightened religion which has finally come to terms with the scientific consciousness is in tune with the most characteristic trend of our national life, and also that it is rendered less of a dream and is brought nearer the region of sane prophecy by this plain, strong presentment of it.

J. W. Scott.

Glasgow.

The History of Freedom, and Other Essays. Pp. xxxix, 630. Historical Studies and Essays. Pp. 544. By the first Lord Acton. Edited by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence. Two Vols. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

The essays collected in these volumes, though dealing for the most part with historical problems and incidents, are not without

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their special interest for readers of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Acton had projected a work on the history of liberty, for which, as it seems, some of these pieces were the rough material, and a survey of the fragments makes it clear enough why the work was never completed. No doubt its plan was too vast; but no one can look into Acton's writings without feeling that, from the nature of the case, his views on political philosophy were scarcely susceptible of systematic exposition.

The two fundamental principles of his life were liberty and Catholicism. Absolutism in all its shapes he condemned in a spirit of moral austerity which gives a touch of the sublime even to his most crabbed page; and his devotion to his church was equally profound and passionate. But the union of these two principles does not seem naturally favorable to logical consistency, and Acton, in spite of the force and subtlety of his mind, had little power of, and little interest in theoretical analysis. This may be a merit in the historian, if it is the historian's sole business to state facts; but in the political philosopher it is a grave defect. Acton's theory (if it can be called a theory) may be stated somewhat as follows. Liberty is the highest political end. No definition of it can be given (in one place he says it is like the camel: it enjoys more definitions than any other natural object), but it may be known by various marks, such as the free action of the church, the security of minorities, the paramount reign of law, the presence of different nations under the same sovereignty, the limitation of the authority of the state and the vindication of the rights of conscience. Or we might define it negatively as the opposite to absolutism in the state. Wherever the state is absolute (*e. g.*, France under Louis XIV, and the United States after the defeat of the South) there is guilt in the impartial eyes of history. Thus democracy is as fatal to liberty as is despotism; "the revolution," with its false doctrine of equality, involves as wicked a tyranny as passive obedience or the Vatican decrees of 1870, since both despotism and revolution have their root in intolerance. "The spurious liberty of the United States is twice cursed," and the Italian *risorgimento* has "a foul preëminence in modern history." Another product of the revolution is the modern theory of nationality, which he pronounced to be "inconsistent both with political reason and with Christianity"—a view, by the way, difficult to reconcile with his condemnation, based on the sanctity of state rights, of the vic-

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torious party in the great American struggle. However that may be, federation seemed to Acton one of the surest guarantees of liberty—so much so that he regarded Austria as the nearest approach to the ideal state. England, one gathers, would be even nearer; but in England the revolution has left its stain of Protestant intolerance, and no state can be perfect of which the institutions are hostile to the spirit of Catholicism. For it is the assumed essential connection between liberty and Catholicism that is the real heart of Acton's position. His reading of modern history is that democracy, the assassin of liberty, springs from the quarrel between church and state: the Protestant reformers inaugurated a great movement for the repression of conscience; they put back the cause of liberty and favored despotism and revolution, of which the Catholic Church, with its doctrine of "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," is the irreconcilable enemy. The church is all things to all nations, whereas heresy is national and local. Nor is there any real incongruity between the Pope's supreme authority and the progress of modern society. The church applies to science and literature its "system of economy and accommodation"—a system which he admits, however, that she has not extended to philosophers. And if she has persecuted, it has not been, like the Protestants, from any inherent principle of intolerance, but partly *per accidens* and partly to save society. The outcome of his argument is that persecution (*e. g.*, of the Albigenses) was right in the Middle Ages, but became wrong about the time of the Reformation.

What is remarkable in these generalizations is not so much their inconsistencies as their air of unreality. They are the work of a man with a passion for truth, indeed, but a one-sided passion. As regards the sifting of documents and the fixing of details, that passion had free play; but when it came to philosophizing, it produced results strangely *en l'air* for a man of such vast learning and cosmopolitan connections. How abstract and verbal his speculation could become may be seen from his treatment of Ethics. One belief underlies all his historical judgments—the belief in an immutable moral law, always supreme for conscience, in virtue of which alone crime is crime and virtue is virtue, both for states and individuals. The Catholic Church is the embodiment of this morality, which is the same at all times and under all circumstances. What precisely he means by asserting this is not plain; but it is plain that there is one particular

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view which he means to deny. He denies (and apparently he regards this denial as equivalent to the assertion of the supremacy of moral law) that the consequences of actions are to any extent relevant to the question whether actions are right or wrong. When he says that the end never justifies the means, and that "mesology is moral skepticism," he rejects all systems of Ethics which make the rightness of action dependent partly on their results. But this is an extreme theoretical position, to which it is hard to conform in practice. Nor did Acton conform. For instance, he says that the Almighty has sometimes "poured down blessings" even through slavery; and he held, as we have seen, that the safety of society may sometimes justify persecution. However, he seems after all to have had but a confused idea of the meaning of "mesology" in Ethics; otherwise he would scarcely have put, as he did, the Carlylean "might is right" and the "Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht" of the Prussian historians in the same pillory with the theory that right actions are those which promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

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ÉTUDES DE MORALE POSITIVE. Par Gustave Belot, Professeur de Philosophie au Lycée Louis-le-Grand. Paris, 1907. Pp. vii, 523.

Writers on Ethics seem to be peculiarly exposed, perhaps because of the very familiarity of the subject-matter, to those errors which spring from treating as identical several different things that happen to be called by similar names. Apparently M. Belot is blind to this danger; at any rate he has not taken proper precautions against it, and his work suffers accordingly.

At the outset his whole conception of positive morality depends largely on a current confusion of speech. Positive morality is the name of the doctrine which he advocates in opposition both to the metaphysicians, who would base morality on some *a priori* theoretical principle, and to the sociologists, whose mechanical theory of society would (he thinks) destroy morality altogether. But what does the name imply? The French word *morale* is ambiguous—even more so than the English word "morality." It can mean either "morality" in the sense of good conduct, or "ethics" in the sense of a theory about good conduct. Now, M.

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Belot never sees that there is any difference between these two meanings. Had he done so, his exposition might have gained in clearness; but then also it might have ceased to be plausible. Consider, for instance, his statement of the problem on page 482. A positive morality, we there read, is one which is true and demonstrable; on the other hand morality is essentially practical, whereas truth is speculative, and, as such, has nothing to do with practice. Much of the book is occupied with the solution of this antinomy. But to make—as M. Belot does not make—the distinction between the sense in which *une morale vraie* means "a true ethical theory," and that in which these words mean "moral conduct which is truly moral," is to see that this is a purely verbal puzzle. The other merits, in addition to truth, which he seems to intend to claim for his view by calling it "positive," are those of being scientific and practical. These terms he uses in a number of different senses, of which perhaps the most important may be distinguished as follows: (1) In the first place, he does at times seem inclined, in his desire to escape the odious charge of being "theoretical," to deny that his is a "theory" at all: the language in which he blames other philosophers sometimes implies that it is unscientific to hold any *theory* about morality, because morality is and must be wholly practical. But, for this self-contradictory position, we frequently find M. Belot substituting, as apparently its equivalent, the view (2) that his theory is scientific because it is based on induction from facts, unlike the theories of metaphysicians, which, setting a principle above facts, are necessarily unscientific. But in supposing that his opponents prefer to ignore facts M. Belot is mistaken. All philosophers appeal, as he does, to what—for whatever reason—they think facts, the only difference being that the supposed facts are of a different kind in the case of different philosophers. On the whole, however, what M. Belot seems most anxious to maintain is, not merely that his theory is superior to others in being based on facts, but (3) that any sound ethical theory must be based on facts of a particular kind—the facts, namely, of "experience." Indeed the rejection of the *a priori* in favor of the empirical (though without any attempt to define these notions) is the dominant note of his work, and his general standpoint may be roughly described as utilitarianism modified by socialism. "Morality," he insists, "is founded on society;" and the main ground of his defense (ch. II) of the Utilitarians against the

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criticism of modern sociologists seems to be his agreement with J. S. Mill in holding that it is the consequences of an action which invest it with the property of being right or wrong. Unfortunately, far from analyzing the difficulties that cluster round this view, he introduces an element of incoherence by a confused formula as to the end of moral action. The end, according to him, is the general interest; and his recognition of the claims of the individual conscience leads him to define this further as not the happiness of society (he is not a Hedonist), but as the absolute will of society in general (p. 189). Now not only is this an abstraction of the kind that he himself constantly condemns, but it is very like the doctrine of those sociologists whom he blames for postulating a social consciousness independent of that of individuals. Another attempt to give precision to his conception of "end" occurs in chapter I, where the fact that the end of moral action must be rational tempts him to define society by means of the motion of rationality: society which is not rational is not really society. But hence a circular argument; for on page 185 he says that to call a morality true (*i. e.*, rational) means that it is *universally* acceptable, thus using the notion of society to define rationality. Again the question, discussed at some length, of the criterion of morality is fertile in confusion, because it does not occur to M. Belot that to determine a criterion is not the same thing as to provide a definition: he oscillates between the view that social utility—or what is thought to be useful—*constitutes* the morality of a rule, and the view that its utility—real or imagined—is a *criterion* of its morality. It may be conjectured that the former is his real view, since, in saying (p. 206) that the moral judgment is *sui generis* and easily recognizable, he admits that a criterion, if it could be found, would be superfluous. Yet all that his instances prove (if they prove anything) is that utility is a criterion of morality. In any case, however, he has to admit (p. 256) that not all rules which are thought to be moral are really useful; and, as he apparently assumes throughout that a rule's being *thought* moral is the same thing as its *being* moral, this admission destroys the argument that *utility* either constitutes morality or is its criterion. What remains is the assertion that all rules which are *thought to be* useful to society—whether they really are so or not—are moral rules, a view of which the absurdity would be manifest if M. Belot did not regard it as identical with the view that "the general

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interest" (clearly a loose expression for "what is thought to be the general interest") "has been the determining cause of the transformation of moral ideas." Now the statement that what is thought to be for the general interest is *identical with* what is thought to be moral, is clearly not the same as (indeed it is inconsistent with) this new statement that opinions about the general interest have always *caused* opinions about morality. The latter statement would have to be proved by considerations quite different from any which M. Belot adduces in its support on pages 240, *seq.;* and, even if proved, it would be irrelevant to his main view that utility is either a criterion or the definition of morality.

Such are some of the confusions which pervade this book. The points in question are so fundamental that confusion on them seems almost entirely to denude M. Belot's work of value as a contribution to philosophy, in spite of the acuteness which he displays in discussing various topics of history and of contemporary life.

S. WATERLOW.

Rye, England.

THE STOIC CREED. By William L. Davidson, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1907.

The amount of attention we in this country have had to spare for ancient philosophy has been chiefly given to Plato and Aristotle. Among other movements of that great period of speculative activity which have had by comparison but meagre treatment, can be mentioned the Stoic philosophy. Contrasted, also, with the mass of scholarly and thoughtful work on this subject done in Germany and France, the British output shrinks to the slimmest dimensions. The neglect thus indicated cannot, as Professor Davidson's book makes clear, be put down to the absence either of difficulties to tempt the ingenious interpreter or of robust and stimulating thinking to attract the philosopher. At any rate the fact of the poverty of British literature on this topic stands, and it has been rightly seized by our author as his opportunity. And he has taken advantage of it to furnish us with a more thorough treatment of Stoicism than has hitherto

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been attempted by any writer in these islands. The origin and purpose of the book—it appears, as did Wallace's brilliant little monograph on Epicureanism, as one of a series—imposes certain limitations upon the writer. Thus even though it be admitted that logic was a secondary interest to the Stoics, yet that aspect of the doctrine of a school which had Chrysippus as one of its lights, which introduced the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogism which brought out the importance and significance of the judgment as the unit of discourse, deserves fuller treatment than Professor Davidson has found it possible to give. On the certainly more important point of the theory of knowledge our author is fuller and more satisfactory. If a criticism on this portion of his volume is to be made, it would be that the distinction between the grounds of belief and the criteria of knowledge is not clearly drawn by the writer, as it was not clearly perceived by the Stoics and that therefore he is inclined to attach more value to this part of their teaching than it can, we think, fairly claim. In the difficult places of the Stoic "Physics," or more accurately Ontology, and the question of its relation to the ethical doctrine, Professor Davidson steers a shrewd and discerning course. He does what can be done to harmonize these, but admits in the end that these two sides hang but loosely together and are "metaphysically not of a piece." There is no doubt that the earlier Stoics at all events regarded the relation of their ontological to their ethical doctrine as vital, but it is also clear that the growing tendency was to develop ethics on independent lines so that the ontology came to be at best "the scaffolding," as has been neatly said, "rather than the basis" of the ethical structure. The strong impulse of the school toward the practical and "edifying" aspects of experience led them to appeal directly to the deliverances of the moral consciousness without over much regard to the possibility of reconciling them with their materialistic and necessitarian "physics." It is for this reason that the Stoic materialism is, as Professor Davidson somewhat quaintly puts it, "practically innocuous," and not so "baneful" as it might at first glance appear. With regard to what may be called the phenomenology of ethics to which the Stoics were valuable contributors, Professor Davidson's account is very full, well balanced and interesting. The many carefully chosen and apt quotations which he has been at some pains to bring together, are a useful feature of this part of the book. One point he has perhaps not stressed

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sufficiently, namely, the individualistic element in the Stoic ethics. He comments fully on their enthusiasm for humanity and their insistence upon the social character of morality, but it ought at the same time to be pointed out that at the core there was this strong individualistic strain, a tendency on the part of the Stoic to maintain the "four-square" attitude toward life and to save his soul alive whatever might befall. Their doctrine of suicide, *e. g.*, is an indication of this.

The chapter on "The Present-day Value of Stoicism," successfully and interestingly enforces the thesis that Stoicism is something more than a subject of antiquarian interest, and in the Appendix the author applies some of the results of his study to the ever-present question of Pragmatism. The study of Stoicism indeed is an appropriate propædeutic to the considerations of this modern "discovery." If Stoicism had been better known and understood the said "discovery" might possibly not have been made.

In sum, Professor Davidson has placed several classes of readers in his debt by this clear, level-headed, and yet sympathetic piece of work. He is surely underestimating the vitality of philosophy in supposing that it is in these days confined to a place in university curricula, and we believe that his book will be of profit and interest not only to the professed student, but to many laymen who preserve a hankering for the things of the mind.

ALEXANDER MAIR.

The University of Liverpool.

THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM. By David Philipson. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907. Pp. 581.

Dr. Philipson has embodied in his book a large amount of interesting material bearing on the history of the Jews in Europe and in this country during the past century. A great deal of this material, such as resolutions and reports of committees of various conferences, was not easily accessible, and the author has done valuable service in putting this material together and making what is, on the whole, a very readable book on an interesting phase in the history of Judaism.

It might, perhaps, have been better if, in the body of the book,

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he had confined himself to the continuous narrative and had placed all the documentary material in a special appendix. Under the present plan the discussion of details is apt to be discursive, and hardly of interest to the general reader, for whom the work is largely intended. Again, important as the part is that Germany has taken in this movement, it is, however, out of proportion to devote eight out of the thirteen chapters to events in Germany; and certainly the three Rabbinical Conferences from 1844 to 1846 do not deserve 120 pages—more than one fourth of the entire work. In return, somewhat more space might have been devoted to the history of the movement in the United States, where it has acquired a much greater significance than anywhere else.

While, as a narrative of the chief events, the book can be recommended as a reliable guide prepared with care and industry, there is entirely lacking any attempt at a philosophical insight into the significance of the movement, nor is its connection with concurrent religious and philosophic thought outside of the sphere of Judaism brought out. The reader may peruse this book from beginning to end without obtaining a definite idea of what the reform movement stands for beyond the casting aside of old —and in some cases worn-out—customs. In a work of this kind one naturally looks for a clear indication of the attitude taken by reformed Judaism toward such leading questions as the conception of God, prayer, inspiration, revelation, and above all an attempt, at least, at a solution of the most interesting problem of all—the exact relationship of a religion, claiming to be universal, to such a doctrine as that of the special mission of Israel, which is logical enough in the case of a "separatist" religious community, but which it is difficult to reconcile with a faith of universal extent.

While in a book on the reform movement one does not look for a full treatment of opposing currents, yet, with the exception of the third chapter, dealing with an incident in the city of Breslau, one learns very little of the leading figures in the "orthodox" camp.

The value of the work as an historic one is thus seriously impaired, for a movement within a religious body becomes intelligible only when treated in connection with the history of the body as a whole.

M. J.

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THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND. By Brougham Villiers. Pp. xiv, 340. London: Fisher Unwin. 1908.

This book is a fair specimen of a large class of recent literature. Its strength lies in the earnestness of the writer's desire to see the existing state of things improved; its weakness is vague generalization and incomplete collection of facts. In one way writers like Mr. Villiers and Mr. H. G. Wells have an easy task. To stir the reader to indignant sympathy they have merely to point to the low ideals of society as now organized, and to the wasteful way in which even those ideals are attained; but when it comes to systematic research and the framing of a consistent doctrine they are seldom equally successful. Thus with the ideal that inspires Mr. Villiers' advocacy of socialism as substituting brotherhood and coöperation for individualism and competition no one will quarrel: we can only regret that the economic arguments with which he supports his position are quite superficial. It is the same on the more philosophical side of the question. He preaches the collective ownership of the means of production and exchange as a step toward general fraternity and equality. Now it is significant that "liberty" has disappeared from the statement of the end to which collectivism is the means; and when we turn to Chapter V on "Socialism and Freedom," we find the gap filled only by the argument that there is more "real" freedom under collectivism than under individualism because more people will be able to realize themselves. But as to whether this self-realization of the multitude will produce more good on the whole than the present system produces, we are told nothing. Yet the question is vital for Socialism. Its solution demands not only careful calculation of the results of political and economic changes, but a philosophical discussion of values, and as long as it is unsolved the individualist will be able to hold that the abolition of the existing great evils would probably entail yet greater evils. Again, Mr. Villiers, in establishing the theory of Socialism, constantly appeals to the notion of "Nature." The advance of socialism is part of the evolutionary process. The gradual triumph of coöperation over competition is only one instance of the law whereby wasteful forms of life sooner or later go under. Nature wars ever against parasitism: thus she has destroyed successive civilizations because they did not feed the poor, and similarly she allows the handloom-weavers to starve as soon as a

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cheaper way of weaving is invented. This view seems to contain several fallacies. (1) It assumes that the notion of "waste" as applied to Nature has the same meaning as in economics and ethics. But the facts show that handworkers displaced by machinery need not starve if their trade unions maintain the standard rate (see Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, p. 419). Hence Nature may be thwarted; and, indeed, it is clear that natural selection, if it promotes coöperation, must promote it among parasites as much as among their victims. (2) In this view the course of Nature is identified with progress—a supposition for which no reason can be given, but which allows the assumption (3) that progress is necessary and continuous.

More praise can be given to the historical chapters in which Mr. Villiers traces the growth of the labor party in England and discusses its relation to theoretical Socialism. Particularly interesting is his account of the way in which the labor groups in the House of Commons must modify the two-party system. Labor members, as he points out, stand, owing to the connection of the party with the trade unions, in a relation to their constituents which is peculiar and novel in English political history, gives them a power in Parliament out of proportion to their numbers, and is big with possibilities of constitutional development.

S. Waterlow.

Rye, England.

Beyond Good and Evil. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Authorized translation by Helen Zimmern. Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis, 1907.

Nietzsche's doctrines have affected recent ethical speculation in England, but his writings are by no means familiar to the ordinary student of moral philosophy. Miss Helen Zimmern and "the good European Society" deserve our thanks for providing those who do not read German easily with a means of becoming acquainted with an important phase of thought. This version should form a quite successful book and should have a considerable circulation. It comes not a moment too early, and the time is still to come when translations of Nietzsche will be too late. And yet that time will come, and at no distant date. Now is the moment for us to be interested in the matter of Nietzsche's thought. The current of events bearing us along at express speed

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will soon alter those historical perspectives which he so piquantly hits off. Again, the particular strain of emotion in his thinking and its clash with parallel socialistic teachings is merely a contemporary phase. Nietzsche, who is aware of no assumption in patronizing Carlyle (and many others), is surely less of a permanent force than he. Once more the lack of coherence or of anything like sustained argument will hardly allow his works to be ranked among the philosophical classics. No; it is ultimately the literary flavor in his writing, his quality of soul as a poet and seer, that is the important thing in Nietzsche. To be properly appreciated he must, like Carlyle or Emerson, be read in the original. The character of his German cannot be reproduced in English; it is something foreign to English thought. Miss Zimmern indeed pays more attention to the literal rendering of her author's expressions than to English idiom. There results consequently something which shows a continual blurring of the expression—nothing positively wrong, but a continual irksomeness and awkwardness of style. This is not, it seems, due to ignorance of English on the part of the translator, but to a desire to be faithful to the original. The rendering, however, will serve. It will show to the reader the paradoxical thought, the tragic psychic struggle of a man of deep feeling and ambitious thought. It is indeed pathetic to see a man of a sensitive spirituality allying himself in the arrogance of his intellectuality with the common ruthless egoist and contemner of the humble.

Miss Zimmern's book is weighted with a preface from another's pen, the tone of which is such as to make us fear that Nietzsche is being exploited by the wrong sort of person, and causes us some misgivings about "the good European Society."

G. R. T. Ross.

Southampton, England.

La Filosofia di Giordano Bruno. By Prof. Erminio Troilo. Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1907. Pp. 160.

The object of Professor Troilo's book is to maintain a thesis concerning the philosophy of Giordano Bruno, which is in the main right, if at some points it is expressed with a certain exaggeration and one-sided emphasis. Taking up the view that the Renaissance meant an effort toward philosophic naturalism, he shows how this differed from the direct naturalism of the pre-

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Socratics. In the return, as he puts it, "from God to Nature," after the long theological episode of the middle period, there still remained "an obscure soul of theosophy, magic, mysticism. The general formula was *Natura sine Deus.* On this formula, Bruno erects his own natural philosophy; but, while he is here the representative of his age, on another side he goes beyond it and announces the future. He completely breaks with dualism whether theological or metaphysical. For all the detritus of older thoughts that we may find in his system, his philosophy is the purest naturalism in the sense that it has no place for any principle beyond nature or external to the universe. Hence, the author concludes, he is substantially "anti-metaphysical," for the essence of all metaphysics, as of all theology, is dualism.

What Professor Troilo says of the complete "immanence" of Bruno's doctrine, its entire exclusion of temporal creation or miracle or action on the universe from without, is perfectly true; only in the statement last cited he seems to go beyond the mark. Dualism, as he recognizes, is also formally excluded by Neoplatonism and by the post-Kantian Philosophy of Germany from Fichte to Hegel. But, he says, the question is about the thing, and not about the mere expression. The development of Bruno's thought was "from transcendental Neoplatonism to naturalistic atomism." In the end, he will have it, the doctrine became, under the form of hylozoism, pure materialism and mechanicism. Now here, at least, he seems to commit himself to a definite error. When, for example, he says that the substance of the universe, according to Bruno, is matter (p. 118), this is distinctly wrong unless we add that, according to Bruno, it is equally "form." And Bruno himself has put on record that at an early stage (probably before he wrote anything) his position was nearer to "Democritus and the Epicureans" than it became when he had more maturely considered.

In fact, the error can be corrected from Professor Troilo's own exposition. Bruno's "Nature," he fully recognizes, is not a mere sum of particulars (pp. 32, 33). By him, as by Spinoza, two kinds of infinity are distinguished. The true infinite, for Bruno also, is not that of mere imaginative juxtaposition without limit, but that which is identical with the unity of being (pp. 104, 105). Bounded parts of space or time are abstractions from the whole, not elements that make it up. Now does not this imply that nature as it appears is not the reality? For it certainly appears

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as groupings of objects spread out in space. And, in going with Bruno at this point, Professor Troilo himself cannot be called either a mechanical materialist or a pure phenomenist. We have in the statements of which he approves one form of what has been called most appropriately a "metaphysics of nature"; since it does not admit that nature either as pure appearance or as a world figured by mechanical concepts is ultimately real, but at the same time takes it to be manifestation of real being. Professor Troilo would allow us to call Bruno's doctrine a "philosophy of nature" or an "ontology." Both of these, in the history of German philosophy at least, are expressions which, for a time, had an even worse repute with positive thinkers than "metaphysics."

Quite rightly, it seems to me, he maintains that the principle called the "coincidence of contraries" is subsidiary, not central, in Bruno's doctrine; yet perhaps he underrates its importance as the means by which Bruno (after medieval precursors) tried to overcome the sharp antitheses of Neoplatonism between the abstractions placed at the summit and at the base of things and of thought. And if the general doctrine has assumed a more naturalistic aspect, still the ideas of continuity and circuit (on which Professor Troilo lays stress) and of a scale in cognitions and in things, remain Neoplatonic. The comparison he makes with Berkeley's "Siris" might have suggested this; for here dependence on the Neoplatonists is closer than in Bruno.

The characteristic of Bruno's system, Professor Troilo observes, is its way of combining the fundamental unity of being with the infinity of fluctuating modes and forms. While he displays a thorough knowledge of the whole series of works, major and minor, his sympathy with the philosophy is greatest on this its cosmological side. On Bruno's "singular prophetic sense" in relation to the conceptions of modern science, he remarks more than once. Even his play with extra-scientific ideas is sure to be never devoid of a certain positivity. Yet, while showing himself able thus to penetrate from ends to things, the author sometimes, as has been said, goes beyond the mark. He certainly avoids the error of tying the philosopher down to literal interpretations of expressions freely taken up from older thinkers; and he sees clearly that a semi-orthodox interpretation like that of Carrière is untenable. On the other hand, he now and then manifests a disposition to accommodate him to a kind of

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scientifically authorized positivism of our own time. This, however, affects only the critical argument, not the exposition itself, when on the whole we are left in no doubt as to what Bruno really said. And, as with Carrière, something of the spirit of Bruno has communicated itself to the exposition.

London. THOMAS WHITTAKER.

STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF THE MIND. By W. Mitchell, Hughes Professor of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, formerly Examiner in Philosophy, University of Edinburgh. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1907. Pp. x, 512.

Professor Mitchell, in writing this fine work, has conferred a great boon upon all English-speaking students, not only of psychology, but of ethics, education, and metaphysics. To the metaphysician it will be most useful on account of the luminous and masterly fashion in which, among others, the problems attaching to the relations between mind and brain are handled. The student of ethics will here find an exposition of the psychology of conduct which touches every essential point. In particular the treatment of the question of freedom (pp. 407-417), with its clear and exhaustive analysis of the senses in which the term is used, may be cited as an example of the author's penetrative methods. Again, in the sphere of education we find a series of discussions, not indeed in a compact form, but scattered throughout the whole book, that are of the highest importance for those who study the psychology of learning in its more practical aspects. By this is meant more than that the educationist will do well to give this work a cursory perusal. If he would escape from the doctrinaire and shallow theorizing that characterizes nearly the whole of the work of the professed exponents of his subject at the present day, let him turn to the discussion of "nurture versus nature" (pp. 430 ff.), of the place of abstraction in education (pp. 339 ff.), or of the distinction between didactic and real explanation. These discussions are outgrowths from the writer's central system, not arbitrary opinions based on facts that can be interpreted in a dozen different ways.

Finally, to the psychologist the work will appeal as a finely executed scheme, by which all the ultimate principles of his science may be brought into relation with each other and expounded in their true order. Though the author displays intimate famil-

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iarity with the whole of the literature of the subject, whether in English or in other languages, and not only with that connected with the central topics, but with the latest details of experimental work, or of the physiological side of the science, his aim is not to give a condensed account of the whole subject-matter of psychology. He does not offer to the world a new text-book. What he does is to select "the parts that need time and reflection" for independent development, presuming that the student, whether junior or senior, will acquire the necessary detail from the primers and manuals already in use. The form retained is that of a series of lectures. But this means no more than that Mr. Mitchell always has an audience in his mind and takes pains to make his points clear. It does not imply that the lectures, even though subdivided, would form a suitable course for an audience of students however intellectually robust.

The work, then, might be called a metaphysical psychology, though this term may perhaps be misunderstood by many people. It is rather, let us say, an investigation into the first principles of psychology, in which the relations between such terms as sense, perception, conception, etc., are cleared up by hard thinking, and since these terms represent facts known primarily to us by introspection, they are elucidated by careful introspective analysis. One feature of the exposition is the author's preference for the ordinary expressions of unreflective common sense, "seeking," "thinking," "power," "faculty;" but these, of course, he proceeds to classify in a way that makes them suitable for use in science. Perhaps we may disagree with his rejection of "conation" as a technical term, a term that has now practically taken root; on the other hand, his justification of a legitimate use of the term "faculty," in spite of the recent outcry, and a division of the mind into one set of "faculties" for description, into another when it comes to explanation, seems both courageous and sound. It is not, however, implied that to refer a function to its appropriate faculty is to give an adequate explanation of the former. The space at my disposal forbids a discussion of the many other important issues which this work raises. It remains to repeat that Mr. Mitchell's work is a great achievement. Its publication places him in the foremost rank of contemporary philosophical teachers.

G. R. T. Ross.

University College, Southampton.

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CIÒ CHE È VIVO E CIÒ CHE È MORTO DELLA FILOSOFIA DI HEGEL. Di Benedetto Croce. Bari: Gius. Laterza e Figli, 1907. 8vo. Pp. xvii, 282.

This book has been published in connection with an Italian translation of the "Encyclopedie," included in the useful series of "Classici della Filosofia Moderna," of which several volumes have already been issued. It is at once a general introduction to and an acute criticism of the Hegelian system. The author regards the great German thinker's work as full of interest, and regrets the comparative neglect into which, especially in his own country, it has fallen; but he regards the logical process of the Hegelian dialectic as unsound in so far as Hegel has transferred the dialectic of opposites into a dialectic of concepts which are distinct, but not opposed. Through this Hegel has been led, incorrectly, according to Signor Croce's view, to regard errors as imperfect truths and evil as imperfect good. He also connects it with Hegel's inadequate treatment of history and science. In general, however, the attitude of Signor Croce is sympathetic, and he concludes his work with an earnest appeal to students to leave off abusing a great man of whom they are ignorant, and to study Hegelianism in order to appreciate the permanent contribution which he has made to philosophic knowledge. The book contains an excellent Hegelian bibliography.

Halifax, N. S. E. RITCHIE.

SOMMARIO DELLE LEZIONI DI PSICOLOGIA CRIMINALE. Fatto nelle R. Università di Roma nell' Anno Scolastico, 1905-1906. Di N. R. D'Alfonso. Roma: Ermanno Loescher e C., 1907. Pp. viii, 144.

In this book we are offered an acute and at the same time a judicious and temperate criticism of the Positivist school of criminology, as well as an exposition of the general principles and main doctrines upon which, in the author's opinion, a sound and fruitful study of the science must be based. As is usual in Signor D'Alfonso's writings, the style is so admirably clear and the arrangement of the subject matter is so methodical as to minimize the difficulties in the student's way. The attitude of the author, moreover, is eminently sane and rational. Of special value, in the opinion of the present writer, is the stress laid upon

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the influence of education, in its broadest and truest sense, in modifying and correcting abnormal and criminal tendencies and in molding the personality as a whole. While it is possible that the positivistic criminologists may have done work of more value than they are here credited with, it is certainly true that many of their more extreme dogmas are both ill-grounded and dangerous in their practical application. On the whole the beginner could scarcely have a better introduction to the science of criminology than this.

E. RITCHIE.

Halifax, N. S.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS: The Bampton Lectures for 1905. By F. W. Bussell, Brasenose College, Oxford; Rector of Sisland, Norfolk. London: Methuen & Co., 1907. Pp. xl, 343.

The contents of this volume consist of the eight lectures written for delivery in St. Mary's Church, Oxford, on the Bampton foundation. These occupy about two fifths of the book; the remainder is occupied with eight so-called "Supplementary Lectures," a plan of arrangement which does not seem justified by the results. The discussions are stimulating and suggestive throughout; but owing to the extent of the ground covered, and the manner of exposition chosen by the author, it is very difficult to state shortly the exact drift of the book. Nor do our present limits admit of a discussion of any of the very numerous interesting points marked out in the course of Doctor Bussell's treatment, which by no means follows certain well-known conventional lines, but is striking and original.

The spirit and style of the book are very well indicated in the following extract from its concluding paragraph (p. 330): "That which binds together rulers and ruled can never be a common culture, but only a common moral aim. Democracy believes that this impulse to cheerful corporate action (not seldom involving sacrifice of personal well-being, but never of personal principles and hopes) is inborn in every man. And (as the experience of the genuine ruler will bear out) to call forth this sentiment needs not minute regimentation nor a system of fear, but a sense of privilege, of dignity, and of responsible use. Like Christianity, the true reformer preaches a gospel of faith, and gives men rights

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before they have learned to employ them. But, it must be earnestly maintained, this generous creed has no lasting root except in the principles and prepossessions which it shares with, or has derived directly from, the gospel. The contest of science and democracy is no idle paradox, no academic antithesis. It pervades and confuses modern thought and modern endeavor. It gives rise to eager and spasmodic efforts after individual interest, at the conquest of the mass through the reclaimed units which compose it. And, after these intermittent attempts, it compels the disheartened reformer to sink back again into hopeless apathy, surrendered to currents which set in an unknown direction; or to take refuge in the feverish ineffectiveness of legislation, which must always remain "outside," and in a measure hostile. Belief in human nature, in the priceless worth of the person and his immortal destiny, in the abiding solicitude of God for the meanest and most depraved, in the sense of worth and steady though slow advance toward full membership of the kingdom—in these thoughts, as we believe, indispensable to any happy life among Western nations, in these "ventures of faith," our heritage from the past and our hopes for the future, the gospel and the churches can reinforce the flagging interest and can put life into the dismayed outlook. Christian belief and the welfare of society are one."

S. H. M.

Belfast, Ireland.

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The object of Mr. R. W. Leage's volume on "Roman Private Law" is stated in the preface to be the meeting of a want, experienced by the author himself in teaching, for "some book which is content to give, as simply as possible, the subject-matter of the 'Institutes' of Gaius and Justinian, following, in the main, the original order of treatment." The book becomes thus an English paraphrase of the "Institutes" with a useful historical introduction on the sources of Roman law and occasional amplification by reference to the other parts of the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. This plan involves a great deal of very convenient simplification in the statement of the law. It does not involve anything more

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than the most cursory criticism of the arrangement of the Institutes with its multifarious cross divisions, or any re-statement of the law from a modern standpoint, and with the modern emphasis on the "law of things" rather than on the "law of persons." Nor, unfortunately, does the plan always involve a facing of the difficulties, often of great juristic importance, unsettled in the "Institutes." Mr. Leage's paraphrase, for instance, leaves as uncertain as does the "Institutes" itself the exact position of the *peculium,* or the time when and the manner in which arose the practice of masters giving slaves their liberty in exchange for their *peculium* in face of the original right of appropriating the *peculium* at any time without releasing the slave. But apart from these occasional instances of too literal adherence to his originals and within the limits set by himself, Mr. Leage is admirably clear and simple.

W. H. BEVERIDGE.

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Articles by writers in Great Britain or Ireland, and all books to be reviewed, except those published in America, should be sent to Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, University College, Cardiff, Wales.

All other articles, and books to be reviewed, published in the United States, should be sent to INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1415 Locust Street, Philadelphia.

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